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Abstract 
This thesis aims to shed light on the dynamics of the mutation of Islamic politics and 
the demise of the Kemalist state in Turkey after the late 1990s. It problematises the way 
in which neoliberal globalisation after the 1980s transformed the cross-class electoral 
alliances of Islamic political parties in Turkey, and also created conditions that made 
changes in civil-military relations possible. First and foremost, the thesis hypothesises 
that the mutation of Islamic politics in Turkey was an instrumental factor in achieving 
the break between military and parliamentary power. Second, the thesis argues that the 
rise of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in 2002 
embodies this mutation in Islamic politics in Turkey, to the extent that the AKP has 
been able to unify the interests of big finance capital and peripheral capital. By 
representing these different fractions of the bourgeoisie, the AKP has managed to 
overcome the political omnipotence of the Turkish military, concurrently leading to the 
institutional necrosis of the Kemalist/Bonapartist state. In other words, the thesis 
contends that while the economic base of Islamic politics in Turkey in the 1990s, as 
represented at that time by the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP, a pro-Islamist party), 
was largely grounded in the peripheral nascent capital and remained aloof from big 
finance capital, the AKP in the 2000s has managed to economically represent the 
symbiosis of peripheral and big finance capital, contributing to the metamorphosis of 
Islamic politics in Turkey into a neoliberal religious conservative project. A breakaway 
from its predecessor’s Islamic genealogy enabled the party to carry out a democratic 
transition until 2010/2011. This study employs a class-based approach to understanding 
state-society relations with respect to Islamic politics and the role of military in Turkish 
society. 
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Introduction 
In an interview entitled “Iran: The Spirit of a World Without a Spirit” Michel Foucault 
described the 1979 Iranian Revolution as “the first post-modern revolution of our time” 
and “the spirit of a world without spirit” (as cited in Bayat, 2005, p.894). Since then, the 
literature on Islamic fundamentalism has addressed the causes for this revivalism. The 
modernist interpretations of Islamic revivalism argue that these movements are anti-
modern and reactionary mobilising traditional people, urban poor and intellectuals 
against a Western type of modernisation process. Examples include the depiction of this 
phenomenon as an encounter with modernity in Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, 
“regressive utopianism” in Albert Melucci, and “Islamism as anti-movement” in Alain 
Touraine. On the other hand, post-modern interpretations of Islamic revivalism, such as 
that of John Esposito, refer to a quest for identity which can give a meaning and order to 
life and society or a formulation of “exclusion of the excluders by the excluded” in the 
case of Manuel Castells (Bayat, 2005, p.894). It is also argued that religious revivalism 
has emerged in response to the global economic crisis of the mid 1970s and of the 
atrophy of secular nationalist and communist ideologies all over the world (Amin, 2009; 
Gülalp, 2002; Moghadam, 2009). François Burgat and William Dowell periodise the 
Islamic movements in the Middle East and North Africa as the continuation of anti-
colonial struggle in the form of discursive struggles against the Western modernity 
(Bayat, 2005, p.895). Importantly, Gilbert Achcar (2006, p.56) emphasises the social 
composition of radical Islamic fundamentalism in the MENA region as a “distorted, 
reactionary expression of the middle classes’ and plebeian layers’ resentment against 
distorted capitalist development and Western domination, often exacerbated by a 
despotic local state”.  
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The resurgence of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey in the 1990s 
has largely been consistent with the analyses above. The mass malaise resulting from 
the adverse effects of neoliberal globalisation in the 1990s was successfully channelled 
through Islamic revivalism in Turkey. The Milli Görüş (MG, The National View) 
doctrine proposed by Refah Partisi (RP, the Welfare Party) was quite instrumental in 
Islamic revivalism in Turkey while strictly preserving its radical anti-Western discourse 
and encompassing radical social segments within the party. In 1998 Turkey’s 
Constitutional Court closed down RP on the grounds that it violated the founding 
secular principles of the state. The RP’s members immediately established a new party, 
the Virtue Party. However, the lifespan of the Virtue Party was short; in 2001 it was 
banned by the Constitutional Court on the same grounds as the RP. 
On the other hand, the genealogy of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, the 
Justice and Development Party) born out of a split from the Virtue Party in 2001, 
indubitably dates back to reformist Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. As a Muslim 
political party, the AKP reflects something of an adaption of Islam to the precepts of 
modernity. Through a convergence of the different interests of the bourgeoisie and an 
ideological breakaway from its past, the AKP has reconciled with the “actually existing 
secular state” and become the bearer of the EU integration process. In other words, 
contrary to the Islamist parties that preceded it, the AKP has managed to economically 
represent the symbiosis of peripheral and big finance capital, leading to the 
metamorphosis of Islamic politics into a neoliberal conservative project in Turkey. This 
joint representation of the different fractions of the bourgeoisie by the AKP was 
instrumental in achieving the severance of military and parliamentary power in Turkey. 
The end of the military’s control of parliament is not only the result of internal 
dynamics. International conditions also played a supplementary role both in 
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precipitating a change in class nature of Islamic politics in Turkey after the 1980s and in 
the weakening of the omnipotence of the military in politics. The EU pressure on 
Turkey to carry out reforms in the domestic political, economic and military spheres, 
and the US ambition to consolidate its imperial strategy in the Middle East through a 
strategic partnership with the AKP, had significant effects on this transformation. 
Therefore, the thesis aims to show how, since 1990, peripheral capital in Turkey has 
constituted itself as a social force responsible for significant effects at the political and 
ideological levels. 
Nevertheless, while it is undeniable that by ideologically separating itself from 
Necmettin Erbakan’s parties and benefiting from the metamorphosis of Islamic politics 
in Turkey, the AKP was able to carry out a democratic transition in Turkey until 
2010/2011, it is also worth noting that this metamorphosis does not necessarily mean 
that the AKP put aside the goal of the Islamisation of society. Especially after the 
completion of the democratic transition in 2010/2011, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan never hided a social project to raise a religious generation (HaberTürk, 1 
February 2012; Hürriyet, 2 February 2012). Specifically, encouragement of the state-
run religious vocational schools (imam-hatip okulları)—religious educational 
institutions that principally train imams and preachers—has been instrumental in the 
Islamisation of society.1 This policy resulted in a tenfold increase in the number of 
                                                          
1 İmam-Hatip Schools were established in 1924 in order to train religious functionaries under the control 
of the ministry of education (Maarif Vekaleti later Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, MEB) after the Unification of 
Education Law (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) abolished madrasas. Students attended imam-hatip schools 
less and less until their closure in 1930. Nearly two decades later in 1949, MEB under CHP rule partially 
initiated İmam-Hatip courses, not schools. These were in line with the proposals of the 7th Congress of 
CHP in 1947. The new DP government replaced imam-hatip courses with imam-hatip schools with seven 
years of education in 1951. The military junta of 1960 opened seven new imam-hatip schools. However, 
it was the 1971 military intervention that closed the middle level of these schools. The most important 
trajectory for these schools came about with the enactment of the “Basic Law on National Education” in 
1973 under the Naim Talu government, which allowed imam-hatip high school students to continue their 
studies at the faculties of social sciences and humanities. In 1974, the middle level of these schools was 
reopened under the pressure of the MSP headed by Erbakan. Despite lasting only ten months, the 
coalition government of CHP and MSP opened 29 imam-hatip high schools. From 1976, female students 
were allowed to enrol in these schools. National Front governments during 1975 and 1978 opened 230 
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students attending these religious vocational high schools from 71,100 in 2003 to 
728,386 in 2015. Adding the number of 10-13-year-old students attending imam-hatip 
schools, this rose to nearly one million (Hürriyet, 4 December 2014). Moreover, related 
to a conservative social project of diminishing women’s control of their own bodies, he 
also suggested that abortion is a murder (Hürriyet Daily News, 26 May 2012), which 
immediately prompted the ministry of health to initiate a proposal for the restrictions on 
abortion (Today’s Zaman, 30 May 2012). Not surprisingly, Erdoğan has been endlessly 
reiterating his call to families to have at least three children since 2008 (Çetik, Gültekin, 
& Kuşdemir, 2008).  
Bearing in mind the mutation of Islamic politics and the demise of the Kemalist 
state in Turkey, the first chapter consists of a literature review and a description of the 
thesis's theoretical framework. This chapter analyses the evolution of Islamic politics in 
Turkey, delineates mainstream analysis of the state-class-political representation nexus 
in Turkey, and addresses its limits. It demonstrates how the formation of the Kemalist 
state has been conceptualised in the statist-institutionalist perspective. Contrary to the 
statist-institutionalist perspective, which describes the explanatory centrality of states as 
potent, distinct, potentially autonomous and legitimate organisational actors in society, 
the chapter suggests that the very structure and function of the (capitalist) state 
guarantees the reproduction of (capitalist) social relations within its economic, political 
and ideological domains. Subsequently, an alternative theoretical framework is 
suggested in order to better analyse state-society relations in Turkey, using the concept 
                                                                                                                                                                          
new imam-hatip high schools. While there were 48,895 students in imam-hatip high schools in 1974-75, 
their number rose to 200,300 in 1980-81. In 1983, the military government permitted imam-hatip high 
school students to enrol in every kind of faculty. In 1985, Anatolian imam-hatip schools were opened to 
send religious functionaries abroad. Another important change for these schools came about with the 28 
February 1997 military intervention, which led to the closure of the middle level of all high schools and 
the introduction of a coefficient factor to curb the entrance of vocational students to universities. As a 
result of that, students’ enrolment in imam-hatip schools decreased sharply from 511,502 in 1997 to 
77,392 in 2002 (Bozan, 2007, pp.11-22; Ozgur, 2012, pp.33-56). 
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of Bonapartism. As a product of precarious conditions and of political crisis, 
Bonapartism is an exceptional form of the capitalist state, which secures the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations. In a Bonapartist political regime, real power 
rests with the executive apparatus of the state.  
In the second chapter, it is suggested that Kemalism in Turkey is an instance of 
capitalist Bonapartism in the 20th century. The chapter also outlines the ways in which 
Bonapartism extends beyond the individual ‘Bonaparte’. In other words, the Bonapartist 
legacy can recapitulate itself after the passing of the ‘Bonaparte’ figure, doing so in 
accordance with existing class relations. This theoretical perspective can be applied to 
the Kemalist state. Even though Mustafa Kemal himself died in 1938, the Kemalist state 
continued to exert power in the economic, political and ideological fields until the 
1980s. The Kemalist regime—based on modernisation, Westernisation, secularisation, 
nationalism, and national developmentalism—aimed to safeguard the conditions of 
capital accumulation and to create conditions for the growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie 
in the 1920s and 1930s until the export-led growth model took over after the 1980s. In 
order to achieve it, the Kemalist regime was based on an extensive role for the civilian 
and military bureaucracy in political life, and in the regulation of the economy, with the 
bourgeoisie being too weak to otherwise consolidate its political hegemony. By means 
of the Kemalist state, the bourgeoisie in Turkey gradually consolidated its economic, 
political, and ideological power, up until the 1980s. 
The third chapter describes the completion of the national developmentalist 
project of Kemalism, which engendered the transformation of the social relations of 
production. It argues that the Kemalist state’s economic basis has started to slowly 
decline with the erosion of national developmentalism. This chapter introduces the 
economic background for the military coup on 12 September 1980. It then suggests that 
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the military dictatorship—as an exceptional form of the state between 1980 and 1983—
was instrumental in the transition to export-led capitalism and the suppression of labour. 
It is postulated that export-led capitalism in Turkey after the 1980s increased the 
economic and political power of what Sebnem Gumuscu and Deniz Sert (2009) call “the 
devout bourgeoisie” in the periphery. The chapter also shows the oscillations in the 
Kemalist state between limited political liberalisation and repression under post-
Bonapartist rule in the 1990s.  
The fourth chapter analyses the political trajectory of successive Islamic 
fundamentalist parties led by Necmettin Erbakan from the late 1960s to the late 1990s, 
historicising the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey with respect to its social and 
economic bases. The chapter reveals the genesis of religious fundamentalism(s) as 
political-religious ideologies in reaction to cultural and social modernisation before 
passing on to the characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism in general. The chapter then 
moves on to discuss the rise of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, 
demonstrated in the foundation of the Islamic parties led by Necmettin Erbakan. This 
chapter prepares the ground for an analysis of the rise of the AKP. 
The fifth chapter analyses how the AKP successfully united the general interests 
of the “devout bourgeoisie” with those of the big bourgeoisie. It examines the political 
strategy through which the AKP neutralised an army faction that opposed Turkey’s 
European integration, co-opted the liberals and entered into an alliance with the Islamic 
community of Fethullah Gülen to gain a pool of bureaucratic staff. The Gülen 
movement—which established a strong presence in the judiciary and the police force 
during the AKP’s time in power—was instrumental in undermining the military’s 
political power in Turkey. The chapter contends that the end of the Kemalist state and 
the democratic transition under neoliberalism have been a common interest for Turkish 
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capitalism since the late 1990s, which the AKP carried out until 2010/2011. In order to 
give a full account of this democratic transition, the chapter identifies and explains the 
role of external facilitators, such as the influence of the EU, and highlights the limits of 
democratisation and Turkey’s authoritarian drift.   
 The sixth chapter analyses the sub-imperialist expansion of Turkish capitalism 
under the AKP mainly into the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. It 
argues that the realignment of Turkish foreign policy under the doctrine of neo-
Ottomanism is a product of decades-long capitalist development in which Turkey's 
regional economic power complemented its political-military capacity and power after 
the transition to the export-led economic model in the 1980s. This chapter proposes that 
neo-Ottomanism is in accordance with the political and economic needs of Turkish 
capitalism as a whole.  
This thesis contributes not only to the debate on Islamic politics in Turkey by 
analysing the class character of the transformation in Islamic politics and the socio-
political reasons behind it, but also to the literature on civil-military relations by 
showing the gradual weakening and dissolution of Kemalism as a social and political 
force. The way in which the Kemalist state is conceptualised here, as a capitalist-
Bonapartist state, offers an alternative to the existing literature on state-society relations 
in Turkey.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework  
The evolution of Islamic politics in Turkey 
The existing literature largely employs the “centre-periphery” dichotomy as a key 
concept in explaining the general trends of Turkish politics. Academic works mainly 
concentrate on the confrontation between the authoritarian secularism of the Republican 
elite at the centre and the broad masses adherence to Islamic principles and values on 
the periphery (Göle, 1997; Gellner, 1981; Heper, 1981; Mardin, 1995; Öniş, 1997, p. 
744; Toprak 2006). For the most part, the manifestation of this dichotomy in Turkish 
politics is deemed to be one of the primary causes behind the Islamic resurgence in 
Turkey. This analysis argues that the genealogy of the Turkish state can be explained 
through the ideational conflicts between the authoritarian civilian/military state elites 
and broad masses. Metin Heper (1981) for instance analyses the state-religion 
relationship in the early phase of Republican Turkey by referring to the effects of the 
Cultural Revolution in the 1920s and 1930s on the broad masses. It is argued that the 
visibility of the Islamic resurgence in Turkey has much to do with the psychological and 
cultural consequences of the secularisation process pioneered by the Kemalist regime. 
The substitution of Kemalist nationalism for Islam failed to offer a system of beliefs and 
practices for the masses, which in turn led to a confrontation between the “radical 
secularists and Islamists” (Heper, 1981). A similar line of reasoning is evident in Emelie 
Olson (1985), Yeşim Arat (1998), Aynur İlyasoğlu (1996), and Hasan Bülent 
Nalbantoğlu (1993) in the sense that modernisation or Westernisation from above is 
seen to have prompted a religious reaction to the secular elite and its dominant ideology.  
 According to Nilüfer Göle, the implementation of "didactic secularism" (Göle, 
1997, p.49; Gellner, 1981, p.68) with a modern pedagogical ideology was intended to 
“demystify religion” in Turkey and to build a society in line with Western values (Göle, 
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1997). In this modernisation and secularisation process initiated by the Kemalist regime, 
the Ottoman past was seen as backward, culturally submissive, and as a heritage that 
should be avoided. The radical cultural reforms such as the change of Arabic script with 
the Latin script in 1928, the removal of Persian and Arabic influences from Turkish in 
order to purify the language, and the institutional establishment of the Turkish 
Linguistic Society (Türk Dil Kurumu) in 1932 to create a pure language, were all aimed 
at effecting a deep-rooted rupture from the Ottoman legacy and its associated political 
elites (Göle, 1997, pp.49-50). From that perspective, Islamic revivalism in Turkey is 
seen as antithetical to the modernisation process of the secular elites in Turkey (Göle, 
1997). It is postulated that “[t]he Islamists are the counter-elites of Republicans but the 
elites of their followers” (Göle, 1997, pp.57-58).  
Regarding the wave of Islamic resurgence in Turkey after the 1980s and 1990s, 
there is a consensus in the literature that successful and deliberate usage of Islamic 
justice, called "Just Order Doctrine" by Necmettin Erbakan and the Welfare Party, was 
one of the major factors in channelling the masses towards Islamic politics in the era of 
neoliberalism (Aydın 2005; Buğra 2002a; Gülalp 2001, 2003; Öniş 1997). The Just 
Order (Adil Düzen) program developed by Erbakan, the leader of the Islamic Refah 
Party, clearly rejected the imitation of the West and Western modernisation while he 
derisively presented all other parties in Turkey as the imitators of the West. It opposed 
capitalism in rhetoric and asked for the establishment of an Islamic common market 
while stressing the need for an independent foreign policy in which Turkey would 
withdraw from NATO (Yeşilada, 2002a). According to Ayşe Buğra (2002b, p.189) and 
Zülküf Aydın (2005), a language of social disadvantage and a particular form of 
distributional politics in the Just Order principle were able to incorporate diverse 
segments of the population into the program.  
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From a critical perspective, Haldun Gülalp points to the fact that Islamic 
revivalism in Turkey became the social response to the failure of statist-nationalist 
modernisation. Gülalp (2001, p.442) argues that “filling the void created by the collapse 
of statism and the ensuing crisis of modernist ideologies that were based on it, such as 
nationalism and socialism, Welfare [Refah] represented a post-nationalist and post-
socialist sense of ‘justice’ ”. This was a clear Islamic challenge to the Kemalist 
modernisation in Turkey (Gülalp, 2002, p.35).  
Having said that, the causes behind the rise of the AKP as a “mutant form” 
emerging from the corpses of the Refah Party and the Virtue Party thereafter (İ. Eliaçık, 
personal communication, August 26, 2013) is still debated in Turkey. Some scholars 
have examined the relationship between globalisation and the emergence of new Islamic 
political identities (Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005). While analysing the changing nature 
of Turkish modernity since the 1980s, Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu (2005) have 
suggested that a state-centred Turkish modernity has been challenged by the emergence 
of new economic and civil society actors. For instance, MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve 
İşadamları Derneği, Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association) 
“constitutes a strong alternative to Turkish secular modernity” by producing a co-
existence between Islamic identity and free market ideology (Keyman and Koyuncu 
2005, p.120). Additionally, Deniz Gökalp and Seda Ünsar (2008) have analysed the role 
of the EU accession process in opening political spaces for Islamism and ethno-
nationalism in Turkey. They conclude that “the Islamist conservative and Kurdish 
nationalist policies have found channels of institutionalisation during the ill-defined EU 
process that led the way [for] harsh marketisation, rapid Islamisation, and ethnic 
divisiveness in society” (2008, p.116). According to Fulya Atacan (2005), Umit Cizre-
Sakallioglu and Menderes Cinar (2003), Senem Aydın and Ruşen Çakır (2007, p.1), the 
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overthrow of the Islamic Refah Party by a coup in 1997 is a turning point for the 
transformation of Islamic politics. The military intervention of 28 February 1997—
during which the army swept away the pro-Islamist civilian government—led to a 
"learning process" for political Islamists and triggered a reconsideration of their policies 
and discourse (Atacan 2005, Aydın and Çakır, 2007, Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cınar 2003).  
On the other hand, Sebnem Gumuscu and Deniz Sert (2009) argue that changes 
that have taken place within the political Islamist constituency have led to the 
emergence of a moderate wing in Islamic politics. According to Gumuscu and Sert, the 
AKP, unlike the Refah Party, represents the ascendant devout bourgeoisie, which has 
vested interests in economic liberalism, liberal democratic politics, and social 
conservatism (2009, pp.957-958). Mustafa Şen attributes the rise of the AKP to a 
process that commenced in the 1980s. This process involved the emergence of Turkish-
Islamic synthesis, the enlargement of the religious field in Turkey, and the marriage of 
neoliberalism with Turkish Islamism (Şen, 2010). 
Cihan Tuğal’s highly praised book Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic 
Challenge to Capitalism presents an ethnographic study on the absorption of Islamic 
radicalism conducted in Sultanbeyli in İstanbul. The book convincingly argues that 
absorption of Islamic radicalism is the culmination of a long process of "passive 
revolution", meaning that the radicals are brought into the realm of neoliberalism, 
secularism and Western domination through hegemonic politics which is exercised by 
linking economy, society, and state (Tuğal, 2009). Nonetheless, fundamentally 
disputable is the argument that Islamic radicalism has been a challenge to capitalism per 
se, given that it does not seek to challenge to monopoly capitalism (Tuğal, 2009). 
Thus, the centre-periphery dichotomy with respect to Islamic politics in Turkey 
offers a wealth of information about the ideological clashes in society. However, such a 
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framework, based on the confrontation between the secular elites and conservative 
masses, necessarily constructs each identity as fixed rather than flexible. In other words, 
the centre-periphery dichotomy attributes to state elites, namely the military and civil 
bureaucracy, a secular character and to the masses a conservative character. This 
approach, however, glosses over the reality that the military elite in Turkey utilised 
Islam even before the 1980 coup as a tool for achieving social order in the political 
convulsions of the 1970s. To the extent that religion has been a bulwark against 
nationalist and socialist tendencies in Turkey, the military as a core nucleus of the state 
apparatus did not refrain from blending it with a new form of nationalism as a new form 
of state ideology (Şen, 2010). Secondly, the centre-periphery dichotomy does not 
explain the reason why Islamic politics in Turkey rose specifically after the 1990s, 
when religion has always been important to the Turkish masses. In other words, the 
historical-political aspect of the resurgence of religion is neglected. Additionally, this 
analysis is blind to the changing social base of Islamic revivalism in Turkey, in the 
context of neoliberal globalisation. The social base of the Islamic movement in Turkey 
is constituted by the newly emerging professional middle classes who are socially 
conservative and challenge the Kemalist modernisation, the peripheral capitalists, and 
the working class who have migrated to the cities and encountered precarious working 
conditions (Gülalp, 2001). Thirdly, even though the centre-periphery analysis aptly 
analyses the ideological consequences of the modernisation/Westernisation process of 
Turkey by the Kemalist state, this analysis is silent on the economic aspect in which the 
modernisation process in Turkey was also an attempt to create a bourgeois society.  
Regarding the rise of the AKP as a breakaway from the Refah Party legacy, the 
literature has a tendency to depict peripheral capital as the only class representative of 
the AKP. However, these explanations omit the fact that the mutation in Islamic politics 
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in Turkey corresponds with a situation of symbiosis between big finance capital and 
peripheral capital. This in turn has led to the severance of military power from civilian 
politics. A more explanatory and historical approach—aiming to grasp the historical 
development of capitalism and its nature in the context of class struggle in Turkey—
would provide a better analysis of the role and historical mission of the AKP. Taking 
such an approach necessitates an exploration of the state-capital-political representation 
nexus in Turkey. 
Statist-Institutionalism on state-society relations 
The literature on state-society relations has a tendency to take the Weberian perspective, 
in that it generally conceives of the state as a potent, distinct, potentially autonomous, 
and legitimate organisational actor that is above the class relations of society (Evans, 
1995; Mann, 1985; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985; Skocpol, 1979; Skocpol 1985; 
Stepan, 1978; Weber, 1968). Weber famously argues in his essay “Politics as a 
Vocation” that the state is a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1946, p.78). 
Thus, politics refers to “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution 
of power, either among states or among groups within a state” (Weber, 1946, p.78). In 
this approach—which can be called “the statist-institutionalist approach”—the state is 
conceptualised as an insulated entity and as an independent variable (for a critique of 
statist-institutionalism and state-centred approaches, see Cammack, 1990; Dinler, 2003; 
Jessop, 2008; Yalman, 2009). In other words, the state is presented as an organisation 
with its own interests, working for itself, and carrying an essence in itself distinct from 
society (Skocpol, 1985). 
In literature taking the statist-institutionalist approach, state actions and public 
policies are explained with reference to the prerogatives of autonomous state officials 
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(Nordlinger, 1981; Skocpol, 1985, p.15; Block, 1987). These state elites are conceived 
of as a privileged status group equipped with “superior knowledge and insight” for 
utilising the state’s capacities (Rueschemeyer & Evans, 1985) or as self-interested 
utility maximisers and historical subjects (Block, 1987). Thus, it is sound to argue that 
the focus on the role of state officials in organising state policies is the prime theoretical 
proclivity of statist-institutionalism. The perspective vividly puts forward that the form 
of the state is not given by the fact that it is a “capitalist state”; rather, the state itself can 
be thought as “set of organisations through which collectivities of officials may be able 
to formulate and implement distinctive strategies or policies” (Skocpol, 1985, pp.20-
21). 
Concomitantly, in statist-institutionalist theory there is a firm belief that the 
structures and activities of the state can condition political culture, group formation, 
collective political action, and collective contention (Skocpol 1985; Stepan 1978). The 
degree of “stateness” with respect to historical, intellectual, and cultural constituting 
components is to be treated as a conceptual variable for empirical comparison between 
different societies (Nettl, 1968). State structures, for instance, influence the capacities 
not only of the subordinate classes but also of the propertied classes (Skocpol, 1985, 
p.26). The institutional capacity of the state is given priority for understanding a social 
formation in a specific country. For instance, Theda Skocpol (1985, p.27) emphasises 
America’s “relatively weak, decentralised and fragmented state structure” in explaining 
the ways in which the US capitalists were able to “splinter along narrow interest lines 
and to adopt an antistate, laissez faire ideology” (ibid, p. 27).  
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The state-class-political representation nexus in Turkey: limitations of the 
statist-institutionalist perspective in the Turkish case 
Metin Heper can be considered the pioneer of statist-institutionalism in Turkey. In his 
book The State Tradition in Turkey (1985), Heper notes that business life in Turkey was 
inherently submissive to the strong state, leading to an understanding of the Turkish 
state as Leviathan in the Hobbesian sense. He argues that interest group associations in 
Turkey were unable to articulate their demands unequivocally and in a straightforward 
manner (Heper, 1991, p.16), contending that the interest groups in Turkey could not 
engage even in partisan activities, and voluntarily chose to stay out of politics while the 
state remained unresponsive to civil society (Heper, 1991, pp.17-18). From this 
perspective, the interests of the state elites, which are autonomous from social relations, 
are translated into a hegemonic set of interests adopted by political parties and civil 
society. It is claimed that “[t]his monist conception of public interest, developed by the 
State elites, was later adopted by the political elites... the State-centred polity was 
replaced by a party-centred polity but not by a civil society-centred one” (Heper, 1985, 
p.20).  
Heper (1985) touches on the causes of this inability of Turkish interest groups to 
articulate their demands, quoting the chairman of TÜSİAD (the Turkish industrialists’ 
and Businessmen’s Association) who said that: 
In this country, our philosophy has always been that of taking the paternal State (‘devlet 
baba’) as paramount, refraining from challenging it, and of pursuing an economic policy 
not in spite of, but along with the paternal State... Hesitancy on part of members of the 
private sector to run for public office stems from the philosophy of not challenging the 
paternal State, from the belief that the State is still influential, and that alienating the 
State would not bode well for them” (1985, p.103; 1991, p.16). 
 
As has been argued, this paternal and strong state was built upon the Ottoman legacy 
which, unlike Western examples, failed to integrate peripheral forces and urban middle 
layers such as “the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later industrial labour” 
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into the centre (Mardin, 1973, p.170). In addition, the state bureaucracy had a firm grip 
on the economy and society and the Ottoman polity therefore lacked multiple 
confrontations and compromises (Mardin, 1973; Heper, 1976). Similarly, the Marxist 
writer Fikret Başkaya (2010) argues that the legacy of the strong Ottoman state still 
continues in Republican Turkey, where the state apparatus subordinates civil society 
and holds real power, such that the army becomes the “principal state party” (asıl devlet 
partisi). According to the liberals, the strong state does not only subordinate civil 
society but also creates an inefficient and unproductive economic system by 
consolidating the power of the bureaucracy (Altan, 1993, p.41). In this context, Mehmet 
Altan coined the phrase “Second Republic” to point to the need for a reversal of the 
general features of the Kemalist state, which he named the “First Republic”. According 
to Altan, the First Republic is a military state in which the National Security Council 
stands above parliament and embodies national sovereignty (Altan, 1993, p.37). Altan 
instead advocates a transition from the political state—the First Republic or the 
Kemalist state—to the liberal state, by which he means the Second Republic (Altan, 
1993, p.42).  
Therefore, the “strong state tradition” literature concludes that the main cause 
for concern amongst businessmen regarding the prospects for productive and efficient 
commercial life was (Buğra, 1994) “the recalcitrance of the Turkish public bureaucracy 
to bourgeois politics” (Heper, 1976). According to Ayşe Buğra, “the most striking 
characteristic of the Turkish experience is the reluctance of the political authority to 
accept associations as the legitimate medium of interest representation” (1994, p.261). 
Turkish businessmen’s self-image is portrayed as timid, humble, and ashamed of 
gaining wealth vis-à-vis the autonomous and strong state bureaucracy (Buğra, 1994; 
Heper, 1985). The result is that the state’s inability to commit to a coherent, long–term 
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industrial strategy and to reduce business uncertainty precipitated forms of rentier and 
speculative activity on behalf of Turkish business. This is despite the fact that the 
Turkish state has a substantial degree of autonomy to discipline big businesses into 
conformity with national objectives (Buğra, 1994, pp.22-23).  
However, it should be noted that Buğra combines the statist-institutionalist 
perspective with class analysis. By taking into account the country’s position in the 
world economy as a late-industrialising state, her book highlights the state-created 
character of the Turkish business class and the role of the bureaucracy (Buğra, 1994, 
p.20). On the one hand, with regard to the autonomy of the Turkish state, Buğra points 
to the inability of business groups in Turkey to form alliances with foreign investors to 
restrict state autonomy (Buğra, 1994, p.21). On the other hand, a statist-institutionalist 
perspective is preferred to the extent that the form of state intervention in the realm of 
private interests is seen as the determinant factor of the interest group politics and its 
social implications (Buğra, 1994, p.228). 
By referring to the strong state tradition in Turkey in which the governments 
tend to regard their political power as absolute, Buğra (1994, p.23) claims that the 
government in power fully controls the state bureaucracy and the legal system. For her, 
the state bureaucracy and the legal system cannot be referred to for the settlement of 
potential or actual disputes between the government and social groups, due to the 
subservient position of these mechanisms vis-à-vis the governments (Buğra, 1994, 
pp.156-157). According to Buğra (1994, p.163), these systems cannot therefore function 
as stable mechanisms of intermediation in state-business relations. Consequently, “... 
haphazard policy changes often become reflected in legal modifications and changes in 
bureaucratic rules which, in turn, enhance the instability of the economic environment” 
(Buğra, 1994, p.97). 
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In the statist-institutional approach, the Turkish bourgeoisie is portrayed as 
predatory and self-maximising due to the existence of absolute state power in the 
Republican period (Buğra, 1994; Heper, 1985). The bureaucratic oligarchy created an 
environment in which “the bureaucracy [in Turkey] remained a class whose location in 
the social system allowed it to attempt the transformation of that system while 
maintaining its location” (Keyder, 1987a, p.48). As a consequence of the strong state 
vis-à-vis the weak bourgeoisie in Turkey, Buğra (1994, p.5) perceives the Turkish 
businessmen’s self-perception as lacking “confidence about the legitimacy of activities 
carried out in pursuit of pecuniary gain”. The animosity between the autonomous state 
and the interests of the Turkish bourgeoisie has precipitated such an industrial 
environment that Turkish businessmen see the state as “the major source of their 
difficulties” (Buğra, 1994, p.5). 
Having said this, this “strong state tradition” literature on state-society relations 
properly regards the Turkish army as the principal power holder, possessor of a 
privileged status in the state, and founder, guardian, and moderniser of the Kemalist 
state, while the methodological position of statist-institutionalism prioritises the main 
social conflict between political and state elites (Demirel, 2004; Hale, 1994; Harris, 
1965; Heper, 1976, 1985, 1991; Heper & Evin, 1988; KarabeliAs [sic] 2009; Lerner & 
Robinson, 1960; Momayezi, 1998; Narli, 2000; Nye, 1977; Sakallioğlu, 1997; Tachau 
& Heper, 1983). Therefore, the main problem of the statist-institutionalist analysis is 
that it neglects to see state power as an agency for capitalist development in Turkey. 
Rather, it has been largely taken for granted that the Turkish state has been the source of 
instability and insecurity for capitalist development (Buğra, 1991; Heper 1985). The 
methodological selection of statist-institutionalism ignores a relational analysis between 
militarist-nationalist institutionalisation and capitalist institutionalisation of the state 
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(Akça, 2010a, pp.354-364). The state and capital relations are rather taken as external to 
each other and autonomous from class contradictions in society. The demarcation of the 
state apparatus from social power relations is absolutised, disregarding hybrid 
formations, policy links, and disunity of state managers (Jessop, 2008, p.64). 
Consequently, it is argued that the Turkish state has incapacitated the development of 
internal endogenous dynamics of capitalism (Buğra, 1994, p.23). However, it becomes 
impossible to characterise the state solely as an obstacle to capital accumulation when 
one takes into account the implementation of state-led industrialisation in the 1930s and 
state entrepreneurship through Five-Year Development Plans in the 1930s and 1960s 
(Boratav, 2006).  
Second, the statist-institutionalist perspective has a tendency to position the 
basic cleavage in society between the bureaucracy as an autonomous class, which 
remains above class politics, and the bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1987a; Heper, 1976). 
However, the civil/military bureaucracy cannot constitute a social class per se. The 
bureaucracy is strictly tied to the dominant ruling class in society. As Leon Trotsky 
(1933) puts it: 
A class is defined not by participation in the distribution of the national income alone, 
but by its independent role in the general structure of the economy and by its 
independent roots in the economic foundation of society ... The bureaucracy lacks all 
these social traits. It has no independent position in the process of production and 
distribution. It has no independent property roots. Its functions relate basically to the 
political technique of class rule. The existence of a bureaucracy in all its variety of 
forms and differences in specific weight, characterizes every class regime. Its power is 
of a reflected character. The bureaucracy is indissolubly bound up with a ruling 
economic class, feeding itself upon the social roots of the latter, maintaining itself and 
falling together with it. 
  
In terms of a class analysis, the civil/military bureaucracy can be conceptualised as a 
social category defined “by its relation to the state apparatuses” (Poulantzas, 1975, 
p.23). This means that “...social categories have a class membership, their agents 
generally belonging to several different social classes” (Poulantzas, 1975, p.24). This 
conceptualisation is important in this thesis because once the civil/military bureaucracy 
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is positioned as a class against the interests of the bourgeoisie, the Turkish state 
automatically turns into the prime impediment to the advance of capitalist development. 
Unsurprisingly, in the 1980s such a conceptualisation of the capitalist state, in the 
context of the centre-periphery dichotomy, was translated into a political discourse of 
neoliberalism which held that state intervention in the economy should be minimised 
(Güngen & Erten, 2005, p.8). 
Third, by downplaying the class content of the state—instead emphasising the 
autonomy of the state and suggesting the analytical superiority of a state-centred 
perspective over Marxism—this analysis makes the state appear as class-neutral and 
neglects to see the logic of social reproduction (Cammack, 1990). Consequently, an 
autonomous state in this analysis, indicates “a possibility of the state going beyond the 
social dominance of the capitalist class and therefore, to be a class neutral state” 
(Chang, 2008, p.22).   
Last but far from least, the statist-institutionalist analysis translates class 
relations into relations between rational individuals or different interest groups, in turn 
mystifying the unequal social relations in society. As Dae-oup Chang (2008, p.24) 
concludes, “this image of the independence of the state resulted, therefore, from a very 
narrow and a-historical understanding of the relations of the state with capitalist society 
as the relations between different societal forces, or more exactly societal organisations 
as set of individual-societal actors, rather than from a serious attempt to understand the 
nature of the capitalist state in relation to particularly capitalist social relations”. 
Consequently, in the statist-institutionalist analysis the unequal power relations between 
capital and labour are purposefully ignored. 
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Towards a theoretical framework: the concept of Bonapartism  
In an attempt to transcend (rather than set aside entirely) the statist-institutionalist 
analysis, a concept of Bonapartism from various Marxist scholars has been adopted in 
this thesis, in order to analyse the exceptional form of the capitalist state in Turkey and 
to comprehend the political, economic, and ideological influence of the Kemalist 
capitalist state roughly between 1923 and 1980.  
The Bonapartist state is an exceptional form of the capitalist state. The core state 
apparatus, the military, can mutate into a special social power only under specific 
conditions (Şaylan, 1988). A bureaucratised power, the military, rises above the society 
in precarious situations. In order to guarantee the reproduction of capitalist social 
relations, the state executive substitutes itself for the direct rule of the bourgeoisie in a 
form of Bonapartist capitalist state (Marx, 1852/1972; 1871/2000).  
Bonapartism, then, is the exceptional form of the capitalist state in which the real 
centre of political power is consolidated in the executive apparatus of the state. As such, 
the state executive or the civil and military bureaucracy prepares the necessary 
conditions for the future direct rule of the bourgeoisie in the form of a functioning 
parliamentary regime. In addition to its economic mission, a Bonapartist state can also 
assume a complementary role in “social transformation” of a society that did not 
complete its capitalist transformation (Şaylan, 1988). 
It is vital to stress that the Bonapartist state does not mean the non-existence of 
a parliament. Instead, parliamentary power is reduced to the shadow of the executive 
power because the parliamentary regime is unable to maintain the social order that the 
capitalists need. Put simply, the bourgeoisie is too weak or has become too weak to 
rule in an effective manner. Thus, the Bonapartist capitalist state is a product of 
capitalist contradictions and of protracted political crisis of the ruling class in which the 
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bourgeoisie as a whole is unable to properly maintain its social, ideological, and 
political hegemony over society through the smooth functioning of a parliamentary 
regime. That is to say, it emerges as a product of specific historical conditions (Şaylan, 
1988, p.454). An internal threat such as a civil war or uprising, or an external threat 
such as a war or territorial dispute, can necessitate the state power to assume additional 
roles in repressing any direct threats to national interests and consequent indirect 
threats to the capitalist order.  
The concept of Bonapartism derives from Karl Marx’s influential work The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In the 1869 preface to this work, Marx 
mainly demonstrates “how the class struggle in France created circumstances and 
relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero’s part” 
(Marx, 1852/1972, p.6). The important narrative of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte is to reveal how Louis Bonaparte’s successful coup d’état overthrew 
bourgeois representatives in the National Assembly and installed in their stead a 
dictator at the head of an enormous bureaucratic and military organisation, and that 
“this appalling parasitic body ... enmeshes the body of French society and chokes all its 
pores ...” (Marx, 1852/1972, p.104). Nonetheless, the all-intermeddling, parasitic 
Bonapartist body is in the service of bourgeois interests without being under their 
control (Marx, 1852/1972).  
Bonapartism, then, refers to the form of the capitalist state where “an 
economically dominant class is served by a government which is strong enough to crush 
opponents and autonomous enough for the bourgeoisie to be able to distance itself from 
the responsibility of rule” (Krygier, 1985, p.60). By substituting itself for the direct rule 
of the bourgeois class, the state executive plays the role of the bourgeoisie and serves 
bourgeois interests. As Marx (1852/1972, p.55) puts it “... in order to save its purse, it 
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[the French bourgeoisie] must forfeit the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard it 
must at the same time be hung over its own head as a sword of Damocles”. In other 
words, while the Bonapartist state administers the interests of the ruling class, it is not 
obliged to do the latter’s command (Krygier, 1985, p.60). On that point, history 
confirms this theory; when the French bourgeoisie failed to maintain its hegemony over 
society due to the economic crisis in 1851 it was the repressive French state apparatus 
that restored the hegemony and tranquillity in France. To the extent that the bourgeoisie 
tied itself to the maintenance of this military caste, “[the French bourgeoisie] 
apotheosised the sword; the sword rules it” (Marx, 1852/1972, p.101). 
It is undeniable that successful economic development is attained under the 
supremacy of this "terrific parasitic body". In The Civil War in France, Marx 
(1871/2000, p.586) clearly indicates that the Empire of Louis Bonaparte protects the 
propertied classes and assures their economic supremacy over the working class. 
“Under its [executive power’s] sway, bourgeois society, freed from political cares, 
attained a development unexpected even by itself. Its industry and commerce expanded 
to colossal dimensions; financial swindling celebrated cosmopolitan orgies; the misery 
of the masses was set off by a shameless display of gorgeous, meretricious and debased 
luxury” (Marx, 1871/2000, p.586). Therefore, the Bonapartist state is not only a form of 
the state that refers to a strong and bureaucratised executive power. It also refers to an 
exceptional form of the capitalist state, which enables the continuation of capital 
accumulation in a country under specific historical conditions.   
For example, as Colin Mooers (1991, p.88) points out, “between 1852 and 1857, 
with the rapid extension of rail networks, financed through the new credit mechanisms 
pioneered by the state, France was able for the first time to sustain a rate of growth 
comparable to that of other industrialising countries.” Under the Second Empire, 
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Mooers (1991, p.89) claims that industrial expansion and economic modernisation 
became the religion of Bonaparte’s advisors.  
In The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx (1852/1972) also delineates the autonomy of 
the French state under Louis Bonaparte. “Only under the second Bonaparte”, Marx 
writes, “does the state seem to have made itself completely independent” (1852/1972, 
p.105, emphasis added). Miliband (1965, p.285) explains that “for Marx, the 
Bonapartist State, however independent it may have been politically from any given 
class remains, and cannot in a class society but remain, the protector of an economically 
and socially dominant class”. In other words, the independence of the Bonapartist state 
from all classes in society is a fictitious independence because Bonaparte represents a 
class.  
Marx (1852/1972, p.105) plainly clarifies the historical function of executive 
power with its bureaucratic and military organisation both in the time of absolute 
monarchy and the decay of the feudal system in France. Marx (1852/1972, p.105) 
argues that “...under the absolute monarchy, during the first Revolution, [and] under 
Napoleon, bureaucracy was only the means of preparing the class rule of the 
bourgeoisie”. As a corollary, by means of “vast and ingenious state machinery” of 
executive power “with is enormous bureaucratic and military organisation”, “[t]he 
seigniorial privileges of the landowners and towns became transformed into so many 
attributes of the state power, the feudal dignitaries into paid officials, and the motley 
pattern of conflicting medieval plenary powers into the regulated plan of a state 
authority whose work is divided and centralised as in a factory” (1852/1972, p.105). In 
other words, the centralised French bureaucracy had helped to accelerate the decay of 
the feudal societal formation.  
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On the other hand, in a capitalist social formation in France, the existence of the 
executive power and bureaucracy seems to be quite different. Marx (1852/1972, p.105) 
argues that “[u]nder the Restoration, under Louis Philippe, under the parliamentary 
republic, it [the executive power] was the instrument of the ruling class, however much 
it strove for power of its own”. The French bourgeoisie instrumentalised bureaucratic 
centralisation to break the power of the feudal aristocracy, and then to establish and 
maintain bourgeois domination (Baehr and Richter, 2004, p.3). This bureaucratic 
centralisation allowed Louis Bonaparte to play the role of the balancer of class forces,2 
an arbiter of class struggle in France, and a benevolent dictator for all classes.  
Engels’ writings on Bonapartism are similar to Marx’s. In The Origin of the 
Family, Private Property, and the State and The Housing Question, Engels argues that 
in exceptional periods state power ostensibly acquires for the moment certain 
independence in relation to warring classes’ balance (1884/1991, p.553; 1872/1988, 
p.363). By exceptional periods, he means that the state is not the state of the most 
powerful economically ruling class. In such circumstances, “the real governmental 
authority lies in the hands of a special caste of army offices and state officials” (Engels, 
1872/1988, p.363). The absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the French Empire under Napoleon I and Napoleon III (Louis Bonaparte) and 
the German Empire under Bismarck can all be understood as examples of these 
exceptional periods (Engels, 1884/1991, p.553).   
In The Housing Question, Friedrich Engels (1872/1988, p.363) also deals with 
the state form of Prussia and argues that the Prussian state form can be considered a 
form of pseudo-constitutionalism, “a form which is at once both the present-day form of 
the dissolution of the old absolute monarchy and the form of existence of the 
                                                          
2 In the absolutist monarchy, there is also a balance of class forces or equilibrium between feudal forces 
and bourgeoisie. However, the difference of Bonapartism “exists above all in the process of how the class 
equilibrium is achieved” (Karatani and Lippit, 2012, p.6). 
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Bonapartist monarchy”. However, this state form of Prussia actually served the slow 
decline of the absolute monarchy (1872/1988, p.363). In the dissolution of old absolute 
monarchy, Engels (1872/1988, pp.363-364) contends that while, on the one hand 
transition from small-scale production to large-scale industry in Germany accelerated 
the acute housing problem, on the other hand it also led the bureaucracy to improve its 
income through speculation in shares or participation in sound and unsound joint stock 
companies. This argument corresponds with Marx’s evaluation of French bureaucracy 
under the Second Empire (1852/1972, p.104), which was he dubbed the “appalling 
parasitic body”. 
On this point, it is important to note that a centralised powerful bureaucracy is 
not always the product of equilibrium between the class forces of the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat in a capitalist society. There are also examples of this bureaucratic 
autocracy, which emerge from the overall weakness of certain class forces. For instance, 
Trotsky (1907, p.12) describes the historical situation in Russia before 1905 as follows:  
In its endeavour to create a centralized state apparatus, Tsarism was obliged not so 
much to oppose the claims of the privileged estates as to fight the barbarity, poverty, 
and general disjointedness of a country whose separate parts led wholly independent 
economic lives. It was not the equilibrium of the economically dominant classes, as in 
the West, but their weakness which made Russian bureaucratic autocracy of a self-
contained organisation.  
 
It is worth adding that, in Fascism and Dictatorship, Nicos Poulantzas (1974) 
elaborates on fascism as an exceptional form of the capitalist state. According to him, 
both Germany and Italy were adversely affected by the transition to monopoly 
capitalism and by political and economic crises (Poulantzas, 1974, p.34). However, with 
the ascension of national-socialism to power in Germany, “the political hegemony of 
big capital was secured, the dislocation between the political hegemony and economic 
domination was resolved, and the growth of its economic domination accelerated” 
(Poulantzas, 1974, p.111). For Poulantzas (1974), military dictatorship and Bonapartism 
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are other exceptional forms of the capitalist state, and as such, they are relatively 
autonomous from the dominant classes and fractions, which is the precondition for the 
reorganisation of the hegemonic power bloc (1974, p.313). He claims that the inability 
of the bourgeoisie to achieve its own internal unity and to realise its political hegemony 
vis-à-vis the dominated classes allows the capitalist class state to take charge of the 
bourgeoisie’s political interests (Poulantzas, 1973, p.284). Second, in the exceptional 
forms of the capitalist state, there is a “strict control of the whole of the State system by 
one ‘branch’ or one apparatus in the hands of the class or class fraction which is 
struggling to establish its hegemony” (Poulantzas, 1974, p.316). By referring to Marx’s 
work on Bonapartism, Poulantzas notes that “the greater the relative autonomy of the 
State from the hegemonic class or class fraction, the stronger is its internal 
‘centralisation’” (1974, p.316, f.n.3). Thirdly, the function of the exceptional state is to 
reorganise the ideological hegemony, which concentrates and increases repression 
against popular classes (Poulantzas, 1974, pp.316-318). That is to say, in these 
exceptional forms of the capitalist state a particular intervention of ideology is necessary 
to legitimise the increased role of physical repression (Poulantzas, 1974, p.316). Fourth, 
Poulantzas claims that under Bonapartist conditions, the police state replaces the legal 
state. In other words, juridically the distinction between the public and private blurs. As 
such, the law no longer regulates and virtually everything falls within the scope of state 
intervention (Poulantzas, 1974, pp.322-323). In these exceptional forms of the state, the 
law is no longer the limit due to the unlimited exercise of executive power (Poulantzas, 
1974, p.322). 
On the other hand, Bourdieu (2014) criticises the Marxist theory of the state as 
being teleological and functionalist. According to him, the Marxists do not consider the 
existence of the state but characterise the state by its function: the maintenance of 
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conditions for capital accumulation in the service of the dominant class (Bourdieu, 
2014, pp.5-6). Instead, Bourdieu describes the genesis of the state as a process of 
concentration of different species of capital—namely military, economic, and symbolic 
capital (Bourdieu, 1994). He conceptualises the state as the holder of “meta-capital” 
which is capable of exercising power over all different kinds of capital (Bourdieu, 2014, 
p.197). In other words, the state is considered to be a “field within which agents 
struggle to possess a capital that gives power over the other fields” (Bourdieu, 2014, 
p.197). In this thesis, the Marxist theory of the state is used as an analytical tool to 
understand the class content of the capitalist Bonapartist state without rejecting other 
traditions. By doing so, this thesis aims to show that Kemalist rule was based on the 
exceptional form of the capitalist state.  
From Kemalist rule to AKP rule: conceptualising bourgeois liberal 
democracy and democratisation   
This thesis contends that the AKP government has symbolised the culmination of a 
post-Kemalist/Bonapartist process which commenced in the 1990s. AKP rule has 
signified the completion of the historical function of Turkish Bonapartism until 
2010/2011. The governing power of the party has corresponded to a situation of 
symbiosis among the different class fractions in Turkey, namely big finance capital and 
peripheral capital at the expense of the political omnipotence of the military. In other 
words, these fractions of the bourgeoisie managed to build their social, political and 
moral hegemony in the parliament, and thus eclipse the state’s hard core or coercive 
apparatus: the military. Yet, the AKP is not the creator of this bourgeois democratic 
transition as in the cases of the third wave of democratisation (for the third wave of 
democratisation see Huntington, 1991). On the contrary, the AKP government is the 
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product of and has been carrier of this bourgeois democratic transition in Turkey until 
2010/2011.  
Procedural democratisation in Turkey until 2010/2011 has not been a product of 
mass popular struggles against the Kemalist state. Thus it differs from the 1974 
Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which started as a military uprising and overthrew 
Estado Novo, an authoritarian regime in place since 1933; Solidarność (Solidarity), a 
Polish independent trade union federation in the 1980s; and the People Power 
Revolution in the Philippines that ousted the Marcos regime in 1986. Furthermore, it 
has not been the “long-term revolutionary process”, as Achcar (2013a) puts it, like that 
of the Middle East since December 2010. The bourgeois democratic transition in 
Turkey is not comparable even with the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in Europe, where 
struggle from below was decisive in overthrowing King Charles X in 1830 and Louis 
Philippe, the July Monarchy, in 1848. Nor is it possible to compare procedural 
democratisation in Turkey with the political mobilisation of the Levellers during the 
English Civil War between 1642 and 1651, which supported the extension of suffrage 
and popular sovereignty. Borrowing Przeworski’s concepts (1991), Turkey’s 
democratic transition succeeded in achieving “extrication” from the 
Kemalist/Bonapartist regime, without constituting a democratic regime. While it 
empowered civilian rule and led the military to be subjected to civilian control, it failed 
to achieve democratic consolidation. 
This thesis takes into account a distinction between the form and the content of 
bourgeois liberal democracy in a Marxist sense. The form of bourgeois liberal 
democracy is related to its various formal, procedural, and electoral aspects. In 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Joseph Schumpeter (2003) attacks the classical 
notion of democracy as being a normative theory of means and ends. Instead, 
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Schumpeter presents a realistic, procedural, and modern definition of democracy which 
has been purified from ideals: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (2003, p.269). Therefore, 
competition by potential decision makers for the electorate’s votes becomes the prime 
barometer of Schumpeter’s procedural definition of democracy (Sørensen, 2008, pp.10-
11). Conceptualising democracy as such, Schumpeter also underlines the importance of 
democratic rights to conduct competitive struggle. “If, on principle at least, everyone is 
free to compete for political leadership by presenting himself to the electorate”, says 
Schumpeter, “this will in most cases though not in all mean a considerable amount of 
freedom of discussion for all” (2003, p.272). He continues to say that “[i]n particular it 
will mean a considerable amount of freedom of the press” (Schumpeter, 2003, p.272). 
This leads us to conclude that bourgeois liberal democracies fulfil the following 
characteristics: “...1. a representative government elected by 2. an electorate consisting 
of the entire adult population, 3. whose votes carry equal weight, and 4. who are 
allowed to vote for any opinion without intimidation by the state apparatus” (Therborn, 
1977, p.4). Democratic rights such as freedoms of speech, assembly, organisation, and 
the press are prerequisites associated with existing bourgeois liberal democracies 
(Therborn, 1977, p.4).  
Yet, there can be specific conditions in which real power is not held or conferred 
by parliamentary institutions, as in the case of Bonapartist regimes. This necessitates an 
expansion of the procedural dimension of the definition of democracy, so that a political 
system is deemed to be democratic “to the extent that its most powerful decision makers 
are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely 
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” 
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(Huntington, 1991, p.7). In this expanded definition, the question revolves around the 
election of the “most powerful decision makers”, leading us to go further in 
conceptualising “democratisation”. 
Democratisation basically refers to the “replacement of a government that was 
not chosen this way by one that is selected in a free, open, and fair election” 
(Huntington, 1991, p.9). In his path-breaking book The Third Wave: Democratization in 
the Late Twentieth Century, Samuel Huntington (1991) observes that the third wave of 
democratisation manifested first itself in Southern Europe in Portugal, Greece, and 
Spain in 1974.3 It then engulfed Latin America in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentine, 
Uruguay, Brazil, Honduras, and Guatemala in the late 1970s and in the beginning of the 
1980s.4 It moved on to Asia; to India in 1977, Turkey in 1983, the Philippines in 1986, 
South Korea in 1987, Taiwan in 1987/88, and Pakistan in 1988. At the end of the 
decade, the third wave involved “communist” regimes; Hungary in 1988/89, the Baltic 
Republics in early 1990, Poland in 1989, and East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Mongolia in 1990 (Huntington, 1991, pp.21-24).     
In his The Third Wave, Huntington (1991) proposes a macro-level analysis on 
regime change, arguing that a combination of several factors led to the third wave of 
democratisation. According to him, on one hand the spread of democratic norms, the 
ideological delegitimation of authoritarian rules, and their economic failures, 
                                                          
3 Huntington neatly captures three waves of democratisation followed by two reverse waves. According 
to Huntington, the first wave took place between 1828 and 1926 when the United States, Switzerland, 
France, Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, Iceland, and Argentina established at least minimal national 
democratic institutions. However, this wave of democratisation was followed by a reverse wave between 
1922 and 1942 when authoritarian governments came to power in various countries at different times. 
The second wave of democratisation came about between 1943 and 1962. It was followed by a second 
reverse wave between 1958 and 1975 when the military dictatorships overwhelmed the Latin American 
and Asian countries. The second reverse wave was noticeable by 1975, with democracy having broken 
down in thirty-eight countries (Huntington, 1991, pp.16-20).  
4 Notable Latin American cases between 1964 and 1990 in which the military stayed in power for a long 
period of time include Brazil between 1964 and 1985; Chile between 1973 and 1990; Peru between 1968 
and 1980; Argentina between 1966 and 1973 and between 1976 and 1983; Panama between 1968 and 
1989; Uruguay between 1973 and 1985; Honduras between 1963 and 1971 and between 1972 and 1982. 
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contributed to the weakening of authoritarian regimes. Moreover, economic advances, 
which had led to widespread literacy, urbanisation, a larger middle class; the changing 
attitude of the Catholic Church as well as of the EU, the US, and the Soviet Union in the 
mid-1980s, together with the snowballing effect that the emergence of new democratic 
regimes in countries such as Spain, Argentina, the Philippines and Poland had on 
democratic movements in other countries, all contributed to the emergence of 
democratic regimes in the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington, 1991, pp.106-107). 
Regarding the role of the power elite in democratic transition processes, Adam 
Przeworski’s book Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, which was published in the same year 1991 as The 
Third Wave, complements Huntington’s macro-analysis. Przeworski (1991) does not 
explain the general causes that generated favourable conditions for the democratic 
transitions as Huntington does.  Rather, he analyses the democratic transition processes 
led by the power elite and their divergent institutional outcomes. The power elite refers 
to politically, militarily, and economically dominant people—namely the political 
directorate, the corporation chieftains, and the warlords—who occupy the command 
posts of pivotal bureaucratic organisations of modern industrial societies and give 
decisions that have at least national consequences (Mills, 1956). Przeworski (1991, 
pp.67-77) argues through the use of game theory that democratic transitions and their 
different institutional outcomes are contingent upon how hard-liners and reformers in 
the armed forces on the one hand and moderates and radicals in the civilian opposition 
on the other hand interact, bargain, and make strategic coalitions. In other words, 
extrication from the authoritarian regime is the product of an alliance between reformers 
and moderates. Extrication is possible only if i) reformers and moderates agree on the 
establishment of democratic institutions for their social forces, ii) reformers can 
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persuade radicals of the benefits of democracy or counterbalance them, iii) moderates 
have political strength to control radicals (Przeworski, 1991, p.68).      
In his analysis, Przeworski (1991) attributes to the level of military integration in 
the face of a threat an importance that shapes institutional outcomes. In other words, if 
the military is characterised by cohesion in defending the regime, the transition leaves 
behind an institutional framework that maintains a tutelary system and grants the 
military elites special prerogatives (Przeworski, 1991, pp.67-79). In these political 
systems, what Brian Loveman calls “protected democracies”, the military continues to 
exert pressure on the definition and application of defence policies, prohibition of 
constitutional protection of civil liberties, maintenance of military jurisdiction over 
civilians, restraint on civilian authorities to intervene in military budgets as well as 
military promotions and retirements (Loveman, 1994, pp.123-124). However, if the 
military cohesion is disintegrated, the transition type and its particular institutional 
framework depend on the balance of power among the conflicting elites (Przeworski, 
1991, pp.82-88). 
Przeworski claims that if the balance of power is uneven and this is mutually 
understood among the conflicting elites, the institutions will then align themselves to 
the dominant faction’s interests. In this situation, the institutions simply reflect the 
existing power relations and therefore the situation continues until the balance of power 
changes. On the other hand, if the balance of power is known and balanced, the outcome 
is indeterminate and may even lead to a civil war. In this context, only a temporal 
institutional arrangement can allow conflicting forces to coexist peacefully. However, 
the resolution is likely to be short-lived and unstable. Third, if the actors involved do 
not know each other’s powers, the outcome is more likely to produce functioning 
democratic institutions because the conflicting elites will seek to establish a system of 
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checks and balances to monitor each other, and consequently compromise will be 
assured (Przeworski, 1991, pp.82-88). 
In this regard, democratic transitions in Latin American countries support 
Przeworski’s analysis on elite bargaining processes and the balance of power. Raúl 
Alfonsín, the first democratically elected Argentinean president between 1983 and 1989 
following the military government, pursued a dual strategy—namely, sanctioning and 
appeasement—to ward off a military insurrection but he failed to accomplish civilian 
control (Trinkunas, 2001, p.179). While he sanctioned the military by reducing the 
defence budget, he also appeased it by prosecuting only the army’s higher commands 
for human rights abuses during a period of state terrorism between 1976 and 1983, 
known as the “Dirty War”, and enacting administrative measures to block the 
advancement of military trials. This strategy, however, only contributed to the decrease 
of Alfonsín’s popularity among the masses and the unification of the military, since the 
latter perceived his strategy as a symptom of governmental weakness (Trinkunas, 2001, 
pp.179-180). On the other hand, when Carlos Menem, who served in the presidency 
between 1989 and 1999, changed the strategy, he pardoned all convicted officers in 
return for military subordination. This led him to find allies in the army, which then 
allowed him to break the military’s resistance to civilian leverage. Ultimately, Menem 
found no difficulty in using the military as a tool for an alignment of Argentinean 
foreign policy with that of the U.S. (Trinkunas, 2001, p.181). 
In his later work Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-
Being in the World, 1950-1990, Przeworski shifts his focus from a micro-level elite 
bargaining analysis to a macro-level analysis based on performance and survival of the 
political regimes. Democracy and Development questions whether the regime types—
namely democracy and dictatorship—have significant impacts on economic growth or 
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vice versa (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). The authors find that 
there is no linear relationship wherein democracy is the natural outcome of economic 
development, as modernisation theory claims (Przeworski et al., 2000, Chapter 2). 
Nevertheless, they contend that “however they emerge, democracies are much more 
likely to survive in affluent societies” (Przeworski et al., 2000, p.137). Likewise, 
Przeworski concludes that the wealthy dictatorships are more likely to survive because 
the fall of the regime is too risky and costly for people (Munck, 2003, p.19). It is further 
argued in Democracy and Development that the regime types do not hinder or foster 
economic growth (Przeworski et al., 2000, pp.178-179) although per capita income 
grows faster and people live longer under democracies (Przeworski et al., 2000, pp.264-
265). These findings do not necessarily mean that democracies have no virtues. 
Borrowing Engels’ phrase that “ballots became paper stones”, Przeworski thinks that 
democracy “as a set of rules” handles conflicts in a peaceful manner because it enables 
the conflicting forces to compromise under conditions of uncertainty (Munck, 2003, 
p.30).   
The electoral, procedural, and minimalist definitions of democracy are 
challenged by various scholars (Dahl, 2000; Grugel, 2002; Held, 2006; Kaldor & 
Vejvoda, 1997; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Mary Kaldor and 
Ivan Vejvoda (1997) differentiate between formal and substantive democracy. 
According to them, substantive democracy is “a process that has to be continually 
reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in such a way as to maximize the 
opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live, to 
participate in and influence debates about the key decisions which affect society” 
(Kaldor & Vejvoda, 1997, p.62). Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry L. Karl draw attention 
to the fact that the contemporary meaning of democracy affirms the principle of 
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accountability of rulers for their actions, which necessarily relates to not only 
procedures for forming government but also to power of civil society organisations in 
order for citizens to exert pressure on public policy (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p.78). 
David Held develops his own model of democracy what he calls “democratic 
autonomy”. In this model, an extensive range of political, social, and economic rights 
are legally entrenched for citizens to enable them to demand democratic rule and 
participation (Held, 2006, p.277). 
Moreover, the Marxist scholars emphasise that the content of this form 
indubitably corresponds to its bourgeois character (Draper, 1974; Savran, 1987; 
Schwarzmantel, 1995; Therborn, 1977; Wood 1995). This particular form of democracy 
bears “a tension between the democratic idea of equal citizenship rights and the 
structure of inequality that exists in ‘civil society’, or rather in the capitalist economy 
within which [liberal] democratic political institutions are situated” (Schwarzmantel, 
1995, p.210). Empirical theories on democracy assume pluralism in society and 
therefore neglect to see structural power relations perpetuated by capitalism (Grugel, 
2002, pp.20-22). In the context of the antagonistic relationship between labour and 
capital, the representative state tends to mean the representation in government of the 
political and economic interests of the different fractions of the capitalists, against 
labour. In the last analysis, as Engels (1884/1991, p.553) puts it in The Origin of the 
Family, Private Property and the State, “...the modern representative state is the 
instrument for exploiting wage-labor by capital”. Parliament becomes a political sphere 
where the capitalists can hide their class interests and make the class differences in 
society invisible to the extent that “[t]he class difference within civil society becomes a 
political difference” (Marx, 1843/1970, p.72). For instance, in the 19th century French 
Legislative Assembly, 
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The parliamentary republic was more than the neutral territory on which the two 
factions of the French bourgeoisie, Legitimists and Orleanists, large landed property and 
industry, could dwell side by side with equality of rights. It was the unavoidable 
condition of their common rule, the sole form of state in which their general class 
interest subjected to itself at the same time both the claims of their particular factions 
and all the remaining classes of society (Marx, 1852/1972,  p.82).  
The representatives of the capitalists turn the parliament into a place where “the 
common denominator of the interests of the bourgeoisie could be determined” (Mandel, 
1969, p.15). Under capitalism, parliament becomes the political meeting place of the 
representatives of the ruling class where they “could be listed, groups opposed to one 
another by a multitude of sectional, regional, and corporative interests” (Mandel, 1969, 
p.16). It is only in parliament that the superficial appearance of conflicting political 
parties can conceal the class struggle and the peculiar physiognomy of the period (Marx, 
1852/1972, p.22).  
It is the class content of bourgeois liberal democracy that inherently restricts the 
majority of the population from exerting effective control over their workplaces and 
lives (Roper, 2013, p.238). Parliamentary cretinism “...holds those infected by it fast in 
an imaginary world and robs them of all sense, all memory, all understanding of the 
rude external world...” (Marx, 1852/1972, p.77). Purporting to represent the whole 
society by conferring political equality on labouring citizens who are otherwise unequal, 
the parliamentary republic neglects the basic contradiction between labour and capital in 
the form of exploitation. It passes over the fact  that “vast areas of our daily lives – in 
the workplace, in the distribution of labour and resources – [...] are not subject to 
democratic accountability but are governed by the powers of property and the ‘laws’ of 
the market, the imperatives of profit maximisation” (Wood, 1995, p.234). This had been 
referred to by Marx a century ago as “democratic swindle”; democratic forms of 
government are utilised to keep “the expression of popular opinion within channels 
satisfactory to its class interests” (Draper, 1974, p.121; 1977, p.306).  
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These critiques of bourgeois/capitalist democracy do not necessarily mean that 
its value can be entirely dismissed (Savran, 1987, p.57; Therborn, 1977, p.5). It is true 
that under capitalism, it makes little sense to assert an absolute distinction between 
democracy and dictatorship, given that under specific conditions and class conjuncture 
in bourgeois politics, dictatorship may emerge out of liberal democratic institutions 
(Carver, 2004, p.125). And indeed, while the French Assembly nearly abolished 
universal male suffrage in 1850, Napoleon III paradoxically re-established it albeit in a 
plebiscitary fashion, after the 1851 coup (Hazareesingh, 2004, p.131). However, that 
being said, capitalist democracy is substantively if not absolutely distinct from certain 
exceptional forms of the capitalist state, as analysed by Poulantzas, such as fascism, 
Bonapartism, and military dictatorship “which override or smash the degree of 
pluralism and autonomy of civil society from the state” (Schwarzmantel, 1995, p.208). 
In addition, it should be recalled that the development of representative democracy, 
which now encompasses universal suffrage and civil rights, is the product of popular 
struggles against exclusive and limited suffrage in which various qualifications 
enfranchised only the wealthy (Roper, 2013, pp.206-208). 
Switching to the Turkish case, it is argued here that the military-Bonapartist regime 
was a decades-long phenomenon, with the beginning of its dissolution coming in the 
post-Kemalist phase in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The democratic transition in 
Turkey under the AKP, which ran until 2010/2011, corresponds with the demise of the 
Bonapartist regime, in that a representative government was now able, to a large extent, 
to control the core pillar of the state apparatus. In other words, the AKP, as a Muslim 
conservative party, found itself taking charge of the completion of the liberal 
democratic transition, a process which was already underway and had gone through 
many ups and downs before 2010/2011.  
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Significantly, the AKP as a governing party is not solely an actor in the democratic 
transition but a product and surrogate of this process, which had already commenced 
under Turgut Özal in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The gradual march of Turkish 
bourgeoisie towards the political possession of the state after the late 1980s is the 
product of class alliance between the ruling classes. Concomitantly, the ruling classes 
were forced to adopt a new strategy to deal with ingravescent Kurdish problem and the 
Kurdish people’s struggle in the 1990s, which meant getting rid of military rule. The 
EU process also played an external role, preventing the politically dominant fraction of 
the bourgeoisie from aligning with the military. Overall, the civilian supremacy over the 
military corresponds to the transition to the democratic form of class domination which 
shelters the common sovereignty of the different fractions of capital in the parliament.  
It is also important to point out that transition from the Bonapartist state to the 
functioning parliamentary republic has nevertheless manifested a neoliberal political 
atmosphere which “shrinks the scope of equality and democratic public life 
dramatically, in all areas of material production and distribution” (Duggan, 2003, p.13). 
It is a fact that this democratic transition in Turkey takes place in an epoch of neoliberal 
globalisation in which the capitalists have more freedom to codify political power and 
ability to enact devastating neoliberal legislative programs due to the weakness of 
organised labour in Turkey, which had been crushed after the 1980 coup. The AKP 
period is, no doubt, the uninterrupted continuation of neoliberal globalisation in 
Turkey—through the transformation of work, the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, and the downsizing of the civil service—which inherently place limits on 
the democratic character of workplaces, social institutions and the state.  
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Research methodology, design, and problematique 
In this thesis, I have largely adopted a qualitative methodology, with a view to gaining a 
deeper understanding of social phenomena. My qualitative research has involved semi-
structured interviews; content analysis of reports, presentations, representative offices 
bulletins, selected newspaper material, and publications and annual reports of capital 
groups in Turkey; EU progress reports since 1998. Additionally, quantitative data has 
been incorporated into my qualitative research. The quantitative data extracted from 
various research companies in Turkey covers 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015 
general election results and the voting constituency of the Refah Party and the AKP. 
The 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 local election results have also been referred to, 
so as to facilitate an understanding of the rupture/continuity in the voting constituency 
of the Refah Party and the AKP. Statistics from international organisations (The World 
Bank, UNDP, OECD, etc.) were also used. Interviews were used to incorporate 
perspectives from the following members of the Turkish elite: representatives of capital 
groups in Turkey such as TÜSIAD, MÜSIAD, ASKON and TÜRKONFED; a 
representative from the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce, the head of which is also the 
founding member of the AKP; a Refah Party parliamentarian who worked in the 
Ministry of Justice between 1996 and 1997; the Minister of Finance during the Refah-
Yol government between 1996 and 1997; two ex-parliamentarians in the Refah Party; 
an ex-parliamentarian in the Republican People’s Party; and some state officials. 
Interviews were also conducted with two socialist writers; a columnist in Turkish 
Cypriot newspaper Afrika and a columnist in newspaper Zaman, which is known for its 
attachment to Fethullah Gülen (a former preacher who set up Turkish private schools 
across the world) and for its entrepreneurial attachment with capital group called 
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TUSKON. The leader of the anti-capitalist Muslims in Turkey, İhsan Eliaçık, was also 
interviewed (See Box 1.1). 
Box 1.1. The Interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unit of analysis (For analysing the AKP) 
In order to understand the class character of the AKP, the research has intensely 
investigated the relationship between the party leadership and different capital groups in 
Turkey. The unit of analysis has been divided into three sections, namely political 
leadership, membership and electorate of the party. Each section is also divided into 
sub-sections: 
1) Political Leadership: In the thesis, the relationship between the party leadership 
of the AKP and different capital groups has been analysed. The notion of 
Sıtkı Abdullahoğlu, Deputy-Chairman of ASKON 
Betül Çelikkaleli, Deputy-Secretary General of TÜRKONFED 
Goncagül Avcı, Legal Adviser of at İstanbul Chamber of Commerce 
Serkan Ersöz, Senior Chief of Political Reforms Department at TÜSİAD 
Mustafa Oğuz, expert at DEİK 
Selçuk Mutlu, Deputy-Secretary General of MÜSİAD 
An economic expert at MÜSİAD (wished to remain anonymous) 
Şevket Kazan, Minister of Justice during the Refah-Yol government 
Abdüllatif Şener, Minister of Finance during the Refah-Yol government 
Mehmet Bekaroğlu, former Refah Party parliamentarian 
Nurettin Akbaş, former Refah Party parliamentarian 
Birgül Ayman Güler, former parliamentarian in the Republican People’s Party 
Hüseyin Gülerce, former columnist in newspaper Zaman 
İhsan Eliaçık, leader of the Anti-Capitalist Muslims in Turkey 
Sungur Savran, socialist writer and head of the Revolutionary Workers’ Party 
Ömer Laçiner, socialist writer and Chief Editor of monthly magazine Birikim 
Yalçın Okut, columnist in Turkish Cypriot newspaper Afrika 
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political leadership is related to the "representational tie" between the party 
leadership and capital groups.  The notion of "representational tie" has two 
consecutive meanings: The first meaning concerns the tie of a political party to 
real class interests. The second meaning concerns “the ideological and 
organisational ties of a party to a class whose real interests it may not well 
represent” (Poulantzas, 1974, p.249). The capital groups that the AKP represents 
the class interests of are: 
• TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) 
• MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association)  
• ASKON (The Anatolian Tigers Business Association) 
• TUSKON (Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey) 
This analysis was based on content analysis of the publications of these capital 
groups. Concerning TÜSİAD, reports, presentations, representative office bulletins, 
publications, and annual reports since 2000 have been analysed on relevant topics to 
reveal the extent to which their economic, political, and ideological interests have been 
adopted by the AKP.  
Concerning MÜSİAD, Çerçeve Review, Research Reports, and Turkish 
Economy Reports in 2010 have been covered. The relationship between the party 
leadership and MÜSİAD is shown to be particularly significant with respect to 
"ideological and organisational ties" given the fact that about ten MÜSİAD members 
participated as founding members of the AKP, and about 20 MÜSİAD members were 
elected as parliamentarians from the AKP in the 2002 elections (Şen, 2005, p.71). For 
the expansion of Turkish peripheral capital towards the Middle East, MÜSİAD’s 
publication on Economic Cooperation Among Islamic Countries in 2008 is taken as a 
significant source. 
 56 
Concerning TUSKON, the association does not have regular publications or 
research reports on the Turkish economy given its recent foundation in 2005. However, 
it does include around 34,000 entrepreneurs (TUSKON, n.d.). As a capitalist 
organisation known for its affiliation with the Gülen community, TUSKON annually 
organises a business forum called "Turkey-Middle East Trade Bridge" which brings 
Turkish businessmen together with their Middle Eastern counterparts. The website of 
the association offered a wealth of data on the commercial activities of TUSKON in 
Africa, Eurasia and Eastern Europe.5 The importance of this capital organisation is that, 
while claiming to remain aloof from domestic politics, the Gülen community supported 
the attempts of the AKP to end the army infiltration of the police force and judiciary. 
However, the clash between the Gülen community and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since late 
2013 has damaged the tie between the AKP and Gülen-linked capital groups. The AKP 
used brute forces to control Gülen-linked capital firms that did not serve its interests— 
for example taking over and appointing a trustee panel to Koza İpek Holding. The 
Erdoğan-Gülen feud and increasingly authoritarian track of the AKP will be detailed in 
Chapter 5.  
Additionally, 
• Party programmes of the AKP and the Refah Party were compared with the 
programmes and demands of these capital groups. This comparison revealed the 
different economic and social bases of the AKP and the Refah Party. 
• EU Progress Reports for Turkey since 1999 were analysed in order to 
underscore the extent to which the EU process has helped to diminish the 
political omnipotence of the military in Turkey and to what extent it exerts its 
                                                          
5 For TUSKON, see http://www.tuskon.org/faaliyet/tum_faaliyetler.php. 
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power on Turkey to initiate reforms in the domestic political, economic, and 
military spheres. 
2) Membership: With regard to membership, the research did not aim to 
intensively analyse the political party membership per se. Rather, it analysed the 
"ideological and political membership" of selected trade unions and newspapers 
to the AKP. For trade unions, it is noted that HAK-İŞ (one of the four major 
national trade unions) and MEMUR-SEN (confederation of public servants trade 
unions) have a subordinate relationship with the AKP. It is also noticed that their 
membership has sharply increased since 2002. MEMUR-SEN increased its 
membership from 41,817 people in 2002 to 707,652 people in 2013 while the 
number of members of the left-wing Confederation of Public Workers Union, 
(KESK), decreased from 262,348 in 2002 to 237,180 in 2013 (Resmi Gazete 
[Official Gazette], 7 July 2002 & 6 July 2013). 
• For newspapers, selected news on civil-military relations in Turkey, the AKP-
constitution making process, and EU relations in newspapers such as Milliyet, 
Hürriyet, Milli Gazete, Radikal, Yeni Şafak, and Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet 
Daily News  were consulted.  
3) Electorate: The general elections in 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015 
and the local elections in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 were assessed 
through the aggregate data collected from the Turkish Statistical Institute. This 
data was compared with the 1995 general elections and 1994 local elections in 
which the Refah Party increased its votes tremendously.6  
This thesis is not only about studying a political party, namely the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). Rather, it intends to explore the causes of the mutation of 
                                                          
6 In the 1994 local elections, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) was able to gain the biggest two 
metropolitan cities in Turkey: Istanbul and Ankara. In the 1995 general elections, RP ranked the first with 
its 21.38% of the vote and formed the government in 1996.  
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Islamic politics; the rise of the AKP in Turkish politics; and importantly the impact on 
state-society relations. It problematises how neoliberal globalisation has transformed the 
cross-class electoral alliances of Islamic political parties after the 1980s and how this 
mutation of Islamic politics has been instrumental in changing the state-society 
relations. The guiding question of the research is as follows: 
1) What accounts for the mutation of Islamic politics in the era of neoliberal 
globalisation and the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey 
after the 2000s? 
By answering this question, the research tries to show that the mutation of Islamic 
politics in Turkey epitomised by the AKP contributed to the demise of the Kemalist 
state. In other words, the study shows that while the reactionary populism and Islamic 
fundamentalist agenda of Necmettin Erbakan failed to settle accounts with the Kemalist 
state, the AKP’s breakaway from Islamic tradition facilitated the end of the political 
regime. In order to conclude its extrication from the Kemalist state, the AKP also 
successfully benefited from the EU accession process and the US imperial interests in 
the Middle East.  
The research also tries to answer the following questions:  
2) What are the social and economic bases of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) as successor of the Refah (Welfare) Party? To what extent do the two 
parties differ in terms of their social and economic bases? 
3) To what extent has the AKP been successful in fulfilling the interests of the 
different wings of the bourgeoisie after the economic crisis in Turkey in 2001? 
4) To what extent did the AKP succeed in neutralising the internal contradictions 
between big finance capital and peripheral capital in Turkey? 
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5) How did the AKP relate to the process that had commenced under Turgut Özal 
in the 1990s, in achieving the demise of the Kemalist state? 
6) Why and how has the AKP in Turkey been able to retain power since 2002 when 
its pro-Islamist predecessor, the Refah Party, was pushed out of office by the 
military after just one year in power in the 1990s? 
7) To what extent is the EU process effective in diminishing the role of the military 
in the political arena in Turkey? 
8) How to understand Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authoritarian turn after 2010/2011? 
9) What are the political features and consequences of Turkish foreign policy under 
AKP rule? 
From these aforementioned questions:  
First and foremost, the thesis hypothesises that the mutation of Islamic politics in 
Turkey was instrumental in achieving the severance of military control from 
parliamentary power. It is acknowledged that this mutation in Islamic politics 
corresponded with the formation of peripheral capital in Turkey into a social and 
political force through the Islamist political parties after the 1980s. Second, the thesis 
argues that the rise of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AKP) in 2002 signifies this mutation in Islamic politics in Turkey to the extent that the 
AKP has been able to unify the interests of big finance capital and peripheral capital. 
Through joint representation of the different fractions of the bourgeoisie by the AKP, 
the government has managed to overcome the political omnipotence of the military in 
Turkey, concurrently leading to the institutional necrosis of the Kemalist/Bonapartist 
state. In other words, the thesis contends that while the economic base of Islamic 
politics in Turkey in the 1990s materialised by the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP, a 
pro-Islamist party) was largely grounded in the peripheral nascent capital and 
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remained aloof from big finance capital, the AKP in the 2000s has managed to 
economically represent the symbiosis of peripheral and big finance capital, contributing 
to the metamorphosis in Islamic politics into a neoliberal religious conservative project 
in Turkey. A breakaway from its predecessor’s Islamic genealogy enabled the party to 
carry out a democratic transition until 2010/2011.  
These questions and hypotheses are crucial in four ways: Firstly, they aim to set 
out the mutation of Islamic politics and the demise of the Kemalist state in Turkey from 
a historical perspective. Without jettisoning the identity-based analysis, this approach 
tries to ascertain the social and economic bases of Islamic politics in Turkey. Secondly, 
the research intends to expose the metamorphosis of Islamic politics in Turkey 
corresponding to the change in state-society relations in line with the weakening of the 
military-Bonapartist regime after the 1990s. Third, the research acknowledges that big 
finance capital and peripheral capital constitute the two great factions of the Turkish 
bourgeoisie and that parliamentary control over the military was their convergent aim. 
However, it is their material conditions that kept these wings of the bourgeoisie apart. 
Fourth, it is necessary to recognise that the neoliberal transformation of Turkey since 
1980 has created conditions in which identity politics and market capitalism have led to 
the rise of peripheral capital, having significant effects on the political and ideological 
levels. The study also takes into account the exogenous factors in metamorphosis of 
Islamic politics into a bourgeois-conservative politics, with EU pressure playing a role 
in diminishing the dominance of military in Turkey and US imperial strategy in the 
Middle East having an interest in collaborating with a conservative-neoliberal party in 
Turkey. 
Last but not least, the study indirectly contributes to the literature on Islamic 
politics by differentiating the AKP from other Islamic fundamentalist parties in the 
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region. Neither Tunisia’s Ennahda nor Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party, which are 
affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, share similar socio-economic interests or 
political characteristics with the AKP. The fundamental divergence between the Turkish 
experience of the AKP and the trajectories of other Islamic parties does not stem from 
their ideological and ethical inclinations, which in both cases are centered around a 
desire for the Islamisation of society. Rather, the difference is rooted in each country’s 
divergent modalities of capitalism and the distinct socio-economic interests that these 
bourgeois parties aspire to represent. For instance, whereas Tunisia experienced—
similarly to Turkey—export-led industrialisation under Ben Ali’s dictatorship, Tunisian 
capitalists—unlike Turkish counterparts—maintained their relationship with despotic 
regime in return for “stability” and financial gains (Achcar, 2013a, pp.265-268). 
However, economic transformation in Tunisia under Ben Ali failed to produce high 
economic growth and higher employment rates. Furthermore, whereas the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt represented—similar to the AKP—the common interests of the 
different fractions of Egyptian capitalism, the Egyptian market bourgeoisie—unlike 
their Turkish counterparts—is still dominantly involved in commercial and speculative 
activities and construction under a rentier state (Achcar, 2013a, pp.276-281). On the 
other hand, Turkey stands out as an example of an emerging country whose economy is 
based on export-led industry. All in all, from a political perspective, the military still 
preserves significant prerogatives in Tunisia and Egypt. The Kef trials in Tunisia were 
not sufficiently successful in investigating the responsibility of the army for repressing 
the uprising and Morsi—unlike Erdoğan— was not adamant enough about settling 
accounts with the army (Achcar, 2013a, pp.270,274). Turkey’s infamous Ergenekon and 
Sledgehammer cases ended the military’s tutelage over politics, albeit creating new 
problems of social polarisation and further erosion of the rule of law. 
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Chapter 2: The Kemalist State as a Capitalist-Bonapartist State  
The Kemalist state, which emerged upon the complete dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire in 1923, encapsulates the classic characteristics of the capitalist-Bonapartist 
state (Başkaya, 2008; Tura, 1998). Clearly the physiognomy of the Kemalist state under 
Mustafa Kemal between 1923 and 1938 took a republican form, whereas the French 
states under Napoléon Bonaparte between 1804 and 1815 and Louis-Napoléon 
Bonaparte between 1852 and 1870 exhibited an imperial form. In other words, while 
Mustafa Kemal principally waged his struggle against the patrimonial rule of the 
Ottoman Empire and consequently declared the Republic of Turkey, the Bonapartes 
were officially declared Emperors of the French. However, these two divergent political 
forms in different territories and different centuries share common traits, which can be 
summed up as the concentration of power into the hands of an individual, and more 
importantly, the tendency toward the hypertrophy of executive power over legislative 
power.  
  The dominance of the state-executive over the legislature in underdeveloped 
countries in the twentieth century does not occur directly in order to resolve or arbitrate 
conflicts of interests between the different factions of the dominant classes (Başkaya, 
2008, p.105). Neither does it emerge from a precarious class equilibrium. Rather, due to 
both the objective and subjective weakness of the national-liberal bourgeoisie, the 
function of Bonapartist regimes such as those in Turkey, Algeria, and Egypt 
complements an economic mission (Başkaya, 2008, p.105). This economic task is to 
develop and strengthen the propertied classes, whose social and political power have 
been shattered by rapid transformation in society. A precarious socio-economic 
condition that the dominant classes are unable to control creates conditions favorable for 
a national hero to guarantee their economic gains (Marx, 1852/1972, p.2). A tranquil 
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socio-political environment, which these classes require to gain strength, can only be 
reached by a Savior of Nation. The Bonapartist Kemalist regime in Turkey, the 
Nasserist regime in Egypt, and the Boumediene regime in Algeria were long-lived and 
repressive due to the weakness of capital accumulation in those countries and the 
necessity to make the bourgeoisie stronger (Başkaya, 2008, p.105). The repressive 
Turkish state is the product of the objective and subjective weakness of the national-
liberal bourgeoisie, which failed to produce its hegemony by consent vis-à-vis the 
dominated classes in the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
It can be argued that Turkish Bonapartism covers a long period commencing 
with the ascension of Mustafa Kemal as the first president of the Republic of Turkey on 
29 October 1923. Mustafa Kemal’s trajectory to becoming president was the product of 
the gradual disintegration of the First Assembly, which functioned between its 
foundation on 23 April 1920 and dissolution on 16 April 1923. Besides, the domestic 
context that resulted in Mustafa Kemal’s domination of the Assembly was situated in 
the precarious conditions of the National Struggle (Başkaya 2008; Demirel, 2011).  
From the beginning, the Constituent Assembly exercised both legislative and 
executive powers; Mustafa Kemal was elected as President of the Assembly and of the 
Committee of Executive Commissioners (İcra Vekilleri Heyeti) (Demirel, 2011, p.160). 
The Assembly was also empowered with a judicial function on 29 April 1920 when the 
Grand National Assembly enacted the High Treason Law (Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu) 
against deserters and opponents of the National Struggle (Zürcher, 2004, p.152; 
Demirel, 2011, p.161). Mustafa Kemal consolidated his grip when a law on 4 November 
1920 granted him, as president of the Assembly, to appoint the executive 
commissioners (Demirel, 2011, p.178). With the Greco-Turkish War threatening the fall 
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of Ankara – where the Assembly was located – all of the Assembly’s power was 
provisionally devolved to him on 5 August 1921 (Demirel, 2011, p.178, pp.260-265).  
In this historical context, the constituent role of the Kemalist army was brought 
into being in a political and economic setting in which none of the propertied classes 
were strong enough to establish hegemony over the other classes during the National 
Struggle period of 1919 to 1922 (Tura, 1998, p.52). Consequently, the strong and 
repressive state and the power of bureaucracy in Turkey are the product of necessity of 
the nascent Turkish bourgeoisie in an underdeveloped country “where capitalism took 
root belatedly in the twentieth century” (Savran, 2002, p.6).  
It is important to stress that, distinct from Western examples of Bonapartism, the 
Kemalist capitalist state rests not only on the personal control of state power. It 
stretches from the personal rule of Mustafa Kemal between 1923 and 1938 to a long-
lasting period of institutionalised military power over the parliament after the 1960 
coup. The long existence of Kemalist Bonapartism mainly stems from the political 
decision-making process going on behind the scenes. In other words, the Kemalist 
military has usurped state power, but not for very long unlike what has been seen in 
Latin American cases, for instance, in Brazil between 1964 and 1985, in Spain between 
1936 and 1975 and in South Korea in the series of military dictatorships from the 1960s 
up until the 1980s. Indeed, the Turkish military enjoyed sharing and controlling state 
power with the political representatives of the bourgeoisie, which created “a dual 
system of executive decision making” (Sakallioğlu, 1997, p.158). This long period of 
Turkish Bonapartism was perpetuated by the ideological dominance of the military 
(Şen, 1996), which was successful in presenting itself as the supreme head of the nation 
and promoting the indivisibility of the nation from its own self-image. It is conceivable 
that the military has not only been a repressive apparatus of the state but also an 
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ideological apparatus for the reproduction of the regime and preservation of Kemalist 
modernity (Şen, 1996). This is mainly due to the fact that the Turkish armed forces, to a 
certain extent, substituted the  prominent function of the ideological tools of capitalism 
in favour of the Kemalist Republic since the schooling was low and the communication 
tools were inadequate to accomplish the ideological struggle in rural areas (Şen, 1996, 
pp.33-35). Therefore, Kemalism has been a state ideology, which is preserved and 
supported by means of administrative and criminal sanctions (Beşikçi, 2010, p.17).7  
The Turkish Bonapartist era reverberated with a tendency for Turkish armed 
forces to frequently migrate from their barracks to the forefront of Turkish politics, as 
seen in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. Following Sungur Savran (2010, p.192), it can be 
postulated that the reproduction capacity and eagerness of the armed forces to intervene 
in political life have corresponded with the impotence and incapacity of the bourgeoisie 
to get its interests accepted by society within the framework of parliamentary 
sovereignty. In short, the intervention capacity of the Turkish military is inversely 
related to the hegemonic governing capacity of the bourgeoisie through its 
parliamentary apparatus (Savran, 2010, p.192). Clearly, then, contrary to the statist-
institutionalist perspective that overlooks class power in the reproduction of state 
power, the organic relationship between the power of the state executive and the ruling 
classes is not external and contradictory, but rather intrinsic and complementary.  
Crucially, Bonapartist law was imposed in the convulsive founding period of 
Turkish Bonapartism, and used as an effective tool to reproduce the political regime. By 
declaring martial law and a state of emergency, the Kemalist Bonapartist state exerted 
                                                          
7 For instance, the Law Concerning Crimes Committed Against Atatürk (Law No 5816), which was 
enacted in 1951, makes defamation of the memory of Mustafa Kemal a criminal act. In one of the recent 
cases in 2005, two young people under 18 were handed jail sentences over defamation of Atatürk when 
they wrote flippant words such as mıstık (an abbreviation in Turkish for the word Mustafa) into the 
memorial book of Anıtkabir where the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal is located (Habertürk, 28 January 
2010).    
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its power for a long time. In the 75 years from the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey on 29 September 1923 to the 75th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey in 
1998, the total duration of martial law (wholly or partially proclaimed) was 25 years, 9 
months and 18 days (Üskül, 1997, p.71). Worse still, even though martial law, which 
had been put into effect in the wake of the 12 September 1980 coup, was lifted in July 
1987, the Council of Ministers under the control of the National Security Council 
maintained an official state of emergency in Turkish Kurdistan until November 20028. 
Following fluctuations in the extension and gradual nullification of the state of 
emergency declarations in some parts of Turkish Kurdistan, the final one was abrogated 
in the Diyarbakır and Şırnak districts in November 2002. It would be far from 
exaggeration to say that an extraordinary governmental declaration turned into an 
ordinary rule in the Republic of Turkey. It is astonishing to note that until the complete 
abrogation of the exceptional rule of the state of emergency in Diyarbakır and Şırnak in 
November 2002, more than 42 years of the life of the Republic of Turkey had been 
under extraordinary rule, either in all or part of the country (Table 2.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 One of the blind acts of violence which was unleashed upon Turkish Kurdistan in the Republican period 
was just after the Mount Ararat Revolt of 1930. Law No 1850 protected civilians and military authorities 
who killed Kurds during the revolt. According to the Law, “Murders and other actions committed 
individually or collectively, from the 20th of June 1930 to the 10th of December 1930, by the 
representatives of the state or the province, by the military or civil authorities, by the local authorities, by 
guards or militiamen, or by any civilian having helped the above or acted on their behalf, during the 
pursuit and extermination of the revolts which broke out in Ercis, Zilan, Agridag (Ararat) and the 
surrounding areas, including Pulumur in Erzincan province and the area of the First Inspectorate, will not 
be considered as crimes. (Article 1)” (as quoted in Kendal, 1993, p.56). The area of the first Inspectorate 
covered Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Van, Bitlis, Muş, Hakkari, Mardin, and Siirt (in Kendal, 1993, p.56).  
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Table 2.1. Martial Law and State of Emergency in Turkey and their durations 
Event  Date Duration 
Sheikh Said Rebellion  23/24.2.1925-23.12.1927 2 years and 9 
months 
Menemen Incident 1.1.1931-8.3.1931 2 months and 7 
days 
Second World War 20.11.1940-23.12.1947 7 years and 1 
month 
Events of September 6-7 7.9.1955-7.6.1956 9 months 
Student Protests and the 27 May 
1960  Coup 
28.4.1960-1.12.1961 1 year 7 months 
and three days 
Attempted Coup by Colonel Talat 
Aydemir 
21.5.1963-20.7-1964 
 
1 year and 2 
months 
Events of 15-16 June of the 
Workers’ Resistance 
16.6.1970-16.9.1970 3 months 
12 March 1971 Memorandum 26.7.1971-26.9.1973 2 years and 5 
months 
Operation in Cyprus 20.7.1974-2.9.1975 1 year and 15 days 
Civil War in Iraq 27.3.1975-27.3.1975 Not implemented 
1 year, 9 months 
and 4 days 
Widespread acts of violence 26.12.1978-12.9.1980 
The 12 September 1980 coup 12.9.1980.19.7.1987 7 years 10 months 
and 7 days 
The war between the Turkish 
Army and the PKK (the state of 
emergency)  
19.7.1987-30.11.2002 15 years, 4 months 
and 11 days 
Total duration  42 years 2 months 
and 17 days 
 
Source: Siyaset ve Asker [The Politics and the Soldiers] by Üskül, 1997, pp.70-71 and my calculation for 
the war between the Turkish Army and the PKK, including the state of emergency.  
Characterised by a hypertrophied state apparatus coupled with capitalist 
economic objectives of developing bourgeois property relations and catching up with 
Western countries through national developmentalism (Başkaya, 2008), Turkish 
Bonapartism was perpetuated through institutional arrangements up until the 1980s, 
long past the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938. During the institutionalisation period of 
Bonapartism between 1960 and 1983, Kemalism was the political, economic, and 
ideological force in Turkey. The economic pillar of Kemalism started to gradually 
dissolve after the 1980s, corresponding with the decline of nationalist and secular 
policies worldwide and a crisis in the popular ideology based on national-statist 
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developmentalism. However, despite this fact, the ideological and political pillars of 
Kemalism—Kemalist nationalism and military tutelage—became more rigid. This is 
because of the perpetuation of the army’s definition of Kurdish separatism and political 
Islam as internal threats in the 1990s (Cizre, 2011, p.61).  
The political pillar of Kemalism was narrowly challenged by limited political 
liberalisation under the rule of Turgut Özal between 1983 and 1993. Accompanied by 
the recommencement of the democratic transition in the late 1990s, this political 
liberalisation eventually succeeded in allowing bourgeois interests to maintain control 
of the parliamentary branch, aided by the impact of the EU accession process on 
military’s supervisory role. In other words, even though the economic aspect of the 
military-Bonapartist regime had completed its historical function during the national 
developmentalist era, it maintained its political hegemony in society as a political force 
through the ongoing military tutelage9 over the bourgeois parliament. The following 
section explains the genesis and economic function of the Kemalist capitalist state, 
which is national-statist developmentalism. The institutionalisation of the military-
Bonapartist regime is then explained and the military-capitalism nexus is revealed, 
while the last section outlines the political economy of the 1960 coup and 1971 
memorandum in Turkey. The military coup in 1980 and the transition to neoliberalism 
afterwards is the subject of the following chapter.  
 
 
                                                          
9 The concept was first introduced for the Turkish context as being “a temporary guardian of the single 
party” in the English edition of a book titled Political Parties: their organization and activity in the 
modern state by French sociologist Maurice Duverger in 1954, arguing the positive aspects of the single 
party regime in preparing country for democracy (The original book was published in 1951 and titled Les 
Partis Politiques). Following Duverger, Walter F. Weiker developed the concept and presented it with a 
positive attribute in his book Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its 
Aftermaths in 1973. It was argued that particular stages of development and modernisation in Turkey 
between 1930 and 1946 under the political tutelage of the single party rule facilitated the transition to a 
multi-party system in 1946 to the extent that the single party made it possible “for the fragile plant of 
democracy to grow in soil that is not prepared for its reception” (Weiker, 1973, p.301).  
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Economic function of the Kemalist state: national developmentalism 
Kemalism rested on national developmentalism, which promoted state-led 
industrialisation and political modernisation (Esen, 2014). From the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire, Kemalist Turkey inherited an underdeveloped country in every sense 
(Başkaya, 2008; 2009). An agricultural society was bequeathed to the newly founded 
Republic. According to the 1927 census, some nine million people lived in agricultural 
areas out of a population of 13.6 million, equivalent to 67% of the total population. By 
the time of the 1935 census, the number of people living in agricultural areas had risen 
to 76.6% of the total population. Of the economically active population, the population 
working in agriculture, however, corresponded to a higher proportion of 81.6%. Even 
though nearly one third of land was arable according to the 1927 agricultural census, 
only about 5% was cultivated. Moreover, land ownership was based on pre-capitalist 
forms—a feudal landlord system (ağalık) and the rule of sheikhs—which aggravated the 
problem of low productivity in land, exacerbated further by backward production 
techniques (Başkaya, 2009, pp.32-34).  
 Underdeveloped manufacturing was no exception to this economic 
backwardness with Turkey having a scant dynamic industrial base (Başkaya, 2009, 
p.42). Enterprises were small and insignificant, which translated into low capital 
intensity. According to the 1927 Industrial Census, only 155 enterprises out of 65,245 
production units employed more than 100 workers. The structure of industry was also 
dominated by small-scale petty commodity production in small workshops. 
Manufacturing industry was concentrated in İstanbul, İzmir, Adana, and Bursa, which 
absorbed 75% of all manufacturing. According to the 1921 figures, the number of 
workers per enterprise stood at 2.3 in these centres. In addition, foreign capital mostly 
dominated the railway and commercial sectors. The ownership structure of the 
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enterprises was also undeveloped and uncluttered: 55% of total enterprises were in the 
form of sole proprietorship whereas the rate of partnership and joint-stock companies 
accounted for 17% and 6% of all companies, respectively. Besides possessing an 
underdeveloped manufacturing sector, Turkey’s foreign trade structure was based on 
exporting low value-added products. Turkey’s main exports were tobacco, cotton, 
opium, raisin, dried figs, nuts and animal products, while the proportion of 
manufactured products that were exported was only 8.6% (Başkaya, 2009, pp.42-53). 
This socio-economic condition substantially explains why Turkish Bonapartism 
tasked itself with pursuing the economic strategy of national developmentalism. Similar 
to typical nation-state building projects in the twentieth century, the Kemalist economic 
project was based on a belief that national independence and political sovereignty could 
only be fortified through attainment of economic sovereignty by rapid industrialisation. 
The Kemalist capitalist state—emulating the five-year plans of the Soviet Union, the 
first of which spanned from 1928 to 1932—initiated an economic programme based on 
five-year industrialisation plans in the 1930s, the first of which was implemented 
between 1933 and 1937 (Zürcher, 2004, p.197). Therefore, the prevailing aspect of the 
Kemalist state’s economic function lies in the fact that the state effectively and heavily 
stepped in as an entrepreneur for capitalist development. This occurred in the context of 
the objective and subjective weakness of the industrial bourgeoisie, which was unable to 
carry out its national-liberal tasks within the limits of bourgeois revolution. The state 
therefore played a role as a facilitator of the Turkish bourgeoisie’s objectives.  
In that regard, Kemalism continued capitalist development in the form of 
national developmentalist projects initiated by the Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), which was in power in the last days of the Ottoman 
Empire. For instance, under CUP rule, there was a tremendous increase in the number 
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of joint-stock companies. While there were only 86 joint-stock companies in the 
Ottoman Empire in 1908, this had risen to 236 by 1918 (Toprak, 1982, p.57). In 
addition, nationalisation and Turkification of the economy had commenced earlier with 
the adoption of the National Economy Policy (Milli İktisat) by.the CUP. This economic 
policy aimed to strengthen Turkish Muslim entrepreneurs while preserving Ottoman 
small-scale industry. In the wake of the promulgation of the Law on the Encouragement 
of Industry in 1914 before the First World War, the products of Ottoman industry were 
to be preferred even if they were as much as 10% more expensive than the imported 
ones. The law sought to build a strong national bourgeoisie by establishing 
entrepreneurial cadres which were recruited from among Muslim traders in provincial 
towns, guilds and even bureaucrats (Zürcher, 2004, pp.125-26).  
However, this economic policy turned non-Muslim entrepreneurs and people in 
general into targets. During the implementation of the Milli İktisat policy, Greek and 
Armenian entrepreneurs faced discrimination and even exile. A campaign of threats and 
intimidation drove at least 130,000 Greeks from the Western coastal regions into exile 
in Greece, transferring their wealth to new Muslim entrepreneurs. This was orchestrated 
by the İzmir CUP secretary, Celal (Bayar), who later became the president of the 
Turkish Republic (Zürcher, 2004, p.126). This economic policy was systematic, 
multidimensional, and gradual. For instance, the deportation of Armenians in the East 
was catastrophic, resulting in the deaths of 600,000-800,000 people after 1915 (Zürcher, 
2004, p.115). The result was indeed an economic convulsion to the extent that this 
political atrocity took place in a multi-ethnic Empire where a huge number of private 
enterprises were in the hands of non-Muslim minorities. According to the Ottoman 
industry industrial census of 1913-1915, out of 264 enterprises only 42 (19.6%) of 
private firms, were owned by Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, whereas 172 (80.4%) 
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were owned by non-Muslims.10 The number of state-owned enterprises was 22, or less 
than 10% of all enterprises (Buğra, 1994, pp.38-39). Fatma Müge Göçek effectively 
illustrates the subjective weakness of the state-dependent bourgeoisie: 
Throughout Europe, the European Enlightenment and the ideas it fostered had 
advantaged the newly emerging bourgeoisie in spearheading the ensuring 
transformations. What distinguished the burgeoning Ottoman bourgeoisie from the 
European one, however, was its multi-ethnic character. The original Ottoman 
bourgeoisie comprised of the [non-Muslim] minorities whose access to economic 
capital (due to their structural restriction to urban commercial activities within the 
empire) and connections with Europe enabled them to establish many joint companies, 
banks and industrial enterprises. Yet, unlike their Turkish Muslim counterparts who 
specialized in either the military or the state bureaucracy, the Ottoman minorities did 
not have the social and political capital that would have enabled them to sustain and 
reproduce their economic transformation of the empire. In addition, the millet divide 
predicated on the dominance of the Muslim Turks structurally prevented the Ottoman 
minority bourgeoisie from uniting forces with their Muslim Turkish counterparts to 
instigate a bourgeois revolution. Instead, the newly forming Ottoman Turkish 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie gradually eliminated the Greek, Armenian and Jewish minority 
bourgeoisie under the banner of nationalism and, by doing so, destroyed the only chance 
it had not only of preserving empire, but also of sustaining its commercial and economic 
development. What instead emerged at the end of empire and over the life course of the 
republic was a state-dependent bourgeoisie robbed of its potential (2011, p.19). 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that this long process of deportation of non-Muslim 
minorities, which peaked with the Armenian genocide during the First World War under 
the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress was instrumental in “the creation of a 
Muslim bourgeoisie” (Akçam, 2012, p.361).11 In one of the cables that was sent by the 
Interior Ministry to Ottoman provinces on 16 May 1916 during the First World War, it 
was instructed that the abandoned and confiscated Armenian properties were to be 
“rented or sold to Muslim applicants at low prices” and the “necessary assistance” and 
“all manner of facilitation” were to be provided (as quoted in Akçam, 2012, p.363). 
This leads to the conclusion that while the objective weakness of the industrial 
bourgeoisie stemmed from the unequal integration of the Ottoman Empire to global 
                                                          
10This industrial census targeted a limited geography which covered İstanbul, İzmir, Manisa, Bursa, İzmit, 
Karamürsel, Bandırma and Uşak. Nevertheless, it gives a useful picture of Ottoman industry given that 
industry was concentrated in these areas at this time.  
11 Vecdi Gönül, Minister of National Defense between 2002 and 2011, said that “if Greeks continued to 
live in Aegean and Armenians continued to live in many parts of Turkey, would it be possible to have the 
same nation-state today? I don’t know how to phrase the importance of this population exchange but if 
you look at bygone balances [in those years], its importance would very clearly show up…” (Radikal, 11 
November 2008).  
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capitalism as an exporter of raw materials and importer of manufactured goods, its 
subjective weakness stemmed from the systematic and continuous forced deportations 
and pogroms directed primarily at non-Muslim minorities during the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
The 1923 İzmir Economic Congress  
The 1923 İzmir Economic Congress, which was organised between 17 February and 4 
March during the interval between two sessions of the Lausanne Peace Conference 
gathered delegates who were selected on the basis of occupational representation 
(Finefrock, 1981, p.376). Some of the prominent decisions that were taken related to: 
1) The development of national and domestic industry; 
2) The establishment of an industrial bank for granting loans to industrialists; 
3) The inauguration of the chamber of industries in districts; 
4) Removing import duties for the machines and machine components for industry;   
5) The establishment of a national insurance company; 
6) The protection of domestically produced commodities and products through 
heavy import tariffs; 
7) Nationalisation of mines and utilisation of them according to national interests; 
8) The abolition of the monopoly (inhisar) system which favoured foreign capital, 
while allowing collaboration with foreign capital on more equal terms to 
continue;  
9) Scheduling the construction of railways;  
10)  Granting privileges only to the subjects (tebaa) of Turkey; 
11)  The abolition of tithe (aşar) tax; 
12)  The abolition of monopolies over tobacco production;12 
                                                          
12 Régie Company, the largest foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire, was founded by Ottoman 
Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye) in 1883 with backing from a consortium of European 
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13) Granting the right to perform trade and business in Turkish ports exclusively to 
ships and vessels flying Turkish flags and exclusive utilisation of cabotage 
right;13 
14) Bestowing the right of association and to form trade unions;14 and 
15) The encouragement of mechanisation in agriculture (Afetinan, 1982). 
Parallel with a decision taken in the Congress, a mixed economy was adopted as 
national policy, with state undertaking major investments in infrastructure (Zürcher, 
2004, p.195). Eight hundred kilometres of track were laid between 1923 and 1929, and 
by 1930, 3,000 kilometres of track had been bought while another 2,400 still remained 
in foreign hands. Eventually, the remainder would all be bought up by the Turkish state. 
Foreign monopolies over tobacco production were abolished. These enterprises were 
nationalised, and turned into a state monopoly integrated with other economic sectors in 
alcohol, sugar, matches, and explosives. İş Bank and Industrial Bank were established 
in 1924 and 1925 for commercial credits and industrial credits, respectively. Through 
the promulgation of the Law on the Encouragement of Industry in 1927, tax exemptions 
were provided for newly expanding industrial firms. Heavy import tariffs were put into 
effect in 1929 after the lapsing period of the Lausanne Treaty, which had restricted the 
implementation of tariffs. In 1925 the tithe (aşar) tax, which was based on the 
traditional practice of in-kind tax from agricultural production, was abolished and 
replaced with a sales tax (Zürcher, 2004, pp.195-196). It is important to note that these 
economic initiatives had been implemented even before the introduction of the five-year 
industrialisation plans which came after the Great Depression in 1929. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
banks. It was nationalised in 1925 and named TEKEL. TEKEL was privatised to British American 
Tobacco in 2008. 
13 The cabotage law was adopted in 1926. 
14 The right of association and of trade unions was not granted until the introduction of the Law on trade 
Unions in 1947. Türk-İş, for instance, was founded in 1952. However, the right to strike was 
acknowledged in the 1961 constitution.  
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Importantly, even though the construction of the national economy was the 
objective of the state elites, for economic development they also welcomed foreign 
capital and the collaboration of the domestic bourgeoisie with foreign capitalists. 
Nevertheless, it was stipulated by the state elites that political independence would be 
respected and quasi-capitulation privileges would not be given to foreign capitalists 
(Boratav, 2006, p.52). However, as Gündüz Ökçün demonstrates, foreign capital found 
a sound base in the newly founded republic through the establishment of joint ventures 
with Turkish capital or through organising itself within the joint-stock companies 
owned by Turks. The result was that between 1920 and 1930, out of 201 Turkish joint-
stock companies, 66 had foreign capital. Yet the role of Turkish shareholders in those 
companies, which was to take dividends but not to participate in the capital formation, 
was planned as a protective facade (as cited in Boratav, 2006, pp.57-58).  
On the other hand, the economic policies of the 1920s were interpreted by left-
Kemalism—a socialist-leaning wing of the Kemalist intelligentsia—as a deviation from 
the founding principles of Kemalism. This is because this group considered “economic 
sovereignty” to be one of the fundamental principles of Kemalism. According to them, 
the economic policies pursued in the 1920s were innately incompatible with Kemalist 
principles because the 1920s was a period of concession to imperialism; this period was 
unavoidably shaped in accordance with the “pressure of the time” (B. A. Güler, personal 
communication, January 16, 2013). Otherwise, left-Kemalists believed Kemalism to be 
intrinsically “anti-imperialist”. In their view, circumstances and virtual structures forced 
the Kemalist Republic principles in the 1920s to adopt more liberal economic policies 
which were in search of foreign capital. Birgül Ayman Güler argues that this aberration 
was unavoidable and very similar to what happened in post-revolutionary Soviet Russia: 
We are close to the experience in the Soviet Union. For instance, there was a period of 
‘war communism’ in the Soviet Union. Then, it was followed with the NEP period - 
New Economic Policy. [Then], the first development plan came into force in 1928 and 
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the kulaks [big land-owners] were eliminated from the economy with the help of 
kolkhozes [a form of collective farm in Soviet Union] and sovkhozes [state farms]. So, 
with reference to us, the first period in the 1920s is a liberal period, [which is] similar to 
the NEP period [in Soviet Russia]. There has been nothing to do [in Turkey]. You can 
demand neither a statist economy nor a socialist economy. [In Turkey], everything is 
taken over from the Ottomans. Municipal Water Management is in the hands of 
foreigners. Terkos, for instance, is owned by foreigners. It is owned by French. 
Communication channels are in the hands of foreigners. You hold barely anything in 
your hand. If you knock [foreign capital] out, then you are left out in the cold. That is to 
say, the period of the 1920s is a concessional period. It is a period that is not only open 
to liberal politics but also to foreign capital (B. A. Güler, personal communication, 
January 16, 2013).  
 
However, the significance of the 1923 İzmir Economic Congress does not lie in 
its national-developmentalist economic project, but in the creation of the conditions 
favourable to the establishment of an unchallenged political party—the People’s 
Party—led by Mustafa Kemal (Finefrock, 1981, pp.384-386). In other words, the 
Congress was instrumentalised by Mustafa Kemal for his Bonapartist rule thereafter. 
About one month after the end of the Congress, on 8 April 1923, Mustafa Kemal 
announced his text called Dokuz Umde (Nine Principles), which was the nine-point 
programme of the People’s Party (Zürcher, 2004, p.195). However, these nine-points 
largely adopted the recommendations of the 1923 İzmir Economic Congress while the 
incorporation of different occupational groups’ interests into the programme were quid 
pro quos for their electoral support (Finefrock, 1981, pp.385-386). This manoeuvre 
afforded Mustafa Kemal a political opportunity since “any attempt by [his] political 
foes to attack it could easily be labelled as opposition to the practical reforms and 
nationalist slogans identified therein (Finefrock, 1981, p.386).  
In the Assembly, the Second Group (İkinci Grup), which was founded in July 
1922 as an opposition force to the Defence of Rights Group (Müdafaa-ı Hukuk Grubu) 
challenged the exceptional powers exercised by Mustafa Kemal during the National 
Struggle (Demirel, 2011, p.379). This group was mainly against the autocratic power of 
Mustafa Kemal and called for parliamentary supremacy (Demirel, 2011, pp.391-405). 
However, hardly any opposition was present in the Assembly subsequent to the 
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elections in June-July 1923, when Mustafa Kemal controlled all candidates (Zürcher, 
2004, p.160). An amendment to the High Treason Law on 15 April 1923 put the Group 
in a position of treason and prevented it from taking part in the elections (Demirel, 
2011, p.530). With a final manoeuvre on 19 December 1923 when a law ended military 
involvement in politics, Mustafa Kemal eliminated his foes in the military (Başkaya, 
2008, p.109), thus rendering his Bonapartist rule largely unassailable.  
The statist and ultra-nationalist phase in the Kemalist capitalist state  
In the convulsive period of the Great Depression in 1929, the Kemalist capitalist state 
merged heavy industrialisation with a statist and national form under nation-state 
building. Statism, which found its full expression following the years of the Great 
Depression, was a typical characteristic of this military-Bonapartist regime in the sense 
that statist implementations were deemed to be for the general interests of the nation. In 
Mustafa Kemal’s words: 
The statism that we pursue is to put the State into operation in order to make the nation 
prosperous and the country affluent as soon as possible in such a way that the state 
activities which predicate on individual labour and principally on the economic sphere 
include the general and high interests of the nation (as quoted in Afetinan, 1982, p.15, 
my translation). 
 
Statism was incorporated in the CHP programme in 1931 and then became a 
constitutional principle in 1937 (Zürcher, 2004, p.197). This phase in national-statist 
developmentalism facilitated the establishment of the SOEs through five-year plans as 
being an accelerator to capitalist development. Clearly, this was a specific means of 
capital accumulation in a capitalist system (Boratav, 2006, pp.24-25). The Soviet 
experience of the first five year plan in 1927 was imitated and the Soviet Union 
supported the Turkish five-year plan (Zürcher, 2004, p.197). In line with Turkey’s first 
five-year plan, initiated in 1933, a number of state-owned enterprises were established 
in iron and steel, textiles, paper, ceramics, glass, and chemical products (Bayar, 1996, 
p.775). Two state-owned banks, Sümerbank and Etiler, were established to provide 
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finance for public enterprises (Bayar, 1996, p.775). This big push strategy of the 1930s 
resulted in an annual average industrial growth rate of 10.3% between 1930 and 1939 
(Boratav, 2011, p.71).   
It is important to stress that the establishment of the SOEs was a characteristic of 
the Kemalist capitalist state and continued even after the partial economic liberalisation 
period following the 1950s. Makine Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (Machinery and 
Chemical Industry Institution, 1950), Gübre, Et ve Balık Kurumu (Fertilisers, Meat and 
Fish Institution, 1952), Türkiye Çimento, Azot (Turkey Cement, Azote, 1953), Türkiye 
Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (Turkish Petroleum Corporation), Devlet Malzeme Ofisi 
(The State Procurement and Supply Office, 1954), Selüloz ve Kağıt (Cellulose and 
Paper, 1955), Demir-Çelik (Iron-Steel, 1955), Türkiye Kömür İşletmeleri (Turkey Coal 
Enterprises, 1957), and other SOEs were established to meet the expanding domestic 
demand for manufactured products. They contributed to the development of the private 
sector through the production of its input requirements. In line with the establishment of 
the SOEs, the proportion of public funds invested in industry showed an increasing 
trend: 57% in 1950, 60% in 1955, and 78% in 1962 (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2003, 
pp.110-111). In 1977, 31.4% of valued added in industry was derived from the SOEs 
(Başkaya, 2009, p.145).  
 Nevertheless, left-Kemalism argues that the statist period cannot be ipso facto 
characterised as being Kemalist in the ideological sense to the extent that the founding 
principles of Kemalism aimed to accomplish “full independence” both in politics and 
economy (B. A. Güler, personal communication, January 16, 2013). Accordingly, this 
political vision towards “full independence” makes Kemalism an “anti-imperialist” 
political ideology (B. A. Güler, personal communication, January 16, 2013). It is said 
that these founding economic principles chiefly asked for a statist-economy based on 
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the soviet model (B. A. Güler, personal communication, January 16, 2013). However, 
the political struggle among state elites headed off the founding principle of economic 
sovereignty:  
The Planning movement first started in 1928. Mustafa Şeref was appointed to the 
Economy Deputy, the Ministry of Economy. And he prepared the first comprehensive 
plan. The result was that he was attacked by Celal Bayar...1928-1933 was the period to 
determine the direction of economy. And İstanbul-based capital triumphed. This is, 
then, no longer Kemalism in the ideological sense. However, this is not the result of 
fundamental principles [of Kemalism] but of an actual positioning. Then comes statism 
but this is not the statism of Mustafa Şeref. That kind of statism is such a statism to put 
the state into operation until private capital is strengthened. However, what had been 
argued on the eve of that [as a Kemalist principle] is to pursue such a statism to put the 
state into operation until Turkey obtains its economic independence. This was more 
soviet-leaning. Yet, since 1933 Celal Bayar had been the deputy to Economy and it was 
visible that İstanbul-based capital had demanded to integrate with the outside world (B. 
A. Güler, personal communication, January 16, 2013). 
 
On the other hand, the statist phase in Turkey between 1930 and 1950 occurred 
in the context of a single party regime between 1925 and 1945 which, if not fascist in 
the strict sense, carried some fascistic elements. Fascism can be defined as “a 
revolutionary form of right-wing populism, inspired by a totalitarian vision of collective 
rebirth, that challenges capitalist political and cultural power while promoting 
economic and social hierarchy” (Lyons, 2008, p.148). This definition shows 
congruence with Poulantzas’ analysis of the fascist state as a specific form of 
exceptional state (1974). According to Poulantzas, the fascist state emerges from a 
response to a specific political crisis in the imperialist stage of capitalism whereby the 
class representation of political parties breaks down and the transition to monopoly 
capitalism is fulfilled under the ideological state apparatuses controlled by the fascist 
party (Poulantzas, 1974). With respect to Turkey’s military-Bonapartist regime, it can 
be argued that the fascistic dimension of Kemalism became prominent after the 1929 
Great Depression; the single party consolidated itself in the 1930s and continued until 
1945. The 1931 Party Congress of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, CHP) declared Turkey to be a one-party state, while the 1936 Party Congress 
merged the state with the party in such a way that the governors became the heads of 
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party branches in their provinces (Zürcher, 2004, pp.176-177). The unification of the 
state apparatus with the party was completed in 1937 when the party’s six principles— 
or the Kemalist principles of republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism, statism, 
and revolutionism—were stipulated in the constitution and institutionalised as state 
ideology (Zürcher, 2004, p.182). Moreover, in the 1930s the Kemalist state reorganised 
the ideological apparatus by suppressing social and cultural organisations. In 1931, the 
Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları)—established in 1912 to disseminate nationalism, 
positivism and secularism—was closed down to be replaced in 1932 by a semi-official 
party organisation called People’s Rooms (Halkevleri). In 1935 the Turkish Women’s 
Union disbanded upon the request of the CHP since it was accepted that the Kemalist 
leadership fulfilled the proclaimed objective of the Union to grant women a right to 
vote. The same year, the Turkish Freemasons’ lodges were closed down (Zürcher, 2004, 
p.180). Similarly, the totalitarian tendencies of Kemalism were accompanied by 
promoting a palingenetic myth of the national history—“the Greek palin (again or 
anew) + genesis (creation or birth)” (Griffin in Lyons, 2008, p.140). In 1932 the first 
Turkish History Congress accepted the “Turkish History Thesis”, which depicted the 
Turkish race as the creator of all ancient civilisations including Sumerians, Hittites, 
Egyptians and Greeks (Cagaptay, 2004, pp.87-88). The history courses in Turkey 
between 1932 and the late 1940s were based on this thesis (Zürcher, 2004, p.191). 
Similarly, the third Turkish Language Congress in 1936 announced the “Sun Language 
Theory”, which argued that all major languages could be traced to Central Asia and 
consequently to the Turkish language due to alleged phonemic similarities “such as that 
between ancient Turkish word siliy (sun) and the French word soleil (sun)” (Cagaptay, 
2004, p.91). This theory was also taught in the Arts Faculty in Ankara (Zürcher, 2004, 
p.190).  
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However, the Kemalist Bonapartism of the 1930s diverged from fascism with 
respect to a different conjuncture of class struggles that led to the rise of these 
exceptional states (Poulantzas, 1974). While in the beginning of the rise of fascism a 
fascist popular movement was reacting “to the disruption of traditional society brought 
about by the industrial revolution and to the threat posed by the socialist movement to 
the middle class; the Young Turk regimes in Turkey imposed their policies from above 
on an indifferent population” (Zürcher, 2004, p.186). In addition, while fascism in 
power relied on a permanent mobilisation of masses for propaganda, Kemalism was at 
odds with practices of rallying the people (Zürcher, 2004, p.186). 
Industrial Upgrading (1960-1980) 
Between 1960 and 1980, state policy predominantly gravitated towards the deepening 
of import substitution industrialisation (ISI). Under ISI, state intervention in trade and 
industrialisation policy involved “overvalued exchange rates, quantitative restrictions 
and direct prohibitions of imports, bilateral trade, a strict system of exchange control, 
high tariffs and guarantee deposits on imports, together with a variety of tax and credit 
incentives for manufacturing investment” (Şenses, 1994, p.52). This inward-oriented 
capital accumulation model had a specific objective for the development of the 
bourgeoisie, which was to achieve the “conversion of the domestic merchant’s capital 
into the industrial bourgeoisie” (Ercan, 2002, p.23). In the second phase of the ISI, the 
first of which was experienced in the statist period in the 1930s, Turkish capitalism 
expanded its manufactured production. According to the 1979 TÜSİAD data the 
increase in industrial production in 58 countries of the middle income group was 7.6% 
between 1960 and 1970 and 7.2% between 1970 and 1976 (TÜSİAD, 1979, in Ercan, 
2002, p.23). The increase in industrial production in Turkey exceeded these rates 
amounting to an increase by 7.8% and 9.5%, respectively (TÜSİAD, 1979, in Ercan, 
 82 
2002, p.23). Overall, between 1962 and 1976, the average annual growth rate in Turkey 
was 6.8% (Boratav, 2011, p.130).  
With respect to wages, Boratav (2011, p.139) shows that the increase in real 
wages from 1963 to 1976 was 220%, equal to an annual increase of 4.9%. Moreover, 
investment by the SOEs proceeded to be the main transmission belt for capital 
accumulation for the private sector. As a 1981 World Bank report indicated, investment 
by the SOEs constituted about one quarter of total fixed investment by the late 1970s, 
with public investment accounting for 59% of total investment and 10% of GNP in 
1980 (The World Bank, 1981, p.20).  
This phase of the ISI model between 1960 and 1980 had distinctive 
characteristics in terms of the content of industrialisation, distribution of investment, 
and investment priorities. The import substitution of nondurable consumer goods which 
was initiated in the 1930s had already been completed in those years. The production of 
durable consumer goods and intermediate goods became the main target of industrial 
production in Turkey between 1960 and 1980. With regards to the internal dynamics of 
capitalism, the increase in the level of income of the urban and rural bourgeoisie 
generated a demand for the production of durable goods such as radios, televisions, 
washing machines, vacuum cleaners, automobiles, modern office furniture, kitchen 
utensils, and homeware. Owing to scant foreign currency, these goods were produced 
inside the country with a collaboration of foreign capital. The increase in the real wages 
of workers and the middle classes facilitated the purchase of these products by the 
middle of the 1970s (Boratav, 2011, pp.118-120).  
The transition to the production of durable consumer goods and intermediate 
goods between 1963 and 1980 can be seen in Table 2.2. The table demonstrates that, on 
the one hand, the share of durable consumer goods in total manufacturing industries 
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increased from 4.4% in 1963 to 10.1% in 1980 (Table 2.2). On the other hand, two 
decades of development in manufacturing resulted in the increase of the share of 
intermediate goods in total manufacturing industries from 20.5% in 1963 to 42.6% in 
1980 (Table 2.2). In addition, the SOEs pioneered the production of intermediate goods 
while the period witnessed the decreasing share of non-durable consumer goods in 
production value. As Table 2.3 demonstrates, manufacturing in state-owned enterprises 
was predominantly geared towards the production of intermediate goods, the rate of 
which increased from 36.5% in 1963 to 64.5% in 1980 (Table 2.3). This clearly proves 
that the state manufacturing sector undertook the task of procurement of basic inputs to 
the private sector (Boratav, 2011, p.134).  
Table 2.2. Structure of Manufacturing, share in production value (%), 1963-1980  
Years Non-durable 
consumer goods 
Durable 
consumer goods 
Intermediate 
goods 
Investment 
goods 
Total 
1963 66.7 4.4 20.5 8.4 100 
1980 39.8 10.1 42.6 7.5 100 
 
Source: Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2009 (The Economic History of Turkey: 1908-2009) by Boratav, 
2011, p.133.  
Table 2.3. Internal Structure of State Manufacturing, share in production value (%), 
1963-1980 
Years Non-durable 
consumer goods 
Durable 
consumer goods 
Intermediate 
goods 
Investment 
goods 
Total 
1963 53.3 0.4 36.5 9.8 100 
1980 29.2 0.1 64.5 6.2 100 
 
Source: Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2009 (The Economic History of Turkey: 1908-2009) by Boratav, 
2011, p.133. 
Not surprisingly, the value creation process by the working class for the private 
sector during the ISI phase clearly shows that the latter model predominantly 
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contributed to the monopolisation of industry in Turkey (Sönmez, 1992). This 
monopoly capitalism was in line with the international division of labour between the 
centre and periphery capitalist countries in which peripheral countries played a 
complementary role for the industries in the centre countries (Başkaya, 2009). In other 
words, industrialisation in peripheral countries was not in competition with the big 
capitalist countries, rather it relied on importing their technologies for producing more. 
Turkey was no exception to this process (Başkaya, 2009, p.146). In addition to its 
dependence on the core countries, the development of the manufacturing sector led to 
the concentration of capital in Turkey in private hands. Following the exhaustion of the 
ISI model and the transition to export-oriented capitalism, by 1985 406 out of the 
biggest 500 companies in Turkish industry already belonged to the private sector 
(Sönmez, 1992, p.25). Capital was concentrated such that 126 out of these 406 private 
companies belonged only to 23 capital groups or families (Sönmez, 1992, p.25). Table 
2.4 shows that in 1985 the biggest 25 business groups accounted for more than half of 
the sales, absorbed approximately half of the workforce, had more than half of the 
profits, and paid more than half of the taxes of the national total. It is plausible to argue 
that the republican project from the 1920s was successful in preparing the conditions for 
the maturation of Turkish capitalism and its expansion to the international market, 
which would be possible with the shift to export-led growth after the 1980s. The 1980 
coup was instrumental in the transition to export-led industrialisation (see Chapter 3).  
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Table 2.4. Concentration in Manufacturing (1985) 
 
Source: Türkiye’de Holdingler: Kırk Haramiler (Holdings in Turkey: The Forty Thieves) by Sönmez, 
1992, pp.25-26). 
Failed democratic transition under the Democrat Party (1950-1960) 
The Democrat Party (DP, Demokrat Parti) was officially founded in January 1946 as an 
outcome of a political and economic split within the CHP. The split in the party was 
crystallised with the introduction of the Land Distribution Law for farmers (Çiftçiyi 
Topraklandırma Kanunu) in May 1945. The aim of the land reform was to end the 
political influence of landlords and war profiteers and to pave the way for independent 
peasant proprietors (Ahmad, 1993, p.103).15 Adnan Menderes, one of the founders of 
the DP was a big landowner in Aydın province and challenged the Land Distribution 
Law for farmers in 1945. Adnan Menderes, the business-banker Celal Bayar, the 
bureaucrat Refik Koraltan, and the famous historian Fuat Köprülü all submitted a 
memorandum known as Dörtlü Takrir (Memorandum of the Four) to the CHP asking 
for the implementation of the Turkish constitution and the establishment of democracy 
(Zürcher, 2004, p.210).  
Political and economic factors paved the way for transition to a multi-party 
system. From a political point of view, political disintegration and the restructuring of 
the power bloc in the CHP coincided with the end of the Second World War and the 
defeat of Nazism, which precipitated the transition to a multi-party system in Turkey in 
                                                          
15 For more information on land reform see Karaömerlioğlu, 2000. 
Number of 
business groups 
Number of 
owned 
companies 
Sale 
(%) 
Workforce 
(%) 
Accounting Profit 
(%) 
Value 
Added (%) 
Biggest 25 126 53 48 58 53 
Biggest 10 97 39 34.2 47 41 
Biggest 3 60 23.8 21.5 27.4 26 
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1945.16 The post-war adjustment involved the intensification of Turkey’s incorporation 
into the global capitalist system both in the field of economy and foreign policy. The 
Truman Doctrine launched in March 1947 by US President Harry Truman was to ensure 
military and financial support for Greece and Turkey upon the withdrawal of British 
assistance to these countries (Zürcher, 2004, p.209; Satterthwaite, 1972, p.75). The 
Truman Doctrine was welcomed by İsmet İnönü, the President and the leader of the 
CHP, as a vivid and hopeful sign from the US towards world peace (Gevgilili, 1981, 
p.53). The military assistance programme involved modernisation and training of the 
Turkish army and the construction of all-weather roads for military aims which would 
also foster an agricultural revival (Satterthwaite, 1972, p.80). In addition to that, in 1948 
Turkey was included in the European Recovery Programme, known as the Marshall 
Plan, which aimed to revive Europe’s post-war economies and ward off Soviet 
influence. Intensified relations with the US played a role in changing the institutional 
status of the Chief of Staff. In 1949, the Chief of Staff became tied to the ministry of 
defence rather than the prime ministry (Hale, 1994, p.93). 
From an economic point of view, the statist industrialisation in the 1930s, under 
the single-party regime between 1923 and 1945, reached saturation. The disintegration 
of the alliance between the military, landlords, and the bourgeoisie during the Kemalist 
period, however, made the maintenance of the status quo impossible (Ahmad, 1993, 
p.102). In 1947, the implementation of the new five-year plan was unsuccessful. The 
CHP already redefined and liberalised the concept in the 1948 Economic Congress as 
“New Statism”. The DP had indeed positioned itself against the statist economic 
implementation under the single-party period, which suggested a free market economy 
and the privatisation of SOEs (Barkey, 1990, pp.51-52). The post-war adjustment was 
                                                          
16 There were failed attempts under the single-party period by allowing the formation of opposition 
parties such as the short-lived Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) between 
1924 and 1925 and the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) in 1930. 
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to ensure the reintegration of the Turkish economy into the world capitalist economy in 
conformity with the liberalisation of international trade relations, without sacrificing the 
objective of industrialisation (Yalman, 2009, p.177).    
 In the 1950 general elections, the leadership under Adnan Menderes and Celal 
Bayar won 53.4% of the votes while the CHP acquired 39.8% of the votes (Zürcher, 
2004, p.217). The DP appealed to the masses and achieved popular legitimacy as the 
winner of consecutive general elections in 1954 and 1957 with vote shares of 58.4 per 
cent and 47.3 per cent, respectively (Zürcher, 2004, pp.223,232). Indeed, the class 
representation of the bourgeois party constituted of an alliance of the agrarian 
bourgeoisie and the big landowners with the commercial bourgeoisie under the DP, and 
represented a disengagement from the Kemalist leadership (Savran, 2010, pp.159-160). 
In terms of economic activity, agricultural growth and infrastructural investment 
came to prominence in the DP period between 1950 and 1960. These economic 
priorities were in line with the findings of official US reports on Turkey in the post-war 
adjustment period after 1945. A report in 1949 by Max Weston Thornburg, Graham 
Spry and George Henry Soule for the Twentieth Century Fund concluded that “[t]he 
first necessity [for Turkey] for further advance is increased governmental activity in 
public works—roads, railroads, irrigation, drainage, expansion of local power stations—
and progress in education, agricultural extension work, sanitation and health measures” 
(Thornburg, Spy, & Soule, 1949, p.254). The 1951 report of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, (IBRD), later the IMF, stressed the priority of 
agricultural development for Turkey and allocation of public resources to agriculture 
“because it provides the greatest opportunity for increased productivity and because it is 
an essential prerequisite for industrial development” (IBRD, 1951, p.264). The report 
also suggested the training of personnel in the fields of public health and education (but 
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not fixed investment in the construction of schools and hospitals), improvements in 
transportation, public works such as irrigation and municipal utilities and services, 
public power facilities, and a withdrawal of public investment for large-scale industry 
and mining (IBRD, 1951, pp. 265-271).   
The DP government relied on the state for investment owing to the objective 
weakness of the dynamic industrial base. The difference between the situation under the 
DP government and the previous single-party government was, however, the direction 
of investments. Under the DP, there were significant investments in highways and 
electrification, which procured the expansion of the domestic market and horizontal 
integration of different regions (Başkaya, 2009, p.140). The second difference was in 
orientation towards the industrial activity. While the CHP in the single-party period 
focused on the production of investment goods, the DP turned towards the production of 
consumer goods (Singer, 1977, p.264). These differentiated approaches to investment 
were understandably bound up with the DP’s economic class representation. It was 
predominantly representing the interests of the commercial and landed bourgeoisie, and 
private manufacturing was largely associated with agricultural prosperity thanks to 
mechanisation in the countryside and the increase in agricultural productivity. The 
results were the increase of income in the agricultural sector, the expansion of the 
domestic market and the flow of surplus labour to urban areas, which provided a 
positive stimulus for industrialisation (Başkaya, 2009, pp.140-141). Close collaboration 
with foreign capital, US aid under the Marshall Plan and Turkey’s accession to NATO 
in 1952 helped the DP government find foreign resources to finance its investment 
expenditure. According to George C. McGhee (1954, p.629) the U.S. Ambassador to 
Turkey between 1952 and 1953, as of June 30 1953, the US made contributions to 
Turkey consisting of $261,500,000 as grants and $140,200,000 as loans via the 
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Marshall Plan and later through the Mutual Security Program and Foreign Operations 
Administration.   
The industrial advance of the private sector was supported by the DP through the 
Industrial Development Bank (IDB, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası), which was 
founded under the recommendations of the World Bank. The IDB aimed to provide 
long-term loans and technical assistance to private manufacturers, to satisfy the foreign 
exchange requirements in the import of equipment, and to assist the development of a 
private securities market (Singer, 1977, pp.256-257). The ISI model was pursued by the 
IDB to the extent that it credited projects which would decrease the balance of payment 
deficit by favouring import replacement rather than export promotion. Towards the end 
of the decade, IDB started to direct its loans from simple processing manufactures such 
as “ginning; cotton and wood spinning and weaving; bricks and tiles; flour and 
macaroni; rice decortication; extraction of vegetable oils and soap making; leather and 
leather goods” to the development of more advanced industries such as “textile dyeing, 
finishing and printing; pharmaceuticals; paint and varnishes; glue manufacturing; 
cables; metal ore smelting; foundries; machinery; metal goods; ceramics; fibre and chip 
boards; asbestos cement sheets” (The Industrial Development Bank in Singer, 1977, 
p.262). The result was a sharp decline in the distribution of loans to simple processing 
industries, from 65% of the Bank’s loans in 1951 to 6% in 1956, even though labour-
intensive activities with low technology and less advanced business administration 
techniques were used by the entire private manufacturing sector (Singer, 1977, pp.262-
263). The size of the public sector in industrial production also remained high; 219 
public establishments produced almost the same amount of industrial output as nearly 
5,300 private firms. Due to their scale, the SOEs were able to employ a larger number 
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of workers. In 1956, the number of workers in the SOEs was on average 624, while it 
was only 31 among larger private enterprises (Singer, 1997, p.302). 
It is clear there was a restructuring of class power under Menderes’s leadership, 
favouring the economic interests of a broad bourgeois coalition, especially through 
support of the agricultural and commercial bourgeoisie in credits, support purchase, and 
taxations. For instance, credits provided by the Ziraat Bank, a state-owned bank which 
provides financial support to farmers, were 270 million TL in 1948, which increased to 
2.7 billion by the late 1950s. The notes receivable that were discounted to the Central 
Bank by the Turkish Grain Board (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi) increased from 200 million 
TL in 1950 to 1.3 billion TL in 1959, while the net credits of agricultural credit and 
sales cooperatives amounted to 500 million TL by the end of the 1950s (Savran, 2010, 
p.163, f.n. 8).  
In the political arena, civil-military relations during the Democrat Party era between 
1950 and 1960 meant an intermission, a period of democratic interim. It was clear that 
the loyalty of the army to İsmet Pasha, the leader of the CHP in those years, was the 
DP’s main concern. In June 1950, just after the general elections where the Menderes 
government captured 52.67% of votes, it was easier to ward off any threat from the 
army. Thus the government purged the army in June 1950 by replacing the bulk of the 
military High Command, including Abdurrahman Nafiz Gürman, Chief of General Staff 
and the commanders of the army, navy and air force—in total 16 generals and 150 
colonels (Özdağ, 1997, pp.24-25; Hale, 2011, p.197). In 1954, the Menderes 
government increased its control over the bureaucracy by introducing a new law which 
made possible the early retirement and service suspension of civil servants with more 
than 25 years, including judges and university professors (Zürcher, 2004, p.230). The 
attempts to control the military included the supervision of military spending. National 
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defence expenditure declined from 1950 to 1960 under the DP government. Table 2.5 
shows that in 1950, national defence expenditure accounted for more than 30% of 
general budget expenditures; this dropped to 23.4% in 1960. And while national 
defence expenditure stood at 44.2% of total investment in 1950, it constituted just less 
than one fifth of total investment in 1960 (Table 2.5). Under NATO influence, the DP 
government aimed to rationalise and modernise the army, putting it under the control of 
the government. Seyfi Kurtbek, ex-colonel and then DP parliamentarian, prepared a 
reform programme for the army in 1953, but Menderes opted for the loyalty and 
cooperation of officers so that the programme was never able to be implemented 
(Ahmad, 1977, pp.151-153).   
Table 2.5. National Defence Expenditure, 1950-1960 
Years 
National 
Defence 
Expenditure 
(million TL) 
% of GNP % of Total Investment 
% of General 
Budget 
Expenditures 
% of General 
and Annexed 
Budget 
Expenditures 
1950 441.7 4.25 44.2 30.1 24.2 
1951 468.0 3.81 37.1 29.4 23.1 
1952 611.0 4.27 33.3 27.2 23.6 
1953 711.1 4.23 34.1 31.0 28.3 
1954 833.6 4.87 33.1 32.5 31.3 
1955 1,160.8 5.51 38.6 35.1 34.2 
1956 979,5 4.03 30.0 28.1 26.0 
1957 1,060.1 3.47 26.4 25.5 24.6 
1958 1,395.5 3.87 27.7 28.1 27.2 
1959 1,736.1 3.88 24.8 25.8 25.0 
1960 1,727.5 3.53 22.2 23.4 22.3 
 
Source: Turkish Planning Experience written by State Planning Organisation, in Singer, 1977, p.414. 
 
Political economy of the 1960 coup and 1971 memorandum in the context of 
the Cold War 
The 1960 coup was instrumental in the transition to the state planning era and in the 
institutionalisation of the social and national security state (Akça, 2010). Nevertheless, 
one can observe that in the second half of the 1950s that the interest of the industrial 
bourgeoisie became gradually more prominent than the interests of the agrarian 
bourgeoisie and the big landowners, represented under the leadership of Menderes 
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(Savran, 2010, pp.162-163). The dislocation in the power bloc surfaced in the 
parliament by means of a crackdown in the DP and the emergence of Hürriyet Partisi in 
1955 (which merged with the CHP in 1958). The 1960 coup resolved the political 
spasm that would feature prominently in the economic interests of the industrial 
bourgeois’ investment policy. The military takeover represented a forcible resolution of 
the contradiction between the industrial bourgeoisie and the other components of the 
power bloc, the agrarian bourgeoisie and big landowners, given that it was impossible to 
resolve the contradiction in a parliamentary way (Savran, 2010, p.166). It was also 
instrumental in allowing the industrial bourgeoisie to upgrade itself to the hegemonic 
position in the power bloc, so that state planning became the hallmark of the two 
decades following the coup in 1960 (Akça, 2010). 
The necessity to transition to the state planning phase and channel investment 
activity through institutional arrangements came to the surface in the late 1950s, in 
conjunction with reports from the OEEC (The Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation, later the OECD) and the IMF. While in 1957 the OEEC declared that “it is 
strongly to be hoped that the Government will be able to achieve the necessary degree 
of control in the near future, so that investment activity may be directed into the most 
appropriate channels and remain within the limits compatible with internal and external 
equilibrium” (OEEC, 1957, p.10, as quoted in Sönmez, 1967, p.32), tripartite 
negotiation with the IMF, OEEC and the US authorities in Paris in 1958 concluded that 
“It is of great importance that this Ministry [of Co-ordination, to be established] should 
exercise the necessary powers to ensure that, henceforth, there should be the necessary 
co-ordination of investment, within the framework of a development program” (OEEC, 
1958, as quoted in Sönmez, 1967, p.32). The economic discomfort that was revealed in 
the 1958 devaluation and the payment crisis was coupled with steps towards further 
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authoritarianism by the DP after winning the 1957 general elections with 47.3% of 
votes (Zürcher, 2004, pp.229, 232). 
In 1956, the press law was changed to increase government control over the 
media. Political meetings, except during an election campaign, were prohibited. In April 
1960, the establishment of Tahkikat Komisyonu (Investigatory Commission) 
empowered the ruling party to investigate the activities of the opposition, which in turn 
augmented the discomfort of the masses. Riots, the suppression of student 
demonstrations by troops, and, restrictions of the press to report on the riots (Zürcher, 
2004, pp.230-240) clearly marked the evaporation of the government’s political 
hegemony. The combination of economic and political instability shattered the political 
hegemony of the power bloc, which had been united under the dominance of the 
commercial and landed bourgeoisie.  
It was known that the army had been in any case uncomfortable with the 
electoral results, because the DP was perceived as a counter-revolutionary party that 
betrayed Kemalist principles. In December 1957, nine army officers were arrested for 
plotting against DP rule (Zürcher, 2004, p.238; Hale, 2011, p.198). The opposition to 
the ruling party was successful in gathering together a broad coalition in which urban 
elite, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and İstanbul-based bourgeoisie became prominent 
(Keyder, 1979, p.25; 1987b, p.45).17  
The 1960 coup trumped the legitimacy of the student protests while spreading an 
illusion that the armed forces extricated the country from anarchy and prevented 
fratricide (Zürcher, 2004, p.241). Not surprisingly, the 1960 coup was celebrated by the 
state in the “Freedom and Constitution Festival” from 1963 until 1981. The euphoric 
                                                          
17 Meanwhile, regional dynamics towards authoritarian rule encouraged axiety in the DP. The overthrow 
of the Hashemite Dynasty by a military group led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim in Iraq in 1958 put the 
DP government on red alert for fear that it too could be overthrown by a similar coup.  
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victory over the DP government was incorporated into the Constitution of 1961. The 
preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey celebrated the achievement of 
the Turkish nation in the Revolution of 27 May 1960 “by exercising her right to resist 
the oppression of a political power which had deteriorated into a state of illegitimacy 
through behaviour and actions contrary to the rule of law and the Constitution” (The 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1961, p.3). The military takeover was perceived 
to be a “revolution” by some writers (Weiker, 1963; Harris, 1970; Tunçkanat, 1996; 
Karpat, 1970). However, ironically enough the proclamation of the coup—read by 
Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, founder of the extreme nationalist party called Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP)—clearly stated the army’s loyalty 
to and reliance on NATO and CENTO. Milli Birlik Komitesi (the Committee of 
National Unity) abrogated the constitution of 1924 and endowed a commission to 
prepare the new constitution. In addition, the Committee of National Unity purged 147 
prominent staff members from the universities (Kayalı, 2012, p.65). 
The 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey introduced the bicameral 
parliament (Ahmad, 1993, p.129). However, the main aim of the constitution was to 
prevent the monopoly of governments such as the DP and to counterbalance it with 
other institutions (Zürcher, 2004, p.245). These constitutional amendments were 
institutional valves intended to preclude the rule of the rural majority over the urban 
minority, 18 and particularly to guard against any act incongruous with the interests of 
the industrial bourgeoisie (Savran, 2010, p.176). Therefore, the political regime was 
based on “a form of the domination of the industrial bourgeoisie over the rural 
majority” (Savran, 2010, p.177). 
                                                          
18 According to the World Bank database, the rural population of nearly 19 million accounted for 68% of 
the total population in Turkey in 1960 (The World Bank, 2015).  
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 The new constitution of 1961 aimed to encompass the economic and political 
interests of the urban population, academia, the military, the bureaucracy, and the 
industrial bourgeoisie. The industrial bourgeoisie benefited from planning in economic, 
social and cultural development through the establishment of the State Planning 
Organisation, tasked with “the preparation and execution, and application and revision 
of the plan, and the measures designed to prevent changes tending to impair the unity of 
the plan” (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1961, Article 129, p.35).  
The 1961 Constitution formally guaranteed freedom of thought, expression, 
association and publication. It also enshrined social and economic rights while giving 
the state a responsibility to plan economic development and preserve the right of 
individuals to property and inheritance and the right of freedom of work and enterprise. 
Full autonomy was given to universities and the mass media (Ahmad, 1993 p.129; 
Zürcher, 2004, p.245). Legal respite was given to workers with the right to strike. The 
relatively liberal constitution of 1961 also paved the way for an increase in political 
activity. The left benefited from this environment and Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP, 
Workers’ Party of Turkey) was established in 1961 by trade unionists. Thanks to the 
proportional representation system, TİP was able to get 15 seats in the 1965 general 
elections even though they got only 3% of the votes. This period was also marked by 
the foundation of Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of 
Revolutionary Trade Unions in Turkey, DİSK) in 1967 and the further radicalisation of 
the working class and youth, which peaked in the 15/16 June upheavals in İstanbul and 
Kocaeli in 1970.  
Nevertheless, the liberal-reformist environment and political polarisation 
ultimately served to undermine the political and economic hegemony of the ruling 
classes. The armed forces had assumed the co-responsibility of fighting against 
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communism after the 1960s. In 1966, Cemal Tural, the Chief of the General Staff, 
ensured that the book Komünizmle Mücadele Metodları (The Methods for Combating 
Communism) was read throughout the armed forces (Ahmad, 1977, p.195). The 
manipulation of religion was also an integral part of the military’s approach in the 
1970s. It was scrupulously and gradually introduced as an ideological counter-weapon 
against the leftist currents in the country, while communism was seen as the primary 
threat in the Cold War period. A leaflet titled Komünistler İşçilerimizi Nasıl 
Aldatıyorlar? (How do communists deceive our workers?), which was published by the 
General Staff in 1973, shows the use of Islam against communism. In this leaflet, 
communism is defined as “a primitive regime that is unable to reach God, repudiates 
[private] property, uses people slavishly” (Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı Birinci Ordu ve 
Sıkıyönetim Komutanlığı [General Staff First Army and Martial Law Command], 1973, 
p.3, my translation). It states that: 
Communism which is more perilous than cancer causes the death of a nation, not only 
of a person, through contamination from person to person. Thus, each person who has 
caught the malady of communism and each nation that is composed of those people start 
to lose the concepts of Allah, Nation, Morality, and Free Thought which are the highest 
cognizance of humanity; and they turn into a living robot or community of robots which 
only obeys the rules of communist parties and implements them” (Genel Kurmay 
Başkanlığı Birinci Ordu ve Sıkıyönetim Komutanlığı [General Staff First Army and 
Martial Law Command], 1973, pp.3-4, my translation).  
 
In this leaflet, the military portrayed the Turkish workers as the ones who “have strong 
common sense even though they do not have a sufficient education pertaining to the 
general conditions of our country. Basically, they are nationalist, Atatürkist and 
attached to their customs”. Any class conflict was rejected. The leaflet stated that 
“[Turkish workers] find great pleasure in using their labour as capital in order to live 
honourably. They are respectful to the rules. They don’t believe that their rights will be 
exploited, as they enjoy all kinds of constitutional guarantees that would prevent it” 
(Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı Birinci Ordu ve Sıkıyönetim Komutanlığı [General Staff 
First Army and Martial Law Command], 1973, p.6, my translation). 
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In addition, Major General Turhan Olcaytu’s book,19 which was published in 
1973 to be circulated in the military and national education system, exposed how “real 
religion” could be used against communists and Islamic fundamentalists. In his book, he 
aimed to “explain how Atatürk, indeed, saved and preserved our religion” and showed 
how revolutions were compatible with the Quran’s verses and hadiths from the Prophet 
(Olcaytu, 1973, p.13). Olcaytu (1973, p.74) condemned vehemently “the alleged 
intellectuals, certified traitors” who “masterfully exploited the high national sentiments 
of patriot workers and youths whose hearts throb for homeland love”. According to him, 
Atatürkism should be explained unilaterally not only in “the minbars of the mosques but 
also in school desks” to youths who “are sucked into the maelstrom of Maoist, 
Castroist, Marxist, Leninist, Right-wing, Left-wing, Nurist, Süleymanist, etc. beliefs 
which are not compatible with our national interests” (Olcaytu, 1973, p.252).  
Islamic fundamentalist forces also played a supporting role in assisting the fight 
against communism.20 When the radicalisation of the working class and youth between 
1967 and 1971, which also manifested itself in growing anti-Americanism, reached its 
peak in the arrival of the Unites States’ Sixth Fleet to Turkey in 1969, Islamic forces 
were alarmed and mobilised. 1969’s Bloody Sunday was marked by a clear provocation 
and use of Islam against the left. As a consequence, two people were killed and 114 
people were wounded (Milliyet, 17 February 1969). Mehmet Şevket Evgi, a well-known 
writer in Islamic circles, wrote an article in Bugün Newspaper on 16 February 1969 
titled “Cihada hazır olunuz” (Be Ready for Jihad), which called for a total war between 
Muslims and “red infidels” and urged Muslims to arm against communism. The column 
represented the overt animosity of Islamic fundamentalist forces in those years towards 
                                                          
19 The name of the book is Dinimiz neyi emrediyor ATATÜRK ne yaptı: İNKILABIMIZ İLKELERİMİZ 
(What our religion commands what ATATÜRK did: OUR REVOLUTION PRINCIPLES). 
20  Necmettin Erbakan became an independent parliamentarian for Konya in 1969 and formed the 
National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) in 1970. 
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communists and progressive forces: “... Let it be known that a big thunderstorm is 
brewing. A full-scale war between the Muslims and red infidels is unavoidable. The 
trial day has arrived. There is no possibility of escaping and avoiding fate ...” (Kural, 
2013, my translation). Eygi continued, calling Muslims to: 
Arm against the communist impiety. In Islam, recruitment and jihad are not arbitrary 
but compulsory. Do not forget even for a moment that jihad is also the obligation upon 
you for Allah and for your servitude to him. If the red rascals of Stalin and similar 
antichrists pour into the streets to demolish Turkey, all Muslims should encounter them. 
Do they have stones, batons, irons and molotov cocktails? We are not bereft of their 
deployment (Kural, 2013, my translation). 
  
In addition, the regional balance of power turned out to be to the military’s 
advantage for a possible intervention. Hafez al-Assad had seized power in Syria through 
a coup in November 1970, just four months before the memorandum in Turkey in 1971. 
There was no harmony within the Higher Command on the extent of the memorandum, 
in which General Muhsin Batur, the commander of the air force, had been arguing for 
radical social and economic reforms, including tax and land reform, nationalisation of 
foreign trade, and reform in the electoral system. Nonetheless, the memorandum was 
issued on 12 March, 1971 at the will of Higher Command of the army by Memduh 
Tağmaç, the Chief of the General Staff; Faruk Gürler, the Commander of the Land 
Forces; Celal Eyiceoğlu, the Commander of the Naval forces; and Muhsin Batur, the 
Commander of the Air Forces.21 Without taking over the state administration, the army 
                                                          
21 The Turkish left in the 1960s and 1970s was under the heavy influence of Doğan Avcıoğlu, who was an 
editor of Yön (Direction) magazine between 1961 and 1967 and the chief editor of weekly newspaper 
Devrim (Revolution) between 1969 and 1971 (for a critique of the Turkish left see Samim, 1987, pp.153-
154; 1981, p.66). Avcıoğlu criticised the parliamentary system by arguing that the multi-party system 
only served the interests of American imperialism with its local compradors in Turkey. Rather, an 
independent country under an authoritarian regime would pave the way for democratic and egalitarian 
society. Therefore, it was suggested that a ‘national democratic revolution’ required the close 
collaboration between the army and civilians. Not surprisingly, he had in contact with the leaders of the 
27 May 1960 coup, with ex-General Cemal Madanoğlu and ex-Colonel Osman Köksal. Avcıoğlu’s 
position was also adopted by a faction in the army. Muhsin Batur, the commander of the air force, 
recounted in his memoirs that a group of officers proposed to him a military regime which would 
advocate the views of Avcıoğlu such as land and tax reforms, nationalisation of foreign trade, mineral 
resources and large institutions, educational and military reform, and the pursuit of independent foreign 
policy. He said he rejected this proposal (Hale, 1994, pp.186-190). In addition, the memorandum was 
perceived positively by a faction on the left. Devrim newspaper, in its first issue following the 
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asked for a strong and credible government that would be able to end the disorder and 
carry out reforms in a Kemalist spirit. The Chief of the General Staff warned that if their 
demands were not met, the army would exercise its constitutional duty and take over 
power itself (Zürcher, 2004, p.258).  
 The political effects of the memorandum were the resignation of the Demirel 
government and the holding of governmental power by a technocratic government 
under Nihat Erim, a right-wing CHP member. The political consequences of the 
military intervention highlighted the enduring antagonism between capital and labour. 
While TİP was dissolved after the military intervention, TÜSİAD was founded in 1971, 
just three weeks after the memorandum. The economic policies of the technocratic 
government between 1971 and 1972 also favoured the interests of big industrialists. The 
reform programme led by Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, who had worked for the World Bank, 
included “land reform, a land tax, nationalisation of mineral industry and measures to 
protect Turkish industry by demanding that joint ventures be least 51 per cent Turkish 
owned” (Zürcher, 2004, p.258). Vehbi Koç and Nejat Eczacıbaşı, leading big 
industrialists in those years and afterwards, supported the proposals, which were 
important for Turkey if she was to join the industrialised countries’ club in the future 
(Zürcher, 2004, p.259). 
Political instability intensified in the 1970s. An armed guerrilla struggle was 
carried out by various groups such as TİKKO (Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu - 
Turkish Workers and Peasants Liberation Army), THKO (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş 
Ordusu - People’s Liberation Army of Turkey), and Deniz Gezmiş and THKP-C 
(Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi - Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front) of 
Mahir Çayan (Zürcher, 2004, p.256). The 1970s were also the years in Turkey in which 
                                                                                                                                                                          
memorandum in 1971, ran the headline “Ordu Anti-Kemalist Gidişe Dur Dedi” [The Military Put a Lid 
on the anti-Kemalist Departure] (Kayalı, 2012, p.187). 
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the fascist groups, backed by the MHP and its paramilitary youth group “The Grey 
Wolves”, adopted a strategy of tension to crush the scattered leftist groups.22 By the end 
of the 1960s, the Nationalist Action Party’s 140 paramilitary commando camps in 
İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and Adana had trained over one thousand young people against 
“communists and masonic-capitalist collaborators” (Türkeş, 1968 in Ağaoğulları, 2003, 
p.224, f.n.113).  
This political turmoil peaked in 1977 after the massacre of 34 people on May 
Day 1977. This was accompanied by successive fascist attacks and pogroms against 
students, such as the shooting of seven students in İstanbul University on 16 March, 
1978, and against Alevis in Eastern and Central Anatolian provinces, such as in Malatya 
(1978), Sivas (1978), Maraş (1978), a seven-day massacre causing at least 100 deaths, 
and Çorum (1980). The years leading up to 1980 in Turkey, particularly 1977-1980, 
were marked by the intensification of fascist attacks on workers, students, leftist groups, 
and Alevis, after which the army staged its bloody coup in 1980. 
Institutionalisation of military-Bonapartist rule in the executive power: 
Bonapartism without Bonaparte 
Capitalist development in Turkey was backed by the hypertrophy of the executive 
power over the legislative power. To the extent that there has been a functioning 
assembly in Turkey in fits and starts, the military has frequently found ways to exert its 
power over the legislative branch. This makes the military in Turkey a “ruling but not 
                                                          
22 Former colonel Alparslan Türkeş, who served in Turkish military mission to NATO from 1955 to 
1958, became the chairperson of Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, 
CKMP) in 1965 and changed its name to the National Action Party (Millliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) in 
1969. Based on Pan-Turkism, the Grey Wolves functioned as a fascist armed youth force of the MHP 
against the “communist threat” during the Civil War. Some notorious civilian members of the Turkish 
“deep state” such as Abdullah Çatlı, Haluk Kırcı and Ali Ağca were recruited from the Grey Wolves. See 
Ganser (2005) on the relationship between the NATO’s stay-behind army in Turkey, Counter-Guerrilla, 
and the Grey Wolves.   
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governing” establishment (Cook, 2007). Bonapartism is not solely limited to the 
personification of rule and the domination of an individual whose personality stands in 
for the validity of popular sovereignty. The political regime has predominantly relied on 
the autonomous institutional setting of the armed forces, which would limit popular 
sovereignty. In such a political regime, the Bonapartist legacy has been easily 
transmitted over the descendant governments. 
That is to say, the political power of the regime is highly dependent on the 
political autonomy of the armed forces vis-à-vis the civilian governments, where the 
political autonomy of the armed forces can be defined as “its ability to go above and 
beyond the constitutional authority of democratically elected governments” 
(Sakallioğlu, 1997, p.153). In such a political system, the military has tended to 
emancipate itself from the limitation of popular will. The ability to adopt the role of the 
the sovereign emanates from favourable conditions granted by the reproduction and 
legitimisation of the official ideology – Kemalism. Unambiguously, the Turkish 
military perceives itself as the guardian of the Republic and the staunch proponent of 
the Kemalist principles: republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, statism, and 
revolutionism. This is a consequence of the fact that civil-military relations are power 
relations (Demirel, 2004); Bonapartist-Kemalist rule dominated the state executive, 
showing itself to be in favour of the reproduction of Turkish capitalism amid the 
convulsive changes taking place in society.   
This Bonapartist rule in the state apparatus has been fortified by institutional 
arrangements in the wake of the coups. It can be said that it was a transition from the 
charismatic Bonapartism, in Weberian terms, of Mustafa Kemal and İnönü to the 
routinisation of rule by the military through institutional arrangements. In other words, 
“Bonapartism without Bonaparte” was institutionalised after the 1960 coup. Following 
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the 1960 coup, the military fortified its politically autonomous position via the 
establishment of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurumu, MGK) under 
Article 111 of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic in 1961. The MGK performed a 
kind of dual power together with the civilian government. The composition and role of 
the MGK were stated in the Constitution of Turkish Republic in 1961 as such: 
 The National Security Council shall consist of the Ministers as provided by the law, the 
Chief of the General Staff, and representatives of the armed forces. The President of the 
Republic shall preside over the National Security Council, and in his absence this 
function shall be discharged by the Prime Minister. The National Security Council shall 
communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers 
with the purpose of assisting in the making of decisions related to national security and 
coordination (The Constitution of the Turkish Republic in 1961, p.30).   
 
Through a bill in 1962, however, the MGK was endowed with having regular 
consultations and participation in the preparatory discussions of the cabinet (Ahmad, 
1993, p. 130). Whereas the assigned task of the MGK in the Constitution of 1961 was 
decision-making related to national security and its coordination, this institutional task 
of the MGK was extended to the designation, determination, and implementation of 
national security policies and the procurement of the necessary coordination (Kardaş, 
2009, p.304). In addition to that, the 1973 constitutional amendments following the 
1971 memorandum assigned the MGK the role of giving policy recommendations to the 
government. With institutionalisation and routinisation of Bonapartism through the 
MGK, the military could exert its influence on politicians without a direct usurpation of 
power. 
 Furthermore, the supremacy of the MGK over the parliamentary branch took its 
roots not only in the constitutional institutionalisation of this “bifurcated executive 
body” but largely from the broad definition of the concept of national security in the 
Cold War and post-Cold War era. The might of the military largely stemmed from its 
ability to use the national security concept interchangeably with public policy. 
According to Article 2a of the MGK, “National Security means the protection of the 
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constitutional order of the State, its nation and integrity, all of its interests in the 
international sphere including political, social, cultural and economic interests, as well 
as the protection of its constitutional law against all internal and external threats” (EC, 
2005, p.14). This comprehensive definition of national security was persistently 
approved by the higher echelons of the army. Orhan Erkanlı, the former Commander 
and member of the Committee of National Unity after the coup in 1960, clearly 
expressed this reality at the fourteenth anniversary of the 1960 coup: 
From the price of rice to roads and touristic sites, there is not a single problem in this 
country which is not related to national security. If you happen to be a very deep 
thinker, that too is a matter of national security (as cited in Ahmad, 1993, p. 130). 
 
In addition to the formal arrangements, the army perpetuated its ideological dominance 
over society by presenting itself as an apolitical establishment. It represented itself as 
superior to the civilian governments. As expressed by the former Chief of General Staff 
General Doğan Güreş: 
Ministries, universities, the bureaucracy, the judiciary have all lagged behind. In the 
Turkish Armed Forces, we constantly renew appointments, promotions, registration 
standards. System engineering was first taught at the military schools. The private sector 
in Turkey looked at the army with admiration and employ[ed] its methods. The Armed 
Forces in the US, by contrast, look at the private sector and benefit from it (as cited in 
Demirel, 2004, p.142).  
 
The ideological power of the MGK was further strengthened through the enactment of 
Law No 2945 in 1983 on National Security and the Secretariat-General of the National 
Security Council. Under Article 4e of this law, the jurisdiction of the body was enlarged 
to include determining the necessary measures for preserving the constitutional order, 
maintaining national unity and integrity, and directing the Turkish nation to national 
ideas and values in accordance with Atatürkist thought and Atatürk’s principles and 
revolutions (Kardaş, 2009, p.301). In addition, the National Security Policy Document 
(Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi), known as the Red Book, has functioned as the second 
and top secret constitution of Turkey. In November 1997 National Security Council 
meeting, it was concluded that no laws, circulars, and regulations were to contradict the 
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National Security Policy Document (Hürriyet, 4 November 1997). This meeting also 
agreed to facilitate economic initiatives, including privatisation, which aimed at 
Turkey’s integration with the world economy (Hürriyet, 4 November 1997).  
 Even though the Council of Ministers is legally responsible for preparing against 
internal and external threats to the country, the Secretariat-General of the National 
Security Council is empowered with implementation. Doğan Güreş, the Chief of the 
General Staff of Turkey from 1990 to 1994, properly explained the supremacy of the 
National Security Council decisions: 
As defined in our constitution, the MGK sets the national security policies which are the 
God and the constitution of all policies. You cannot think to act in a manner which 
contradicts with these policies. For this reason, the 1982 Constitution states that ‘MGK 
notifies the Ministry’ rather than stating that ‘MGK recommends to the Ministry’. This 
is a constitutional commitment... (Bila, 1997, my translation). 
 
Apart from the supremacy of the MGK over the parliament, the Bonapartist 
institutionalisation in the state executive reflected itself in the double-headed judiciary. 
The military succeeded in enlarging its jurisdiction regarding administrative and 
criminal laws. For instance, the decisions of the Supreme Military Council (Yüksek 
Askeri Şura, YAŞ), a body responsible for deciding promotion, retirement and 
expulsion from the army, were exempted from judicial oversight. Moreover, following 
the amendments in the 1961 Constitution, the military bureaucracy benefited in the 
scope of administrative jurisdiction from the establishment of the High Military 
Administrative Court. The judicial control of administrative acts and actions by the 
military body were then taken from the jurisdiction of the Council of State and given to 
the High Military Administrative Court. Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution extended 
the jurisdiction of the military administrative court to civilians, on the condition that the 
administrative acts and actions falling under its remit were related to military service 
(Kardaş, 2009, pp.297-301). According to Article 157 of the Constitution of Republic of 
Turkey in 1982, 
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The High Military Administrative Court shall be the first and last instance for the 
judicial supervision of disputes arising from administrative acts and actions involving 
military persons or relating to military service, even if such acts and actions have been 
carried out by non-military authorities. However, in disputes arising from the obligation 
to perform military service, there shall be no condition that the person concerned be a 
member of the military body (p.82). 
 
The institutionalisation of the Bonapartist regime is not only related to the extended 
executive and judiciary power of the Turkish armed forces. The president as the head of 
the state has predominantly been a tutelary power for the continuation of the Bonapartist 
regime. Traditionally, generals were the presidents of the Republic or, if civilian 
candidates were elected for this position, they would not be allowed to supersede the 
military (Sakallioğlu, 1997, p.158). Contrary to the common belief that the role of the 
presidency in Turkey is symbolic, the reality is the exact opposite: The Turkish 
Constitution of 1982 endows the presidential office with substantive political powers in 
the legislative, executive, and judicial spheres. According to Article 104 of the 
Constitution of 1982, the most important powers include the power to send laws back to 
the Grand National Assembly of Turkey when necessary; to represent the office of 
Commander-in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces; to decide on the use of the Turkish 
Armed Forces; and to appoint the members of the Council of Higher Education, the 
university presidents, the members of the Constitutional Court, one fourth of the 
members of the Council of the State, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief 
Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, the members of the High Military 
Court of Appeals, the members of the High Military Administrative Court, and the 
members of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (The Constitution of the 
Republic of Turkey, 1982, pp.50-52). 
 Apart from the institutionalisation of Kemalist Bonapartism in the executive, the 
state ideology was empowered through Turkey’s legal system. For instance, the legal 
framework prohibited the foundation of class-based associations and advocacy for 
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religion-based government according to Articles 141,23 142,24 and 16325 of the Turkish 
Penal Code, which had been imported from Mussolini’s Italy in 1926 and was repealed 
in 1991. Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code were also used to punish 
Kurdish militants who dared make the slightest cultural or political demand (Kendal, 
1993, p.78). It can be argued that the longevity of the state ideology in the legal system 
was the product of socio-economic instability in Turkey in which the big bourgeoisie 
could by no means find sufficient support in the masses, which were polarised towards 
the camps of the revolutionary and reactionary forces, particularly in the late 1960s and 
1970s. The ultra-nationalist party of Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, the NAP (National 
Action Party, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and its youth organisation, the Grey Wolves, 
were under the protection of the security forces and the police during the Nationalist 
Front governments between 1974 and 1977 (Zürcher, 2004, p.263).  
 Not surprisingly, the Turkish Constitution of 1982 restricts the right to form 
political parties. Even though it is stated that “[p]olitical parties are indispensable 
elements of democratic political life”, and shall be formed without prior permission, the 
Constitution restricts this political right “within the limits of the law” by Articles 68 and 
69 of the Constitution. It is clearly stated that “[t]he statues and programs, as wells as 
the activities of political parties shall not be contrary to the independence of the State, 
its indivisible integrity within territory and nation, human rights, the principles of 
equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and 
secular republic; they shall not aim to promote or establish class or group dictatorship or 
                                                          
23 According to Article 141 of the Turkish Penal Code which was repealed in 1991, “Anyone creating, 
leading or inspiring associations, whatever their designation, which seek to ensure the domination of a 
particular social class or to overthrow the country’s existing social and economic institutions, is liable to a 
period of imprisonment running from eight to fifteen years” (Kendal, 1993, p.94, fn. 51).  
24 According to Article 142 of the Turkish Penal Code which was repealed in 1991, “Anyone spreading 
propaganda of any type which seeks to ensure the domination of one social class over another or seeks to 
overthrow any of the country’s existing fundamental institutions, or aims to destroy the social and legal 
order of the state, will be liable to five to fifteen years imprisonment” (Kendal, 1993, p.94, fn. 51).  
25 Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code prohibited the domination of the political structure of the State 
by religion. 
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dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime” (Article 68 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, p.30).  
The articles on the formation and dissolution of a political party have been 
broadly interpreted in order to punish Kurdish, Islamist and communist/socialist parties. 
Article 5 and Articles 78 to 90 in the Political Party Law detail the restrictions on the 
aims and activities of political parties. Communist parties, parties aiming at 
regionalism, religious distinctions and racial differences are excluded from the party 
system. In order to prevent the politicisation of citizens, Article 68 of the Constitution 
forbade political parties from forming auxiliary branches such as women’s or youth 
branches, and other groups until 1999. The Constitution also banned political parties 
from engaging in political cooperation with associations, trade unions, foundations, 
cooperatives, occupational and professional associations, and also from developing 
political ties and various modes of political co-operation with such existing 
organisations until 1995. Aside from restrictions on forming political parties, the 
Constitution banned political parties from receiving aid or financial support from these 
organisations. Freedom of association was prohibited for voluntary associations 
(Articles 33 and 34) and labour unions (Articles 52 and 54) to pursue political goals, 
engaging in “political activities”, developing links with political parties, co-operating or 
co-ordinating their activities with them, and receiving or giving aid to them (Turan, 
1988, pp.69-70). However, these articles in the constitution that aimed to depoliticise 
citizens through the restriction of elementary freedoms were eventually repealed in the 
process of political liberalisation by constitutional amendments in 1995.  
According to the Constitutional Court data, as of 2014 49 political parties had been 
dissolved since the establishment of the Court in 1962 (Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Turkey, 2014a). Following the transition to civilian rule in 1983, 19 
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political parties were dissolved; of these, seven were Kurdish parties, five were socialist 
parties and three were Islamic parties (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, 
2014b). Even the names of the dissolved political parties reveal the ideological biases of 
Bonapartist rule. These political parties and the year they were closed by the 
Constitutional Court since 1983 are demonstrated in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6. Political Parties Banned by the Constitutional Court since 1983 
Kurdish Parties 
 
 
 
The People’s Labour 
Party (Halkın Emek 
Partisi)-1993  
The Freedom and 
Democracy Party 
(Özgürlük ve 
Demokrasi Partisi)-
1993 
The Democracy 
Party (Demokrasi 
Partisi)-1994 
The Democracy and 
Change Party 
(Demokrasi ve 
Değişim Partisi)-
1996 
The Democratic 
Mass Party 
(Demokratik Kitle 
Partisi)-1999 
The People’s 
Democracy Party 
(Halkın Demokrasi 
Partisi)-2003  
The Democratic 
Society Party 
(Demokratik Toplum 
Partisi)-2009 
Socialist Parties 
 
 
 
The United 
Communist Party of 
Turkey (Türkiye 
Birleşik Komünist 
Partisi)-1991 
The Socialist Party 
(Sosyalist Parti)-
1992  
The Socialist Turkey 
Party (Sosyalist 
Türkiye Partisi)-
1993 
The Socialist Unity 
Party (Sosyalist 
Birlik Partisi)-1995  
The Labour Party 
(Emek Partisi)-1997 
Islamic 
Fundamentalist 
Parties 
 
The Tranquillity Party 
(Huzur Partisi)-1983 
The Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi)-1998 
The Virtue Party 
(Fazilet Partisi)-2001 
Other parties 
 
 
 
The Republican 
People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi)-1991 
The Democratic 
Party (Demokrat 
Parti)-1994 
The Greens (Yeşiller 
Partisi)-1994 
The Resurrection 
Party (Diriliş 
Partisi)-1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, 2014b. Note: The Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 1991 on the grounds that the CHP used the logo and 
the name of a banned party and the CHP claimed its continuity with this banned party (Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Turkey, 2014b, Number: E.1990/2, K.1991/2). The Democratic Party was 
dissolved on the same grounds in 1994 (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, 2014b, Number: 
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E. 1994/1, K.1994/3). The Greens Party was dissolved in 1994 on the grounds that it did not submit its 
account (kesin hesap) of 1988 in the statutory period to the Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Turkey, 2014b, Number: E.1992/2, K.. 1994/1). The Resurrection Party was dissolved in 
1997 on the grounds that it did not participate in two consecutive general elections in Turkey 
(Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, 2014b, Number: E.1996/2, K.. 1997/2). 
 
Sami Selçuk, the honorary first president of the Court of Cassation between 
1999 and 2002, openly summarised the legal political framework of Turkey in the 
inaugural speech of the 1999-2000 court year, where he criticised the functioning of 
political power in Turkey: 
...The 1982 Constitution is not a normative constitution that guarantees human rights 
and freedoms. It is not preventive against the arbitrariness of political power and it is 
not protective of the essence of individual rights and freedoms. This is apparently a 
nominal, semantic constitution, a text. Because even on the position of the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs, it aims to protect the state while regulating the state organisation in 
detail. It fails to coalesce with social dynamics. It perceives rights and freedoms as 
exceptions. It converts them into a titular text. It is like a ball gown waiting in the 
wardrobe because it is not related to daily life and rights. According to the Constitution, 
people and individuals are for the state. The state is not for the people and the 
individuals...Secularism is mentioned in the constitution. However, the constitution kills 
off secularism by the introduction of compulsory religious education. It is, therefore, 
anti-secular. Thus, if needs to be remarked by the concepts of constitutionalism, Turkey 
is today a “state with a constitution” but it is not a “constitutional state” (Selçuk, 1999, 
my translation). 
 
Military-capitalism nexus: the Turkish Armed Forces Assistance and 
Pension Fund (OYAK) 
All these institutional nexuses clearly show that TAF not only holds a politically 
autonomous position—in keeping with its Bonapartist character—but also finds an 
interest in the establishment and continuation of its economic empire. The armed forces 
economically benefited from the institutionalisation of Kemalist Bonapartism in the 
executive. In the deepening phase of the ISI discussed earlier, the armed forces founded 
OYAK (Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu, Turkish Armed Forces Assistance and Pension 
Fund) in 1961 following the 1960 coup, which provided social security privileges for 
them. It has functioned as a supplementary social security fund in addition to the state 
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retirement fund (Emekli Sandığı) for members of the armed forces. In 1961 OYAK was 
designed to be a pension fund that would serve “members of the Turkish Armed Forces, 
members of the Gendarmerie General Command, Coastal Guard Command 
and...employees including members of public seeking to participate voluntarily” and has 
been operating in accordance with the article of law numbered 205 (OYAK, 2012). It is 
administratively and financially autonomous. According to Article 18 of the OYAK 
Law, the revenues of the fund are primarily based on a ten percent deduction from the 
salaries of the permanent TAF members and a five percent deduction from the salaries 
of the reserve officers (Military Personnel and Assistance and Pension Fund Law, 1961, 
p.6). This fund is not only “Turkey’s first and most prodigious private pension fund” 
(OYAK, 2012, p.1), but also a gigantic economic actor in production and consumption, 
with its 55 companies scattered in different sectors: 33 OYAK companies function in 
the industrial sector, 17 in the service sector and five in the financial sector (OYAK, 
2012, p.3).26 Industrial corporations running under OYAK Group conduct economic 
                                                          
26Corporations in Manufacturing are: Ataer Holding A.Ş., Ereğli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikaları T.A.Ş. 
(ERDEMİR), İskenderun Demir ve Çelik A.Ş. (İSDEMİR), Erdemir Maden A.Ş. (ERMADEN), Erdemir 
Çelik Servis Merkezi A.Ş. (ERSEM), Erdemir Mühendislik Yönetim ve Danışmanlık A.Ş. (ERENCO), 
Erdemir Lojistik A.Ş. (ERLO), Erdemir Romania SRL, Erdemir Gaz San. ve Tic. A.Ş. (ERGAZ), Adana 
Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş., OYAK Beton San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Adana Çimento Free Port. LTD., Adana 
Çimento San. ve Tic. Ltd. (TRNC), Mardin Çimento San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Bolu Çimento Sanayii A.Ş., Ünye 
Çimento San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Ünye Cem SRL (Romania), Aslan Çimento A.Ş., Birtaş Birlik İnşaat San. ve 
Tic. A.Ş., Marmara Madencilik San. ve Tic. LTD ŞTİ., Aslan Beton A.Ş., AS-SAN İnşaat San. ve Tic. 
A.Ş.,OYKA Kağıt Ambalaj San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Oyak Renault Otomobil Fabrikaları A.Ş., İskenderun 
Enerji Üretim ve Tic. A.Ş. (İSKEN), Ayaş Enerji Üretim ve Tic. A.Ş. (Ayaş Enerji), OYAK Elektrik 
Enerjisi Toptan Satış A.Ş. (OYAK ENERJI), Hektaş Ticaret T.A.Ş. (HEKTAŞ), Takımsan Tarım Kimya 
San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Akdeniz Kimya Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., Akdeniz Germany GmbH, Akdeniz Kimyasal 
Ürünler Pazarlama İç ve Dış Ticaret A.Ş. 
Corporations in Service Sector: Mais Motorlu Araçlar İmal ve Satış A.Ş. (MAİS), Omsan Lojistik A.Ş. 
(OMSAN), Omsan Havacılık A.Ş., Omsan Denizcilik A.Ş., Omsan Lojistik OOO (Russia), Omsan 
Logistica SRL (Romania), Omfesa Logistica SA (Spain), Omsan Logistique SARL (France), Oytas İç ve 
Dış Ticaret A.Ş. (OYTAS), Vize Agrega Asfalt Madencilik San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Oyak Savunma ve 
Guvenlik Sistemleri A.Ş., OYAK Teknoloji Bilişim ve Kart Hizmetleri A.Ş. (OYTEK), OYAK İnşaat 
A.Ş., Oyak Pazarlama Hizmet ve Turizm A.Ş., OYAK Telekomünikasyon Hizmetleri A.Ş., OYAK 
Girişim Danışmanlığı A.Ş. (OYAK Girişim), Tukaş Gıda Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş. (TUKAŞ). 
Corporations in Finance: Oyak Anker Bank GmbH (Germany), VfG GmnbH (Germany), Oyak Yatırım 
Menkul Değerler A.Ş. (Oyak Yatırım), Oyak Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş., Orfin Finansman A.Ş. (ORFIN) 
(OYAK, 2012, p.3).  
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activity in sectors such as “iron and steel, energy, cement and automotive production” 
(OYAK, 2012, p.3), with an oligopolistic economic structure in those sectors.  
Through diversification of economic activity, OYAK corporations have been 
functioning in the service sector as well such as in the construction, foreign trade, 
logistics, and information sectors (OYAK, 2012, p.3). According to the Annual Report 
of OYAK in 2012, OYAK served 275,990 members. In 2012 OYAK Group companies, 
employing 27,596 people, owned total assets which stood at US$ 20.005 billion, with 
total gross sales revenues of US$ 15.540 billion and total pre-tax profit amounting to 
US$ 918 million (OYAK, 2012, p.7). The Annual Report testifies that total exports of 
OYAK companies stood at US$ 4.2 billion, accounting for 2.79% of Turkey’s total 
exports in 2012 (OYAK, 2012, p.3).  
This is why OYAK whets the appetite of the retired members of the armed 
forces. The Board of Directors of OYAK gives us a clue to how this entity has been 
placed as a retirement office for the retired generals and bureaucrats. In 2012, six out of 
seven members of the Board of Directors were composed of four generals, one rear 
admiral, and one retired governor (OYAK, 2012, p.11). Yıldırım Türker, the retired 
lieutenant general, was the Chairman of OYAK until May 2012, and was succeeded by 
Hasan Memişoğlu, the retired lieutenant general. This is not surprising, though. Since its 
establishment, the core state apparatus and the big capitalists have been in harmony 
through the convergence of the interests of the military elite and the big capitalists in 
OYAK. Since then, big capitalists have been integrated in the structure of OYAK. 
Vehbi Koç, industrial and commercial emperor of Turkey during his time, and Kazım 
Taşkent, baron of the private banking sector and founder of the Yapı Kredi Bank, were 
members of the first Board of Directors in OYAK and founding shareholders of OYAK-
Goodyear and OYAK-Renault, respectively (Parla, 2009, p.211).  
 112 
This mutual relationship between the armed forced and the big capitalists helped 
OYAK benefit from the oligopolistic economic structure in the deepening phase of ISI 
in Turkey. Between 1960 and 1980, OYAK and Koç group, for instance, controlled the 
private car market in Turkey; Goodyear, Uniroyal and Pirelli were the sole producers of 
tires in the market. Goodyear produced 28.8% of tires in 1971 and its market share was 
21% in 1982. OYAK also produced 23% of cement in Turkey in 1976 (Akça, 2009, 
pp.250-251). Between 1962 and 1970, the net value of OYAK increased phenomenally 
by 2400% (Parla, 2009, p.202). 
In a similar way, this oligopolistic structure continued in Turkey’s period of 
export-led capitalism after the 1980s. OYAK produced 13.4% of cement between 1985 
and 1998 on average and this ratio rose to 18.8% in 1998. Moreover, in the pesticides 
sector, Hektaş, one of its companies, owns 18-20% of the market. The share of OYAK-
Renault in the automotive sector between 1992 and 2001 was 20% on average and this 
share rose to 27.7% in 2001. In the motor vehicles sector, one of its companies, MAİS, 
owned 23% of the sector in 2000 (Akça, 2009, pp.250-251). This oligopolistic structure 
in specific economic activities continues today. According to a report by the İstanbul 
Chamber of Industry, OYAK-Renault is the third biggest industrial enterprise in Turkey 
in production-based sales, which  stood at more than TL 7.5 billion, equivalent to US$ 
3.9 billion in 2012 (İSO, 2012). The OYAK Group also maintains its leadership 
position in the cement industry with a market share of 15%. In the private car sector, the 
group manufactured 53.8% of Turkish cars with 311,000 cars, of which almost 227,000 
were exported in 2012 (OYAK, 2012, pp.1-17). 
Taking into account the oligopolistic industries that OYAK dominates, OYAK 
reaped the benefits of legal privileges to which it has been entitled since its 
establishment. Under Articles 35, 36, and 37 of the OYAK Law, it enjoys a variety of 
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tax exemptions (Akça, 2010b, p.11). Its properties, revenues, and debts are under legal 
protection, and its members enjoy housing benefits. In OYAK Law, Article 35 
juxtaposes the exemptions of the Fund as such:  
 ...a) The Fund shall be exempt from taxes on Corporations; b) Donations made to the 
Fund and benefits of any kind provided by the Fund to its members or to their legal 
heirs shall be exempt from Income Tax and Inheritance Tax; c) The Fund shall be 
exempt from stamp duty in connection with its transactions; d) Dues collected from 
permanent and temporary members shall be exempt from Income Tax; e) All kinds of 
revenues of the Fund shall be exempt from Expenditure Tax (Military Personnel 
Assistance and Pension Fund Law, 1961, p.11).  
 
While according to Article 36 the Fund is entitled to privileges with respect to the 
construction of housing for its members, Article 37 states “All of the property of the 
Fund as well as all of the revenues of and debts due to the Fund shall enjoy the same 
rights and privileges as State property. Offences against such property shall be subject 
to the same legal remedies as offences against State property” (Military Personnel and 
Assistance and Pension Fund Law, 1961, p.11). According to a report by the 
Parliamentary Investigation Committee in November 2012, OYAK was immune from 
any institutional auditing until 2001 (TBMM, 2012, p.151). In addition, subsidiaries of 
OYAK are also under the state guarantee. For instance, as Mustafa Sönmez indicates, 
when the Turkish Automotive Industry (TOE) and its subsidiary company Motor 
Vehicles Trade (MAT) went bankrupt, in 1984 they were taken over by Ziraat Bank, 
one of the state banks in Turkey (Sönmez, 1992, p.230).  
Therefore, an army playing this role in a late developing country like Turkey not 
only benefits by rewarding itself political power, but also serves to reproduce the 
system in its convulsive periods. The 1960 coup and 1971 memorandum temporarily 
resolved the political crisis of the bourgeoisie that was unable to bring political 
solutions in a classic bourgeois parliamentary way. While the 1960 coup was functional 
in upgrading manufactured production through a transition to the deepening of the ISI 
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model and the planned economy, the 1971 memorandum functioned as the Sword of 
Damocles, targeting the radicalisation of youth in those periods.  
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Chapter 3: Neoliberal Transition under Conditions of Military Rule 
The previous chapter explained the Bonapartist character of the regime which pertains 
to a particular economic model, national developmentalism. This chapter looks firstly at 
the completion of the national developmentalist project. It argues that the Kemalist 
state’s economic pillar had started to slowly decline with the erosion of national 
developmentalism. It also suggests that it was only in the 1990s that the political pillar 
of Kemalism began to weaken under limited political liberalisation. This chapter 
introduces the economic background for the “conservative coup” of 12 September, 
1980. It then suggests that the military dictatorship as an exceptional form of the state 
between 1980 and 1983 was functional in transitioning to export-led capitalism and the 
suppression of labour. It is postulated that export-led capitalism in Turkey after the 
1980s increased the economic and political power of what Gumuscu and Sert (2009) 
call “the devout bourgeoisie” in the periphery. Importantly, religion has become the 
ideological cement, particularly for the second generation of Turkish capitalism. By 
analysing the development of the second generation of Turkish capitalism, represented 
in MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği - The Independent Industrialists’ 
and Businessmen’s Association), ASKON (Anadolu Aslanları İşadamları Derneği - 
The Anatolian Tigers Business Association) and TUSKON (Türkiye İşadamları ve 
Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu - Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and 
Industrialists), this chapter prepares the ground for Chapters 4 and 5, which explain the 
evolution of Islamic politics in Turkey and the rise of AKP rule, respectively.  
The completion of the national developmentalist project 
The development of big monopoly capitalism in Turkey was a protracted process 
backed by the military through providing the necessary social conditions for its 
maturation. Yet, at a certain stage in the development of the means of production, the 
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conditions for which national developmentalism served capital accumulation turned into 
fetters for its further expansion. In other words, the crisis of national developmentalism, 
the economic pillar of the Kemalist state, was decisively structural.  
 The incompatibility between reducing dependence of the Turkish economy on 
foreign resources and sustaining planned economic growth in the five-year development 
plans (1963-1967, 1968-1972, and 1973-1977) under the low levels of domestic savings 
and capital formation (Aydın, 2005, pp.34-35) produced an economic blockage to 
further capital expansion. This was mainly due to the fact that Turkish industry was 
unable to deepen the import-substitution model under national developmentalism for 
imported investment goods. Whereas the share of durable consumer goods and 
intermediate goods in industrial manufacturing increased from 24.9% in 1963 to 52.7% 
in 1980, the share of investment goods in industrial manufacturing decreased from 8.4% 
in 1963 to 7.5% in 1980 (Boratav, 2011, p.133, Table 2.2 in the previous chapter).  
 The contradiction of the Turkish economy under the import-substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) model reflected itself in the increase of imports of intermediate 
and capital goods in manufacturing. Between 1950 and 1978, while the proportion of 
consumer goods in total imports declined from 20.6% to 2.9%, the proportion of raw 
materials in total imports rose from 33.4% to 62.4% (TÜSİAD, 1979 in Ercan, 2002, 
p.24). On the other hand, the level of domestic savings, which could have balanced the 
scarce foreign currency, lagged behind the increase in investment. While the rate of 
investment rose from 19% of GDP in 1967 to 26% in 1977, savings stayed at an average 
of around 17% of GDP (The World Bank, 1981, p.5). The World Bank warned that the 
gap between domestic savings and investment was increasingly financed by short-term 
and medium-term borrowing from abroad (The World Bank, 1981, p.5).  
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 Yet, the crucial contradiction was that the ISI model, which had aimed to reduce 
the dependence on foreign resources, resulted in the import dependence of industry. 
Whereas imports were US$2.1 billion in 1973, they rose to US$5.5 billion in 1980 
(Başkaya, 2009, p.165). By 1977 export revenues were able to cover only 30% of 
import costs and the foreign trade deficit exceeded $US4 billion (Boratav, 2011, p.140). 
Figure 3.1 shows that the gap between the share of exports in GDP and the share of 
imports in GDP widened after 1973. In 1977, the share of exports was only 4% of the 
GDP while the share of imports in the GDP rose to 11% (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1. Exports and Imports (% of GDP), 1960 -1980.  
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015. 
Even though the trade deficit problem was a common symptom of the Turkish 
economy since the post-war adjustment period in 1946, it was underlined by the 
increase in consumption between 1960 and 1980. The middle classes, which constituted 
the social base of Kemalist Bonapartism, largely benefited from the ISI period between 
1963-1980 in the form of an increase in real wages and the consumption of durable 
consumer goods. However, the production of these goods were dependent on imports 
and their quality, unit costs and the scale of production fell behind Western products 
(Boratav, 2011, p.119).     
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  The exhaustion of national developmentalism under the ISI model—that 
successfully united the divergent interests of the proletariat, urban population, industrial 
bourgeoisie and bureaucracy—precipitated the dissolution of the historic bloc. National 
developmentalism under ISI made the implementation of populist distributive policies 
possible between 1962 and 1976 (Boratav, 2011, p.123). This brought reconciliation 
between the ruling classes and mass population (Boratav, 2011, p.123). Higher wages 
and workers’ rights, the right to strike and collective bargaining, which was put into 
effect in 1963, facilitated the extension of the domestic market (Boratav, 2011, p.124). 
However, trade union activism in the 1970s was seen as a barrier to capital 
accumulation by international financial organisations. The World Bank’s 1980 report, 
Turkey: Policies and Prospect for Growth, acknowledged that trade union participation 
was high in Turkey compared to other developing countries (The World Bank, 1980, 
p.141). Unionisation rates in the industrial labour force were 43% and 57% in 1967 and 
1977, respectively (The World Bank, 1980, p.141). Turkey was characterised as “an 
outliner [sic] amongst developing countries” with regards to the workdays lost per 
striking worker (The World Bank, 1980, p.143). The report observed that an average of 
57 days per striking worker were lost in 1973 in Turkey, whereas the closest developing 
country was India with 10 days (The World Bank, 1980, p.143).   
 Not only national developmentalism but also Keynesianism was in crisis. The 
crisis of the Keynesian economic policies which had prevailed in advanced countries 
after the Second World War until the 1970s led to the neoliberal turn. The radical 
assault on Keynesian economic policies with full employment as the key objective was 
fundamentally carried out in October 1979 by Paul Volcker, chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve Bank under Carter, who was reappointed to his position under Reagan in 1980. 
The Volcker shock, known as a sudden and high increase in the nominal interest rate in 
 119 
the US in order to fight inflation, had a devastating effect on debtor countries. 
Following the OPEC oil price hike in 1973, the developing countries were seen as the 
safest and more profitable destinations for the New York investment banks to lend 
petrodollars of oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi. The 
abundance of foreign credit designated for developing countries pushed these countries 
into default by the sharp increase of the US interest rates as in the case of Volcker shock 
(Harvey, 2005, pp.23-29).  
 Turkey was no exception to this global debt crisis. The symptom of this 
economic contradiction crystallised itself in the perpetual balance of payment crises 
during the late 1970s (Boratav, 2011, pp.139-144; Başkaya, 2009, pp.170-172). 
Nevertheless, workers’ remittances, which in 1974 reached US$1.462 million, played 
some role in the postponement of an imminent economic crisis (Zürcher, 2004, p.267). 
Between 1971 and 1974, workers’ remittances approximated 5% of the national income 
(Pamuk, 1984, p.58). They equalled 93.1% and 93.6% of Turkish export earnings in 
1974 and 1975, respectively (Başkaya, 2009, p.175). 
Industrialisation’s high dependence on foreign resources compelled successive 
governments to steer the economy towards the prescriptions of the IMF and the World 
Bank. From 1978 onwards, the government of Bülent Ecevit negotiated with the IMF, 
WB, and OECD on stabilisation programme for new credits. However, even though an 
agreement for $US1.8 billion was reached in July 1979, it was conditional on the 
introduction of a reform package by the Turkish government which would include 
abolishing controls in trade, cutting subsidies to state-owned enterprises, freeing interest 
rates, raising prices and reducing government expenditure (Zürcher, 2004, p.268). The 
implementation of this programme became the priority of the Demirel government in 
late 1979 and of the undersecretary in the State planning organisation, Turgut Özal 
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(Zürcher, 2004, p.268). Even though coalition governments were compelled to 
devaluate the Turkish Lira by 29.9% and 40% in 1978 and 1979 respectively (Öniş, 
1998, p.16), the resistance of the unions and especially of DİSK (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi 
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey) to 
this programme—including factory occupations and strikes resulting in confrontation 
with the police and army—paralysed the implementation of the economic package 
(Zürcher, 2004, p.268).  
As a result of the unstable economic and political conditions, in 1979 the 
representational link between big monopoly capitalists and the Ecevit government was 
severely weakened. It culminated with a notice published by TÜSİAD  (Türk 
Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği - Turkish Industry & Business Association) 
declaring “the only realistic solution” for Turkey to be “free enterprise” and “the 
encouragement of the individual in competition” while criticising the government for 
“increasingly moving away from the market economy” (Milliyet, 15 May 1979). While 
this proclamation of big monopoly capitalists was evaluated by the government as a 
“memorandum” (Milliyet, 16 May 1979), Nejat Eczacıbaşı, then president of TÜSİAD, 
declared his “suspicion” toward Ecevit after the latter denounced private corporations as 
exploiters on state television (Milliyet, 17 May 1979). The Ecevit government fell in 
November 1979, and was replaced by a minority government under Demirel. This 
political situation confirms the fact that the bourgeoisie was politically weak in Turkey, 
unable to overcome the economic contradictions and political crisis. This led to a 
political spasm in the leadership of the bourgeoisie in which only the military 
dictatorship, as an exceptional state form, could overcome the political and economic 
crises once again (Savran, 2010, pp.182-183).   
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However, the increasing geostrategic role of Turkey in the Cold War period 
meant the US administration was obliged to take into account the exigency of stability 
in the country, which helped to strengthen the army’s position. It should be stressed that 
as a NATO country since 1952, Turkey has always been one of the main recipients of 
the US military assistance programme. For instance, according to a 2012 report by the 
Security Cooperation Agency, part of the United States Department of Defence, Turkey 
ranked second in Europe, after the United Kingdom, in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
deliveries of the US from 1950 to 2012 receiving more than US$ 16 billion (Security 
Cooperation Agency, 2012, pp.14-21).27 Nevertheless, the gradual success of Necmettin 
Erbakan (the leader of the Islamic parties in Turkey since 1970) in the coalition 
governments with the CHP in 1974 and in the consecutive National Front (Milli Cephe) 
governments led by Demirel in 1975-1977 and 1977-1978, together with the emergence 
of pro-Khomeini para-military groups in Turkey, ruffled the US. According to Birand 
(1987, p.67), this was due to the fear of losing of Turkey as a “buffer zone” not only for 
the Middle East but also for Europe. Fundamentally, the political and economic crisis in 
Turkey that politicians were unable to resolve ran counter to the interests of the US. The 
coup was therefore welcomed by the US administration (Birand, 1987, p.185).  
Structural transformation under the exceptional form of the capitalist state 
On the morning of 12 September 1980, Kenan Evren, Chief of General Staff, explained 
that the army was fulfilling its “duty of protecting and safeguarding the Turkish 
Republic as laid down under its Internal Service Code in an orderly manner within the 
chain of command” as such had “taken over the complete administration of the country” 
                                                          
27 Turkey ranked seventh in the world in FMS (Foreign Military Sales) acquisitions from the U.S. 
between 1950 and 2012. The top ten in FMS of the U.S. between 1950 and 2012 were Saudi Kingdom, 
Israel, Egypt, Taiwan, Korea, United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany, Australia, and Greece. The amount of 
the FMS of the U.S. for these countries were $72.3 billion, $30.2 billion, $29.6 billion, $28 billion, $17.3 
billion, $16.4 billion, $16 billion, $15.3 billion, $15.2 billion, $12 billion, respectively (Security 
Cooperation Agency, 2012, pp.14-21).    
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(General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982, p.221). The purpose of the 
coup was described as being “to preserve the integrity of the country, to restore national 
unity and togetherness, to avert a possible civil war and fratricide, to re-establish the 
authority and existence of the State and to eliminate all the factors that prevent the 
normal functioning of the democratic order” (General Secretariat of the National 
Security Council, 1982, pp.221-222).  
 In some respects the form of the 1980 coup was different from the previous ones 
in 1923 and 1960. Adopting Gilbert Achcar’s categorisation of coups in Arab history, it 
is fair to argue that Turkey witnessed a “revolutionary coup” in 1923, a “reformist 
coup” in 1960 and, a “conservative coup” in 1980. According to Achcar (2013, pp.177-
178), “revolutionary coups aim radically to transform the political regime and call 
themselves “revolutions” such as anti-monarchical coups in Egypt in 1952, Tunisia in 
1957, Iraq in 1958, Yemen in 1962, Libya in 1969 as well as in Sudan in 1969 with 
Nasserite inspiration and in 1989 with Islamic inspiration. “Reformist coups”, on the 
other hand, look for the correction or rectification of an already established regime 
without effecting a radical break such as coups in Algeria in 1965 by Houari 
Boumediene, Iraq in 1968 by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, Syria in 
1970 by Hafez al-Assad, Tunisia in 1987 by Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, and “palace 
revolutions” in the oil monarchies (Achcar, 2013, p.178). “Conservatives coups”, 
however, respond to political instability and seek to preserve the established order or 
restore it in a transitional period such as most of the repetitive coups in Mauritania 
(Achcar, 2013, p.178).  
 Therefore, the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 under Mustafa 
Kemal followed a form of a revolutionary coup which abolished the Ottoman Sultanate 
in 1922 and radically transformed the country in line with Western modernisation. The 
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1960 coup was rather a reformist coup which set out the institutionalisation of 
Bonapartist rule via the establishment of the National Security Council. The 1980 coup 
was, on the other hand, a conservative coup which brutally reacted to political and 
economic convulsion of the 1970s and re-established the state order between 1980 and 
1983.28 Unlike the 1960 coup when middle-rank army officers seized power, the 
military hierarchy was preserved in the 1980 coup and the leader of the coup, Kenan 
Evren, became the president. The military body of the 1980 coup did not necessitate 
expulsing existing military officers whereas in the 1960 coup, Rüştü Erdelhun, Chief of 
General Staff during the coup, was removed (Hale, 1994, p.248). Aside from the 
expulsion of the civilian members in the National Security Council, there was no purge 
of military officers after the 1980 coup. The 1980 coup was, therefore, the reflection of 
“the collective will of the high command” (Hale, 1994, pp.248-249). Importantly, 
whereas the 1960 coup established the National Security Council which sometimes 
replaced the cabinet as a locus of power and decision-making, the 1980 coup had a firm 
effect on controlling every aspect of society through, for instance, the promulgation of a 
new Law on Political Parties and the establishment of YÖK (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu-
Higher Education Authority) which was responsible for directly appointing all rectors 
and deans (Zürcher, 2004, pp. 241, 280-281).  
  The class character of the 1980 coup was obvious. In his inaugural speech for 
the Second Economic Congress of Turkey which was held in İzmir on 2-7 November 
1981 and imitated the First Economic Congress of Turkey held in 1923 in İzmir by 
Mustafa Kemal, Kenan Evren stressed that the pre-1980 period of “anarchy and 
                                                          
28 Achcar also describes a fourth category of coups: reactionary coups which “sets out to repress a 
movement for a radical change that has come to power or is about to” such as the 1992 Algerian coup 
(2013, p.178). In this regard, the 1980 coup shares more similarities with a conservative coup than a 
reactionary coup. Even though the left was brutally repressed after the coup in 1980, the left was 
politically feeble to come to power in the pre-coup period of the 1970s.   
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terrorism” had been a threat to the national economy. Indeed, his speech reflected the 
economic rationale of his coup:  
...the conditions created by anarchy and terrorism spreading throughout the country 
before 12 September, had brought our State to the brink of collapse, and our country to 
a stage of dismemberment. These conditions were exercising an increasing pressure 
over the social and economic life of our people. As a result of such pressure, production 
was declining, investments were decreasing, unemployment was growing, and all these 
factors were further imperilling the atmosphere of unrest and insecurity developed by 
anarchy and terrorism. The most evident example of this can be noticed in factories. 
Their outputs that had fallen down to 15 per cent have subsequently increased up to 80 
and 90 per cent, following the arrest of many notorious subversive gang leaders, the 
prevention of partisanship, the securing of an impartial rule, and the resumption of 
peace and security that was the right of the Turkish worker. In the agricultural sector, 
armed rural gangs were seizing at gun point a share of the produce [sic] harvested by the 
Turkish farmers at the price of a whole season’s toiling and sweat; agricultural workers 
were being held up, threatened and prevented from working; and sometimes produce 
[sic] and farming machinery like tractors and combines, which represent the national 
wealth and the labour of the farmer, were being burnt and destroyed (Evren, 1983, 
p.10).  
 
Owing to the necessity to preserve the social order of capitalism and overcome 
the political impasse of the pre-1980 period, the military indubitably acted to protect the 
Turkish capitalists. The suspension of the parliamentary regime and the instalment of 
the military dictatorship in Turkey between 1980 and 1983 was applauded by Turkish 
capitalists, recalling the Marx’s observation in 1852 on the attitude of the French 
bourgeoisie to the demise of the parliamentary republic in France, which had effectively 
been to say “Rather an end with terror than terror without end!”.  
 Complaining about the inability of political parties, despite all warnings, to form 
stable governments between 1973 and 1980, Vehbi Koç, industrial and commercial 
emperor of Turkey during his time, defended the coup on the grounds of the sharp 
decrease in anarchic movements after the intervention. While Koç claimed that people 
felt relieved after the coup, he also asked the military government to introduce the 
“necessary laws and Constitution” and to allow the liberal democratic parliamentary 
system to function in a normal way (Milliyet, 18 December 1980).  
 It goes without saying that the “conservative coup” mercilessly pursued the 
eradication of political activities and dissidents. A state of emergency was declared 
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throughout the country and no one was allowed to leave. By the end of 1981, 30,000 
people had been arrested and by September 1982, 80,000 were in prison, 30,000 of 
them awaiting trial (Zürcher, 2004, pp.278-279). The Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey’s (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi-TBMM) 2012 report summarised the balance 
sheet of the coup as follows: 650,000 people were taken into custody, of which 210,000 
were prosecuted in martial courts, and 65,000 were sentenced. 6,353 people were tried 
under the threat of capital punishment; more than 500 people were condemned and of 
these 50 people were executed. Hundreds of thousands of people were blacklisted, 
388,000 people were forbidden to travel abroad, and 4,891 public officials were fired. 
Four thousand five hundred and nine public officials were deported and more than 
20,000 public officials were forced to retire or resign. Thirty thousand people fled 
abroad, and the citizenship of 15,000 people was cancelled. Speaking Kurdish was 
banned. With this regulation, Turkey became the first and only country in the world to 
legally ban the speaking of a language. Newspapers, magazines, periodicals and non-
periodicals were forbidden; journalists and authors were given heavy prison sentences. 
Tens of thousands of books were burned, 937 movies were banned, all political parties 
were dissolved, and trade unions and non-governmental organisations were closed down 
(TBMMb, 2012, pp.916-917). The transitional period and the military dictatorship 
between 1980 and 1983 was a substitute for the direct rule of the bourgeoisie. 
 Meanwhile, “the necessary laws and the Constitution” were introduced. The 
Constituent Assembly, composed of the Consultative Assembly and the National 
Security Council (NSC), replaced the parliament to prepare a constitution in which 
Evren and his colleagues would have the final say (Hale, 1994, p.256). A referendum 
was conducted for the constitution and it was accepted in November 1982 by a majority 
of 91.4% with a 91.3% turnout (Hale, 1994, p.256). The Higher Education Law, 
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Political Parties Law, Trade Unions Law, and Law on Collective Labour Agreements 
were passed under the military regime (Hale, 1994, pp.251-259). Indeed, from 
September 1980 to December 1983 when power was handed down to the civilian 
government, the military regime passed 669 laws (TBMMa, 2012, p.74). 
 Allowing major changes in the state structure, the military played a key role in 
shifting Turkey’s economic trajectory from a state-controlled to a market economy. It 
was crucial because the civilian government led by Demirel, which confronted the 
militant working class, had certainly failed to fully implement the stabilisation 
programme. The coup regime’s decisions involved “[t]he reduction of direct 
government intervention in the productive sector, and instead greater emphasis on 
market mechanisms, competition, private initiative and indirect government incentive 
schemes, [t]he replacement of an inward-oriented development strategy with a 
substantial increase in exports and gradual import liberalisation, [and] some lowering of 
barriers to foreign direct investment, even in sectors from which it had previously been 
barred” (Wolff, 1987, p.99). These policy measures were evaluated by the OECD as 
representing “a courageous attack on the serious economic problems facing the 
economy” (OECD, 1980, p.29). “Greater reliance of market forces” and “reduction of 
direct government intervention in guiding the economy”, along with “exposing Turkish 
enterprises, including most State-owned firms, to more competition” constituted the 
pillars of the structural adjustment programme in a mixed economy where the SOEs 
provided 40% of valued added and employment in industry in 1979 (OECD, pp.5,19). 
The structural adjustment programme became “the new hegemonic strategy of the post-
1980 era” aiming to integrate Turkey into the world market (Yalman, 2009, p.250). The 
target was to open up the Turkish economy by relying on market forces (Başkaya, 2009, 
p.189). The new paradigm in the economic model was based on the increase of export 
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and foreign currency, in which industrial production would serve the demands of the 
competitive international market rather than the protected domestic market. In this way, 
exposure to “international competition” was regarded as the path to increased industrial 
production. The structural adjustment programme opened a new economic reform 
period in the post-1980s which included flexible exchange rates, austerity and export 
drive, public enterprise reform and privatisation, financial liberalisation, import 
liberalisation and the promotion of direct foreign investment (Arıcanlı and Rodrik, 
1990). 
 This new hegemonic strategy was put into practice under conditions of military 
dictatorship. While fully implementing the stabilisation programme and paving the way 
for the transition to export-led capitalism in Turkey, the military prepared the socio-
political conditions for competition in the world market by disciplining the working 
class. The left-wing trade union confederation DİSK was closed down along with the 
extreme right-wing confederation MİSK (Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, 
Nationalist Trade Union Confederation) and their leaders were jailed (Sayarı, 1992, 
p.31). The military only permitted the continuation of the centrist trade union 
organisation Türk-İş (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Turkish Trade Union 
Confederation) whose leader was appointed as Social Affairs Minister in the military 
government (Sayarı, 1992, p.31; Wolff, 1987, p.120). Measures taken by the military 
regime included suspension of trade union activities, the trial of the DİSK leaders, 
banning strikes, and the replacement of collective bargaining by the determination of 
wages by Yüksek Hakem Kurulu (High Board of Arbitration) (Boratav, 2011, p.150). In 
the “counter attack of capital against labour”, borrowing the phrase from Boratav 
(2011), the post-1980 period, notably between 1980 and 1988, saw a setback for the 
rights of the working class. Real wages dropped 29% from 1978/1979 to 1988 relative 
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to wholesale prices, and by 32% with relative to consumer prices. Moreover, the ratio of 
wages to the value-added in the manufacturing industry dramatically fell to 15.4% in 
1988 from 37.2% in 1978/1979 (Boratav, 2011, pp.163-165). Real wages were 
repressed in the export-led capitalist period, a trend initiated after 1976, in order to 
increase the competitiveness of the industry, which was accompanied by a rapid 
decrease of real salaries (Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.2. The Development of Real Wages and Salaries (TL/day), 1963-1988. Data are in local 
currency.  
Source: Türkiye Ekonomisi (The Turkish Economy) by Kepenek & Yentürk, 2003, p.429.  
Islamisation of society after the 1980s 
The military regime also had an interest in the Islamisation of society. The fusion of 
religion with nationalism appeared in the post-1980 period, with Islam used to 
complement the formulation of Turkish national identity. The military drew ideological 
legitimisation from a nationalist and conservative institution called Aydınlar Ocağı (The 
Hearth of the Enlightened) which was founded in 1970 to counter the monopoly of 
leftist circles in the political, social and cultural fields (Zürcher 2004, p.288). This 
organisation worked out a system called Türk-İslam Sentezi (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis) 
which has been used as an official state ideology ever since. Pioneered by İbrahim 
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Kafesoğlu, Türk-İslam Sentezi held that Islam had been attractive to Turks because of 
the remarkable similarities between the pre-Islamic Turkish culture and Islamic 
civilisation; these include justice, monotheism, a belief in the immortal soul and 
attachment to family and morality. The Turkish mission was determined to be acting as 
“soldier of Islam”, with the two main pillars of Turkish culture built on a 2500-year-old 
Turkish element and a 1000-year-old Islamic element (Zürcher, 2004, p.288).  
These views were also adopted by the state bureaucracy. The State Planning 
Organisation (SPO) prepared a Report on National Culture in 1983 which attacked the 
“divisive foreign ideologies” that were seen as the cause for the moral and cultural 
deterioration of Turkish people during the 1970s (Atasoy, 2005, p.155). While 
criticising the republican education system for adopting a materialist and positivist 
view, the report suggested a “faithful, knowledgeable and moral” generation (Eligür, 
2010, p.106). The family, the mosque, and the military constituted the three basic 
institutional pillars of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis view for accomplishing social 
cohesion and discipline (Yavuz, 2003a, p.73). The Presidency of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) expanded its tasks beyond the organisation of religious 
activities; it supported Turkish nationalism while defining its institutional aims as the 
protection and preservation of Turkish national identity and confrontation with 
communist and atheistic ideologies among the youth (Yavuz, 2003a, p.70). Religious 
courses and ethics were also offered to more than 80,000 prisoners in 1982 by the 
Minister of Justice (Geyikdağı, 1984, p.141). In addition, religious courses were made 
compulsory in primary and high schools under the military dictatorship, as stipulated in 
Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution.29 The Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren 
explained the reason for this regulation in Erzurum on 26 October 26 1982: 
                                                          
29 Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution stipulates, “...Religious and moral education and instruction shall be 
conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and morals shall be one of 
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 ...When the exploiter of religion and, above all, ignorant politicians say, mingling 
freely with the crowd, that “this is the case in our religion that is the case in our 
religion”, there have been no people around who had enough religious knowledge to say 
to him frankly that this is actually the true one...Turkish children were completely 
unable to learn the religion of the Turkish nation, of their family, of their mothers and 
fathers, of themselves in propria persona. This religious knowledge cannot be given by 
each family at home. If they attempt to teach it, this would not be in good taste. Because 
they can teach it wrongly, teach it faultily or they can teach it according to their 
views...I asked you not to send your children to illegal Quranic courses...[T]he religion 
[and] piety will be taught to our children in the state schools by the state. In this way, 
are we acting against the clause of secularism as some people who are inimical to 
religion argue? Or, on the contrary, are we serving secularism? Of course we are serving 
secularism. Because secularism does not mean that through being deprived of religious 
knowledge, Turkish youth and Turkish citizens would be exposed to the people who 
exploit religion so that they could be deceived [and] cheated (Evren, 1991, p.309, my 
translation). 
 
The control over Islam by the military developed in a particular context of socio-
transformation in the domestic and international environment after the mid-1970s. The 
crisis of national capitalists in the developing countries and the triumph of market 
economy and individualism challenged traditional state-society relations. The Turkish 
state increasingly needed to control religion “as the main vehicle through which the 
state reshaped modernity in line with ideology of marketisation while also resolving the 
problem of legitimacy” (Sakallioglu, 1996, p.245). The political and ideological 
vacuum left by the secular and left forces to confront the assertiveness of Islamic 
fundamentalism was immediately filled by the manipulative power of the state over 
Islam (Sakallioglu, 1996, p.246). In addition, the interests of the business world were 
also in line with the incorporation of religion within state as the best way to curb the 
power of Islamic fundamentalism (Sakallioglu, 1996, p.246). In a letter by Vehbi Koç, 
the leading industrialist in Turkey, submitted to Kenan Evren on 12 October 1980, it 
was proposed that “A nation with no religion is not possible. This time religious affairs 
should be regulated in such a way that as not to allow the political parties to exploit it” 
(as cited in Sakallioglu, 1996, p.246; Milliyet, 23 December 1990).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
the compulsory lessons in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and 
instruction [Quran courses and Quran summer courses] shall be subject to the individual’s own desire, 
and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives” (1982, pp.11-12).   
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  In this way, the institutionalisation of Islam in the state—and a particular branch 
of it, Sunni Islam—gained momentum after the coup. The personnel of Diyanet 
increased tremendously.30 Whereas there were 50,765 personnel in Diyanet in 1979, this 
number rose to 84,172 in 1989. An average of 1,500 mosques was built annually and 
the number of mosques rose from 54,667 in 1984 to 62,947 in 1988, equivalent to one 
mosque for every 857 people.31 Building mosques in Alevi districts has been a part of 
the assimilationist state policy towards Alevis (Bulut, 1997, p.81). Brigadier Kenan 
Güven who was appointed in 1982 as the governor of Dersim, an Alevi populated 
district, praised the “ascension of call for prayer” in a Kızılbaş region (Hür, 2013).32 In 
addition, the expansion of lower grade Quran schools after the 1980 coup, which 
increased from 2,610 before 1980 to 4,715 schools in 1989, went hand in hand with that 
of imam-hatip schools (religious vocational schools). The number of students going to 
imam-hatip schools increased incrementally from 68,486 to 155,403 in the same period, 
of whom 58,350 were female (Ahmad, 1993, pp.220-221). 
 It was also under the military regime between 1980 and 1983 that the salary of 
official Turkish imams sent for Turkish people living Belgium and West Germany by 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs was paid by World Muslim League (Rābitat al-
‘Ālam al-Islāmī, known as Rabıta) between 1982 and 1984 (Mumcu, 1993, pp.171-
173). In addition, Rabıta financed a mosque, an Islamic centre on the campus of left-
wing Middle East Technical University, and a major portion of the university’s Arabic 
language program (Mumcu 1993; Akin and Karasapan, 1988, p.15). 
                                                          
30 With its 98,555 personnel in 2011, this bureaucratic machine has been administering 84,684 mosques 
and 10,914 Quran courses in 2012 that 302,143 people attended by the end of schooling year 2009/2010 
(Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 2012). 
31 The number of mosques in Turkey was 84,684 in 2012 (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 2012) and the 
population of Turkey was 75.627.384 by the end of 2012 (TUİK, 2013a, p.9). This means that there was 
approximately one mosque for every 893 people. 
32 Later, Kenan Güven was appointed to the general directorate of a municipal company called Belko by 
Melih Gökçek, the major of Ankara from the Welfare Party in 1994. 
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Furthermore, religion has increasingly been used as a tool for the adaptation of 
Turkish foreign policy to establish close economic and political relations with the 
Muslim world without deviating from the main goal of membership of the European 
Economic Community. At the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference held in Casablanca, 
Morocco in 1984, Kenan Evren was elected as the Chairman of the Standing Committee 
for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
(COMCEC), the main multilateral economic and commercial cooperation platform of 
the Islamic world, which is one of the four standing committees of the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) founded in 1969.33 He suggested that “improvement of our 
relations with the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries has gained a special political 
and economic content. We are in the endeavour of elevating our relations with the 
Middle East and Islamic countries by developing and strengthening the existing 
historical, cultural, and spiritual ties and by achieving [a] productive cooperation in all 
areas that serve the interests of all sides. We see the positive results of various contacts 
both in the dual-plan and in the framework of the Islam Conference” (as cited in Eligür, 
2010, p.116). 
Turgut Özal in power (1983-1989 and 1989-1993): export-led capitalism, 
post-Bonapartist rule, and Islamisation of society  
After establishing “peace and security” through their exceptional form of state rule, the 
military junta only allowed three political parties to participate in the general elections 
in November 1983. These were the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, MP) led by 
Turgut Özal, the People’s Party (Halkçı Parti, PP) led by Necdet Calp, and the 
Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, NDP) led by an ex-general 
Turgut Sunalp. Although the military supported Turgut Sunalp’s Nationalist Democracy 
                                                          
33 Established by the Third Islamic Summit Conference held in Mecca/Taif in 1981, the COMCEC aims 
to strengthen economic and commercial cooperation and develop coordination among the Member States 
while addressing the economic challenges of the Islamic Ummah (COMCEC, 2014). 
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Party, the MP under Turgut Özal won the elections with over 45% of the votes 
(Zürcher, 2004, p.282). The first MP term spanned from 1983 to 1987. In the 1987 
elections, Özal was able to acquire 36.3% of the votes. Later, he became the 8th 
president of Turkey in 1989 and died of a heart attack in 1993. After Özal left the MP to 
become the president in 1989, the party lost its charismatic leadership. In the 1991 
elections, the MP under Mesut Yılmaz acquired 24% of the votes, and was replaced by 
the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, TPP) under Süleyman Demirel.  
 Özal was a bureaucrat well-known for working in the interests of big business 
(Acar, 2002). As a protégé of Demirel, he worked in the State Planning Organisation 
(SPO) as an undersecretary between 1967 and 1971. In 1972, he went to the World 
Bank in Washington, D.C. and worked there about two years. At the same time, he 
continued his links with the representatives of big capitalists and business groups in 
Turkey that he was connected to through the SPO. Özal also provided some Turkish 
firms with technical advice on industrial and mining projects when he was in the US. 
After returning to İstanbul, he worked as a top-level manager in private firms for six 
years and conducted business by establishing partnerships with friends and family 
members. Following the coup of 12 September 1980, he was appointed as deputy prime 
minister in charge of economic affairs and stayed in this position until 1982, when he 
successfully implemented the January 24 Decisions (Acar, 2002, pp.164-167). The 
January 24 Decisions combined a stabilisation programme including devaluation, an 
increase in the price of state-owned enterprises’ products and the removal of price 
controls, within a structural adjustment programme including several measures to 
strengthen domestic and international capital against labour (Boratav, 2011, pp.147-
148).  
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 As a follower of monetarist economic policies, Özal was a staunch supporter of 
the stabilisation programme. He declared in the government programme of 1983 that the 
government’s foremost target was to combat inflation. Anti-inflationary policies were 
presented as a means to achieve income redistribution and to combat poverty (The 
Government Programme 1983, p.9). Second, in line with the transition to export-led 
capitalism, Özal declared his dedication “to market economy based on competition” 
(The Government Programme 1983, p.9). The main function of the state was deemed to 
be regulatory; it should not take part in industry and trade (The Government Programme 
1983, p.10). In his own words: 
We find it imperative to abandon the long prevailing import substitution mentality and 
switch to an industrialization policy which would be export-oriented and would 
integrate with world industry and trade. The import substitution policy which as a 
general rule envisaged the production of everything by [us] only pushed the cost up and 
neglected the element of quality. As a result a structure emerged whereby the entire 
burden was placed on the shoulders of the consumers and industries, with no export 
capability [resulting] (The Government Programme 1983, p.26).  
 
The abandonment of “the long prevailing import-substitution mentality” and 
transition to export-led capitalism as a prominent result of the stabilisation programme 
necessitated a strong leadership, embodied in Özal’s prime ministerial position (1983-
1989). The support of the transnational community for this transition, establishing trust 
for domestic and international capital for necessary investment performance, and the 
ability to get the consent of the people became possible only under a strong and 
effective leadership (Öniş, 2004, p.118). Yet, this aggravated the political calamity in 
Turkey caused by the fact that Özal preferred to rule by governmental decrees rather 
than by laws, in order to circumvent parliamentary rules and pressures (Öniş, 2004, 
p.114). The violation of the rule of law was the most damaging economic legacy of 
Özal (Öniş, 2004). 
 The post-1980 period under Özal was marked by a rapid increase in the export 
of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. While Turkish exports amounted to 3% 
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of GDP in 1979, it increased to 16 % in 1989 (The World Bank, 2015). Merchandise 
exports rose considerably from $2.3 billion in 1979 to $11.7 billion in 1988 (Arıcanlı 
and Rodrik, 1990, p.1347). Özal pursued a dual strategy of encouraging foreign 
investment and promoting Turkish exports. On the one hand, he passed a decree in 1983 
which legalised the establishment of special financial houses34 to administer Islamic 
banking (Moore, 1990, p.247). Saudi and Kuwaiti capital flowed into Turkey through 
Al-Baraka and Faisal Finance, both of which “financed Turkish oil imports—in the 
respective amounts of $150 million and $50 million annually—with which Korkut 
[Ö]zal [the brother of Turgut Özal] was alleged to have had an interest” (Moore, 1990, 
p.248). On the other hand, Özal submitted an official application for membership of the 
European Community in April 1987 (Zürcher, 2004, p.323). According to him, 
Turkey’s membership of the EC would be a win-win situation for both parties. He said 
that: 
...we [Turkey] shall represent a vast market for its [European] high technology products, 
and we shall offer enormous opportunities for productive investment for its enterprises, 
because we have many major projects to undertake. You have in large measure 
completed your infrastructure: you are in position to help us. Your companies will be 
able to invest in this area and create a great deal of employment, both in your 
[European] countries and in ours. Bearing in mind the differing wage costs of Europe 
and Turkey, you will be able to employ Turkish labour more economically in Turkey. 
Turkey will be able to play for the Community the role which the ‘sun-belt’ played in 
the economic development of the United States (Özal, 1991, p.314).  
 
Even though Özal was hostile to state dominance of the economy, the transition 
to neo-liberalism actually necessitated omnipresent state involvement in the economy in 
order to provide a fertile ground for the private sector. The state assumed an active role 
in the increase of public fixed investment in the share of total fixed investment in 
Turkey until 1988. While public fixed investment accounted for nearly half of total 
                                                          
34 These institutions operate under the Participation Banks. There are four participation banks in Turkey. 
These are AlBaraka Turk Participation Bank Inc., Asya Participation Bank Inc., Kuveyt Turk 
Participation Bank Inc., and Turkiye Finance Participation Bank Inc. The share of these four participation 
banks of total banking was 4.3%, in 2010. The share of these four banks in the volume of collected funds 
was 5.4% and the share of participation banks in the total volume of loans was 6% in Turkey in 2010 
(Yahşi, 2010, p.5). 
 136 
fixed investment in 1979, this increased to 58.1% in 1985. The value of private fixed 
investment exceeded that of public fixed investment only in 1988 (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. Relative Share of the Public and Private Sectors in Total Fixed Capital 
Investments, 1973-1988. 
Year 
Total Fixed   
Investment (% of 
GDP)* 
Public Fixed 
Investment 
(% of Total Fixed 
Investment) 
Private Fixed Investment 
( % of Total Fixed  
Investment) 
1973 15.7 47.0 54.9 
1974 14.8 47.9 52.1 
1975 16.1 50.4 49.6 
1976 18 51.5 48.5 
1977 19.2 55.4 44.6 
1978 17 48.2 51.8 
1979 15.6 49.7 50.3 
1980 15.9 55.8 44.2 
1981 15.1 62.2 37.8 
1982 15.1 61.5 38.5 
1983 14.8 56.2 43.8 
1984 14.4 54.0 46.0 
1985 15.3 58.1 41.9 
1986 17.1 58.1 41.9 
1987 24.7 54.4 45.6 
1988 26.1 47.5 52.5 
 
Source: "Export-Led Growth and the Center-Right Coalition in Turkey", in T. F. Nas and M. Odekon 
(Eds.), Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization, 1992, p.50. *Data on Total Fixed Investment as 
ratio to total GDP are taken from The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015.   
When the composition of fixed capital investment is analysed in the first decade 
of the transition to export-led capitalism, it can be easily seen that there was a structural 
division of labour in the orientation of public and private investment. According to 
TÜSİAD’s 1992 report, private fixed investment was concentrated in the housing and 
manufacturing sectors in 1990 and 1991, while the public sector played a crucial role in 
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providing infrastructure and energy investment for the private sector (Table 3.2). This 
clearly shows that the capitalist state under neoliberalism does not necessarily mean the 
minimisation of state, but rather signifies the redefinition of the role of the state. 
Table 3.2. Distribution of Fixed Capital Investment (as % of total) 
Sectors 
Public Private Total 
1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 
Agriculture 9.5 10.7 4.8 4.5 6.9 7.3 
Mining 3.4 3.4 1.2 1.3 2.2 2.3 
Manufacturing 4.5 5.1 27.5 26.4 17.5 16.7 
Energy 21.4 19.4 1.6 1.8 10.2 9.8 
Transport and 
Communications 
34.1 36.5 12.7 13.7 22.1 24.1 
Tourism 1.3 1.5 6.2 6.1 4.0 4.0 
Housing 4.0 1.6 41.1 40.5 25.0 22.8 
Education 7.0 5.6 0.6 0.7 3.4 2.9 
Health 2.8 2.7 0.9 1.5 1.7 2.0 
Other 12.1 13.5 3.4 3.4 7.2 8.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: The Turkish Economy’92 by TÜSİAD, 1992, p.36. 
 
With respect to civil-military relations, the Özal period between 1989 and 1991 
was a post-Bonapartist phase in Turkey. Özal took advantage of the transition to the 
post-Evren period in terms of military control by counterbalancing the political factions 
in the army. General Necdet Üruğ planned to retire in July 1987 and then choose 
General Necdet Öztorun, commander of the land forces, as his successor for Chief of 
General Staff. So, Üruğ wanted to control the military by opening a space for his 
political faction in the army and then become president after Evren’s term expired in 
1989 (Ahmad, 1993, p.215). However, Özal overruled the senior military command and 
appointed Necip Torumtay to succeed General Necdet Üruğ (Zürcher, 2004, p.285; 
Evin, 1994, pp.32-33; Özbudun, 2000, p.118). According to Feroz Ahmad, “[i]n the 
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future, Özal wanted by his side a chief of staff who shared his views on Turkey’s 
defence needs” (1993, p.217). Özal also planned to make the Chief of General Staff 
directly responsible to the Minister of Defence rather than the Prime Minister 
(Karabelias, 1999, p.137).  
 However, the fissure between Özal and Torumtay on the Gulf crisis in 1990 led 
to the resignation of the latter in December 1990. Özal was eager to benefit from the 
Gulf Crisis in 1990, saying that “Many things have changed in Turkey...In foreign 
policy the days of taking cowardly and timid position are over. From now on we’ll 
pursue an active policy based on circumstances. This is a totally political choice” (as 
cited in Ahmad, 1993, p.201). In terms of holding power in the executive, Özal declared 
his candidacy for the presidency to succeed Evren. He was elected by the assembly as 
the eighth president of the Republic of Turkey in 1989, becoming the first civilian 
president since the toppling of Celal Bayar by the military in 1960 (Özbudun, 2000, 
p.118).  
 Even though Özal sought to hold sway over the military, he continued the 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis put into effect by the military. The 1983 Government 
Programme stated  that “...it is necessary to take measures in order to ensure religious 
education in the primary and secondary schools so that generations with stable minds 
and moral values could be raised” (Özal, 1983, p.13). Recognising the family as “the 
foundation of the nation”, Özal put special emphasis on the training and education of 
children and youth to have “perfect national, moral and cultural values” (Özal, 1983, 
pp.35,38). As Hakan Yavuz (2003a, p.75) notes, Özal followed a policy of Islamising 
the educational system. A new curriculum prepared by Vehbi Dinçerler, the Minister of 
Education and a follower of the Nakşibendi order, rewrote national history and culture. 
In this new curriculum, the term “national” (milli) included and made reference to a 
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religious sense (Yavuz, 2003a, p.75). Religion gradually complemented Kemalist 
nationalism, which was in decline, in the latter’s role as the ideological basis of Turkish 
Bonapartism. 
 It is not surprising that the military incorporated religion into the general aims 
of “national power” following the dissolution of communism in the Eastern Bloc 
between 1989 and 1991 and the Republics of the Soviet Union in 1991. Religion was 
characterised by the military as a necessary component of “psycho-social and cultural 
power”. By doing so, the Turkish state not only fortified social integration in society, 
but also gained more room to manoeuvre in the Republics of the Soviet Union. In 
Devlet’in Kavram ve Kapsamı (The Concept and the Extent of the State), published by 
the General Secretary of the National Security Council in 1990, psycho-social and 
cultural power (socio-cultural power in short) is defined as “the sum of thoughts, faith 
and behaviour which develop through culture and play a driving and decisive role in 
improving and preserving the national entity” (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel 
Sekreterliği, 1990, p.230, my translation). In this sense, religion was seen as a necessary 
institution that would contribute to “national morality, patriotism, defence of 
motherland, brotherhood and national unity, and integrity and thereby to the 
development of social power” (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği, 1990, p.239, 
my translation). However, it was deemed that religion should be interpreted in a modern 
way (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği, 1990). It was noted that: 
As long as religion is interpreted in a modern, rational, and realistic way, as long as it is 
not used as a ‘tool’ by a community or a group that would provide them any political 
and social interest, but rather [religion is] appraised as an ‘aim’ in order to develop into 
a perfect person and perfect society; as long as it does not allow fundamentalism and 
bigotry, as long as it is invoked not simply for a proper departure to the hereafter but 
rather for future orientation to live in modern and advanced conditions without sticking 
to the past, religion benefits not only its believers but the whole of humanity...(Milli 
Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği, 1990, p.240, my translation).  
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Political liberalisation in the 1990s under post-Bonapartist rule  
 “[Political liberalisation] refers not to liberalism in its two modern senses but to the 
oscillation toward a “soft” internal policy instead of a “hard” one on the part of a 
despotic government which does not thereby give up its power to decide on one or the 
other” (Draper, 1977, p.276). It can be suggested that limited liberalisation in Turkey 
under post-Bonapartist rule in the 1990s was the extension of “the third wave of 
democratisation” in the late twentieth century (Huntington, 1991). In addition to the 
general factors that created conditions favourable to democratisation in the 1970s and 
1980s such as the development of democratic norms, the demise of authoritarian 
regimes, the increase in economic wealth, and the spread of democratic transitions and 
of democratic social movements (Huntington, 1991, pp.106-107), the rapid 
development of information and communication technologies (ICTs), together with the 
availability of television weakened authoritarian regimes, since the ICT revolution 
played a key role in disseminating information about human rights violations, thus 
creating alternative sources that challenged the state’s information monopoly (Navia & 
Zweifel, 2004; Selian, 2002). The development of ICTs made access to the alternative 
sources of information possible. While there were only 495 million Internet subscribers 
in the world in 2001, corresponding to 8% penetration rate, this rose to 3,174 million 
subscribers by 2015 with an estimated penetration rate of 43.4% (International 
Telecommunication Union [ITU] Statistics, 2015). The increase in the rate of 
individuals using the Internet in the developing countries was also been high over the 
past fifteen years. While only 2.8% of individuals in the developing countries were 
Internet subscribers in 2001, this rose to an estimated 35.3% by 2015 (ITU Statistics, 
2015).  
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Turkey followed the same global pattern in the development of ICTs. Figure 3.3 
demonstrates the development of ICTs of the past two decades. While there were only 
81,276 mobile telephone subscribers in Turkey in 1994, this rose to 71,888,416 
subscribers in 2014. The Internet users also incrementally increased in the 2000s. While 
there were only 229,885 internet users in Turkey in 1998, this rose to 41,272,940 in 
2014 (Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3. Number of Mobile Telephone and Internet Subscribers in Turkey, 1994-2014.  
Source: TÜİK, (n.d.).   
Similar to the dynamics of third wave democratisation, a combination of both 
external and internal dynamics contributed to the weakening of Bonapartist rule in 
Turkey in the 1990s. First, as an external force, the end of the Cold War brought EU 
pressure on the Eastern Bloc for democratisation and free markets, and US foreign 
policy under the Clinton administration (1993-2001)—from containment to 
enlargement—produced a snowballing effect that reached Turkey. In September 1993 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake declared the US’s strategy of enlargement: 
“enlargement of the world’s free communities of market democracies” (Lake, 1993/94, 
    72 
    41 
  10
  20
  30
  40
  50
  60
  70
  80
M
ill
io
ns
 
Number of Mobile Telephone Subscribers Number of Internet Subscribers
 142 
p.71).35 This put pressure on Bonapartist rule in Turkey to partially liberalise its 
political regime. Second, those bourgeois interests who desired accession to the 
European Union (EU) pushed the Turkish state to make reforms, particularly the 1995 
constitutional amendments, which were then followed by the Customs Union between 
the EU and Turkey, put into effect in December 1995. The Decision of the EC-Turkey 
Association Council to implement the Customs Union between the European 
Community and Turkey in December 1995 was the final phase of the Association 
Agreement, known as Ankara Agreement, which was signed in September 1963 
between the European Economic Community and Turkey. The conclusion of the 
Customs Union was conditioned by the EU upon further liberalisation (Zürcher, 2004, 
p.297). 
 Indeed, to shift from a state-controlled to a market economy the Turkish 
bourgeoisie needed more political space. It can be argued that this is why they then 
pushed for constitutional amendments for political freedom. An important aspect of 
liberalisation was realised with the 1993 constitutional amendment which put an end to 
the state monopoly on television and radio broadcasting (Zürcher, 2004, p.297; 
Özbudun, 2007, p.184). This contributed to the increase of private radio and television 
stations together with the development of social and political pluralism in Turkey 
(Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009, p.35; Özbudun, 2007, p.184). It was, nevertheless, the 
1995 constitutional amendments that were the most comprehensive in the realm of 
political liberalisation (see Box 3.1). These amendments contributed to the development 
of political participation while nonetheless failing to improve the rule of law and 
fundamental rights and liberties (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009, p.40).  
                                                          
35 However, even after the end of the Cold War, the US and Western governments continued to back 
despotic regimes in the Middle East mainly due to the control of oil and for the fear of Islamic 
fundamentalism. (For “Arab Despotic Exception”, see Achcar, 2013a, pp.108-118; 2004, pp.69-74; 
1997).  
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Box 3.1. Constitutional Amendments in 1995  
Amendments accepted 
• Abolition of the paragraphs of the preamble referring to the necessity and 
legitimacy of the 1980 coup 
• Lifting restrictions on trade unions, associations, foundations, cooperatives, 
and public professional organisations engaging in political activity and 
granting political cooperation between political parties and these civil society 
institutions 
• Lowering the voting age to 18  
• Increasing the number of parliamentarians to 550 from 450 
• Granting Turkish citizens living abroad the right to vote 
• Recognition of the right to unionise for public employees 
• Allowing university instructors and students to become members of political 
parties 
• Lowering the age of party membership from 21 to 18 
• Permission for political parties to form auxiliary bodies such as women’s and 
youth branches, foundations, and organisations in foreign countries 
• Concerning the suspension of activities of associations and public professional 
organisations, the requirement that a competent judge review within 24 hours 
and make a decision within 48 hours 
• Relaxation of restrictions on changing party membership, which had been a 
cause for loss of parliamentary membership 
• Restricting the loss of parliamentary membership to those whose words or 
deeds caused the banning of a political party  
• Limiting the grounds for prohibition of parties 
• Limiting the ban to five years for those who caused the prohibition of the 
party by their words or deeds 
 
 
Source: Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-making in Turkey by E. Özbudun and Ö. 
Gençkaya, 2009, pp.39-40. 
The relaxation in Bonapartist rule was illustrated by the publication of a report 
written in 1989 by a commission headed by Deniz Baykal, the General Secretary of the 
Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP), titled Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkçı Parti’nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu Sorunlarına Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri 
(Social Democratic Populist Party’s View on Eastern and South-Eastern Problems and 
its Recommendations). For the first time, a mainstream Turkish party challenged the 
official ideology regarding the Kurdish problem and recognised the Kurdish people as a 
separate ethnicity. It was emphasised that citizens living in some places in Eastern and 
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South-Eastern Anatolia are of predominantly Kurdish origin with respect to ethnicity. 
The report recommended that the citizens who accept their Kurdish identity and say “I 
am of Kurdish origin” should be able to express this identity freely in every area of their 
life (SHP, 1989).36 
The parliament enacted the “Law for Suppression of Terrorism” in April 1991 
which deleted Articles 141, 142, and 163 from the penal code so that establishment of 
association based on class and religion was no longer an offence (Zürcher, 2004, p.292; 
Hale, 1994, pp.289-290). As Kazan claims, since the 1950s, while Articles 141 and 142 
of the penal code prohibited communism, Article 163 targeted religious movements in 
Turkey (Ş. Kazan, personal communication, November 16, 2012). Laws on political 
parties and press, however, limited the repercussions of the withdrawal of Articles 141, 
142, and 163 of the penal code (Hale, 1994, p.290).  
 The writing and speaking of Kurdish in public, which had been banned since 
1983, became legal in 1991 (Hale, 1994, p.290). In 1991, Demirel publicly stated 
official recognition of the “Kurdish reality” (Hale, 1994, p.286; Pope, 1997, p.271). As 
Hale notes, “For the first time in the history of the republic, Kurdish-language books 
and newspapers began to appear in Turkey, and government even began a dialogue with 
the Kurdish leadership in Iraq, which now enjoyed virtual autonomy under Western 
protection” (Hale, 1994, p.286). Nevertheless, because the concept of terrorism was 
broadly defined in the newly enacted anti-terror law, verbal or written statements could 
fall under the concept of terrorism, which resulted in the persecution of many trade 
unionists, lawyers, human rights activists, journalists, and writers (Zürcher, 2004, 
p.292).  
                                                          
36 Similar reports on the Kurdish situation followed over the years. Most remarkable were those of Adnan 
Kahveci “who warned in 1992 of civil war if a democratic solution was not applied, and Doğu Ergil, an 
Ankara University professor, whose 1995 report showed that although not all Kurds supported the PKK, 
they did want respect for a separate Kurdish cultural identity” (Pope, 1997, p.265).  
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 Nonetheless, the army continued to rule from behind-the-scenes both in the post-
Evren period and in the 1990s even though the provisional Article 4 of the constitution, 
which prevented the leaders of the pre-1980 parties to engage in political activities for 
ten years, was repealed with a referendum in 1987 (Hale, 1994, p.279). The army was 
still controlling the state apparatus, if not formally ruling the country, through 
institutional routes and mechanisms such as the National Security Council, the 
presidency, martial law, and the military courts (Evin, 1994, pp.25-26). In this period, 
repression in Turkish Kurdistan and political liberalisation occurred simultaneously. 
The Turkish armed forces reasserted themselves in Turkish Kurdistan with the 
foundation of the Regional State of Emergency Governorate (Olağanüstü Hal Bölge 
Valiliği, OHAL) and of state of emergency in 13 cities from 1987 to 2002. This left 
behind high social and economic costs in the forms of underdevelopment, high 
unemployment, forced migration, and low levels of investment in education (Kayaoglu, 
2014). While the official statistics declared that by the mid-1990s there were a total of 
329,916 displaced people from 12 South-Eastern provinces (Pope, 1997, p.274), it was 
estimated that around 1.1 million people in the OHAL region were forced to migrate 
between 1985 and 2000 due to the war (Mutlu, 2011, p.68). In terms of total economic 
costs, the war with the PKK between 1984 and 2005 imposed an economic burden on 
the economy which amounted to between $100 billion and $170 billion depending on 
different valuations (Mutlu, 2011, p.73).  
 Mehtap Söyler labels the 1990s as “the transformation of the deep state into the 
state, i.e. the emergence of the informal state, hence, the shift of the state to the 
boundary between democracy and autocracy, where the difference between an 
authoritarian regime and defective democracy is nominal” (Söyler, 2015, p.143). This 
period saw a stern repression of the Kurds especially in Turkish Kurdistan. During the 
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Newroz celebration of March 1992, more than 90 people were killed in the South-East 
(Pope, 1997, p.269). Successive Kurdish parties were banned one after the other in 
1993, 1994, 1996, and 1999 (see Table 2.5). In this period murders by unknown 
assailants were widespread. The following list outlines some of the murders during the 
1990s: the assassination of intellectuals and public figures such as Muammer Aksoy, 
Çetin Emeç, Turan Dursun, Bahriye Üçok in 1990, Uğur Mumcu in 1993 and Ahmet 
Taner Kışlalı in 1999; the assassination of several military officers throughout the 
1990s; the assassination of Kurdish politicians such as Vedat Aydın in 1991, Musa 
Anter in 1992, Mehmet Sincar in 1993; the unexpected death of Eşref Bitlis, 
Commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie Forces, in 1993; the Sivas Madımak massacre 
in 1993 in which a mob of Islamic fundamentalists set fire to the Madımak Hotel, 
causing the death of 33 Alevi people; the Gazi Quarter incident in 1995 in which  a 
vehicle opened fire on coffee houses, causing clashes between Alevis and the police and 
the death of 22 people; the assassinations of Kurdish businessmen in Bolu, Düzce, and 
the Sapanca triangle between 1993 and 1996; the assassination of Özdemir Sabancı, a 
prominent Turkish businessman, in 1996 (TBMMa, 2012, pp.164-165).37  
                                                          
37 This oscillatory tendency of Bonapartist rule in Turkey in the 1990s echoes Engels’ description, more 
than a century earlier, of the liberalisation of Tsarist Russia under the “reformist” autocrat, Alexander II 
of Russia, who had reigned between 1855 and 1881:  
During the first years of Alexander’s reign, the old imperial despotism had been 
somewhat relaxed; the press had been allowed more freedom, trial by jury established 
and representative bodies...had been permitted to take some share in local and provincial 
administration. Even with the Poles some political flirtation had been carried on. But the 
public had misunderstood the benevolent intentions of the government. The press 
became too outspoken. The juries actually acquitted political prisoners which the 
government had expected them to convict against evidence. The local and provincial 
assemblies, one and all, declared that the government, by its act of emancipation, had 
ruined the country, and that things could not go on in that way any longer. A national 
assembly was even hinted at as the only means of getting out of troubles fast becoming 
insupportable. And finally, the Poles refused to be bamboozled with fine words, and 
broke out into a rebellion which it took all the forces of the empire, and all the brutality 
of the Russian generals, to quell in torrents of blood. Then the government turned round 
again. Stern repression once more became the order of the day. The press was muzzled, 
the political prisoners were handed over to special courts, consisting of judges packed 
for the purpose, the local and provincial assemblies were ignored (Engels, 1989/1878, 
pp.227-228).  
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Second-generation Turkish bourgeoisie38   
The shift from a state-controlled to a market economy contributed to the emergence of 
the second-generation Turkish bourgeoisie, known as the Anatolian bourgeoisie, as an 
economic and political force after the 1980s. This faction in Turkish capitalism mainly 
consists of the second generation of business groups in Turkey (Cokgezen, 2000). 
Among the second-generation Turkish bourgeoisie, economic activity is 
overwhelmingly performed by small and medium-sized enterprises that are 
predominantly active in labour intensive industries with low technology such as textiles, 
construction, and food.39 Contrary to the big monopoly capital—the sovereignty of 
which crystallised under the state-controlled economy with the foundation of TÜSİAD 
in 1971—Anatolian capitalists converged their scattered interests under the banner of 
MÜSİAD in 1990 in the period of export-led capitalism.  
 Nevertheless, divergence within the Anatolian bourgeoisie is clearer than that of 
the big capitalists. Three main groups can be identified within the Anatolian 
bourgeoisie. First, the “devout bourgeoisie” (Gumuscu & Sert, 2009), which flourished 
within export-led capitalism under Özal after the 1980s; its interests in the continuation 
of political and economic liberalisation led it to support Erdoğan in the 2000s. The 
devout bourgeoisie refers to a new faction within the ruling class in Turkey which broke 
away from the Islamic economic programme that has highlighted social justice, state 
intervention, and redistribution in the realm of economy (Gumuscu & Sert, 2009). 
                                                          
38 This classification is based on the Cokgezen’s article titled “New fragmentations and new cooperations 
in the Turkish bourgeoisie” (2000).   
39 SMEs in Turkey can be classified as such: 
“ARTICLE 4:  Article 5 of the same regulation has been changed as follows:  
Article 5: SMEs can be classified as follows: 
1. Micro enterprise: Enterprises where less than ten people are annually employed and annual net sales or 
any financial balance sheet does not exceed one million Turkish lira. 
2. Small enterprise: Enterprises where less than 50 people are annually employed and annual net sales or 
any financial balance sheet does not exceed eight million Turkish lira. 
3. Medium-sized enterprise: Enterprises where less than 250 people are annually employed and or any 
financial balance sheet does not exceed forty million Turkish lira” (Official Gazette, 04.11.2012, No: 
28457). 
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MÜSİAD has been the economic representative of this rising devout bourgeoisie, of 
which the AKP has been the political reflection. The second group comprises a small 
number of companies owned by the religious sects (tariqats) or religious communities. 
They also have a vested interest in economic liberalism and mostly engage in the 
service sector such as education, publishing/media, and health. Server Holding under 
the İskenderpaşa community is the classic example of a tariqat company. This holding 
does business in  various sectors such as education (Asfa Eğitim Kurumları [Educational 
Institutions]), media (Server İletişim [Server Communication] and Akra FM), 
construction (Necat İnşaat [Necat Construction]), tourism (Seyran Turizm [Seyran 
Tourism]), and foreign trade (Vera İç ve Dış Ticaret [Vera Domestic and Foreign 
Trade]) (Server Holding, 2014). The third group is the Anatolian Holding Companies, 
which “followed the Islamic finance principle of profit and loss sharing or partnership 
finance through selling issued bonds of companies and investors to individuals, families 
and businesses” (Özcan & Çokgezen, 2003, p.2070). They first emerged in the 1970s to 
control small family savings and workers’ remittances from Germany but became 
popular in their second wave in the 1990s, a period in which Islamic fundamentalism 
was ascendant (Özcan & Çokgezen, 2003). Well-known Anatolian Holding Companies 
include Kombassan, Yimpaş, İttifak, Jet-Pa, Endüstri, Kimpaş, Büyük Anadolu and 
Investment Holding.40 
 Importantly, the second generation bourgeoisie takes its name from the spatial 
concentration of particular capital groups in Anatolia even though the headquarters of 
MÜSİAD and ASKON, the prime organisations of the second generation of Turkish 
capitalism, are located in İstanbul. The second generation of Turkish capitalism refers to 
a specific dependency relationship with big finance capital. Regardless of their spatial 
                                                          
40 For a similar grouping of Anatolian bourgeoisie, see Demir, Acar & Toprak (2004) and Öztürk (2014).  
 149 
concentration, this capital faction has emerged in the orbit of monopoly capitalism in 
Turkey. In other words, their peripheral position in the circuit of production has been 
the necessary condition for the development and advancement of big monopoly 
capitalism. Big capitalism benefits from the existence of the second generation of 
Turkish capitalism for the maintenance of a relatively low cost of labour reproduction 
and surplus extraction. To the extent that this second generation Turkish capital 
develops, the members of this capital faction are predisposed to the echelons of the big 
capital group. Examples can be seen in the TÜSİAD membership of Ahmet Çalık from 
Çalık Holding, Ethem Sancak from Hedef Alliance Holding and Memduh Boydak from 
Boydak Holding. Ideologically, Islam, which gradually complemented Kemalist 
nationalism in the form of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis for social cohesion, has been the 
ideological cement unifying the scattered second generation Turkish capitalists.  
The particular nature and composition of this capital faction is the result of the 
unequal distribution of state loans in favour of big capital under national 
developmentalism. Due to the structure of the holding banking system, in which big 
business groups have controlled the main sources of money capital, SMEs were 
excluded from the credit system (Öztürk, 2014, p.199). Subcontracting relations with 
big capital and being unprotected by the state made these small and medium-sized 
enterprises prone to exploitation by larger ones (Gülalp, 2001, p.439). The dynamics of 
Anatolian enterprises were neglected by the state. Moreover, they were excluded from 
state investment funds and other privileges granted to big capital symbolised by 
TÜSİAD (Buğra, 1998, p.525). Even though SMEs constituted approximately 99% of 
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the total enterprises and 45% of employment in Turkey, the loans extended for SMEs 
were limited to 3.5% in 1996 (TÜSİAD, 2002, p.144).41  
 However, the shift to export-led capitalism increased the economic force of the 
peripheral cities. For instance while the proportion of total private manufacturing value 
added accounted for by five selected Anatolian cities (Gaziantep, Denizli, Kayseri, 
Konya, and Kahramanmaraş) increased from 3.55% in 1983 to 8.5% in 2000, this ratio 
in five metropoles, (İstanbul/Kocaeli, Ankara, İzmir, Bursa, and Adana) decreased from 
80% to 66% over the same period (Buğra & Savaşkan 2010, p.95). Only fourteen 
companies from five selected cities made the İstanbul Chamber of Industry’s 1980 
survey of Turkey’s Top 500 Companies. Denizli and Kayseri were represented by only 
five and nine companies, respectively (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010, p.111). The number of 
big companies in these five selected cities had more than quadrupled by 2012, according 
to a survey conducted by the İstanbul Chamber of Industry. Turkey’s Top 500 Industrial 
Companies in Turkey-2012 showed that these five cities absorbed the 62 biggest 
companies in Turkey in 2012. It also revealed that Gaziantep, Kayseri, Denizli, Konya 
and Kahramanmaraş included 23, 12, ten, nine and eight companies in 2012, 
respectively (İSO, 2012). Nevertheless, it is still hard to argue that the distribution of 
economic power is skewed towards the second-generation Turkish bourgeoisie. 
According to Onaran’s and Oyvat’s calculations (2015, p.30), 38 of the 50 private 
enterprises that had highest revenues in 2002 before AKP rule increased their value 
added share in total industry from 10.1% to 14.2% during a decade between 2002 and 
2012. 
 
 
                                                          
41 According to the OECD report titled Small and Medium Size Enterprise Outlook 2002, they accounted 
for 99.5% of establishments, 61.6% of employment and 27.3% of value added in the manufacturing sector 
in Turkey (2002, p.203). 
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MÜSİAD (The Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) 
An offshoot of TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD was founded on 5 May 5 1990 by 12 
entrepreneurs.42 Erol Yarar was the first chair of the organisation.43 Ömer Cihad 
Vardan, the fourth chair of MÜSİAD, perceived the establishment of MÜSİAD in 1990 
as the revival of a forgotten potential of Anatolia (Vardan, 2012). In his autobiography, 
he argues that  
MÜSİAD was the name of an outcry, opposition, and awakening. We can say that 
Anatolia woke up with MÜSİAD; Turkey rose to her feet. Indeed, MÜSİAD contributed 
to the termination of unilateralism, monologism [the reduction of multiple voices to a 
single version of truth], and the sovereignty of a specific layer in the business world. 
After the 1990s, it initiated a transformation in the business world from a point where 
businessmen were marginalised, weren’t credited, and their self confidence wasn’t 
developed, to a point where they achieved the will which will rule the country 
afterwards (Vardan, 2012, p.63, my translation). 
 
This association saw itself as the representation of the “periphery” and claimed it had 
always been excluded from the “centre” (S. Mutlu, personal communication, October 
22, 2012). According to MÜSİAD, the “periphery”, which burst through its shell only 
after the 1990s, had been represented neither in local governments, state administration 
nor the business world since the establishment of the Republic (ibid). Arguing that “the 
economic opening in the 1980s led to a change in the country’s destiny”, the import-
substitution industrialisation model was discredited since it claimed that import 
prohibitions created the emergence of monopolies in Turkey that favoured TÜSİAD 
(Turkish Industry & Business Association) members (ibid). 
As one of the representatives of the second-generation of Turkish capitalism, 
MÜSİAD is an umbrella business organisation of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) that mushroomed following the export-oriented industrialisation model in 
Turkey after the 1980s. The basic underlying difference from TÜSİAD was said to be 
                                                          
42 The founders of MÜSİAD are Erol Mehmet Yarar, B. Ali Bayramoğlu, Abdurrahman Esmerer, Natik 
Akyol, Sekib Avdagic, Mehmet Gönenç, Mahmut Ekrem Ensari, Arif Gülen, Cihangir Bayramoğlu, 
Mehmet Turgut, and Ahmet Yıldırım (MÜSİAD, 2012, p.13). 
43 His father, Ali Özdemir Yarar, was a member of the board in TÜSİAD between 1974 and 1975. 
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the size of member enterprises—mostly SMEs—and the representation and 
embracement of Anatolia (S. Mutlu, personal communication, October 22, 2012).44 It is 
also accepted that the SMEs are more effective in putting pressure on governments due 
to their high number of members. A middle-ranking MÜSİAD official eloquently 
sumps up the representational link between the AKP and the capital group: 
The views of MÜSİAD on constitution and laws are very important, effective and real 
[on government]. They are even more effective than those of TÜSİAD in this period ... 
We annually issue an Economic Report on Turkey and inside it, there is a part called 
‘suggestions, views and evaluations’ from a wide range of issues such as education and 
constitution. When you look at them, all that we had said one or two years ago was 
translated into constitutional change or sometimes into law amendments one or two 
years later. [These economic reports] are highly effective (S. Mutlu, personal 
communication, October 22, 2012). 
 
  MÜSİAD provided a platform for the Anatolian capitalists. For instance, 
businessmen in Konya had the chance to go abroad to do business only after the 1990s 
with the help of MÜSİAD (S. Mutlu, personal communication, October 22, 2012). This 
has been reflected in the MÜSİAD biennial international business fairs occurring since 
1993. Around 150,000 visitors and 5,140 foreign businessmen from 92 countries 
participated in the 14th MÜSİAD international fair in İstanbul in 2012 (MÜSİAD, 
2014a). The fair was supported by various state institutions such as the Ministry of 
Economics, Ministry of Development, Small and Medium Enterprises Development 
Organisation (KOSGEB), and Turkish Airlines. It is worth noting that even though the 
motto of the 14th International Fair was “The Islamic World is in this fair”, the only 
noticeable Islamic element was the conversion of a large area in the Expo Centre into a 
temporary mosque for Friday prayers.45 
 According to the provisional data gathered from MÜSİAD, the organisation 
represents 7,500 members, employing approximately 1.5 million workers in nearly 
35,000 companies in Turkey. It has 76 domestic contact offices and four foreign 
                                                          
44 Selçuk Mutlu was the vice-secretary general of MÜSİAD in 2012. 
45 The observation was based on a participant observation in the 14th MÜSİAD International Fair and 16th 
International Business Forum in İstanbul on October 11th-14th, 2012.  
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representatives together serving 149 destinations in 56 countries (MÜSİAD, 2014b). 
Even though MÜSİAD members are ostensibly more homogenous with respect to 
members’ common religious sensitivities than TÜSİAD members, the most important 
material difference between MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD was said to be different attitudes 
towards international creditors such as the IMF (personal communication with an 
economist in MÜSİAD, October 22, 2012). It was argued that TÜSİAD had become 
“accustomed” to a particular type of economic model based on crony capitalism in 
Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s. TÜSİAD members have relied on foreign resources 
because enterprises with foreign currency debts are overwhelmingly TÜSİAD members 
(personal communication with an economist in MÜSİAD, October 22, 2012). It was 
further argued by MÜSİAD that the state always worked for TÜSİAD members, 
because in the period of scarcity and oil crisis in Turkey in the 1970s, the state did not 
open up the economy for competition, instead selling oil to members of TÜSİAD at 
subsidised prices to support their domestic production. The result was that while South 
Korea, for example, took off, the wealth and prosperity of TÜSİAD members became 
the price for which Turkey kept going in circles (personal communication with an 
economist in MÜSİAD, October 22, 2012).  
  The sectoral distribution of MÜSİAD members seems to be divergent. Table 3.3 
shows that the members encompass printing, publication, packaging and advertisement, 
information technologies, durable consumer goods and furniture, energy and 
environment, food and agriculture, services, construction, chemistry-metal and mining, 
logistics, machinery, automotive industry, health, and textiles and leather. Construction 
companies account for 5,606 out of 27,657 companies in the organisation, or more than 
one fifth of the total, holding influence over a large proportion of firms in the business 
organisation in 2014. These construction companies specialise in infrastructure, 
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elevator/escalator, bathroom/kitchen equipments, glazing, landscaping, fittings, service, 
constructional service, fine construction material, building construction machinery and 
equipment, bulk material, hardware, installation, and insulating products.46 The textile 
and leather sector is represented by 3,605 companies, accounting for 13.02% of the total 
(Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3. Sectoral Distribution of MÜSİAD Members (2014) 
The Sectors (MUSIAD) 
Number of 
Companies/Members 
(%) 
Construction  5,606 20.26 
Textiles and Leather 3,605 13.02 
Durable Consumer Goods and Furniture 3,430 12.39 
Food and Agriculture 3,110 11.24 
Chemical Substances, Metal, and 
Mining 
2,329 8.41 
Printing, Publication, Packaging, and 
Advertising 
2,164 7.82 
Services  1,827 6.60 
Machinery 1,679 6.06 
Energy and Environment 1,576 5.69 
Automotive 830 2.99 
Information Technologies 802 2.89 
Health 414 1.49 
Logistics 295 1.06 
Total 27,667 ̴100 
  
Source: Own calculations based on e-MÜSİAD, 2014. 
 
Not surprisingly, in the second-generation of Turkish capitalism the sectoral 
power of the financial sector in the organisation is marginal when compared to TÜSİAD 
members. Only 19 companies in MÜSİAD are engaged in financial services, out of 
which four companies engage in participation banking (Islamic banking) (e-MÜSİAD, 
2014). These four participation banks are AlBaraka Türk, Asya Katılım, Kuveyt Türk, 
and Türkiye Finans. According to the data of the Participation Banks Association of 
                                                          
46 The biggest overseas contracting Turkish companies such as Rönesans, Enka, Polimeks, TAV, Çalık, 
Gama, Yüksel, Gap, Nurol, Limak Companies are still TÜSİAD members.  
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Turkey, these four banks only held 5.55% of the total assets of the banking sector in 
Turkey in 2013 (n.d., p.84). On the other hand, in 2013 TÜSİAD had 67 out of 606 
members operating in the financial sector. Manufacturing is the constitutive sector of 
big capital in Turkey in which 212 companies account more than one third of total 
TÜSİAD members (Table 3.4). Yet, even though the number of TÜSİAD members is 
just above 600, TÜSİAD dominates the Turkish economy. According to TÜSİAD 
figures in 2013, TÜSİAD’s contribution to the Turkish economy includes 50% of value 
added in the non-public sector, 65% of industrial production, 80% of the volume of 
foreign trade (excluding energy), 50% of registered employment in the non-agricultural 
and non-public sectors, and 85% of corporate tax (TÜSİAD, 2013). 
Table 3.4. Sectoral Distribution of TÜSİAD Members (2013) 
The Sectors (TUSIAD) The Number of Members (%) 
Manufacturing 212 35 
Wholesale and Retail Sale 79 13 
Financial Services 67 11 
Construction 67 11 
Transportation 61 10 
Energy 36 6 
Agriculture and Food 24 4 
Education 6 1 
Mining 6 1 
Other 48 8 
Total 606 100 
 
Source: Own calculations based on TÜSİAD, 2013 and TÜSİAD, 2011, pp.88-95. 
 
MÜSİAD has a vested interest in liberalising the economic system for a 
competitive economic environment and overcoming the omnipotence of the 
bureaucracy in Turkey. One of its first publications in 1993 titled Orta Ölçekli 
İşletmeler ve Bürokrasi (Medium-sized Enterprises and Bureaucracy) affirms these 
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vested interests.47 The first chair of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar, contends in this publication 
that bureaucracy, which he compares to cancer with its self-growing structure and a 
structural illness paralysing the organs one by one, is one of the biggest factors 
hampering the implementation of common ideas (1993a, p.III). Bureaucracy, according 
to Yarar, is the primary obstacle to development in Turkey. In this report, MÜSİAD 
offers to reduce the burden of the bureaucracy. It includes a number of 
recommendations: The foundation of a Small and Medium Sized Industry Promotion 
Department in the State Planning Organisation and of entrepreneurship development 
and a small enterprises ministry; curtailing the ability of big enterprises to take part in 
small tenders; ensuring that 30% of government tenders go to small enterprises; a five-
year tax exemption for newly formed enterprises; and an obligation for the banks to 
credit small and medium-sized enterprises (1993a, pp.22-25). In another report in 1993, 
SOEs are attacked. Privatisation is seen as a tool, not an aim in itself, to strengthen the 
free market economy, to increase efficiency, update technology levels, disseminate 
wealth to the masses, ensure public utilisation, enable a minimal state and support 
private enterprises while restricting the share of foreign investors in SOEs (1993b, 
pp.77-81). In a report in 1996 titled “A New Perspective of the World at the Threshold 
of the 21st Century”, a dual economic development policy that would combine import 
substitution with export promotion is proposed. The competitiveness of Turkish 
corporations in global markets should in any case be secured. Otherwise, “[t]he one-
dimensional import-substitution [would transform, as it did in the past] our large 
industrial enterprises into domestic parasites” (MÜSİAD, 1996, p.48).   
Furthermore, an Islamic focus fails from view when one considers that 
MÜSİAD has gained from the share of wealth under export-led capitalism and 
                                                          
47 The report was written in 1993 by Hüner Şencan and Ömer Dinçer, who was elected as a member of 
parliament from the AKP in 2007 and served as Minister of Labour and Social Security between 2009 and 
2011 and Minister of National Education between 2011 and 2013. 
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facilitated the new practice of global voracious consumption. The result is that the 
“devout bourgeoisie” (Gumuscu & Sert, 2009) have successfully combined the Islamic 
way of life with luxury consumption, ostentation, and intemperance by commodifying 
Islamic culture. Fashionable Islamic attires for women, five-star alternative halal 
vacations or holiday villages in which swimming pools are segregated, deluxe hajj and 
umrah packages, Islamic personal care products which have halal certification, and the 
establishment of luxury shisha cafes and non-alcoholic restaurants in major cities help 
the devout bourgeoisie to articulate global consumerist patterns while leading to 
“discursive tension” (Madi, 2014, p.151). The Islamist writer Mehmet Şevket Eygi 
(2013) teases this new form of fusion of Islamic identity and individualism by labelling 
new rich Muslim women as Süslüman48 who wear stiletto heels, colourful non-
traditional veils, and tight and short dresses. In this “discursive tension”, the founding 
president of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar, on the other hand, disagrees with the Islamic values 
of sobriety and modesty. He says,  
Allah wants to see his blessing on his subjects. The garments of the Ottoman sultans do 
not look like those of Karacaoğlan.49 If the calibre is to dress as little as possible, then, 
how will we explain Abu Hanifa? His house was the most beautiful house in Baghdad. 
If I give alms, then, nobody has the right to ask in Islam why I behave so. The prophet 
too does not allow the whole disbursement (infak) of property. It is supposed that a man 
despite the fact that he is becoming rich should live like the poor. There is no such thing 
(Özkan, 2009, my translation). 
 
Significantly, this economic acquisition threatens to break down worldly asceticism by 
calling the devout bourgeoisie to fulfil a duty in worldly affairs, which is “a struggle for 
profit free from the limits set by needs” (Weber, 2005, p.27). Money-making is valued 
“as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident 
proof of rebirth and genuine faith” (Weber, 2005, p.116).  
 
                                                          
48 Süslüman is a modified word which combines two words, Süslü (Fancy) and Müslüman (Muslim). It 
was used by Mehmet Şevket Eygi to refer to the fancy Muslim women.   
49 Karacaoğlan was the 17th century Anatolian folk poet (âşık) whose poems were on the nomad life of 
Turcomans,  nature, love, and death. 
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ASKON (The Anatolian Tigers Business Association) 
To the extent that the new Islamic ethos—framed by the idea “Allah wants to see his 
blessing on his subjects” (Star, 20 July 2009, my translation)—is articulated by the 
devout bourgeoisie, the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself ceases to be reprehensible. 
However, the interest (faiz), which inhibits the release of acquisitive activity, is a 
significant constraint on a particular section of the devout bourgeoisie, namely ASKON 
(The Anatolian Tigers Business Association). Founded in 1998 from a split in 
MÜSİAD, ASKON states that it does not exclusively affirm an economic target but 
maintains “a claim and identity” (ASKON, n.d., p.3). The name Anatolia references 
more than the geographical area; it corresponds to a “deep value” in a heritage and in 
future which stretches “from Baghdad to Bukhara, from Caucasia to Bosnia and from 
Africa to Asia” (ASKON, n.d., p.3). Supporting the perspective of Rightful Wealth 
(Haklı Zenginlik)—that “the right (hak) and the rightness (hakkaniyet) are defined by 
reference to Islam which is an alternative to the system of Adam Smith and to the 
system of Marx”—this faction of the devout bourgeoisie remains together not only 
through specific conditions of production but also through a political commitment (S. 
Abdullahoğlu, personal communication, October 11, 2012).50 ASKON is under the 
control of the Felicity Party which continues to embrace the views of Erbakan. 
 ASKON greatly benefited from the diversification of the domestic 
entrepreneurial groups under export-led capitalism. The number of companies in 
ASKON was boosted from 72 in 1999 to 2,350 in 2011 (ASKON, n.d., p.7). These 
companies are mostly in the small-scale manufacturing and commercial sectors for 
domestic consumption, such as apparel, ready to wear, furniture and home textiles, 
leather and shoes, construction and construction materials, services, finance, jewellery, 
                                                          
50 Sıtkı Abdullahoğlu was the vice president of ASKON when this interview was conducted. 
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machinery and replacements, and the food and agriculture sectors (ASKON, n.d., pp.20-
21). Even though ASKON companies employed 250,000 employees and had US$25 
billion business volume in 2010 (ASKON, 2010), only nine ASKON export companies 
were in the top 1000 Turkish export companies in 2011 (ASKON, n.d.).  
While proscribing interest as an illicit source of undeserved wealth (S. 
Abdullahoğlu, personal communication, October 11, 2012), ASKON encourages a 
corporate identity which adopts the view that “the commercial life of our Prophet is the 
best example for ASKON members” (ASKON, n.d.). It argues that in addition to 
advocating morality and not cheating people, the system of the Prophet provides the 
regulation of the market. In order to prevent monopolisation in the market, the Prophet 
did not allow the price to be set before it was determined in the market; implementing 
fixed prices was not allowed. In other words, it is said that the Prophet organised the 
free market in such a proper way that he averted the systems and schemes such as 
hoarding (ihtikar) that would manipulate the market (S. Abdullahoğlu, personal 
communication, October 11, 2012). ASKON suggests the adoption of this system and 
supports “an economic freedom that is compatible with righteousness” (S. 
Abdullahoğlu, personal communication, October 11, 2012) and against financial 
speculation and monopoly capitalism.  
TUSKON (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists)  
Composed of seven different business federations and representing 211 business 
associations, TUSKON is the biggest business association in Turkey by membership, 
involving over 55,000 entrepreneurs (TUSKON, n.d.). Even though TUSKON has risen 
under the second-generation Turkish bourgeoisie, it involves big holding companies 
including Fernas Group, Boydak Holding, Orkide Group, Alfemo Group, Kaynak 
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Holding, and Sanko Holding.51 Established in 2005, TUSKON has been organising 
business forums called Turkey-World Trade Bridge since 2006. These business forums 
bring together Turkish businessmen with their foreign counterparts where they can 
engage in one-to-one bilateral business matching.  
 Correspondingly, TUSKON has four foreign representatives’ offices in New 
York, Brussels, Beijing and Moscow and partner organisations in 140 countries 
(TUSKON, n.d.). It is important to note that the confederation is close to the Fethullah 
Gülen community and the Hizmet movement, which has been active notably in Central 
Asia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Hendrick, 2009). The Gülen community 
is known for opening schools and cultural centres all over the world but particularly in 
Central Asia and Africa. The significance of these schools and cultural centres is that 
they generate a kind of social capital.52 Accordingly, Fethullah Gülen, the Islamic 
preacher, acknowledged the economic function of these schools by stressing  
These institutions [schools and cultural centres] in all places but notably in Central Asia 
create material, cultural, and social sources of honour for our nation and the state...In the 
near future, many people who are ready and enthusiastic to engage in every kind of 
dialogue on behalf of our nation and the state will be trained in all such 
places...Wherever [these] schools exist, people who go there for education and culture 
also create opportunities that will develop economic relations; they develop business 
and commercial relations. This will certainly provide fruitful development in the future 
(Gülen, 2005, October 18, my translation).  
 
Within this framework it can be concluded that a new capital accumulation 
strategy, namely export-led growth based on private initiative and competition, was 
successfully implemented in Turkey under military rule. As shown, export-led 
capitalism in Turkey after the 1980s increased the economic and political power of the 
devout bourgeoisie in the periphery. Nevertheless, even though decomposition and 
necrosis of the economic pillar of the Kemalist State slowly started with the erosion of 
                                                          
51 It is important to note that Fernas Group and Boydak Holding are also TÜSİAD members. 
52 Social capital refers to “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession 
of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition - or in other words, to membership in a group - which provides each of its members with the 
backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various 
senses of the word” (Bourdieu, 1986, pp.248-249). 
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national developmentalism after the 1980s, the political supremacy of military tutelage 
eroded until the rise of the AKP. The military coup on 12 September 12 1980 was 
functional in shifting the economic trajectory of Turkey to export-led capitalist growth. 
However, at a certain stage, notably after the second half of the 1990s, the interests of 
the devout bourgeoisie are found to undermine military rule in Turkey. This resulted in 
the convergence of the interests of the devout bourgeoisie with those of the big 
capitalists, which precipitated a move to control the core state apparatus. The 
bourgeoisie as a whole concurrently demanded to control political power as Bonapartist 
state power became costly and began to act as fetters, politically. The process was 
completed in the 2000s under AKP rule, belatedly resulting in a continuous power 
struggle between the bourgeoisie as a whole and the military elite. Therefore, it is 
important to underline that AKP rule is the product of Turkey’s neoliberal transition that 
was steered by Özal (1983-1993). The AKP completed this democratic transition that 
had already commenced in the 1990s. The political, economic, and ideological 
transformation of the Kemalist pillars mostly benefited the second-generation Turkish 
bourgeoisie. For this reason the second generation Turkish bourgeoisie has been able to 
constitute themselves as social force that challenged Bonapartist rule together with the 
big capitalists. 
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Chapter 4: Evolution of Islamic Politics in Turkey  
This chapter analyses the political trajectory of successive Islamic fundamentalist 
parties led by Necmettin Erbakan from the late 1960s to the late 1990s, historicising the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey with respect to its social and economic bases. 
The chapter first reveals the genesis of religious fundamentalism(s) as political-religious 
ideologies born in reaction to cultural and social modernisation. The chapter then 
discusses the characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism in general before moving to the 
rise of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, demonstrated in the foundation 
of the Islamic parties led by Erbakan since the 1970s.  
Necmettin Erbakan was born in 1926 in Sinop, a city on the Black Sea coast in 
Turkey. Erbakan had a completely secular education in state schools. He graduated in 
1948 with a degree in mechanical engineering from İstanbul Technical University. He 
was sent to Aaachen Technical University in Germany to conduct scientific research. 
After his return to Turkey, Erbakan played a key role in the establishment of the Gümüş 
Engine Factory in 1956, which produced local and national engines. In 1966, he became 
president of the Industrial Division of the Union of Chambers and later the General 
Secretary of the Union. He was elected president of the Union of Chambers in 1969 but 
was removed from office by the government of Süleyman Demirel. He applied to join 
the Justice Party under Demirel to become a parliamentarian in 1969, but after being 
refused, he became an independent parliamentarian for Konya, a central Anatolian city 
known for its reputation for being the most conservative city in Turkey. He founded his 
first political party, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), in 1970 with 
the encouragement of Sheikh Mehmet Zaid Kotku, leader of the Nakshibendi order. 
After its closure following the military coup in 1971, Erbakan went to Switzerland, 
which was referred to by his supporters as Hegira (holy emigration) (Özdalga, 2002, 
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p.130). In 1972, Erbakan founded another party, the National Salvation Party (Milli 
Selamet Partisi, MSP) which took part in the coalition governments between 1974 and 
1978. After the coup in 1980, the party and Erbakan himself were banned from politics. 
He returned to politics in 1987 as part of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) which 
had been founded in 1983. Following the general elections in 1995, he formed a 
coalition government with the True Path Party (led by Tansu Çiller) in June 1996 and 
served as prime minister for only 11 months. After the military intervention in 1997, he 
was again banned and his party disbanded. The Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) was 
established in 1998 as a successor of the RP. However, Erbakan controlled the Virtue 
Party from behind the scenes until its dissolution in 2001. Erbakan died in February 
2011 as the leader of the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) (see Erbakan, 2013a, pp.5-
12; Özdalga, 2002; Saadet Partisi, 2010a). 
All these successive Islamic political parties were the same party, only under 
different names. The parties were closed down and had to recreate themselves in this 
manner due to Kemalist pressure and interruptions in the democratic process (Yavuz, 
2003, p.208). They shared uniform economic and social bases and came under the 
generic title of the National View (Milli Görüş) parties. The term “nation” (millet) does 
not stand here for ethnicity or civic nationality. It points to “the Qur’anic notion of 
“Millet” which often appears in association with the Prophet Abraham...[It] denotes a 
community that gathers around a prophet and the values he conveys” (Islamische 
Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş, n.d.; see also Yükleyen, 2012, pp.57-58). The term 
indirectly alludes to the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, referring to “the 
organized and legally recognized religious communities, such as the Greek Christians, 
the Armenian Christians, and the Jews, and by extension also to the different ‘nations’ 
of the Franks” (Lewis, 1961, p.329).  
 164 
Another commonality that the Islamic fundamentalist parties in Turkey shared is 
that their economic bases mostly consisted of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
which were in confrontation with big and monopoly capital in terms of accessibility to 
state resources such as credits and loans (see Gülalp, 2001; 2003). The fundamentalist 
political parties found their social base in the traditional petty-bourgeois segments of 
society, including the lower middle classes, manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans and 
peasants. From the late 1980s, this came to include professionals, students and 
intellectuals (Gülalp, 2001; 2003). The Islamic fundamentalist parties also successfully 
appealed, under the “Just Economic System”, to the impoverished new middle classes 
and to the proletariat whose living standards were deteriorating in the age of neoliberal 
globalisation. To a great extent, the Welfare Party had been instrumental in unifying 
petty entrepreneurs’ and peripheral small capitalists’ political interests, which were in 
opposition with the Kemalist state. However, the party only found room for manoeuvre 
in the late 1980s in the crisis of Turkey’s state-led development under globalisation 
(Gülalp, 2001). After the 1990s, the small and medium-sized business sector, the lower 
middle classes, and a large portion of the working class were steadily mobilised through 
Islamic politics. This Islamic politics was able to boldly challenge elements of Kemalist 
principles of secularism and nationalism.  
This chapter considers the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, with the 
Welfare Party’s rise to governmental power in the 1995 general elections. However, the 
military intervention on 28 February 1997 led to the demise of Islamic politics in 
Turkey and eliminated the parliamentary route for the Islamists to take power. The 
AKP, which upheld the separation of state and religion but advocated the re-
Islamisation of society, emerged out of this breakup in Islamic politics and deliberately 
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carried out a democratic transition in Turkey until 2010/2011, which is the subject of 
the following chapter. 
Reconsidering Islamic fundamentalism 
Various terminological suggestions have been proposed to describe the political-
religious movements in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). These include 
“political Islam” (Amin, 2009; Fuller, 2004; Roy, 1994; for a critique of the term see 
Hirschkind, 1997), “Islamic activism” and “Islamic revivalism” (Esposito, 1999), 
“Islamism” (Bayat, 2005 & 2007; Berman, 2003; Fuller 2004; Moghadam, 2009), “New 
Religious Politics” (Keddie, 1998), and “Islamic fundamentalism” (Achcar, 2004 & 
2013; Al-Azm 1993 & 1994; Chomsky & Achcar, 2007; Choueiri, 1997; Rodinson, 
2004). John Esposito (1999, p.6) prefers to use “Islamic activism” and “Islamic 
revivalism” as “Islam possesses a long tradition of revival (tajdid) and reform (islah) 
which includes notions of political and social activism dating from the early Islamic 
centuries to the present day”. The term fundamentalism, according to Esposito, is 
generally associated with “political activism, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism, and anti-
Americanism” (1999, p.5). Graham E. Fuller, on the other hand, clarifies the term 
Islamic fundamentalism, in the introduction of his book, The Future of Political Islam, 
restricting the use of the term only “to refer to those Islamists who follow a literal and 
narrow reading of the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet, who believe they have a 
monopoly on the sole correct understanding of Islam and demonstrate intolerance 
toward those who differ” (2004, xii). As a former vice chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council at the CIA, Fuller does not regard “political Islam” or “Islamism” 
as an alternative to modern ideologies such as democracy, fascism, socialism, 
liberalism, and communism but as a “cultural variant, an alternative vocabulary in 
which to dress any of these ideological trends” (2004, p.193). Nikki Keddie (1998, 
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p.698), uniquely, proposes the term “New Religious Politics” as it has “the advantage of 
neutrality and of making clear both the political content of the movements they cover 
and their contemporary nature”. 
 The term Islamic fundamentalism is used throughout this chapter in order to 
refer to a political-religious ideology which seeks a return, recuperation, or revival of 
the foundations of Islam, the Quran and the Prophet’s Sunna, for practical guidance to 
resolve any social problems. The return to or revival of these Islamic fundamentals is 
accordingly instrumental in “(a) ... organizing people for radical socio-political action, 
(b) ... mobilizing the masses for the coming struggles and fights against internal and 
external enemies, and (c) ... providing a lasting and authentic solution to all the ills and 
problems plaguing present-day Muslim societies” (Al-Azm, 1993, p.97). Therefore, 
“Islam is the Solution”, the political motto of the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 
Egypt 1928 by Hassan al-Banna), is the classic example of the political signifier of an 
Islamic fundamentalist movement/party.  
 Given the heterogeneity of Islamic movements in the MENA region, which have 
adopted various brands of this religious-political ideology—some revolutionary, some 
reactionary, some gradual or moderate—Islamic fundamentalism is distinguished by its 
political character, rather than its ecclesiastical nature. Maxime Rodinson, a prominent 
French Marxist historian in Islamic studies, characterises Islamic fundamentalism as a 
political-religious ideology: A glorious and peaceful “Muslim community in Medina 
between 622 [the era of the hijra, meaning emigration, from Mecca to Medina] and 632 
[the year when Prophet Muhammad died]” would be reproduced for the Muslims or for 
the whole world by the complete imposition of “Islamic dogmas and practices” in 
politics and society (Rodinson, 2004, p.3).  
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 By defining a political-religious ideology using the term and concept 
“fundamentalism”, this chapter aims to show that Islamic fundamentalism should not be 
conflated with Islam per se. Orientalists frequently commit this misrepresentation by 
attributing an essence to Islam and reinforcing the peculiarity and exceptionalism of the 
“Islamic world” while explaining the historical circumstances through reference to an 
“immutable culture” of MENA.53 Here the term and concept fundamentalism 
emphasises a political-religious ideology influenced by past social and political schemes 
while suggesting an all-embracing religious dogma for society and politics. In this 
sense, the term “fundamentalism” can equally be used to refer to movements within 
Christianity, Hinduism, or Judaism.54 In other words, Muslim societies are not unique in 
witnessing the resurgence of fundamentalist movements. Indeed, the term 
fundamentalism was originally used to designate a distinct version of American 
evangelicalism which developed in the US in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.55 The 
real issue, as Asef Bayat (2007, p.12) puts it, is to examine the social conditions of 
                                                          
53 See Said (2003), Orientalism; Bayat (2007), Islam and Democracy: What is the Real Question?; 
Achcar, (2013b), “Orientalism in Reverse: Post-1979 Trends in French Orientalism” in Marxism, 
Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism. 
54 For a comparison between Islamic fundamentalism and  American Christian fundamentalism see Al-
Azm S. J., (1994), “Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered: A Critical Outline of Problems, Ideas and 
Approaches, Part II”. 
55 It referred to “a movement among American ‘evangelical’ Christians, people professing complete 
confidence in the Bible and preoccupied with the message of God’s salvation of sinners through the death 
of Jesus Christ” (Marsden, 1980, p.3). Alarmed with the radical forms of theological liberalism and 
cultural crisis of American civilisation following the First World War, fundamentalists were “evangelical 
Christians, close to the traditions of the dominant American revivalist establishment of the nineteenth 
century, who in the twentieth century militantly opposed both modernism in theology and the cultural 
changes that modernism endorsed” (Marsden, 1980, p.4).  Published in a set of 90 essays in 12 volumes 
from 1910 to 1915 and funded by a Southern California oil millionaire, Lyman Stewart, The 
Fundamentals became a referencing point for recognising a fundamentalist movement in the U.S. 
(Marsden, 1980, pp.118-119). The Fundamentals “was meant to be a great “Testimony to the Truth” and 
even something of a scholarly tour de force” (Marsden, 1980, p.118). This set of essays was an attempt to 
defend the faith and to emphasise overwhelmingly personal experience, soul-saving, and individual 
prayer while combining various traditional theological questions to attack the frailties of modern 
ideologies of that time. These ideas were mainly rooted in theology and politics such as Protestant 
liberalism, Mormonism, Eddyism, Modern Spiritualism Romanism, modernism, Darwinism, Russellism, 
communism, and anarchism. The Fundamentals championed criticism only to the extent that they could 
be used as a tool for discovering the plain facts of God evident in Scripture, consequently proving the 
compatibility of the theological text with scientific ‘common sense’ (Marsden, 1980, pp.120-123). 
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agents—for instance Muslim societies—or social forces which “render a particular a 
particular reading of the sacred texts hegemonic”. 
Waves in Islamic political thought and the resurgence of Islamic 
fundamentalism  
The first wave in Islamic political thought in the Ottoman Empire emerged in the 
second half of the 19th century. As it was developed during the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire the emphasis of this thinking was mainly on the “salvage of the 
Empire” (Eliaçık, 2012, p.309). Islamist intellectuals contemplated why the glorious 
Islamic civilisation lagged so far behind the West militarily, economically, politically 
and technologically. As Ali Bulaç, one of Turkey’s leading Islamist intellectuals, notes 
that first generation believed that the reason for the Islamic world’s decline was not due 
to Islam per se, but historical misunderstandings and misapplications linked to 
traditions, institutions, and external forces. This first Islamist generation was, therefore, 
in opposition to the sultanate, the jurisprudence of the traditional ulama (Muslim legal 
scholars), politicians, notables, ayans (landed proprietors in the Ottoman Empire) and 
seigneurs, whom they held responsible for the consolidation of the backwardness and 
weakness of the Empire (Bulaç, 2005, p.59). It emphasised a return to the Quran and 
Sunna in order to provide an Islamic awakening.56 It also promoted dynamic 
interpretation (ijtihad) by intellectuals and ulama to find real and sound solutions to 
problems while “awakening the spirit of jihad” in order to oppose exploitation and 
repulse the Western offensive (Bulaç, 2005, pp.59-60).  
Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-1897) and his disciple Muhammad ‘Abduh 
(1849-1905) best represent the political ideology of this period. Under the rubric of pan-
                                                          
56 Covering a period from the second half of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th, this evolution was 
to be remembered by leading figures such as Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, Syed Ahmad Khan, Muhammad 
‘Abduh, Hayreddin Pasha, Ahmad Cevdet Pasha, Ahmad Hilmi of Filibe, Said Halim Pasha, Seyyid Bey, 
Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Muhammad İkbal, Muhammad Hamdi Yazır, İsmail Hakkı İzmirli (Eliaçık, 2012, 
p.309).   
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Islamism, this school demanded “political unification of the Islamic world to gain 
strength for defence against European imperialism” (Adamec, 2009, p.247). The pan-
Islamism of al-Afghānī was in fact incompatible with a categorical rejection of Western 
cultural modernity. Together with the Al-Risāla group of ‘Ali Abdul-Rāziq, Ahmad 
Amīn, ‘Abbās Mahmūd al-‘Aqqād and Tāha Hussein in 1930s Egypt, they contributed 
to the “Arab Islamic aggiornamento” of the late nineteenth century (Achcar, 2011, 
p.103).57 
The second generation of Islamic thought developed after Mustafa Kemal’s 
abolition of the caliphate in 1924, which precipitated the idea of the Islamic state. The 
leading figures in this evolution of Islamic thought were Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, 
Abul A’la Maudūdi, Ruhollah Khomeini, Morteza Motahbari, and Ali Shariati (Eliaçık, 
2012, p.310). Beginning in the second half of the 20th century, this phase of Islamic 
thought emphasised the establishment of an Islamic state as well as the foundation of an 
Islamic society against jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic period of ignorance) (Bulaç, 2005, p.49). 
The absolute Islamisation of social structures and culture, as well as the state and its 
institutions, was the prime objective of this second generation (Bulaç, 2005, p.49). The 
“Arab Islamic aggiornamento” indeed drifted into a “fundamentalist 
counterreformation” led by Muhammad Rashīd Ridā (1865-1935), whose ideology 
aligned with Wahhabism (Achcar, 2011, p.105). Achcar clarifies the term 
“counterreformation”. By counterreformation, he does not refer to a reaction to 
reformation or to restoration of the remnant but to a reformation in its own right: “with 
a reactionary objective, reminiscent of the Catholic Counter-Reformation in response to 
the Protestant Reformation” (Achcar, 2011, p.105). The modernisation of Islam was 
then repulsed by this “fundamentalist counterreformation” launched by Rashid Rida, a 
                                                          
57 See Achcar, G. (2011). Reactionary and/or Fundamentalist Pan-Islamists. Chap. 4. The Arabs and the 
Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives. 
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disciple of ‘Abduh. Salafism consequently emerged, which “eventually came to 
designate literalist, fundamentalist adhesion to the legacy of early Islam” (Achcar, 2011, 
pp.105-106). 
Ridā’s ideas in turn shaped the foundation of the Society of Muslim Brothers 
(Jamā’at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna; its reactionary 
objectives, especially after the 1920s, symbolised the counterreformation (Achcar, 
2011, pp.104-106). Maudūdi (1903-1979), the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan 
in 1941, proposed an Islamic revolution as “a spiritual prerequisite of the Islamic state” 
in his 1955 book The process of Islamic revolution (Enayat, 2004, p.103) and called for 
implementation of Sharia not only as an Islamic code but as a comprehensive social 
order (Enayat, 2004, p.105). The epoch of Islamic fundamentalism, however, was 
marked by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, less than three decades after the publication 
of Maudūdi’s book.58,59   
In this context, Islamic fundamentalism bears an “elective affinity” with 
“medieval-reactionary utopianism”, according to Gilbert Achcar (2013b, pp.26-27). It is 
this “medieval-reactionary utopianism” that sparks Islamic fundamentalist ideology, 
regardless of its various interpretations of Islam—radical, reformist, or revolutionary—
asking for a return to canonical texts, and to the Quran as the main guide for society. 
                                                          
58 Eliaçık (2012) and Bulaç (2005) represent a third generation in modern Islamic thought. İhsan Eliaçık, 
the leading figure of Anti-Capitalist Muslims in Turkey, began this third evolution of Islamic thought in 
the 1990s with the Soviets’ withdrawal from Afghanistan accompanied by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and after the first decade of the Iranian Revolution (Eliaçık, 2012, p.382). Civic initiatives, the 
gradual transformation of society, and Islamisation from below were put forward by third generation 
Islamists (Bulaç, 2005, p.49). Nevertheless, the common ground for these three evolutions within Islamic 
political thought remained their adherence to the original sources of Islam (Eliaçık, 2012, p.382). It is 
clear that this third generation has been rather a weak current since it is overshadowed by the heavy 
influence of the second generation. 
59 For more information on modern Islamic thought and politics, see Eliaçık, İ. (2012). Adalet Devleti: 
Ortak İyinin İktidarı (The Justice State: Rule of Common Good);  Kepel, G. (2006). Jihad: The Trail of 
Political Islam; Bulaç, A. (2005). İslam’ın Üç Siyaset Tarzı veya İslamcılığın Üç Nesli (Three Political 
Ways of Islam or Three Generations of Islamism). ın T.Bora & M. Gultekingil (Eds.). Modern Türkiye’de 
Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık (Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism); Dreyfuss, R. (2005). Devil’s 
Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam; Beinin, J. & Stork, J. (Eds.). 
(1997). Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report; Enayat, H. (2004). Modern Islamic Political 
Thought. 
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Therefore, as Achcar points out, the ideology and programme of Islamic 
fundamentalists are basically reactionary (2004, p.50). Their social composition and the 
social background of their founders also correspond with their petty-bourgeois character 
(Achcar, 2004, p.51). Achcar points to the composition of the petty-bourgeois character 
of Islamic fundamentalism from The Communist Manifesto. The petite-bourgeoisie is 
composed of “[t]he lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the 
artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their 
existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but 
conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of 
history” (Achcar, 2004, p.51; 2006, p.54).60  
 Given this “elective affinity” between Islamic fundamentalism and “medieval-
reactionary utopianism”, the question remains as to why Islamic fundamentalism is 
omnipresent in the Middle East. This can be explained by regional and external factors. 
Importantly, the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in MENA emerged in the 
context of a global change from Keynesianism to neoliberalism in the 1980s. 
Accelerated population growth along with rising indebtedness and unemployment had 
an adverse effect on the people who Islam appealed to (Moghaddam, 2009). The 
neoliberal turn in the region and the infitah (economic opening) initiated by Anwar 
Sadat following the death of Nasser in 1970 precipitated anomie, combined with the 
precariousness of the age of globalisation. Against this backdrop, religion has provided 
a powerful “identity marker” (Achcar in Chomsky & Achcar, 2007, p.32). In addition, 
the reaffirmation of one’s self-identity around a combination of religion and nationalism 
                                                          
60 Islamic political movements channel mass resentment into a religious rhetoric and promise radical 
change for the petty bourgeoisie – whose interests are shattered under neoliberal globalisation. However, 
these movements by no means pursue consistent and radical policies due to their class character. In 
addition, Islamic fundamentalist movements attract “parts of the proletariat whose proletarianisation is 
very recent, and above all parts of the sub-proletariat that capitalism has dragged down from their former 
petty bourgeois level” (Achcar, 2006, p.55). 
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can be seen as a response to ontological insecurity and existential uncertainty (Kinnvall, 
2004) which neoliberal globalisation exacerbates. In such a situation, mass resentment 
was channelled through an Islamic discourse based on a desire to return to or revive the 
golden age of Islamic civilisation.  
From a global perspective, Islamic fundamentalist movements were compatible 
with the US interests in the region during the Cold War, which sought a natural ally 
against the progressive nationalism embodied by Nasser’s Egypt (Achcar, 2013, p.25; 
Achcar in Chomsky & Achcar, 2007, p.28). As an antidote to Arab nationalism, Islamic 
fundamentalism had been backed against the “Soviet expansion” and communist threat 
in the region (Achcar, 2013, p.25; Achcar in Chomsky & Achcar, 2007, p.28). On 5 
January 1957, President Dwight David Eisenhower requested authority from Congress 
to increase military and economic aid to Middle Eastern countries under the 
international communist threat (Yaqub, 2004, p.1). The Eisenhower Doctrine “marked 
American’s emergence as the dominant Western power in the Middle East, a role the 
United States continued to play long after the policy itself had been abandoned” 
(Yaqub, 2004, p.1). Even though the doctrine officially targeted the Soviet intrusion in 
the Middle East, it further aimed to “contain the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian 
president Gamal Abdel Nasser and to discredit his policy of ‘positive neutrality’ in the 
Cold War, which held that Arab nations were entitled to enjoy profitable relations with 
both Cold War blocs” (Yaqub, 2004, p.2). The reason for this containment was 
strategic: Nasser was a threat to America’s post-war strategy, which was to control 
Saudi oil (Dreyfuss, 2005, p.96). The possibility of a secular pan-Arabism emerging, 
which could combine Egypt’s soft power with Saudi Arabia’s economic power, was a 
threatening prospect both for the U.S. and the United Kingdom (Dreyfuss, 2005, pp.98-
99).  
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Accordingly, the Saudi Kingdom emerged as the financial backer of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the region with the most reactionary interpretation of Islam, which 
was merged with Wahhabism. As a counter-attack to the proclamation in the Egyptian 
National Charter of socialism, Arab nationalism, and anti-imperialism, the Saudi 
Kingdom— with CIA-backing—hosted the foundation of the Muslim World League in 
1962, igniting reactionary Islam in the MENA region (Achcar, 2006, p.51). Considering 
that Saudi Arabia owns the world’s largest oil reserves, it has always been an object of 
strategic value to the US. The love affair between the Saudi Kingdom and the US 
corresponds to a feudal relationship of mutual loyalty, in which the overlord protects the 
vassal and the vassal provides military service for the overlord or contributes to the cost 
of war (Achcar in Chomsky & Achcar, 2007, p.38).  
At the regional level, the political developments in the 1970s contributed to 
Saudi Arabia taking the lead of the Islamic fundamentalist movements. The 1973 Arab-
Israeli War and the subsequent oil crisis substantially strengthened the domination of oil 
exporting countries in the region, especially the Wahhabite Kingdom. The Saudi 
Kingdom utilised this economic opportunity in the promotion of Islamic 
fundamentalism for its political hegemony over Muslim countries. It projected Islam 
onto the international scene, replacing descendant nationalist movements and reducing 
the different interpretations of Islam to a Wahhabi doctrine (Kepel, 2006, pp.69-70). It 
is fair to say that Islamic fundamentalist movements flourished on “the decomposing 
corpse of the progressive movement[s]” and secular nationalism (Achcar, 2013b, p.25; 
Achcar in Chomsky & Achcar, 2007, p.28). 
Turkey was no exception. The country was directly under the influence of the 
resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, which became visible only in the 
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late 1960s through the establishment of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, 
MNP) by Necmettin Erbakan. 
The political trajectory of Islamic parties led by Necmettin Erbakan in 
Turkey 
 The National Order Party (1970-1971)  
Divergent class interests between the big bourgeoisie (which was tied to the import-
substitution industrialisation model) and the peripheral small bourgeoisie, small 
merchants, craftsmen, and small farmers intensified within the Justice Party under 
Demirel in the late 1960s. This prompted a search for a new party with Islam as its 
unifying ideology (Gülalp, 2001, pp.435-436). Erbakan led the initial search for an 
alternative establishment in the interest of the peripheral capitalists by capturing a high-
ranked position in the Union of Chambers. As the representative of small and medium-
sized merchants, Erbakan was elected to the presidency of the Union of Chambers in 
1969. The İstanbul and İzmir-based bourgeoisie responded by prompting the Minister of 
Commerce in the AP not to recognise his presidency, which was as a result suspended. 
This was the first confrontation between peripheral merchant capitalism and monopoly 
capitalism. Erbakan characterised this cleavage explicitly in terms of competition over 
access to state resources in the import-substitution industrialisation period:  
The economic system has been operating in favour of big urban merchants; thus the 
Anatolian merchants perceive themselves to be stepchildren. The lion’s share in import 
quotas has been reserved for three to four urban merchants...The deposit in the 
Anatolian banks is deposited by Anatolian people but this money has been given to the 
big urban merchants in the form of credit. The union of chambers completely works via 
a comprador-masonic minority. Huge chambers are under the control of comprador 
commerce and industry. Thus, first of all, we claimed to join the administrative board 
and put it at the disposal of Anatolian merchants and industrialists as well (as cited in 
Sarıbay, 2005, p.576, my translation). 
 
The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) was founded out of this 
economic cleavage by Erbakan and 17 companions on 26 January 1970. Even though 
the party promoted Islam, there was only one theologian, Hasan Aksay, among the 
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founders. The founders were mainly middle class. Five were lawyers, four were 
merchants, three were constructors, two were engineers, and the remaining included a 
peasant, a retired state officer and a doctor (Çakır, 2012, pp.229-230).   
 The political principles embodied by the MNP were not perceived as right-wing 
policies by its key figures, although successive Islamic parties in Turkey embraced 
right-wing conservative agendas in the social arena. As Şevket Kazan explains, the 
parties headed by Erbakan, which sharply differentiated themselves from right-wing and 
left-wing parties, had an explicit all-embracing Islamic ideology:  
The parties based on an ideology started in Turkey after the ‘60s. Previously, the parties 
were catch-all parties (kitle partisi). They were talking about some ideologies but they 
didn’t know what these ideologies were. They claimed to be populist (halkçı) but they 
didn’t know what populism was...Erbakan Hodja’s National Order Party, however, was 
a party of an ideology (fikir partisi)...When he talked about the Justice Party, he 
nicknamed them “colourless people”. Of course, colourless people mean the right-wing 
people...On the other hand, Milli Görüş (National View) was different. Indeed, our 
youngsters generated a slogan: “We are neither right nor left. We are on the path of 
right, on the path of right” (Ne sağdayız ne solda. Hak yolundayız, hak yolunda). This 
slogan was continuously repeated. After all, our position as a political party turned into 
Milli Görüş. It became a party of an ideology (Ş. Kazan, personal communication, 
November 16, 2012). 
 
The party was also supported by the Islamic Orders (Tariqas), particularly by the 
İskender Pasha Order.61 Mehmet Zahid Kotku, the leader of the Naqshbandi Order,62 
spoke pejoratively of politics and political power: “The Real Muslim is the one who 
annihilates the desire for power and leadership. Without annihilation of this desire, it is 
                                                          
61 Indeed, Islamic orders have always been in politics since the transition to the multi-party system in 
1945. During the single-party regime between 1923 and 1945, state persecution of the Islamic Orders led 
them underground. After 1945, religious orders such as Naqshbandi, Süleymancı, and Nurcu found an 
opportunity to increase their political influence in the elections by providing votes for the centre-right 
parties from the rural areas (Eligür, 2010, p.52). The Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) under Adnan 
Menderes between 1950 and 1960 was a channel for Islamic groups to voice their demands. After the 
1950 elections, the DP lifted some Kemalist bans on Islamic practices such as the call for prayer in 
Turkish and ban on Quran schools (Yeşilada, 2002b, p.63). The party also stopped the persecution of 
Said-i Nursi, the leader of the Nur community, which in turn led to the dissemination of his ideas by his 
followers (Yavuz, 1997, p.33). The followers of Nursi gathered around a “reading public” or “textual 
community” that “evolved into a major social movement, the Nur movement, with powerful economic, 
cultural and political capital” (Yavuz, 1997, p.33). After the military intervention in 1960 and the closure 
of the DP, the support of Islamic orders in Turkey was channelled to the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) 
under Demirel (Yavuz, 2003a, p.33). Appealing to the Nur movement vis-à-vis the Erbakan movement 
and using religion as an antidote to the increasing leftist movements in Turkey, Demirel tried to 
amalgamate personal religiosity with political secularism and the market economy (Yavuz, 2003a, p.65).  
62 Necmettin Erbakan, Korkut Özal, Hasan Aksay, Fehmi Adak and the ministers in various coalition 
governments during the 1970s were notable followers of İskenderpaşa Order before their rise in politics 
(Atasoy, 2005, p.82).  
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impossible for a Muslim to reach maturity” (as cited in Yaşar, 2005, p. 330).  Despite 
this, he openly supported the establishment of the MNP:  
In the aftermath of the deposition of the Sultan Abdülhamid II, the country’s 
governance has been taken over by masons, who are imitating the west. They are a 
minority. They cannot represent our nation. It is a historical duty to give the governance 
of the country to the real representatives of our nation by establishing a political party. 
Join this already belated endeavor (as cited in Eligür, 2011, p.66).  
 
The “Principal Objective” section of the party programme emphasised the fulfilment of 
a national temperament of high morality and virtue together with the development of 
morality which would bring order, peace, social justice, and happiness and salvation for 
the citizens. The party claimed to achieve the synthesis of material and spiritual 
development in the democratic legal order without vitiating national and moral values. 
It also proposed to reestablish a superior global civilisation (Sarıbay, 2005, p.577). The 
party programme also underlined the importance of educational policy, which it claimed 
it could overcome underdevelopment and help the nation reach a point where it would 
be a model for humanity. Therefore, it was emphasised that the new generation should 
be “faithful, hardworking, patriotic, spirited in national morality, family order, and 
historical consciousness, righteous, devoted, and determined to scientific, technical 
progress for illuminating all of humanity” (as cited in Sarıbay, 2005, p.578). In addition, 
the programme emphasised that an education system based on morality and morals 
would be the primary strategy for the prevention of anarchist events and communism in 
Turkey (Erbakan, 1975, p.30). 
The party programme envisaged state intervention in the economy. It proposed 
that the state should establish economic and industrial institutions where the private 
sector cannot. However, once the economic efficiency of the institutions increases, they 
would be transferred to the private sector. By defending the enactment of a new Law for 
Encouragement for Industry (Sanayii Teşvik Kanunu), the party also supported the 
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development of heavy industry for the whole country, as this was seen as a symbol of 
economic and political independence (Erbakan, 1975, p.30).  
 However, the political life of the MNP was short. The Constitutional Court 
disbanded the party two months after the military coup since it was judged that the party 
violated the secular principles of the state. According to the unanimous 1971 
Constitutional Court decision, the speeches of the party leaders, which included such 
statements as “the religion and the state are the same, they go hand in hand, it is 
impossible to separate them” (Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi [Journal of 
Constitutional Court Decisions], 1972, p.67) and the anthem for the youth “The only 
solution is Islam” (Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi [Journal of Constitutional 
Court Decisions], 1972, p.68) were considered to violate constitutional principles and 
the law on political parties.  
The National Salvation Party (1972-1981) 
The army was dissatisfied with the closure of the Islamic party in the anti-communist 
era. The state was able to control the Islamic brotherhoods through the MNP and aimed 
to use it against the left and communism in Turkey. According to Süleyman Arif Emre, 
former secretary general of the MNP and founder of the subsequent National Salvation 
Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), Rafet Ülgenalp, the general Secretary of the 
National Security Council, objected to the closure of the MNP and advocated religious 
education in order to launch a counterattack against “leftist anarchy” (Eligür, 2010, 
p.68).  
The MSP, successor to the MNP, was founded by Süleyman Arif Emre on 11 
October 1972. The party immediately took part in the general elections. The 1973 
election was actually a success for the party, which received 11.8% of the votes and 48 
parliamentary seats thus becoming the third largest party after the CHP (186 seats) and 
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the AP (150 seats). Erbakan became chairperson of the party in 1973 following the 
elections. The party participated in a coalition government in February 1974 with the 
Kemalist party, the CHP, headed by Bülent Ecevit. This enabled the party to hold the 
office of Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministries of State for Religious Affairs, 
Internal Affairs, Justice, Commerce, Food, Agriculture and Livestock, and Industry and 
Technology (Alkan, 1984, pp.82-83; Çakır, 2005, p.547 & 2012, p.232). During their 
ten months’ tenure in government, the most important political development was the 
1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which resulted in the partition of the island. 
According to Erbakan, the MSP was firmly determined to launch the operation despite 
the hesitations of the CHP, and succeeded in mobilising the government for the 
operation (Erbakan, 1991a, pp.59-77). He further suggested that the objective of the 
MSP in this military operation was to control the whole of the island (Erbakan, 1991a, 
p.72). 
In addition, Erbakan did not refrain from forming coalition governments headed 
by Demirel, despite having previously accused him of being “colourless”, and a 
supporter of exploitation and usurer capitalism (Ş. Kazan, personal communication, 
November 16, 2012). Erbakan served as a Vice Prime Minister in the National Front 
governments led by Demirel between 1975 and 1977, and 1977 and 1978. In the June 
1977 elections, the MSP only managed to get 8.56% of the vote with 24 seats (Alkan, 
1984, p.84).  
Indeed, the period between 1973 and 1980 was a window of opportunity for the 
political socialisation of the Islamists with regard to the preparation and development of 
alternative state staffs (Çalmuk, 2005, p. 567). During that period, Erbakan prioritised 
the removal of the blockage against devout segments by Republican elites in the 
bureaucracy by assigning his supporters to key civil service posts (Çalmuk, 2005, p. 
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567). He also established civil society organisations such as associations for lawyers, 
crafts, local administrations, health, Islamic sciences, teachers, contractors, and 
businessmen to support his party. These institutions were, in one sense, alternative 
ministries (Çalmuk, 2005, p. 567).   
During the 1970s, the visibility of Islamic organisations went hand in hand with 
Saudi influence in Turkey. Under the National Front governments, Turkey was eager to 
form an alliance with the Saudi Kingdom. In 1976, the country participated in one of the 
conferences led by the Saudi-based Muslim World League (Rabıta al-Alam al-Islami, or 
Rabıta), the Seerat Congress in Pakistan, and was represented by the state minister of 
the MSP, Hasan Aksay. Salih Özcan, owner of the Islamic magazine, Hilal (Crescent), 
and later MSP parliamentarian for Şanlıurfa and founder of the Islamic bank Faisal 
Finance,63 was the Turkish representative in the constituent assembly of Rabıta, which 
was composed of 41 delegates.64 Ahmet Gürkan, a parliamentarian between 1950 and 
1957 in the DP, later the Konya representative for AP between 1961 and 1965 and the 
President of the Turkish-Saudi Arabian Friendship Association, was also a founding 
member of Rabıta (Mumcu, 1993, p.173). Korkut Özal, a former NSP parliamentarian 
and minister of agriculture and brother of Turgut Özal, was a consultant for the Islamic 
Development Bank. He established Al-Baraka Turk as a joint venture with Eymen 
Topbaş (Atasoy, 2005, p.151; Mumcu, 1993, p.180). 
                                                          
63 Tevfik Paksu with Salih Özcan was involved in the foundation of Faisal Finance (Atasoy, 2005, p.151). 
Paksu was one of the founders of the MNP in 1970 and the Minister of Labour between 1975 and 1976 in 
the First National Front government.  
64 In his well-researched article, Hakan Köni traces the Saudi influence in Turkey in the 1970s. According 
to a book published by Rabıta, A World Guide to Organizations of Islamic Activities in Cooperation with 
Rabita, some important associations and foundations of that time were the branches and representatives of 
Rabıta in Turkey. They included the Turkish National Student Union, Eastern Turkestan Immigrants 
Foundation, Istanbul University Islamic Research Institute, Izmir National Turkish Foundation for 
Building and Sheltering Islamic Institutes, Cyprus Turkish Islamic Association, Turkish-Saudi Arabian 
Fellowship Foundation, Turkish-Saudi Arabian Parliament Fellowship Association, and Radio Turkish 
Voice in Australia (Köni, 2012, p.106).  
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Besides the Saudi influence in Turkey, Turkish workers living in Europe, and 
Germany in particularly, contributed to Erbakan’s political movement from the 1970s 
(Yükleyen, 2012; Sunier & Landman, 2015). In 1976, the “Türkische Union in Europa” 
was founded. In 1985 it was renamed European National Vision Organisations (Avrupa 
Milli Görüş Teşkilatları, AMGT), whose headquarters was in Cologne (Yükleyen, 
2012, pp.60-61; Sunier & Landman, 2015, pp.73-74). Since 1995, it has been referred to 
as Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG), the Islamic Community of Milli 
Görüş, which “incorporates 514 mosque communities [in Europe], 323 of which are in 
Germany” (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş, n.d., p.21). According to the Islamic 
Community of Milli Görüş, “[T]he teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunnah...constitute 
the guiding principles for both the community and its [around 87,000] members” 
(Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş, n.d., p.3).65  
The 1973 MSP election manifesto opposed integration with the European 
Community via the common market, arguing that the national industry together with 
merchants, craftsmen, and artisans would be destroyed by European competition (Milli 
Selamet Partisi 1973 Seçim Beyannamesi [The National Salvation Party Election 
Manifesto in 1973], n.d., pp.37-38). The party basically favoured industrialisation, the 
establishment of organised industrial districts and small industrial areas by the state, and 
the creation of a heavy military industry (Milli Selamet Partisi 1973 Seçim 
Beyannamesi, pp.44-51). The MSP proposed an “expanded private sector” (yaygın özel 
sektör)”, identified with the joint-stock company. A joint-stock company, which was 
composed of at least 100 shareholders and with no one having a share more than 5% of 
                                                          
65 IGMG also built a “personal link” with the Islamic Community in Germany (IGD) known as the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Germany. Ibrahim al-Zayat, the head of the IGD since 1997, is married to the 
sister of Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, the head of the IGMG between 2001 and 2002 and the nephew of 
Necmettin Erbakan (Steinberg, 2010, p.150).  
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the company stock, could connect small businessmen to heavy industry under state 
control (Gülalp, 2003, p.64).  
The party programme championed moral and material development in its first 
article but proposed that moral development preceded material development (Alkan, 
1984, p.85). In fact, in his speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1973 
regarding the third Five-Year Plan (1973-1977), Erbakan argued that even economic 
development depended on the advancement of morality (2013g, Vol.5, p.50). “Morality 
and Morals” were seen as an antidote to the threat of communism and materialism 
(2013g, Vol.5, p.54). It was believed that interest as a capitalist notion should be 
abolished (2013g, Vol.5, p.68) and the poor should not be taxed (2013g, Vol.5, p.69).  
The party was disbanded after the military coup in 1980 and Erbakan was 
banned from politics until 1987. It was with the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), a 
pro-Islamist party, that Islamic politics in Turkey reached its peak in the era of 
neoliberal globalisation.  
The Welfare Party (1983-1998) 
The municipal elections of 27 March 1994 and the general elections of 24 December 
1995 marked a tremendous victory for the RP. In the former, it managed to capture 28 
municipalities out of 75 provincial centres, including the metropolitan municipalities of 
İstanbul and Ankara, with a voting share of 19% (Ayata, 1996, p.40). The RP more than 
doubled its vote share from the previous 8.74% in the municipal elections in 1989 
(Figure 4.1) and more than tripled its number of constituents from 1.175 million in 1989 
to 3.785 million in 1994 (Yerel Yönetimler Portalı [Local Administrations Portal], 
2014). 
 The victory of the RP signalled an unmitigated failure for the Social Democratic 
Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti SHP); in the municipal elections of 1989, 
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the pro-Islamic party won the sizable municipalities of İstanbul, Ankara, Kayseri, and 
Diyarbakır (Yerel Yönetimler Portalı [Local Administrations Portal], 2014). With more 
than 5.3 million votes, the Islamic party received almost one fifth of the total votes in 
1994 local elections. İstanbul and Ankara were taken over from Social Democrat 
municipality mayors. Likewise, the general elections in 1995 created the opportunity for 
the RP, which won 21.4% of the votes with 158 seats (Figure 4.2; Kazan, Vol.2, p.27), 
to lead the country. The 1991 and 1995 general elections, which increased the votes of 
the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), revealed that crisis of Kemalism’s modernist 
ideology and the failure of state-led development in the 1980s had created a vacuum, 
ready to be filled by just such an Islamic fundamentalist party. This was reflected in a 
zero-sum game between the social-democratic parties associated with Kemalism and the 
Welfare Party, in which the latter replaced the former in big cities in the 1990s (Gülalp, 
2001, p.442). 
 
Figure 4.1. Milli Görüş Parties and the Party that Won the Municipal Elections, 1963-2014.  
Source: Yerel Yönetimler Portalı [Local Administrations Portal], 2014; TÜİK, 2005; TÜİK, 2009; YSK, 
2014. 
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Figure 4.2. Milli Görüş Parties and the Party that Won the General Elections, 1950-2015.  
Source: “Milletvekilleri Genel Seçimleri 1923-2011 [The General Elections 1923-2011]" by TÜİK, 2012, 
p.25, pp.93-94. For the 2015 general elections, see Yüksek Seçim Kurulu [The Supreme Electoral 
Council], 2015. In this election, the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) was in alliance with the Grand 
Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi, BBP).  
The successive electoral victories of Refah revealed that a pro-Islamic party 
found fertile ground in Turkey during a particular time span between the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s (Figures 4.1 & 4.2). There were several causes for this Islamic 
revivalism. Neoliberal globalisation altered employment relations through the declining 
power of working class politics, the rise of small entrepreneurship, sweatshops and sub-
contracting, which in turn provided a basis for Islamic fundamentalism  (Gülalp, 2001, 
p.437; 2003, p.47). Precarious employment relations were coupled with the decreasing 
role of the state in providing for the social needs of the poor. As a result, Ziya Öniş, a 
Turkish political economist, suggests that  
The increasing incapacity of the nation state, especially the failure of the social 
democratic movements within the individual nation-state to cater explicitly for the 
needs of the poor, the disadvantaged or the excluded, has created a vacuum in political 
space. This vacuum has provided a gateway for the proliferation of political movements 
organised on the basis of extreme nationalism and religious fundamentalism (1997, 
pp.746-747). 
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The failure of state-led development in Turkey in the late 1970s and the intense process 
of globalisation had social costs. The effects of neoliberal globalisation on Turkey 
began to be experienced in the mid-1980s. According to a study by Michael Förster and 
Mark Pearson published by the OECD in 2002, Turkey witnessed a significant increase 
in income inequality—more than 12 per cent, similar to Italy—from the mid-1980s to 
the mid-1990s (Förster & Pearson, 2002, p.9). Among the 21 OECD countries selected, 
Turkey ranked 20th with a 0.49 Gini coefficient value, before Mexico with a 0.53 
coefficient value in the mid-90s (Förster & Pearson, 2002, pp.9; 38). Furthermore, real 
wages deteriorated in line with the structural adjustment programme. While labour 
productivity increased after the 1980s, this was not accompanied by an increase of real 
wages: “While value added made by the labour in the manufacturing industry increased 
2.5 times between 1980 and 1997, increases in real wages have always fallen behind. In 
fact, wages in the manufacturing industry in 1997 were at 1980 levels” (Aydin, 2005, 
p.130). 
 The reaction to the social consequences of neoliberal economic transformation 
was marked by mass protests led by organised labour between the late 1986 and 1991, 
commonly known as the Spring Demonstrations of 1989 and the Great Miners’ March 
(Dogan, 2010). In 1990 there was an explosion in the number of strikes and of workers 
participating in strikes, with 458 strikes in 861 workplaces and 166,306 workers going 
on strike (Akkaya & Çetik, 1999, p.155). In 1995 there were strikes in 3,369 workplaces 
with approximately 200,000 workers going on strike (Akkaya & Çetik, 1999, p.155). As 
mass resentment reached its apex, the change in Refah’s political approach—from 
conveying an Islamic message (tebliğ) to concerning themselves with people’s worldly 
affairs—played an important role in its electoral success. The party no longer 
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proclaimed that “their rivals are ‘bad Muslims’” but could now say they were “bad 
leaders/politicians” (Çakır, 1994, p.81).   
 The rise of Refah coincided with the search by the impoverished masses for a 
new party to channel their discontent using Islamic rhetoric. Mainstream centre-left and 
centre-right political parties throughout the 1990s were unable to gain the public’s trust 
in their ability to find solutions to social problems such as corruption, poverty, and 
unemployment (Delibas, 2015). In such a political environment, Refah gained the 
support of a wide range of economic and social bases, including the peripheral segment 
of the capitalist class, which consisted of small and medium scale and mostly provincial 
businesses, the professional middle class, and lastly the working class (Gülalp, 2003, 
p.59; 2001, pp.444-445). In addition to the established working class who supported 
Refah, Gülalp contends that the working class who had recently immigrated to the cities 
and had most difficulty finding secure jobs were influenced by the populist propaganda 
mobilised by this Islamic party (2001, p.444). 
The “global crisis of modernism and the rising challenges against the universal 
myths of Western civilization” also popularised an Islamic post-modernism (Gülalp, 
2001, pp.442-443). Contemporary Islamist intellectuals such as İsmet Özel, Ali Bulaç, 
İlhan Kutluer, Ersin Gürdoğan, and Rasim Özdenören utterly rejected modern science, 
technology, and industry and proposed a return to the “Golden Age of the Prophet” 
(Toprak, 1993).66 For instance, İsmet Özel, the most notable Marxist-turned-Islamist 
                                                          
66 The depiction of the past as an ostensible “Golden Age” is not only narrated by Turkey’s Islamists but 
also by elderly Republicans. In Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in 
Turkey, Esra Özyurek (2006, p.48) explains how the elderly Republicans recounted the early Republic as 
a “past utopia in which people were too innocent...to look after their private interests, which could 
conflict with the collective goal”. The representation of the past as such, Özyürek (2006, p.48) argues, is 
then used as a way to challenge the arguments that the early Republic was an authoritarian regime. 
Özyurek’s book (2006) illustrates the way in which state ideology and Kemalist symbolism permeated the 
domestic and intimate worlds of individuals in the 1990s through their voluntary acts and market-based 
choices without any state imposition. The articulation of state ideology through the intimate worlds of 
individuals was the outcome of a process that commenced when neoliberal ideology “privatised” state 
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intellectual in Turkey, made the following criticism: “Commodities are sacred; brands 
and designer names have a special spiritual force; advertisement has replaced prayer” 
(as cited in Toprak, 1993, p.250). In his 1978 book, Üç Mesele: Teknik-Medeniyet-
Yabancılaşma (Three Problems: Technology-Civilisation-Alienation), Özel argued that 
technology and civilisation are inseparable in as much as technology inevitably goes 
hand in hand with the civilisation it stems (in Toprak, 1993, p.253). “Alienation only 
comes into question with a civilised lifestyle; civilisation only exists with technology. 
Technology reproduces a civilisation in order to continue its presence. It is impossible 
to be civilised without being alienated. The relationship between these three issues is 
completely intrinsic” (Özel in Aktay and Özensel, 2005, pp.785-786, my translation).  
 The economic base of the pro-Islamic party included small and medium-sized 
enterprises with MÜSİAD (The Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association) as their umbrella organisation.67 1994 MÜSİAD’s research report titled 
“Economic Cooperation Among Islamic Countries”, pointed out the importance of 
cooperative actions among Islamic countries. Erol Yarar, the founding President of 
MÜSİAD (1990-1999), argued that Muslim countries lag far behind the industrialised 
nations (1994a, p.3). The report contended that Islam pays special attention to human 
problems and their solutions from a unique angle of brotherhood and cooperation. The 
inclusion of Quranic words such as taawun (cooperation) and jem’ia (society) and 
Hadiths reflected this endeavour (1994a, p.9).68 Yarar (n.d., 1997, p.8) put a particular 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ideology and imaginary and political Islam started to become visible in the public arena in the 1990s 
(Özyürek, 2006).   
67 However, to the extent that small and medium-sized enterprises expanded and integrated with the world 
economy, they came to conflict with the economic agenda of Refah. An executive officer in MÜSİAD 
argued that The National Economy model was indifferent to direct integration with the world. Unless this 
transformation of the National View had taken place, it would have been impossible to attract foreign 
capital (S. Mutlu, personal communication, October 22, 2012). 
68 Islamic references in the research report were quite visible in 1994. However, it is interesting to see that 
the organisation published a report with the same title “Economic Cooperation Among Islamic Countries” 
in 2008 in which direct reference to Islam and Islamic civilisation were less prominent. 
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emphasis on a conservative social agenda, highlighting the characteristics of pre-
industrial and agricultural societies such as family values, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, and non-profit voluntary associations. Yarar also stressed that economic 
development should not be the main objective of a Muslim. Economic development 
could only be a tool for God’s sake (Allah rızası) (Yarar, n.d., p.49).  
Another report that same year in December, titled İş Hayatında İslam İnsanı 
(Men of Islam in the Business World), offered an Islamic challenge to contemporary 
capitalism, albeit not to capitalism itself, and to its inevitable product—the modern 
capitalist man. This report, which provided an alternative societal programme, can be 
considered the political manifesto of ascendant small capital in the 1990s in Turkey. It 
suggested that an Islamic paradigm should be established and social relations should be 
based on Homo Islamicus. Homo Islamicus refers to servitude to Allah (el-abd) and 
being His successor on earth (halifetullah fi’l-arz) (MÜSİAD, 1994b, p.21).  
The outline of the individual paragon was complemented with a vision of the 
desired relations between, and attitudes of, employees and employers in the workplace. 
Sabahattin Zaim, in his article, idealised the attitudes and behaviours of employees and 
employers by urging that an employee should be proud of working physically and 
intellectually for his living (MÜSİAD, 1994b, p.103). He suggested that:  
A Muslim man works in his job according to these principles: He is clean, his 
appearance (his dress) is nice, he is easygoing, he obeys the rules and instructions, he is 
swift. He enjoys his work performs his work thoroughly, controls and corrects it, he 
goes the whole hog, he works fast, he does a good job, he cooperates, he is open to 
criticisms, he works properly in the workplace...he takes care of the equipment, raw 
material and stock as required, he properly uses the equipment and engine, he 
implements productive working methods, he complies with health and safety measures 
(MÜSİAD, 1994b, pp.103-104, my translation). 
  
According to the report, an employer also had some responsibilities. By ensuring that 
the right of possession was guaranteed by the state, he could bequeath his legitimate 
wealth to his children and to the extent that the state would not interfere in economic 
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activity, he was confident about the future and knew he would make his living from 
honest earnings (MÜSİAD, 1994b, p.104).  
MÜSİAD’s 1996 report prefigured for the political aims of the Welfare Party 
when it came to power. Titled “A New Perspective of the World at the Threshold of the 
21st Century”, the report proposed the rebirth of Islamic civilisation. It questioned the 
causes of backwardness in the Islamic civilisation. Yet, contradictory views on wealth 
acquisition were present in the report. Presenting something of an Islamic version of 
Max Weber’s Protestant work ethic, Erol Yarar was critical of the Islamic ascetic motto 
“living on very little” (bir lokma, bir hırka) because this resulted in the complete 
deterioration of business motivation (MÜSİAD, 1996, p.39). On the other hand, the 
report offered subordination to God as a means to economic acquisition. 
For a Muslim individual, the main goal in this life is to get the consent of the Creator ... 
In this respect, economic development is not an end in itself, but simply a means to this 
end. Our goal is to reach a high morality, by which we can make the world a happy and 
prosperous place where men and the whole creation can live in peace and harmony 
(MÜSİAD, 1996, p.45). 
 
The report argued that the decline of Western civilization was inevitable. Western 
civilisation was based on a rational, Cartesian philosophy and the rejection of value and 
existence (MÜSİAD 1996, p.50). Secularisation was strictly criticised by stressing that 
“[t]his overturning of religious values and their replacement by a secular “morality”’, 
transformed homo sapiens into “homo brutalitas” (brutal man) (MÜSİAD, 1996, pp.50-
51). Homo economicus in the capitalist system had “transformed endless accumulation 
of capital into the sole goal of individual life” resulting in wars and the deterioration of 
ecological balance (MÜSİAD, 1996, p.51).  
The just economic system: a petty-bourgeois utopia in the era of 
neoliberalism  
The Just Economic System (Adil Ekonomik Düzen) concept is essentially an expression 
of specific socio-political interests; it manifests the utopia of an “egalitarian petty-
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bourgeois society composed of individual entrepreneurs” (Gülalp, 2001, p.440). 
Therefore, it provided a platform for the social classes and groups challenging their 
resentment of the Kemalist state while also tapping into their desire for an alternative 
state, society, and world order. The Just Economic System was a very influential 
doctrine in Turkey in the 1990s when the masses were searching for an alternative.  
The booklet titled Adil Ekonomik Düzen (The Just Economic System) by 
Erbakan starts with a diagnosis of the economy stating that there is a “Slave Order” in 
Turkey. However, this order is not self-created; it is the result of “Modern Colonialism” 
in which Imperialism and Zionism are intentionally, deliberately, and systematically 
enforced (Erbakan, 1991b, p.1). The booklet employs biological language to comment 
on the “slave order” in Turkey where “five microbes” in the usurious capitalist system 
exploit the masses. These microbes are 1) the interest microbe; 2) the unduly collected 
tax microbe; 3) the bank note microbe; 4) the foreign exchange microbe; and 5) the 
credit system microbe (Erbakan, 1991b, pp.3-4).  
Following the diagnosis of the economic system in Turkey, it observed that the 
contemporary economic system nurtures world imperialism, Zionism, Israel, and 
comprador allies (Erbakan, 1991b, p.4). The principal cure for the malady requires 
wiping these microbes out of the system; without this the healing of the body and the 
end of suffering are impossible (Erbakan, 1991b, p.12).  
The Just Economic System is in contradiction with Western civilisation, since 
the latter is the product of a mentality which praises force. This civilisation oppresses 
the masses through the twin brothers of communism and capitalism. According to 
Erbakan, both systems, which praise force, are basically the same. They are based on an 
oppressor-oppressed system. The only difference is that in communism the oppressive 
 190 
force is the political power while in capitalism the oppressive force is the economic 
power of a minority that controls capital (Erbakan, 1991b, p.16).  
The Just Economic System discusses the pros and cons of the capitalist and 
communist systems, highlighting itself as an alternative to both. On the one hand, the 
capitalist system includes profit, which is an incentivising factor. It nevertheless also 
includes interest (faiz), which is an instrument for cruelty and oppression. The capitalist 
system also includes free market competition; however, it cannot prevent the 
development of monopolies and trusts. On the other hand, the communist system 
opposes interest in principle; however, its rejection of profit and the right to property is 
in contradiction with human nature (Erbakan, 1991b, p.18). By contrast, the Just 
Economic System is an ideal order—an amalgam of these two economic systems where 
the useful sides of capitalism and communism exist together (Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. The Characteristics of Economic Systems According to Milli Görüş. 
Source: Adil Ekonomik Düzen (The Just Economic System) by Necmettin Erbakan, 1991b, p.79. 
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interest, which is described as an unduly collected tax paid to imperialism and Zionism 
(Erbakan, 1991b, p.43). It is proposed that the Salam contract (selem senedi)—an 
agreement in Islamic economics in which an advance payment is made for a specified 
commodity to be delivered on a specified future date—substitutes the interest gained. 
This substitution, according to the Just Economic System, is crucial for wiping out 
imperialism and Zionism. It is said they can be destroyed not by “the atomic bomb” but 
by “the Salam agreement” (Erbakan, 1991b, p.41). It is further suggested that when the 
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Salam agreement replaces the bonds of the usurious capitalist system, unjust 
exploitation will be prevented and cheapness will prevail over expensiveness (Erbakan, 
1991b, pp.41-42). Ruşen Çakır, a leading researcher in Islamic politics in Turkey, 
suggests that the Just Economic System is an “intermediary stage for the transition to 
the “Order of Happiness”, which emulates an Islamic order in the Golden Age (Asr-ı 
Saadet) of Prophet Mohammed and the Four Caliphs” (1994, p.149). 
 The Constitution of the Just Order System proposes that “there shall not be 
interest gain”, “the state shall not release fiat currency”, and “the state shall not pass a 
tax law” (Erbakan, 1991b, p.55). In this economic system, there will ostensibly be only 
one uniform tax and it will be taxed in terms of the type of production (Erbakan, 1991b, 
p.59). The state, which is also a shareholder in production, claims its stake, equivalent 
to 20% of production (Erbakan, 1991b, p.60).   
The Just Order System divides the role of the state in the economy into two 
categories. First, the state carries out General Public Services such as security, 
administration, the courts system, energy procurement, water, construction and 
maintenance of roads and other public infrastructure, health, education, transport, and 
communication services. Second, the state carries out “Regulatory Services” for 
essential economic goods. For instance, a Wheat Waqf would replace the Turkish Grain 
Board so consumers and producers would buy and sell goods via this waqf, which does 
not aim make profit (Erbakan, 1991b, pp.22-23). 
Under the Just Economic System, there would be no need for strikes and 
lockouts (Tuğal, 2007, p.13); Erbakan paints a rosy picture of an economy which only 
produces prosperity and welfare: 
Because the economy keeps progressing and develops, the real problem will be to find 
an unemployed person. Because in the Just Order, there will be no person without a job. 
Because the economy develops in the Just Order, everybody will receive recompense 
for their work, which will serve for a decent life. As soon as the Just Order is adopted, 
the unemployed people who hang around in the coffeehouses consequently will have the 
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opportunity and potential to gain higher wages. Contrary to a situation where 
unemployed people are looking for a job, entrepreneurs will in fact look for new 
employees in order to get credit [from the state] (1991b, p.36, my translation).  
 
The Just Economic System is not only concerned with the economy. It is 
concurrently presented as a cure for any problems in moral development of human 
beings and society. It is claimed that interest gain leads to moral corruption since it 
makes the rich richer and the poor poorer (1991b, pp.84-85). It is argued that if a person 
has not been morally edified, he is easily pushed to drugs, alcoholism, gambling, and 
other moral corruption (1991b, p.85). In the capitalist order, bribes, squandering of 
money, drug use, alcoholism, gambling, mafia, criminality, general moral corruption 
and AIDS all proliferate (Erbakan, 1991b, p.85). However, the following five points 
were proposed to counter the “five microbes”: 1) “The Just State Order” should replace 
“the Order of Slavery” which Imperialism and Zionism established and have 
maintained; 2) The “exploitative system” of the usurious capitalist order should be 
replaced by the “Just Economic System”; 3) A “national, powerful, rapid, and expansive 
development” should be implemented, 4) The “devout personnel” are a prerequisite for 
this development; and 5) “A wise person” knows how to discipline his or her desires 
(1991b, pp.90-92).  
The national view (milli görüş) as common ideational ground for Islamic 
parties  
According to Erbakan, Milli Görüş, arising from the glorious Ottoman legacy, is “the 
spirit and essence of our nation which conquered İstanbul, thus ushered in a new age 
and brought the old one to an end, surrounded Vienna, won the Battle of Gallipoli, 
waged a War of Independence, and most recently made miracles again in Cyprus in 
1974” (Erbakan, 1975, p.27, my translation). This glorious legacy reminded people of 
wars and started “when the community confronted a thousand years ago the deceitful 
character of the Crusaders which constituted the overall might of the West” (Erbakan, 
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1975, p.18, my translation). In order to repulse Western attacks on Muslim soil, the 
power of faith was an instrument to mobilise the emboldened Muslims against external 
aggression. Erbakan agreed on the special attributes of the Islamic community (Ummah 
in Arabic) boasting that “Our community is the precious and immaculate chosen 
community of Allah in the track of supporting rightness (hak), attaining goodness, and 
preventing evil” (Erbakan, 1975, p.17, my translation). 
It is such a community which established admirable civilisations, illuminated humanity, 
taught them what morality and virtue mean, controlled and regulated the world order. 
Until the modern age, it fought with the world nations not one to one but as a whole and 
prevailed over the whole. In gaining these victories, it was surely beyond doubt that 
faith constituted the preeminent source of its power. At the same time, in the material 
field, it outranked the whole world, guided humanity. It was the flag of civilisation. It 
was advanced in knowledge, science, technology, and education. Specifically, moral 
and spiritual supremacy was the reason for its success in every field. In addition to its 
supremacy for a long time in the field of divine sciences, it guided the whole of 
humanity in the material sciences by its constructive, exploratory, and constitutive 
faculty. It is our community that founded the material sciences of which the West is 
now able to take better advantage than we who established them as sciences and were 
the owners of them (Erbakan, 1975, p.17, my translation). 
 
That this community unacceptably lagged behind Western civilisation, according 
to Erbakan (1975, p.18), was mainly due to the fact, that after the enemy failed to defeat 
our nation by external attacks, a different strategy was adopted in which “non-
communal movements” led to the material and spiritual decay of the empire. This 
distinct strategy was embodied in the Westernisation process in the Ottoman Empire, 
which led to the neglect of the authentic laws, institutions, and customs of the nation. 
Imitation of the West was severely criticised in Erbakan’s book Mukaddesatçı Türk’e 
Beyanname (Declaration to the Religious Turk), published in 1969. It argues that the 
Westernisation process since the 19th century resulted in the abandonment of the 
Muslim Turks’ personality and nobility, “thus bringing to [European] knees the Turk 
who for centuries could not be defeated by the crusaders and external blows” (as cited 
in Ahmad, 1991, pp.14-15).  
 The remedy, it was argued, can only be found in Milli Görüş since the latter 
represents “the national fabric” (Erbakan, 1975, p.28). “The liberal view” and “the 
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leftist view” in Turkey were, according to Erbakan, based on external sources and do 
not fit Muslim Turks’ body. That is to say, while the CHP’s leftist view took its sources 
from inefficient socialist views in the West which restricted freedoms, the AP’s liberal 
view was inspired by the exploitative, usurer capitalist views (Erbakan, 1975, p.28). In 
order to realise “All-Powerful Turkey Again” (Yeniden Büyük Türkiye), a spiritual 
development, which would pursue material development in technology and science, was 
to guide Turkey with a motto of “First of all, Morality and Morals” (Önce Ahlak ve 
Maneviyat) (Erbakan, 1975, pp.17-29).  
Another rigid issue in Milli Görüş is its undeniable obsession with “Jewish-
Masonic institutions”, wrapped in anti-Semitic rhetoric where the “terms Jew-Zionism-
Israel were intermixed freely” (Bali, 2013, p.184).69 Zionism is frequently portrayed as 
a transcendental power, which manifests itself in every turning point of history against 
Islam. Zionism, for instance, is seen as preventing the Islamic world from reviving: 
As an ideology, Communism is one arm of Zionism, and capitalism is the other. 
Actually, Zionism wants to rule the world and manipulates these two arms according to 
its will...The purpose of the Yalta Conference was to divide the world in the name of 
Zionism; since then some new forces have appeared and they want to consolidate this 
division in Vladivostok. However, the revival of the Islamic world in the last ten years 
has changed the situation. Then what happened? The rhetoric of détente and 
rapprochement between East and West in Helsinki appeared. What does it mean? It 
means ‘there is a revival in the Islamic world, let’s stop fighting each other and find a 
solution to this problem (as cited in Alkan, 1984, p.94).    
   
The obsession with “Jewish-Masonic” institutions is still a hot issue for Milli 
Görüş followers. For instance, Şevket Kazan, Refah’s Minister of Justice in between 
1996 and 1997, vividly mentioned a “Jewish focus” in the USA which controls 
elections and ultimately US foreign policy through a Jewish-Zionist lobby group, the 
Washington Institute, whose aim is to establish a “Greater Israel” stretching from the 
                                                          
69 Anti-Semitic views were more obvious in the case of Cevat Rifat Atilhan, the founder of İslam 
Demokrat Partisi (the Islamic Democratic Party) in 1951. Showing a personal interest in Nazi Germany, 
he translated anti-Semitic classics such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and several books such as 
Zionism and the Danger of Surrounding Islam, Turkish Son: Know Thine Enemy!, Jewish Spies on the 
Palestinian Front, and Freemasons: How They Have Conspired to Destroy Turkish Nationalism and 
Islam (Brockett, 2009, p.446). 
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Nile to the River Euphrates (Ş. Kazan, personal communication, November 16, 2012). 
Not surprisingly, Erbakan said that the centre of Zionism is Wall Street, New York 
(1991b, p.1). 
The Islamic alternative to the Kemalist state 
Erbakan waged a frontal attack on the Kemalist state, which had historically led Turkey 
on the path of Westernisation. Erbakan’s political strategy concentrated on reversing 
Westernisation and rejecting the liberal euphoria of the 1990s. According to Erbakan, 
using the West as a reference point was a major mistake. In his book, Türkiye’nin Temel 
Meseleleri (The Fundamental Problems of Turkey), he states that even though the 
nation sought remedies in the West over the past 200 years, by adopting Western 
education, family structure, state organisation and judicial system, it neither became 
European nor was it able to protect its Muslim identity (Erbakan, 1991a, pp.27-28). This 
Westernisation process, he claimed, continued in modern Turkey, its application to the 
European Community in 1987 being the “last chain of the endeavour of the Republic to 
become a European country” (Erbakan, 1991a, p.28). In terms of its economic relations 
with the West, Erbakan objected to integration with the European Community, seeing it 
as a manifestation of the “denial of our Muslim identity and hypothecating of our past, 
history, culture, art, and economy to the European Community” (Erbakan, 1991a, p.28).  
 Erbakan attributes to the European integration process a religious plot, arguing 
that the only objective of the European Union is the victory of the Crucifix over the 
Crescent (Erbakan, 1991a, p.42). In one of his speeches in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, he presented economic integration with the European Community via the 
common market as a Zionist trick. Echoing the anti-Semitic work The Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion, he speculated that European integration was the consequence of an 
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insidious plan by Theodor Herzl70 in which Zionists aimed to rule the world and 
establish a system of usury which Masonic institutions pushed to implement (Erbakan, 
1971, p.65). The criticism of the European integration in 1971 was that 
In its illusionary form, the common market is supposed to commence with the 
integration of six Catholic countries.  However, in reality, the common market is an 
institution that relies upon Zionists. Despite their low population, Zionists established 
capital and a usury rule in order to sovereign the world. They have aimed to make the 
masses of the world work in their Zionist capital, and they developed it in the West 
(Erbakan, 1971, p.64; see also Erbakan, 2013f, Vol.3, p.388, my translation). 
 
Antipathy to the West was a ubiquitous issue for Erbakan in the 1990s. In his 
book Adil Ekonomik Düzen (Just Economic Order), he proposes the establishment of an 
Islamic Customs Union against the Catholic European Community. He notes that  
There two basic faults in the pillars of the Treaty of Rome. One is that its cultural pillar 
is based on the ancient Roman civilisation, in other words, the mentality “that praises 
oppression”. The second fault is that the economic system is taken from capitalism. This 
pillar does not bring felicity. It brings oppression, crises, and social explosions for the 
masses (1991b, p.93, my translation).  
 
Another alternative political project targeting the Kemalist state and its tutelary 
democracy pivoted around the criticism of Western representative democracy. It is 
undeniable that Turkey had never been a fully-fledged representative democracy under 
the Kemalist state, but rather a tutelary democracy in which the military controlled the 
key pillars of the state. Nevertheless, Erbakan’s perception of representative democracy 
was as problematic as the military’s. Even though Erbakan tentatively attacked the 
principle of Western representative democracy, his vision of representative democracy 
had little to do with the Schumpeterian procedural model but was more related to a 
meritocratic rule in the pursuit of rightness (hak). The party programme and the charter 
of the National Order Party, described one aspect of democracy as the way in which the 
most wise and competent people, who are the most respectful to the right (hak), would 
serve the nation (millet, in the sense of “community”) (Erbakan, n.d., p.5, in TBMMc, 
                                                          
70 Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) is known as founder of modern political Zionism who organised the First 
Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897 and forthwith founded the Zionist Organisation. He wrote a book Der 
Judenstaat–meaning “state of Jews” (Achcar, 2011, p.9) which was published in 1896 and commonly 
known in its English version “The Jewish State”. 
 198 
my translation). Another aspect of democracy was regarded as having opportunities that 
would lead to the pursuit and fulfilment of the rightness (hak) for the most just, 
appropriate, and scientific ways (ilmi usuller) of administration (Erbakan, n.d., p.5, in 
TBMMc). According to Erbakan, democracy should be understood as “the product of 
the development of people on the path of virtue” and “bodily, rambling freedoms should 
not be aimed for” (in TBMMc, n.d., p.5, my translation). Democracy, according to the 
party’s view, can only be established and developed in a community where virtue and 
morality dominate; otherwise; democracy is degenerated and becomes a tool for 
anarchy (Erbakan, n.d., p.5, in TBMMc, p.6). In Türkiye’nin Meseleleri ve Çözümleri 
(Problems of Turkey and Their Solutions), published in 1991 as the party programme of 
Refah, Erbakan continued his views on representative democracy by claiming that 
“Democracy is a tool. It is not an objective. The objective is to establish the Order of 
Happiness (Saadet Nizamı)” (Erbakan, 2013c, Vol.2, p.384, my translation). This is due 
to the potential of democracy to elect an unexceptional person would lead to an “Order 
of Oppression” (Zulüm Nizamı) (Erbakan, 2013c, Vol.2, p.384). Ruşen Çakır argues that 
this instrumentalist view of representative democracy shows “Refah is neither a 
follower of Sharia nor a democrat because Refah is both a self-styled follower of Sharia 
and a self-styled democrat” (Çakır, 1994, p.129). Çakır, (1994, p.129) uses the term 
“theo-democracy” to specify the symbiosis of theocracy and democracy in Refah. 
 Indeed, theo-democracy is used by Maudūdi, founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, 
and subordinates popular legitimacy for the suzerainty of Allah. In The Islamic Law and 
Constitution, first published in 1955, Maudūdi coined the phrase as describing a kind of 
popular vicegerency. According to Maudūdi’s explanation, the Islamic theo-democracy 
is     
a divine democratic government, because under it the Muslims have been given a 
limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God. The executive under this 
system of government is constituted by the general will of the Muslims who have also 
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the right to depose it. All administrative matters and all questions about which no 
explicit injunction is to be found in the shari‘ah are settled by the consensus of opinion 
among the Muslims. Every Muslim who is capable and qualified to give a sound 
opinion on matters of Islamic law, is entitled to interpret the law of God when such 
interpretation becomes necessary. In this sense the Islamic polity is a democracy...[I]t is 
a theocracy in the sense that where an explicit command of God or His Prophet already 
exits, no Muslim leader or legislature, or any religious scholar can form an independent 
judgement, not even all the Muslims of the world put together, have any right to make 
the least alteration in it (1967, p.148). 
 
The theo-democratic position of Milli Gazete (the National Newspaper), the 
semi-official newspaper of the party since 1973, on representative democracy turns out 
to be more radical than Erbakan’s views. The motto of the newspaper since its 
foundation has been “The Rightness (Hak) has come and the Wrongness (Bâtıl) has 
passed away”; this was also used as one of the main slogans of the National Salvation 
Party. A closer look reveals that this is a direct quotation from the Surah Al-Isra of the 
Quran (Qur’an, 17:81, Oxford World’s Classics).  
 Correspondingly, some hardliners in the newspaper such as Necdet Kutsal 
discredited democracy as a heretical regime antithetical to the order of Islam. As the 
newspaper put it, Islam’s order of salvation argues against the follies of people such as 
communism, capitalism, socialism, and democracy (Kutsal, 1980 in Alkan, 1984, pp.92-
93). Others followed the same logic on democracy: The hardliners asked for the rule of 
the Quran, since the principle of the sovereignty of the people contradicts Islam (Aydın, 
1980 in Alkan, 1984, pp.92-93). Even though popular sovereignty was a contested issue 
for Milli Görüş parties, the democratic aspirations of the Kurds and the impact of 
liberalisation after the end of the Cold War in Turkey compelled Refah to address the 
Kurdish problem. A Kurdish report prepared by the İstanbul Provincial Administration 
of the party in 1991, which was headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, proposed to use the 
word “Kurdish” and articulate their agonies and problems (Çakır, 1994, p.153). The 
report further suggested challenging the official ideology which had implemented 
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“denialist, assimilationist, oppressive” policies with regards to the Kurdish problem for 
75 years (Çakır, 1994, p.153).   
 The pragmatic articulation of the Kurdish problem was blended with an Islamic 
vision in which the solution was said to be the establishment of an Islamic Unity led by 
Turkey and the fulfilment of a Just System (Çakır, 1994, p.157). The reason for the 
protracted Kurdish problem in Turkey was attributed to the renouncement of “our 
national and religious values” and adoption of “denialist, racist, and materialist 
politics”, against which the “Islamic brotherhood” binding Turkish and Kurdish people 
was frequently stressed (Erbakan, 2013b, p.169). 
 During a rally in 1994 in Bingöl, a city in Turkish Kurdistan, Erbakan attacked 
Turkish nationalism, one of the pillars of the Kemalist state. He was tried in the 
Diyarbakır State Security Court in 2000 and was sentenced to prison for one year for 
violating Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, which forbids “inciting hatred based on 
ethnic, religious, regional or linguistic differences” (Ntvmsnbc, 17 July 2000). In this 
rally, he said that 
When starting school in the morning assembly, the children of this country used to 
begin with “in the name of God”. You changed that and made them say: “I’m Turk, I’m 
brave, I’m hard-working.” On the other hand, when you said that, a Muslim of the 
Kurdish origin may feel it is within his right to say: “Oh really, in this case I am a Kurd, 
I’m braver, I’m more hardworking.” In the near future, when the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly is controlled by Muslims, everyone will get his equal right without 
any bloodshed (as cited in Cook, 2007, p.112).  
 
Another line of criticism of the Kemalist state concerned its statist-secular form. 
As his alternative, Erbakan offered a completely pragmatic and one-sided form of 
secularism in which he championed “freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, [and] 
freedom of worship. [Secularism] means that no one could oppress anybody due to 
his/her faith” (Erbakan, 2013b, p.171, my translation). In the party programme of the 
MNP, secularism was succinctly defined as the guarantee of freedom of thought and 
faith. It stated that the party is against the use of secularism as oppression of religion 
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and disrespect of the devout. Secularism was also supported in the party programme of 
the MSP, since it was a guarantor of freedom of thought and belief. However, it was 
noted that it should not be used as a means for suppressing people on the grounds of 
their thoughts and beliefs (Alkan, 1984, p.85). 
Erbakan juggled the concept of secularism by ignoring the crucial element in 
Laiklik (laïcité in French): the separation of religion and state. Laiklik has been 
comparably practiced in Islamic jurisprudence in order to set out “the existence and 
acceptance of divergent Islamic schools and sects” which implement particular forms of 
worship in different ways (Erbakan, 2013b, p.171). Therefore, according to Erbakan, 
laiklik refers to “acceptance of the existence of others” and the presence of people who 
think differently. However, he claimed, the implementation of secularism in Turkey 
went against this principle, because laiklik had been implemented as “hostility to Islam” 
and a “tool for oppression” (Erbakan, 2013b, p.172).  
Erbakan never explicitly stated a desire for the establishment of a political party 
based on Sharia. This was, indeed, impossible because of the existing laws in Turkey. 
However, the youth organisation The Raiders (Akıncılar), which was founded in 1976, 
chanted for the abolition of the irreligious state and the establishment of an Islamic 
government (Ozgur, 2012, p.124). Erbakan stated that he sought to give secularism its 
“real meaning”—freedom of thought, conscience and faith. In 1972, MSP offered to 
make a “scientific description” of secularism in which the related articles in the 
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights” recognising freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion would be embedded into the constitution (2013e, Vol.3, p.351).71  
Despite Erbakan’s ambiguous views on secularism, he directly criticised Article 
163 of the Penal Code of Turkey. According to the 1999 Human Rights Watch report, 
                                                          
71 For Erbakan, science refers to science (ilim) stemming from the recognition of Allah (2013b, p.49). For 
more information on Erbakan’s thought on science (ilim) see İslam ve İlim (Islam and Science). In Prof. 
Dr. Necmettin Erbakan Külliyatı (Complete Works of Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan) (2013h). 
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“Violations of Free Expression in Turkey”, Article 163 of the Penal Code of Turkey 
was used to prosecute Islamists until its abolition in 1991 after the passage of the Anti-
Terror Law (Human Rights Watch, 1999).72 In Milli Görüş, Erbakan proposed to annul 
Article 163 of the Criminal Code and replace it with a Law on the Protection of Human 
Rights in order to implement freedom of thought, conscience, and worship (Erbakan, 
1975, p.54).  
Similarly, when questioned in a 1991 interview on the possibility of establishing 
a Sharia party Erbakan stated that the imitators of the West and imperialism would 
never provide the full implementation of freedom of thought and worship in Turkey 
(Erbakan, 2013d, Vol.3, p.15). In addition, according to Erbakan, Islam had not been 
fully implemented in some Muslim countries such as Pakistan and Sudan because Islam 
is all-embracing; it encompasses a whole system of justice and right (hak). It is 
impossible to implement Islam, he stated, “under the exploitative and servile system” by 
enforcing only a small number of penalty clauses as implemented in Sudan under 
Nimeiri73 (Erbakan, 2013d, Vol.3, p.17).74  
 
                                                          
72 Before its abolition, Article 163 was in use to penalise those who, “contrary to secularism, make 
propaganda or suggestions with the purpose of adopting, even partially, the basic social, economic, 
political, or judicial structures of the State based on religious principles or beliefs or with the purpose of 
obtaining political benefits or personal influence by making use of religion or religious sentiments or 
sacred things...” (Human Rights Watch, 1999). 
73 Gaafar Niemeiri took power in Sudan after a military coup in 1969 and ruled the country until 1985. He 
initially pursued socialist and Pan-Arabist policies in the 1970s, but in the 1980s he formed an alliance 
with the Muslim Brotherhood and invited Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of Sudan’s Muslim Brothers, and 
later the founder of National Islamic Front (NIF), into his government. In 1983, he enforced Sharia and 
Sudan was declared an Islamic state. In the following years, “decisive justice courts” were established, 
Islamic criminal punishments such as amputations (hudud) were applied, income tax was replaced with 
zakat (an alms tax), and banks were “Islamised” (Hale, 1997, p.236-237). 
74 Democracy and secularism continue to be a debated issue in Milli Gazete. Mehmet Şevket Eygi, one of 
its prominent Islamist writers, juggles with the concepts of democracy and secularism, giving the example 
of the UK, where religion and state are not separated and the ruler is also the head of the religious and 
national church. The UK is praised since even though it is not a secular state, it is the most democratic 
state in the world where Muslims live freely, dauntlessly, and comfortably. It is further stated that 
secularism is not a condition of democracy and republicanism since none of the universal and 
fundamental human rights declarations, agreements, and texts have advertised secularism as a value, duty 
or right (Eygi, 2012b). On the other hand, democracy is only acknowledged to the extent that it can be 
used as a tool for a smooth transition from a non-Islamic order to an Islamic one (Eygi, 2012a). 
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The 28 February military intervention: the Kemalist reconfiguration 
 In the general elections of December 1995, Refah won 21.4% of the votes and became 
the leading party in the parliament. The anti-Western attitude and petty-bourgeois 
utopian economic programme of the Just Economic System intimidated the big 
capitalists. Just three days after the elections, TÜSİAD invited the centre-right parties to 
reconcile and form the government (Milliyet, 27 December 1995). The army, whose 
interests were closely tied to the big capitalists, were from the very beginning 
determined to hold off the popular majority under the pretext of opposing Islamic 
fundamentalism. As Güven Erkaya, the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces the 
time, said in an interview in Milliyet in January 1996 that the military would not turn a 
blind eye to the transformation of the country’s secular regime into a system based on 
Sharia by a political party which exploits democracy even if it achieves a majority of 
the votes. It was threatened that, if needed, this would be prevented by circumvention of 
the rules of democracy; because indeed, the people wanted and asked this of the army 
(TBMMb, 2012, Vol.2, p.946).   
 For all that, the Refah-Yol cabinet was formed in July 1996 between Refah and 
the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP), led by Tansu Çiller. This followed the 
failure of a short-lived (three months) centre-right coalition government formed by 
ANAP and DYP (see Kazan, Vol.2). During the Refah-Yol government, which lasted 
only about one year, a serious political scandal, the Susurluk Scandal, erupted in a car 
crash in November 1996. This incident uncovered the intricate relationship between the 
state (Hüseyin Kocadağ, the former deputy chief of İstanbul Police Department), the 
government (Sedat Bucak, a parliamentarian from DYP) and the convicted fugitive 
Abdullah Çatlı, as all three were revealed to have been in the same car (TBMMb, 2012, 
Vol.2, p.950). In the context of the existence of the “deep state” tradition in Turkey, 
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Deputy Prime Minister Tansu Çiller said that both people who killed others on behalf of 
the state and people who were killed on behalf of the state are honourable (Söyler, 2014, 
p.10; Milliyet, 27 November 1996). The Susurluk Scandal prompted nation-wide 
protests popularised with the slogan “One minute’s darkness for perpetual light” 
(Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık) (TBMMb, 2012, Vol.2, p.952).  
 The military was able to overcome the Susurluk Scandal “by calling the social 
base of political Islam a danger to internal security” (Söyler, 2013, p.318). In practice, 
the military had the power to define what “internal security” meant as it saw fit in its 
role as the “ultimate guardian of the republic”, which allowed it to intervene in politics 
to varying degrees (Cizre, 2003). The army tried to eliminate the state’s hegemonic 
crisis by designating Refah a national threat. Güven Erkaya, the Commander of the 
Turkish Naval Forces at that time, stated that “extreme religious currents do pose an 
important threat to the future of the country. İrtica [reactionism] has become a more 
particular threat than the PKK” (Milliyet, 12 August 1997, my translation). However, 
the Kemalist state, in all respects, was at the peak of its hegemonic crisis in the 1990s 
(Kurkcu, 1996). This crisis was compounded by the disintegration of Kemalist 
nationalism—“No other nation but Turks exist in Turkey”—especially after 1991 when 
approximately one million Kurds arrived in Turkey following Saddam Hussein’s 
crushing of a popular uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan. A further problem was the weakening 
of Kemalist secularism, which first manifested itself after the coup of 1980 in the 
transition to a conciliatory approach of the military towards Islam; this occurred through 
a political project called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and finally in the rise of Refah in 
1996 (Kurkcu, 1996). 
      In addition, the traditional ally of the military, big capital was opposed to the 
economic policies of Refah, which aimed to block it from lending money to the state 
 205 
through government debt securities. This also sparked political tension within the 
coalition, particularly between Necmettin Erbakan and Ufuk Söylemez, the treasury 
secretary in the DYP. While Erbakan exhorted that the Treasury should not issue 
government debts, Söylemez insisted that government borrowing is the requirement of 
the market and would continue (İnan, 1997). Erbakan’s position was supported by the 
Refah Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan, and explained in his four-volume book Refah 
Gerçeği (The Refah Reality). He argued that Refah’s economic initiatives to reduce 
domestic borrowing threatened the interests of the big capitalists (2003, Vol.3, p.28). 
According to the “pool system” (havuz sistemi), all the autonomous incomes of public 
institutions would be pooled in one account and capital would be used as needed; in this 
way the dependence of the Treasury on loans offered by rentiers at high interest rates 
would be reduced (Şener in Toker, 2008, p.214). The Minister of Finance in the Refah-
Yol cabinet Abdüllatif Şener argued: 
The attacks against the government and the developments succeeding the February 28 
events were essentially attacks by a group of capitalists, since we implemented an 
[economic] policy in which the group of capitalists, especially the rentier sectors, would 
be disturbed...[The policy meant that] interest rates were perpetually decreased. Before 
February 28, interest rates nearly equalled the inflation rate...We achieved this with the 
pool system (Şener as cited in Toker, 2008, pp.213-214, my translation).  
 
The clash of interests between Refah, favouring small and medium-size enterprises, and 
big business turned into open hostility. Şevket Kazan declared that  
TÜSİAD is the main actor in the commercial exploitative order in Turkey. Koç 
[Holding] sits in the pilothouse of this order...You realise from a short investigation that 
the ones who hold the reins are the Doğan, Bilgin, and Uzan groups (Kazan, Vol.3, 
p.31, my translation). 
  
          TÜSİAD was named the “Duchy of İstanbul” due to its relationship with the 
state. Şevket Kazan stated that approximately 400 businessmen of the association could 
develop their enterprises by lending money to the state in the continuing economic 
crisis, and thereby become the country’s “House of Lords” (Kazan, Vol.3, p.31). Even 
Özal’s period was severely criticised: 
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In Turkey, the architect and the first implementer of domestic borrowing is Turgut Özal. 
Özal started the domestic borrowing through the 24 January decisions, even in the 
1980s. The owners of the big capital, who had become the economic duchy before [the 
1980s] through the incentives and excessive loans they got from the state, gained more 
than they dreamed of in this new path to making easy money...Since 1995, it was seen 
that the percentage of interest revenues of the biggest 500 industrial enterprises in 
Turkey to their net accounting profits has risen by 87% [and] these establishments have 
neglected industrial production and leaned towards the rentier economy which was 
more profitable (Kazan, 2003, Vol.2, p.195, my translation). 
 
On 28 February 1997, after a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), 
the military issued an 18-point list of policy recommendations to the government. The 
list included extending compulsory education from five years to eight years and curbing 
the activities of religious schools and private Quran courses, which were believed to 
foster anti-secular values (Narli, 2000, p.115; Günay, 2001). Unlike the former military 
interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980, the military increasingly felt it necessary to have 
public consent and support rather than initiating a direct, brutal and sudden 
appropriation of political power. Therefore, direct appeals to the organised segments of 
urban-secular groups such as business, academia, the media, the judiciary, and civil 
society organisations—even holding briefing meetings with them to elucidate the extent 
and the magnitude of the Islamic threat (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar, 2003, p.322)—
aimed at garnering public legitimacy for the military’s intervention. Güven Erkaya 
describes the new political tools of the military in galvanising the public:  
We hold briefings to inform the public. The great part of our essential efforts is to 
persuade the deputies. They should principally realise that the regime is under 
threat...We expected that the members of the parliament would politically resolve the 
issue. [However] they didn’t get the messages we gave, they didn’t want to get it. Now, 
we implement the second alternative. We create a public opinion in civil society (as 
cited in Bayramoğlu, 2009, p.99, f.n.57).   
 
Nonetheless, the reason why the military decided against seizing power through 
a coup was that they had reckoned with the possible political and social costs, having 
taken into account the Algerian scenario.75 In addition, the US administration opposed a 
                                                          
75 When the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) party won the first round of 
Algeria’s first multi-party elections in December 1991, the military cancelled the electoral process, forced 
President Chadli Bendjedid to resign, and instituted a military junta, the State High Committee. The FIS 
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military coup. Madeleine Albright, United States Secretary of State between 1997 and 
2001 under the Clinton administration, warned the Turkish military to stay within 
constitutional limits and resolve the problems with the civilian government (Çongar, 
1997).    
 The political strategy of mobilising civil society instead of staging a coup was 
successful to the extent that the “Civil Solidarity Group”, composed of Rıdvan Budak, 
the Head of DİSK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey), Derviş 
Günay, the Head of TESK (Confederation of Chamber of Merchants and Craftsmen of 
Turkey), and Bayram Meral, the Head of Türk-İş, sent a letter to all deputies stating 
their adherence to “the Republic of Turkey established by Grand Atatürk” and the 
principles of the secular and social state governed by the rule of law (Milliyet, 7 March 
1997). In May 1997, TİSK (Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations) and 
TOBB (The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) participated in 
the “Group”, making a joint declaration stating their commitment to the principles and 
revolutions of Atatürk, the gains of the Republic and their preservation at any cost. 
They determined that the country was headed towards internal disorder and called to 
form a new government that could establish unity, solidarity and friendship (Sabah, 22 
May 1997).  
The rupture in Islamic politics  
According to Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff between 1998 
and 2002, irtica was the “first prominent threat” for Turkey, and the February 28 
process would last a thousand years, if necessary (Milliyet, 4 September 1999). During 
this process, Refah was closed down in January 1998 and Erbakan, along with senior 
party leaders, was banned from politics for five years. The dissolution of the Welfare 
                                                                                                                                                                          
was banned and several FIS senior members, including its leader Hachani, were arrested. A bloody civil 
war then began (Volpi, 2003). 
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Party in 1998 by the Constitutional Court was unanimously approved by the European 
Court of Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights, 2003). In addition, 
MÜSİAD Chairman Erol Yarar and Deputy Chairman Ali Bayramoğlu were brought 
before the State Security Court (Hürriyet Daily News, 23 May 1999).  
 The Virtue (Fazilet) Party subsequently replaced Refah by toning down their 
political discourse by reconfiguring it towards democracy, human rights, and political 
freedoms. This was coupled with an economic break in “The Just Economic System” 
(Gülalp, 2003, pp.83-84). This was all essentially a democratic façade, since the party 
was in favour of repealing Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code which restricted 
freedom of thought and expression only when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was sentenced 
due to publicly reciting an Islamic poem (Gülalp, 2003, p.113). With this new 
settlement, Fazilet won 18.4% of the votes in the 1999 municipal elections, keeping two 
big cities, İstanbul and Ankara. Its share of the vote in the 1999 general elections, 
however, declined to 15.4% from the previous 21.4% attained in the 1995 general 
elections (Figures 4.1 & 4.2).   
 The rupture in Islamic politics in Turkey surfaced with the first congress of 
Fazilet in May 2000. Divided between Traditionalists (Gelenekçiler), backed by 
Erbakan and led by Recai Kutan, and Reformists (Yenilikçiler) led by Abdullah Gül, the 
congress ended up with a narrow margin of victory for the Traditionalists; Kutan got 
633 votes and Gül 521 (Yeşilada, 2002, p.69). Gül and his reformist followers were 
dismissed from the party and the Constitutional Court disbanded Fazilet on the grounds 
that it was the continuation of Refah (Yeşilada, 2002). The split embodied itself in the 
establishment of two different political parties. The Reformists in the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), broke away from Erbakan’s 
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Milli Görüş doctrine, and the Traditionalists in the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) 
adhered to Erbakan and Milli Görüş  (Gumuscu and Sert, 2009).  
 The programme of the SP is the continuation of Milli Görüş in a more moderate 
form. From an economic perspective, a radical tone is put forward against “racist 
imperialism [and] financial capitalism” as characterised by the rentier economy. The 
transition to the “real economy” for development with the target of just redistribution is 
proposed, and a free market economy is endorsed. However, the monopolies and 
privatisation that favour foreign and domestic monopolies are disparaged, while the 
programme offers support for SMEs and craftsmen and artisans. IMF and global 
capitalist policies are to be abandoned in favour of national ones. On foreign policy, the 
party declares itself to be against the EU, and favours instead cooperative organisations 
with neighbours. The D-876 is portrayed as an alternative bloc to establish “a new 
world” (Saadet Partisi, 2010b).  
 The political strategy of Erbakan in confronting the Kemalist state was radical. 
Only by ideologically separating itself from Erbakan’s parties and “taking off the Milli 
Görüş shirt”, as Erdoğan put it, could the AKP carry out a democratic transition in 
Turkey until 2010/2011. The AKP has so far accepted the principle of “actually existing 
Turkish secularism”—the control of religion by the state and the existence of the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs as a state body—but has pursued the Islamisation of 
society as a political agenda especially since 2010/2011. The democratic transition and 
the dismantling of the Bonapartist state in Turkey will be the theme of the next chapter.   
 
 
 
                                                          
76 D-8 (Developing Eight) instigated by Erbakan in 1997 is a development initiative for eight Muslim 
countries as a counter to the G-8. The D-8 consists of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey (Erbakan, 2013b, pp.202-203). 
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Chapter 5: The AKP in Power: Economic and Political Transition under 
Neoliberalism 
This chapter elucidates the international conditions following the end of the Cold War 
that pre-date the rise of the AKP, before examining the economy under the AKP. It 
argues that the assurance of political and economic stability for Turkish capitalism by 
the AKP in the aftermath of the severe economic crisis of 2000/2001 enabled the party 
to settle accounts with the military over the latter’s political influence over the 
following decade. This period was sealed with the approval of the constitutional 
referendum in September 2010 and rounded off with mass resignation of top military 
brass ahead of the Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura, YAŞ) of July 2011, 
all without spawning any considerable political crisis. This chapter analyses how the 
AKP successfully united the general interests of the devout bourgeoisie with those of 
the big bourgeoisie. Further, it examines the political strategy through which the AKP 
neutralised an army faction that opposed Turkey’s European integration, co-opted the 
liberals, and entered into an alliance with the Islamic community of Fethullah Gülen for 
a pool of bureaucratic staff. The Gülen movement, which established a strong presence 
in the judiciary and the police force during the AKP’s time in power, was instrumental 
in undermining the military’s political power in Turkey. The chapter contends that the 
end of the Kemalist state and the democratic transition under neoliberalism have been a 
common interest for Turkish capitalism since the late 1990s, which the AKP carried out 
until 2010/2011. In order to give a full account of this democratic transition, the chapter 
explains external facilitators, such as the influence of the EU, and highlights the limits 
of democratisation and Turkey’s authoritarian drift. Lastly, it is shown that following 
the AKP’s third term in 2011, Turkey’s democratic transition did not lead to a 
consolidated democracy, but to competitive authoritarianism. 
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The restructuring of the state after the end of the Cold War 
During the Cold War, the military allies of the US worked to suppress leftist and 
progressive forces within their territories and fend off Soviet threats as part of a 
“containment policy”. It was feared that economic problems in these countries could 
pave the way for a strengthening of leftist forces. This necessitated the 
institutionalisation of the “national security state” in peripheral countries, which worked 
as an instrument of the hegemonic foreign policy of the US. The characteristics of these 
regimes were conditioned and implemented in accordance with a specific security 
perspective. In other words, these national security states hinged on a “specific security 
anxiety” (Uzgel, 2009, pp.326-328).  
 This “specific security anxiety”, coupled with a fear of potential invasion by the 
Soviet Army, led to the establishment of secret stay-behind armies in some NATO 
countries (Ganser, 2005). In order to counter a possible Soviet invasion of Western 
Europe, these armies composed of clandestine soldiers under NATO command who 
would have carried out operations in enemy-controlled zones, formed local resistance 
groups, and conducted sabotage against enemy’s logistic supplies (Ganser, 2005, p.2). 
In November 1990 the European Parliament passed a resolution called “Operation 
Gladio” acknowledging the involvement of these secret military forces in acts of 
terrorism and crime; it is said that these organisations operated out of civilian control 
(Taş, 2014, p.165). In January 2006, the US Department of State also admitted the 
existence of stay-behind forces in Europe as resistance forces against a possible Soviet 
occupation (Taş, 2014, p.166).  
 Turkey was no exception for establishing stay-behind forces. After joining 
NATO in 1952, a stay-behind force known as Counter-Guerrilla was set up under the 
official name of the Special Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi) and was tied to 
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the General Staff (Söyler, 2013, p.316; 2014, p.9; 2015, p.101). It was financed through 
the “Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey” (JAMMAT) as a part of the 
US Armed Forces and it was renamed to the “Joint US Military Mission for Aid to 
Turkey” (JUSMMAT) in 1958 (Söyler, 2015, p.101). During the Cold War, it 
functioned as the Tactical Mobilisation Council (Seferberlik Tetkik Kurulu) between 
1952 and 1967 and Special Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi) between 1967 and 
1991 (Söyler, 2015, p.101). Following the end of the Cold War, its operations were 
taken over by Special Forces Command (Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı) (Ganser, 2005, 
p.226; Söyler, 2015, p.101), and since 1994 it has been operating as part of the Special 
Forces (Özel Kuvvetler) (Söyler, 2013, p.316; 2014, p.9; 2015, p.101).  
Despite the long-time denial of its existence, Chief of the General Staff between 
1990 and 1994, Doğan Güreş, confessed in 1992 to the existence of a counter-guerrilla 
force aiming to “organise people for a resistance” (Yalçın, 1992). As part of the “deep 
state”, this clandestine body was not subject to any parliamentary control. In fact, when 
Bülent Ecevit learned in 1974 of the existence of the Special Warfare Department, he 
started to investigate its funding resources but failed to go further. The prosecutor 
Doğan Öz started to investigate the links between the MHP, Counter-Guerrilla forces, 
the Special Warfare Department and terror activities in Turkey in the 1970s. However, 
he was assassinated by a member of Grey Wolves, İbrahim Çiftçi in 1978 (Ganser, 
2005, pp.236-237).  
This body was “made up of elements from the military, security and judicial 
establishments wedded to a fiercely nationalist, statist ideology who, if need be, are 
ready to block or even oust a government that does not share their vision” (as cited in 
Gunter, 2008, p.109; 2014, p.20). The 1993 Parliament Fact-Finding Commission 
Report on Political Murders by Unknown Assailants acknowledged that “Such 
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organizations cannot be overseen by bodies elected to lead the state, nor can they be 
questioned by judicial bodies. They control the bodies leading the state as they please 
and have the capacity to use the state for any and all of their own purposes” (as cited in 
Avşar, Özdil, & Kırmızıdağ, 2014, p.8).  
The end of the Cold War rendered the functionality of “The Rule of the 
Pretorians”—a phrase from Marx’s 1858 article in the New York Daily Tribune under 
the same title)—and these clandestine organisations defunct. The euphoria for liberal 
democracy mobilised idealist neo-conservative ideologists to argue that democracy 
innately leads to peace. The triumph of liberal democracy was seen as the evolutionary 
culmination of humanity’s social progress and the end of antagonistic history. In his 
1989 article, “The End of History?” Francis Fukuyama hailed the “total exhaustion of 
viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism”. He argued that “[w]hat we may be 
witnessing in not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of 
post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1989). Criticising the extreme pessimism of 
the 20th century due to destructive wars, the rise of totalitarianism, manipulation of 
scientific knowledge in favour of nuclear weapons and ecological damage, Fukuyama 
suggested a Hegelian recognition of a universal and homogeneous history. Liberal 
democracy was portrayed as a global phenomenon under which nations can coexist with 
each other (Fukuyama, 1991; 1992).   
 On the other hand, these ideas were challenged by the realist Samuel 
Huntington. He rejected the universality of Western culture while objecting to the 
notion that Western civilisation fits all humanity (1993, p.40). Instead, he argued that 
even though Western culture has permeated the world at a superficial level, the concepts 
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of Western civilisation such as individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human 
rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, and secularism are 
alien to Asian societies. Imposing such concepts in these societies would lead to a 
religious fundamentalist reaction (Huntington, 1993, pp.40-41). This is what he termed 
the “democracy paradox”. According to Huntington, the adoption of Western 
democratic institutions by non-Western societies leads to the triumph of indigenous 
forces, which are hostile to these values (Huntington, 1996, p.94).  
When the third wave of democratisation started in Southern European countries 
such as Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the 1970s before moving on to Latin America, 
the Asia Pacific region, and finally Eastern Europe in the late 1980s (Huntington, 1996), 
it was only the Arab-speaking countries, which were still under the “anomaly of Arab 
despotism” (Achcar, 1997). The “democracy paradox” was put forward as an 
explanation for the Middle East. In fact, the predominant long-standing US strategy in 
the Middle East—the control of oil reserves—necessitated the support of despotic 
regimes in order to achieve “stability” in this region before and even after the Cold War. 
The fact that Saudi Arabia owns one of the largest oil reserves in the world77 and the 
existence of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism in the region were significant reasons 
for Western governments to align with despotic regimes in the Middle East (Achcar, 
1997; 2004; 2013a).  
Nevertheless, when Islamic fundamentalist movements, especially the Muslim 
Brotherhood, dissociated themselves in the 1990 Gulf War from the sponsorship of 
Saudi Arabia, the Western powers then favoured despotic regimes against anti-Western 
Islamic fundamentalism. This also explains why the US allowed Saddam Hussein to 
crush insurgents in Northern and Southern Iraq in 1991, the West’s tacit endorsement of 
                                                          
77 Venezuela, which surpassed Saudi Arabia in 2010 with respect to oil reserves, owned a little over one 
fifth of proven oil reserves in the world at the end of 2013 while Saudi Arabia had nearly 18% (OPEC, 
2014, p.22).  
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the military coup in Algeria against the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1992 
elections, and its acquiescence to repression in Tunisia and Egypt, which silenced the 
Islamic fundamentalist movements (Achcar, 1997; 2004, pp.73-74).  
Western powers also had hypocritical attitudes towards Turkey. Unlike Middle 
Eastern countries, Turkey was not under a long-standing despotic regime; rather, it was 
a guided democracy in which the military held real political power. However, due to 
intensified Kurdish guerrilla movements and increasing anti-Western Islamic 
fundamentalism in Turkey in the 1990s, democratisation, if not liberalisation, was 
postponed for roughly a decade after the end of the Cold War. In this period, the US 
backed the Turkish military in its fight against Kurdish guerrillas. As Noam Chomsky 
points out, in 1997 alone, Turkey received more US weapons than the entire period 
between 1950 and 1983 (Chomsky in Chomsky & Achcar, 2007, p.124).  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration adopted the slogan 
of the “War on Terror” and enhanced its military presence in Central Asia by 
establishing military bases in Uzbekistan78 and Kyrgyzstan79 after the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001 (Achcar, 2004, pp.38-41; see also Achcar in Chomsky & Achcar, 
2007, p.44; Achcar, 2013a, p.112). It was only after the 2003 invasion of Iraq that the 
US discursively endorsed “democracy promotion” when the pretext that Iraq owned 
weapons of mass destruction had been disproven (Achcar in Chomsky & Achcar, 2007, 
p.44; see also Achcar, 2013a, p.113). At that point, the “Turkish model” of the AKP—a 
successful blend of neoliberal market fundamentalism with Islamic conservatism in 
social affairs and formal democratisation—coincided with the US pressure on its allies 
in the Middle East. This pressure also produced in 2005 the Iraqi, Palestinian, Saudi 
                                                          
78 US military forces withdrew from Karshi-Khanabad Air Base (K2) in November 2005 due to tense 
relations after the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan in May 2005 (Wright & Tyson, 2005).    
79  US military forces were evicted from Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan in June 2014 (Dzyubenko, 2014).  
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Arabian elections as well as the extension of political rights for Kuwaiti women and 
liberalisation in Egypt for the 2005 elections (Achcar, 2013a, pp.115-117).   
 Importantly, the US administration was disenchanted with the Turkish military, 
upon the rejection by parliament of a bill on 1 March 2003 to station US troops on 
Turkish territory for the Iraqi invasion. The Turkish military was held responsible for 
this rejection. Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz lashed out saying that the 
Turkish military “did not play the strong leadership role” for pressing government that it 
should have (Lacey, 2003). All these international and domestic conditions strengthened 
the AKP’s hand against military omnipotence in politics. Still, it was predominantly the 
political and economic stability in the aftermath of the 2000/2001 economic crisis that 
played a key role in the strengthening of the liberal democratic institutions. It can be 
argued that the 2000/2001 economic crisis put an end to the historical function of 
Turkish Bonapartism. Turkish capitalists felt strong enough to hold real political power 
after long decades of military tutelage.  
The economy under AKP rule 
 “The cost for me of [my workers] praying is 20 minutes”. 
A conservative entrepreneur in Kayseri (Emre, 2008) 
 
The 2001 economic crisis  
Turkey drastically changed its state-led economic development policy to export-led 
development under the military dictatorship between 1980 and 1983. In this period, the 
dissidents and organised left were smashed. In this political vacuum, the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms encountered little opposition; Islam was elevated 
to a more prominent level by unearthing the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”. Turgut Özal 
continued this neoliberal economic programme with export-led growth, as analysed in 
Chapter 3.  
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 The AKP was the product of this economic shift. The devout bourgeoisie 
benefited from export-led growth and formed the main economic base of the party. 
However, the political and economic situation which paved the way for the rise of the 
AKP stemmed from the 2000/2001 economic crisis. This economic crisis mutated into a 
political crisis by shattering the decade-long hegemony of centre-right political parties 
in Turkey.  
 It is important to stress that the integration of Turkey into global capital markets 
and the liberalisation of capital accounts in 1989 set the stage for severe economic crises 
in the 1990s and 2000/2001 (Cizre & Yeldan, 2005; Öniş, 2003). This prompted an 
increase in the number of banks from 25 in 1990 to 36 in 1997 (Kazgan, 2008, p.273). 
Crony capitalism made it possible to easily acquire banking licenses through links with 
politicians and hushing up inspection reports. Turkish banks increasingly relied on 
profitable high interest rates in treasury bonds, rather than supporting capitalist 
production (Kazgan, 2008, pp.273-274). Alongside political cronyism, increasing risk 
and uncertainty and increasing rates of return gap in favour of financial assets diverted 
portfolio choice of the non-financial corporations to the short-term reversible financial 
investments in the 1990s (Demir, 2009). While the average annual real GDP growth 
was only 3.4% between 1990 and 2000, the real rate of growth of banking assets was 
more than 13% per year (Balkan & Yeldan, 2002 in Cizre & Yeldan, 2005, p.391).  
 Correspondingly, these banks allowed Turkish companies to easily earn money 
in the 1990s. Some companies increasingly entrusted their liquid assets on repurchase, 
investment funds and treasury bonds instead of investing in production (Boratav, 2011, 
p.191). The state also contributed to this organic link between companies and banks by 
pumping money into the banking system. It increasingly relied on borrowing from 
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domestic agents; Turkey’s domestic debt stock reached 25-30% of GDP before the 2001 
crisis, while it was close to zero in 1987 (Öniş, 2003, p.7).  
 The public sector was increasingly indebted and in need of funds; interest 
expenditure was an significant burden on the budget. Following a steady increase from 
1990, the interest payment of the public sector,80 which reached over 18% of GDP in 
2001, outstripped the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) (Figure 5.1). This is 
an important indicator that the public sector needed funds mainly in order to pay its 
interest expenditure, not because of an increase in public investment or expenditure of 
SOEs.  
 
Figure 5.1. Public Sector Borrowing Requirement and Interest Expenditure/GDP. 1990-2014.   
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2013. 2014 figures are provisional.  
Between 1997 and 2002 the burden on the public was further aggravated when 
the wrecked banks were taken over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF)—a 
government body which guarantees the protection of deposits—since the state was to 
guarantee to pay the creditors’ receivables (Kazgan, 2008, pp.273-275). By early 2004, 
twenty-one domestic private banks were taken over by the SDIF (Steinherr, Tukel, & 
Ucer, 2004, p.6). The Treasury undertook commercial and public banks’ debts, which 
                                                          
80 Public sector includes general government budget, local governments, extrabudgetary funds, 
unemployment insurance fund, social security institutions, general health-care insurance, revolving funds 
and SOEs (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2013).  
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amounted to $21.9 billion on duty losses and recapitalisation for the state banks and 
$21.8 for the private banks taken over by the SDIF. In other words, the total cost of the 
banking crisis to the Treasury amounted to $43.7 billion or 29.5% of GNP in 2001. The 
private sector, however, only spent $9.5 billion or only 6.4% of GNP in 2001. All in all, 
the cost of the banking crisis to Turkey came to over $53 billion or nearly 36% of GNP 
in 2001 (Steinherr et al., 2004, p.5). Put simply, this was a “state-led banking rescue” on 
the basis of the socialisation of costs, with the benefits going to the financiers (Marois, 
2012, p.175).   
The crisis also severely affected labour. The official statistics show that 600,000 
enterprises were closed down and 2.3 million workers lost their jobs between August 
2000 and August 2002 (Şenses, 2003, p.99). According to the results of the Household 
Labour Force Survey, the unemployment rate increased from 6.3% in the last quarter of 
2000 to 10.6% in that of 2001 (Şenses, 2003, p.100). The urban non-agricultural 
unemployment rate also increased from 11.9% in 2001 to 14.6% in 2002 (Onaran, 2009, 
p.252). The rate of decline in real wages in the manufacturing sector reached an average 
of 14.4% (Şenses, 2003, p.101). The wage share fell continually for the eight years 
following the crisis in 2001, estimated by Onaran and Oyvat (2015, p.18) as a 
cumulative fall of 22% from the pre-crisis level in 2000 to 2008. Regarding the poorest 
segment of society, applications to Social Assistance and the Solidarity Fund increased 
by two million from September 2000 to December 2001, while those holding a Green 
Card, the instrument to give the poorest access to health service, increased by 2.5 
million from September 2000 to December 2001 (Şenses, 2003, pp.103-104).  
 The unemployment rate, first exceeding and then remaining at 10% in the post-
crisis period, played a crucial role in lowering labour’s bargaining power vis-à-vis 
industrial capital. This was further aggravated by the decline in the ratio of wage and 
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salary earners that belonged to a trade union to 9.5% in 2002 from 9.9% in 2000 
(OECD, 2013b), and the decline of labour’s share in income to 26.3% in 2002 from 
29.2% in 2000 (Dufour & Orhangazi, 2009, p.116).  
The economic crisis was to be overcome by the “Programme for the Transition 
to a Strong Economy”. Initiated by Kemal Derviş, who worked in the World Bank as 
Vice-President for Poverty Reduction and Economic Management before being 
appointed plenipotentiary Minister for Economic Affairs and the Treasury under the 
Ecevit government in Turkey, the programme involved neoliberal restructuring of the 
economy and banking sector. This financial restructuring included increasing the 
petroleum consumption tax and value added tax; decreasing state support of cereal 
purchases; stabilisation of support-price increases; privatisation of public banks and the 
telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, tobacco and sugar sectors; operational 
independence of the Central Bank; reduction of government borrowing requirements; 
and sustainability of public debt (Nas, 2008, pp.100-101). The IMF also backed the 
programme by providing an extra $8 billion of credit, increasing Turkey’s debt to the 
IMF to $19 billion (IMF, 2001, May 15).  
The rise of the AKP in the post-crisis period and continuation of neoliberal            
economic policies  
It was this severe economic crisis that led to the rise of the AKP. On 3 November 2002 
the AKP achieved a victory in the general elections, receiving 34.3% of the votes with 
363 seats in the 550-member Parliament, while CHP received 19.4% of the votes with 
178 seats. The AKP’s electoral victory was welcomed by the different factions of the 
capital groups due to the urgent need for the political stability that a single party 
government could bring. Sakıp Sabancı, the Turkish industrial tycoon, commented that 
Turkey had paid a high cost for coalition governments, and with the victory of the AKP, 
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Turkey could “hop on the second Özal train” (Hürriyet, 3 November 2002). Ali 
Bayramoğlu, the head of MÜSİAD between 1999 and 2004, shared similar views to 
Sabancı regarding the merits of a single-party government, and also pointed out the 
resemblance of this process with the era of Özal. Bayramoğlu noted:  
We haven’t experienced the single party government since approximately 1987. When 
we think that political instability very much disturbs Turkey, I predict that stability will 
be positive for Turkey...I think that we should return to the successful line of Turgut 
Özal between 1983 and 1990 (Hürriyet, 3 November 2002, my translation).  
Tuncay Özilhan, the chairman of TÜSİAD, the umbrella organisation of big 
capital, promoted the AKP to European leaders as a “conservative, democratic and 
secular party” (Milliyet, 5 November 2002a), while the leader of the main opposition 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), Deniz Baykal, backed Erdoğan to cooperate in 
Turkey’s EU accession process (Milliyet, 5 November 2002b). Defining itself in the 
2023 Political Vision as “a conservative democratic mass party that situates itself at the 
center of the political spectrum” (AK Party, n.d.), the AKP is a Muslim conservative 
party which has equivalent in Christian Democrat parties in Europe and within the 
Republican Party of the USA. It distances itself from Islamic fundamentalism (Axiarlis, 
2014). 
The AKP continued the neoliberal “Programme for a Transition to a Stronger 
Economy”, an extension of the 1999 deflationary IMF-led programme (Nas, 2008). Ali 
Babacan, who was Minister of Economy (2002-2007) and of Foreign Affairs (2007-
2009), then Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs since 2009, 
played a key role in the implementation of this programme. The AKP first continued to 
lower the annual inflation rate from 45% in 2002 to 8.9% in 2013 (Figure 5.2). This was 
important considering the fact that the 1990s were years of high inflation—peaking at 
106% in 1994—with damaging effects on the population (Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.2. Annual Inflation in Consumer Prices (%), 1990-2014.  
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015. 
Secondly, the “Programme for the Transition to a Strong Economy” aimed at 
restructuring Turkey’s “debt management”. The implementation of this programme 
made Turkey shift its growth and debt management model from one based on budget 
deficit and public debt to another model based on current account deficit and private 
debt (Eğilmez, 5 December 2013). Before 2005, the public sector relied more on 
external debt than the private sector except for a short period between 1998 and 2000 
(Figure 5.3). Since 2005, the private sector has surpassed the public sector with respect 
to the external debt of Turkey (Figure 5.3). In 2014, the gross external debt of the 
private sector reached $282 billion, almost 70% of Turkey’s gross external debt, 
whereas in 2000 it was about 45% (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat 
of Treasury, 2014, Figures 5.3 & 5.4). Nevertheless, Turkey’s foreign debt in 2014 
exceeded 50% of its national income (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry 
Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2014, Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.3. Turkey’s Gross External Debt (million $), 1989-2014.  
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2014. Gross external debt refers 
to the sum of total short-term and long term debts of public sector, private sector and Central Bank.  
 
Figure 5.4. Turkey’s Gross External Debt to GDP (%), 1989-2014.  
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2014. 
The IMF-led programme initiated by Derviş in 2001 and substantially adopted 
by the AKP adhered to fiscal discipline. The budget deficit decreased to 1.2% of GDP 
in 2013 from 17.4% of GDP in 2001 (Figure 5.5).  
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Figure 5.5. Budget Balance to GDP (%), 1990-2013.  
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Finance, n.d. 
Another pillar of this neoliberal economic programme was privatisation. 
Privatisation revenues between 2003 and 2014 marked their highest level during the 
course of the Republic of Turkey. It is important to highlight that privatisation revenues 
in 2005 alone were nearly equal the entire 18 years between 1986 and 2003 (Figure 
5.6).  
 
Figure 5.6. Privatisation Revenue by Years (million $).  
Source: Privatisation Administration, 2014. 
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Gross fixed capital formation81 showed an upward trend during 2002-2006 after 
hitting bottom in 2001 (Figure 5.7). It declined throughout the three years following 
2006, falling to a level of 17% in 2009. This was accompanied by a rise in the ratio of 
gross fixed capital formation to GDP during 2010-2011. However, it stagnated during 
2012-2014, at a level of 20% (Figure 5.7). Still, the share of investment in total 
production in Turkey is lower than other emergent countries such as China, India, and 
Malaysia, which invested 44.3%, 28.7%, 26% of their respective GDPs in gross fixed 
capital formation in 2014. In terms of investment performance, Turkey is, however, on a 
par with countries with comparable levels of development such as Brazil and Mexico 
whose gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP stood at 19.7% and 21% in 2014, 
respectively (The World Bank, 2015).  
Figure 5.7 also highlights the significance of political and economic stability in 
Turkey for private capitalist investment. For instance, the 1990s were a period of 
fluctuating investment, mostly due to the war between PKK guerrillas and the army 
focused in Turkish Kurdistan. The declining trend of the rate of investment to GDP in 
Turkey during 1998-2002 was the outcome of the convergence of the several factors: 
the 1998 Russian crisis, which led to a relative deterioration in Turkish exports and a 
capital outflow at $7 billion in the second half of 1998 (OECD, 1999, p.34); a political 
crisis after the toppling of the Erbakan government by the military in 1997; the 1999 
İzmit earthquake; and the 2000/2001 economic crisis. It can also be argued that political 
stability under AKP rule between 2002 and 2006 and the EU accession process played a 
role in stimulating private gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, which 
increased from 11.7% in 2001 to 18.9% in 2006. On the other hand, the global financial 
                                                          
81 According to World Bank Data (2015), “[g]ross fixed capital formation (formerly gross domestic fixed 
investment) includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and 
equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings”.  
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crisis of 2007-2008 and increasing authoritarianism of the AKP since 2011 seem to 
have debilitated private investment (Figure 5.7).  
 
 
Figure 5.7. Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP, Total and Private Sector, (%), 1968-2014.  
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015. 
However, it should be emphasised that the AKP era showed a corresponding 
growth pattern since the liberalisation of capital accounts in 1989, which was based on 
speculative capital inflows, leading to the boom-bust cycles (Onaran & Oyvat 2015). 
For instance, in the 1994 currency crisis following the liberalisation of capital accounts 
in 1989, the percentage of the depreciation of the Turkish Lira was 23.9 in 1994, 
leading international investors to benefit from deflated asset prices in financial markets 
(Onaran, 2009, p.244; Onaran & Oyvat 2015, pp.5-6). On the one hand, capital flows to 
Turkey increased during a five year period after the 1994 currency crisis. On the other 
hand, the adoption of the currency peg in 2000 with a view to combatting inflation 
failed to prevent the appreciation of the currency and the current account deficit stood at 
3.7% of GDP in 2000 (Onaran & Oyvat 2015, p.6). When Turkey plunged back into an 
economic crisis in 2000/2001, a rise in interest rates triggered the capital inflows again, 
which then financed Turkey’s annual high growth rate of 7.2% between 2002 and 2006 
(Onaran, 2009, p.246; Onaran & Oyvat 2015, p.8). However, international financial 
investors again benefited from the deflated prices in the financial markets and the 
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depreciation of the currency after the 2001 crisis. While Turkey was able to attract FDI 
thanks to the EU process, privatisation, and the high rates of the depreciation of the 
currency, local currency continued to appreciate and the current account deficit peaked 
at above 6% of the GDP in 2006, leaving the Turkish economy fragile in the wake of 
global economic instability (Onaran, 2009, p.247; Onaran & Oyvat 2015, pp.8-9). Put 
simply, the Turkish economy fell back into a boom-bust cycle. 
Indeed, the pace of increase in GDP per capita (measured in constant local 
currency unit) between 2002 and 2014 was higher than the previous decade, which rose 
to TL1,660.5 in 2014 from TL1,113.5 in 2002, equivalent to an increase of slightly less 
than 50%. In 1990, GDP per capita was TL939.3 whereas it rose to TL1,145.4 in 2000, 
only an increase of approximately 22% in a decade (The World Bank, 2015). In contrast 
to the low GDP per capita annual growth in the 1990s—which witnessed three years of 
GDP per capita contractions in 1991 during the Gulf War, the 1994 economic crisis and 
the 1999 earthquake in İzmit, an industrial hinterland of İstanbul—the post-2001 period 
under the AKP resulted in high GDP per capita growth especially between 2002 and 
2007 (Figure 5.8). The 2008 global economic crisis negatively affected Turkey in that 
GDP per capita decreased by 1% in 2008 and 6% in 2009. However, it was 
compensated by a higher increase in GDP per capita in 2010 and 2011, at 8% and 7% 
respectively (Figure 5.8).  
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Figure 5.8. GDP per capita Annual Growth Rate (%), 1961-2014.  
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015. 
This high GDP per capita growth between 2003 and 2012 under AKP rule can 
only be compared with two separate decades of high growth in Turkey: a period 
between 1963 and 1972 and another between 1983 and 1992. The “planned 
development” era commenced in Turkey with the 1963 First Five-Year Development 
Plan, which aimed at a high growth rate through the import-substitution growth model 
coupled with relatively high wages. The period between 1963 and 1972 had a record 
3.61% GDP per capita average annual growth (Figure 5.9). In this period, Bonapartist 
rule consolidated its legitimacy over the popular masses. On the other hand, the 1970s 
were a recessionary period in Turkey where GDP per capita growth declined over the 
three consecutive years 1978, 1979 and 1980 (Figure 5.9). These years also saw an 
unabating polarisation of society and perpetuation of fascist attacks on the left and 
students. The 1980 coup crushed the left and created a vacuum, but it took until 1990s 
for Islamic fundamentalism to fill this vacuum.  
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey in the 1990s was not surprising, 
though. In the 1990s Turkey’s GDP per capita growth was at its lowest with an average 
of 1%, far below middle income countries, OECD countries and the world average 
(Figure 5.9). Turkey’s average GDP per capita annual growth rate in the 1990s was very 
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low: at 1%, it slipped below the world average of 1.44% (Figure 5.9). It was under these 
economic conditions that the Just Economic Order publicised by Erbakan became 
popular among the masses. It is fair to say that Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey found 
a wide cross-class alliance in two decades: first in the 1970s by participating in National 
Front governments and in the 1990s by winning the 1995 general elections, a common 
denominator of the two periods being that the GDP per capita growth was 
comparatively low. The rise of the AKP in 2002 was shaped by a period of low GDP 
per capita annual growth of the 1990s. Between 2003 and 2012, Turkey’s GDP per 
capita increased by 3.71% annually under export-led capitalism (Figure 5.9). This ratio 
was above the OECD and world averages but below the GDP per capita average annual 
growth of middle income countries.  
 
Figure 5.9. GDP per capita Average Annual Growth Rate in Comparison (%).  
Source: Own calculations based on The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015. 
Relatively high GDP growth in Turkey can be compared with the economic 
performance of emerging countries such as China, India, Malaysia, South Korea, Brazil, 
and Mexico. Between 2002 and 2013, GDP annual growth of Turkey was 5%, ahead of 
South Korea, Brazil, and Mexico, and falling behind China, India, and Malaysia (Table 
5.1). 
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Table 5.1. Annual GDP Growth in Some Selected Emerging Countries and Turkey 
(%),2002-2013  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Av. 
China 9 10 10 11 12 14 10 9 10 9 8 8 10 
India 4 8 8 9 9 10 4 8 10 7 5 5 7.25 
Malaysia 5 6 7 5 6 6 5 -2 7 5 6 5 5,1 
Turkey 6 5 9 8 7 5 1 -5 9 9 2 4 5 
S. Korea 7 3 5 4 5 5 3 1 6 4 2 3 4 
Brazil 3 1 6 3 4 6 5 0 8 3 1 2 3.5 
Mexico 0 1 4 3 5 3 1 -5 5 4 4 1 2.2 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015. 
 
On the other hand, high GDP per capita growth and neoliberal economic 
development in Turkey have been achieved at the expense of domestic labour. Longer 
working hours than those in OECD countries have been instrumental in achieving this 
economic development. According to OECD statistics, Turkish workers worked on 
average 1855 hours in 2012, compared to 1765 hours on average in OECD countries, a 
difference of over 90 hours annually (OECD, 2013a). That said, Mexico (2226), Chile 
(2029), and Greece (2034) had the longest working hours of OECD countries (OECD, 
2013a). On the other hand, economic growth is not followed by a decrease in the 
unemployment rate. According to the Turkish Statistical data (n.d.), the overall 
unemployment rate was 9.5% in 2005, while it reached to 9.9% in 2014.  
The “lower labour cost and lower average wages together with increasing labour 
productivity” in comparison to rival countries was highlighted by the Investment 
Support and Promotion Agency (Investment Support and Promotion Agency 2010, 
p.12). This state body, which is under the control of the Prime Ministry, actively 
advertises Turkey to potential foreign investors by drawing attention to the “efficiency” 
of the labour force and employment relations in the country. To illustrate, between 2002 
and 2009, the annual average of labour productivity growth was 4.4% in Turkey—
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compared to 9.6% in China and 6.0% in India. The average increase in real wages 
between 2002 and 2009, meanwhile, was one of the lowest among developing countries, 
with an increase in real wages of only 0.4%; this ratio was 11.6% and 14.7% for the 
same period for China and India, respectively (Investment Support and Promotion 
Agency, 2010, pp.12-13). The state agency also boasts about the “labour force’s 
dedication to work via low absenteeism” by comparing the annual average number of 
sick days per employee in Turkey (4.6 days in 2008) with those in other countries such 
as Bulgaria (22 days), Portugal (11.9 days), Czech Republic (10.8 days), Poland (9.7 
days) (Investment Support and Promotion Agency, 2010, p.8). 
 Not surprisingly, the social cost of neoliberal economic development reflected 
itself in lethal “occupational accidents” for the workers. Under AKP rule between 2002 
and 2014, at least 14,555 workers died on “occupational accidents” (Bianet, 3 
November 2014). Faruk Çelik, Labour and Social Security Minister, confessed that 
“[i]n 2002, the number of occupational deaths was 872, but by 2010, the number rose to 
1444” (Gürgen, 2011).  
 Occupational conditions have been strongly affected by the worsening 
organisational unity of the working classes. The AKP has been benefiting from the 
unorganised and defenceless position of the workers born of diminished trade union 
density in the neoliberal epoch. By July 2014, out of a total 12.3 million workers, only 
1.2 million—9.68% of total workers—were unionised in Turkey according to statistics 
from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. This was a tremendous regression, 
down from 57.54% in July 2003 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security, n.d.). On the other hand, in 2002 the unionisation rate of wage and salary 
earners in Turkey was 9.5%, down from 20.8% in 1986. This ratio hit rock bottom at 
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5.4% in 2011, being the lowest unionisation rate among OECD countries with a 17.3% 
average rate of unionisation in 2011 (OECD, 2013b).  
 It is this paradoxical condition of neoliberal economic development in Turkey 
since 2002, which partly explains the electoral success of the AKP. The AKP so far has 
been able to achieve a politics of class compromise between the poorest and the richest 
segments of population. On the one hand, the ratio of minimum wages to average wages 
of full-time workers increased from 0.32 in 2002 to 0.37 in 2014, while the ratio of 
minimum wages to median earnings increased from 0.61 to 0.68 in the period under 
consideration (OECD, 2015). The share of the wage income held by the poorest two 
quintiles rose to 12% in 2013 from 10.7 in 2006, while the share in the top quintile 
within the total wage income also rose to 53.1% in 2013 from 51.7% in 2006. However, 
the class compromise was achieved at the expense of the organised blue collar and 
professional working class—rather than taxes levied on net profits—leading to a 
reduction in the wage income share of the middle 40% to 34.9% in 2013 from 37.6% in 
2006 (Onaran & Oyvat, 2015, pp.25-26).  
Moreover, while the AKP has been pursuing neoliberal policies on employment, 
in the process causing sub-contracting in all sectors and precariousness among 
workers,82 it has also pursued a social policy based on social transfers. According to a 
June 2012 Social Assistance Statistics Bulletin published by the Ministry of Family and 
Social Policy, the ratio of social assistance and service to GDP rose from 0.5% in 2002 
to 1.42% (including the compensation payments by the Social Security Institution) in 
2011 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family and Social Policy, 2012, p.18). In 2014, 
slightly more than 3 million households benefited from regular and/or non-regular 
                                                          
82 A 2011 constitutional proposal relating to the economic and commercial provisions by İstanbul 
Chamber of Commerce suggested that the concept of “public interest” (kamu yararı) be removed from the 
constitution, natural resources contribute to economic activity, and minimum wage be deregulated (G. 
Avcı, personal communication, October 16, 2012). Murat Yalçıntaş, founding member of the AKP in 
2001, was the chairman of the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce between 2005 and 2013. 
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social assistance (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family and Social Policy, 2015, 
p.74).83 The estimated amount of total social assistance in 2014 was equivalent to nearly 
NTL 20.4 billion, or $8.95 billion (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family and Social 
Policy, 2015, p.74).84 The bulk of this social assistance was dedicated to pensions for 
handicapped people in need of care, old-age pension, fuel assistance, free textbooks for 
students, free lunch assistance for poor students, conditional cash transfers on 
pregnancy, child health and education, and conditional cash benefit for needy women 
whose spouses passed away (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family and Social Policy, 
2015).  
 High economic development had a significant effect on putting absolute poverty 
rates in decline in Turkey (Figure 5.10). According to official statistics, while nearly a 
third of the population (30.3%) lived on less than $4.3 (at purchasing power parity) per 
day in 2002, this decreased to 2.06% in 2013 (Figure 5.10). The OECD stated that 
“Turkey is one of the few OECD countries where inequality of household disposable 
incomes declined in the 2000s, even if some of the progress achieved was reversed 
following the onset of the global crisis” (2014b, p.34, Box.1). Nevertheless, with a 
relative poverty rate85 of 19.3% Turkey had the 3rd highest level of relative poverty in 
the OECD in 2010, after Mexico (20.4%) and Israel (20.9%) (OECD, 2014a, p.113). In 
addition, OECD found out that there was an increase in the share of people who 
reported that they could not afford food from 26.6% in 2006/2007 to 32.7% in 
2011/2012 (OECD, 2014c). 
                                                          
83 Nearly 2.3 million households in Turkey benefited from regular social assistance in 2014 while 
approximately 1.9 million households benefited from non-regular social assistance (Annual Report of the 
Ministry of Family and Social Policy, 2014, p.74). 
84 On 10 October 2014, 1 USD was equal to 2,2789 NTL according to the Central Bank of Turkey.  
85 Relative poverty rate refers to the percentage of people living with less than 50% of median income.  
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Figure 5.10. Poverty Rates According to the International Threshold of 4.3 Dollars per Day, 2002-2013. 
Source: TÜİK, The Poverty Rates According to Poverty Line Methods, n.d. 
Neoliberalism has negatively impacted wealth distribution. It has been revealed 
that it was largely the top percentile of the population that could reap the benefits of 
economic growth under the AKP since the wealth was unequally distributed and 
concentrated in this percentile (Güney, 2015). The Global Wealth DataBook 2014 
indicated that Turkey contained more individuals with wealth over $1 billion in 2014 
(37) than Japan (15), France (31), Italy (29), Canada (25), and Korea (35) (Credit 
Suisse, 2014, p.112). According to this databook, the wealth share of the top percentile 
of adults rose sharply from 38.1% in 2000 to 54.3% in 2014 (Credit Suisse, 2014, 
p.125), thus making Turkey the sixth most unequal country in the world in terms of 
wealth inequality (Güney, 2015).  
To sum up, the economy under AKP rule became the major parameter in 
broadening its mass electoral base. According to the Supreme Court of Appeals 
Prosecutor’s Office data from November 2014, the AKP is the largest political party in 
Turkey with 8,698,551 members, followed by the CHP with 1,012,412 members; the 
DP with 715,399 members; the MHP with 374,430 members; and the SP with 210,521 
members (Milliyet, 27 November 2014). The AKP managed to increase its share of the 
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vote to 46.6% in 2007 and 49.8% in the 2011 general elections. In absolute terms, it 
doubled its votes from 10.8 million in 2002 to 21.4 million in 2011 (TÜİK, 2012, p.93). 
This electoral success, in turn, has helped carry out a relatively smooth democratic 
transition until 2010/2011. External factors such as the EU anchor and the USA 
facilitated this transition. Bonapartist rule, which was to reinforce social order and 
maintain bourgeois economic power under the grip of the military, was superseded by 
the AKP rule. As has been shown, the AKP represented the symbiosis of big capitalists 
and peripheral capitalists for holding state power.  
Procedural democratisation under the influence of the EU  
Procedural democratisation in Turkey until 2010/2011 has not been a product of mass 
popular struggles against the Kemalist state, as contrasted in Chapter 1. Moreover, the 
socio-economic context of procedural, formal and Schumpeterian democratisation 
undermines the realisation of democratic deepening. As Roper (2013, p.238) argues that 
even in the most developed democratic countries, democratic control of workplaces, 
distribution of labour and resources remain under rule of market forces. Therefore, 
Turkey’s democratic transition was a process of establishment of civilian rule in a 
neoliberal era in which the power of business outstrips that of labour. Neoliberal 
hegemony indubitably restricts and devalues democracy as a system of political 
representation by converting citizens into consumers (Munck, 2005, pp.65-66). In the 
Turkish case, the symbiosis of different bourgeois fractions to produce capitalist 
democracy—a process influenced by the EU and also supported by popular masses— 
extricated the country from long-lasting Bonapartist rule.   
Indeed, the emphasis on civil and political rights and the rule of law has been 
straightforwardly vocalised by TÜSİAD since the intensification of Turkey’s integration 
with the European Union after the conclusion of the Customs Union in 1996. The 
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fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria, which recommend that democracy and free 
market economy go hand in hand, have been prioritised by the big capitalists. 
According to the Criteria,  
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership 
presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (European Council, 
1993, p.13).  
 
For TÜSİAD, the increasing economic relations of Turkey with the EU 
necessitated broadening of political freedoms. TÜSİAD’s 1997 report, entitled 
Türkiye’de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri (Democratisation Perspectives in Turkey) 
underlined that the permanence of a free market economy in Turkey can only be 
sustained in a pluralist democratic political structure (TÜSİAD, 1997). The report 
suggested amending the Political Parties Law. One of the bold proposals was even to 
repeal the clause that “political parties operate in accordance with Atatürk’s principles 
and revolutions”. The report proposed lowering the election threshold to 5% and 
expanding freedom of expression. It further suggested that the General Staff should be 
responsible to the Minister of Defence rather than the Prime Minister. The report 
proposed a motion for judicial independence, requesting that military courts should not 
try civilians. The National Security Council, as a constitutional body, was criticised and 
the report proposed to replace it with a High Council of National Defence. It proposed 
ending compulsory religious courses. With regard to the Kurdish issue, even though the 
report rejected changing Article 66 on citizenship in the constitution, which stipulates 
that “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk”, it 
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proposed using Kurdish as a mother tongue in schools in Kurdish areas (TÜSİAD, 
1997).86  
In addition, MÜSİAD’s 2000 report, entitled Anayasa Reformu ve Yönetimin 
Demokratikleşmesi (Constitutional Reform and Democratisation of Power) suggested 
that the Chief of Staff be tied to the Ministry of Defence and the structure of the 
National Security Council be amended in such a way that the army be represented only 
by the Chief of Staff (MÜSİAD, 2000, p.14). MÜSİAD’s 2011 constitutional text, 
entitled Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasa Önerisi (Constitutional Proposal for the Republic 
of Turkey) maintained the secular character of the state but replaced reference to the 
state’s loyalty to the “nationalism of Atatürk” with “nation state” (MÜSİAD, 2011, 
p.60). MÜSİAD did not incorporate in its proposal the National Security Council and 
Supreme Military Council as constitutional bodies. Similar to TÜSİAD’s 1997 report, 
MÜSİAD’s 2011 constitutional text suggested that the General Staff be responsible to 
the Minister of Defence rather than the Prime Minister (MÜSİAD, 2011, p.95). 
  Therefore, the role of the EU in applying pressure on Turkish governments to 
diminish the role of the military in politics and initiate constitutional human rights 
reforms started before AKP rule. At the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was 
granted full membership candidacy status in the EU (Table 5.2). The EU’s views on 
“progress made by Turkey in preparing for EU membership” have been annually 
recorded in Progress Reports since 1998. In the progress reports, called “Regular 
Reports” before 2005, the lack of civilian control of the army and the political influence 
of the National Security Council through its “recommendations” were prioritised by the 
EU with respect to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria.  
                                                          
86 The content of the report resulted in serious controversy when TÜSİAD led members to declare that the 
report was “open to debate and does not bind TÜSİAD members (TÜSİAD, 1999). TÜSİAD members 
were not alone in distancing themselves from the report. The Turkish armed forces declared that the real 
objective of the report was “to discredit the General Staff and dismantle the Turkish Armed Forces” 
(Cumhuriyet, 26 January 1997, in TÜSİAD, 1999, p.47).  
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Table 5.2. Chronology of Turkey-EU Relations 
 
1959 Turkey’s first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) 
1963 The Signature of the Agreement Creating an Association between The Republic 
of Turkey and the European Economic Community (the Ankara Agreement)  
1970  Agreement between Turkey and the EEC on Additional Protocol 
1982 Suspension of relations between Turkey and EEC 
1987 Turkey’s Application for Full Membership of the European Community  
1996 The completion of Customs Union between Turkey and the EU 
1997 Failure to mention Turkey among candidate countries at the Luxemburg 
Summit 
1998  Publication of first Progress Report for Turkey by the European Commission 
1999  Official recognition of Turkey as a candidate state at the Helsinki European 
Council 
2003 
 
Establishment of EU Harmonisation Commission for Turkey in the General 
Assembly of Turkish Republic 
2004  Refusal of Annan Plan in a referendum conducted in Cyprus 
2005 The launch of Turkey’s Accession Negotiations with the EU 
2006 Admission that eight chapters of EU legislation shall be opened and none of the 
chapters of EU legislation shall be closed temporarily (due to the refusal of 
Turkey to open its ports and airports to Cyprus)  
2007 Opening of negotiations on chapters of EU legislation relating to Policies of 
Enterprises and Industry, Financial Control and Statistics, Health and Consumer 
Protection on Trans-European Transport 
2008 Opening of negotiations on chapters of EU legislation relating to Company 
Law, Intellectual Property Law, Free Movement of Capital and Information 
Society, Media 
2009  Opening of negotiations on chapters of EU legislation relating to Taxation and 
Environment  
2010 Opening of negotiations on chapters of EU legislation relating to Food Safety, 
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy 
2013 Opening of negotiations on chapters of EU legislation relating to Regional 
Policy and Coordination of Structural instruments, launching a dialogue on visa 
liberalisation, and signing the Readmission Agreement  
2015 Opening of negotiations on chapters of EU legislation relating to Economic and 
Monetary Policy  
 
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Affairs,  2015. 
 The European Commission (EC) enunciated in Turkey’s 1998 Regular Report 
“certain anomalies in the functioning of the public authorities, persistent human rights 
violations and major shortcomings in the treatment of minorities” (EC, 1998, p.21, 53). 
The European Commission expressed 
The lack of civilian control of the army gives cause for concern. This is reflected by the 
major role played by the army in the political life through the National Security 
Council. A civil, non-military solution must be found to the situation in south-eastern 
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Turkey, particularly since many of the violations of civil and political rights observed in 
the country are connected in one way or another with this issue (EC, 1998, p.21, 53).  
 
The Copenhagen political criteria, together with economic ones,87 have been 
included in the 2001 Accession Partnership Document for Turkey by the European 
Council, which was revised in 2003, 2006, and 2008. Turkey responded by announcing 
its 2001, 2003 and 2008 National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). 
The 2001 Accession Partnership Document for Turkey listed strengthening of “legal 
and constitutional guarantees for the right to freedom of expression” as a short-term 
objective, and alignment of “the constitutional role of the National Security Council as 
an advisory body to the Government in accordance with the practice of EU Member 
States” as a medium term objective (The Council of the European Union, 2001).  
 In Turkey’s 2000 Regular Report, the EC warned that the National Security 
Council (NSC) spontaneously interfered in political processes, by giving its 
“recommendations” “over the dismissing of the civil servants suspected of links with 
radical Islamic and separatist movements” (EC, 2000, p.14). As a response, and to 
harmonise Turkish legislation with the EU’s requirements, the 2001 constitutional 
reform package on the structure of the NSC (Article 118), which had been the 
cornerstone of Turkish Bonapartism, arrived as the first blow against the army’s 
position. Turkey’s 2001 Regular Report welcomed the package, which increased the 
number of civilian members of the NSC from five to nine while the number of military 
representatives in the Council remained at five. The advisory character of the NSC 
decisions was emphasised, with its role limited to giving “recommendations”. With 
these amendments, the government is only required to “evaluate” the NSC decisions 
instead of being obliged to give “priority consideration” to their implementation (EC, 
                                                          
87 Copenhagen economic criteria for candidate countries include “the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” 
(European Council, 1993, p.13).  
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2001, p.19). Following the decreasing formal influence of the NSC, the European 
Commission warned against the influence of the military in the political process through 
“informal channels” such as “public speeches, briefings or statements to the media and 
declarations” (EC, 2004, p.23).  
The 2004 constitutional amendments were, indeed, more comprehensive. They 
included complete abolition of the death penalty; the precedence of international 
agreements concerning fundamental rights and liberties, which were to be duly put into 
effect, over domestic laws; permission to extradite Turkish citizens, stemming from 
being party to the International Criminal Court; abolition of the State Security Courts; 
elimination of the army’s privileged exemption from the control of the Court of 
Accounts; removal of the military representative from the Board of Higher Education; 
reinforcement of equality between men and women by stating their equal rights and 
obliging the state to take action to ensure this equality (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, pp.55-
57; Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009, p.66).  
 Nine harmonisation packages entered into force between February 2002 and July 
2004. While three of these were enacted by the coalition government led by Bülent 
Ecevit, the AKP continued these packages as part of the EU candidacy (Hale & 
Özbudun, 2010, p.57). With respect to freedom of expression, the third Harmonisation 
Package in August 2002 limited the severity of the criminal offense of “insulting 
Turkishness and the Republic” (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, p.58). It was only in 2008 
when vague words such as “Turkishness” and “the Republic” were replaced with 
“Turkish Nation” and “the State of the Turkish Republic”. Importantly, it was specified 
that criminal investigations relating to Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code shall only 
be commenced upon the approval of the Minister of Justice (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, 
p.58).  
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 Under the Sixth Harmonisation Package, which entered into force in July 2003, 
Article 8 of the anti-Terror Law was abrogated, which had prohibited “written, oral or 
visual propaganda, as well as meetings, demonstrations and marches carried out with 
the purpose of destroying the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and 
nation”. With the sixth package, the use of force or violence was made a prerequisite for 
the definition of terror. With the second, third, and fourth packages, a court decision 
was made a prerequisite to the confiscation of printed material (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, 
p.58). In July 2004, a new Law on Associations was enacted and freedom of association 
was expanded, while the power of provincial governors to postpone or ban meetings 
and marches was limited with the seventh harmonisation packages. The rights of non-
Muslim communities in acquiring and disposing of property was enlarged but put under 
the permission of the General Directorate of Foundations with the fourth package. 
Under the permission of administrative authorities, they were allowed to build places of 
worship. While the third package permitted use of “different languages and dialects 
traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” such as Kurdish in radio and 
television broadcasting, the sixth package enlarged this right to public radio and 
television channels (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, pp.57-60). In January 2009, the 
government introduced TRT 6 (TRT Şeş), a 24-hour Kurdish TV station broadcasting on 
state-run television.  
Meanwhile, the EU appreciated the appointment in 2004 of the first civilian 
chairman of the Secretary General of the NSC, Mehmet Yiğit Alpogan, and the 
reduction in the number of NSC staff from 408 to 305. Yet, the political influence of the 
military members of the NSC and senior members of the armed forces in foreign and 
domestic matters via public briefings continued to be an important issue (EC, 2005, 
pp.12-14). Turkey’s Progress Reports in 2006 and 2007 noted delays in reforms 
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concerning civilian control of the military. These stated that the Turkish Armed Forces 
Internal Service Law88 and Article 2a of the Law on the National Security Council, 
which provided a broad definition of national security, had yet to be reformed.  
The preparation of the defence budget was brought into question by the 
European Commission. The Commission pointed out the “substantial degree of 
autonomy in establishing the defence budget” by the armed forces, highlighting the 
existence of two extra-budgetary funds available to the military (EC, 2002, p.25). The 
problem of transparency and accountability of defence expenditures was pointed out by 
the EU with regards to restrictions on the Court of Accounts “under Article 160 of the 
Constitution under which the confidentiality of the national defence is foreseen” (EC, 
2003, p.19). Although the clause of Article 160 of the Constitution, which exempted 
state property owned by the Turkish armed forces from being audited, was repealed in 
the 2004 constitutional amendments, a new Law on the Court of Accounts (no. 6085) 
was only adopted in 2010 after waiting six years in the Parliament.  
The law that was finally introduced reflected a political consensus between the 
government and the military. Under its terms, auditors would only audit the results of 
activities of public administrations, i.e. whether or not the objectives and indicators 
determined by them had been carried out. The Court of Accounts is unable to conduct 
“efficiency auditing” on military expenditures, i.e. whether or not the purchase of that 
amount of military arms is in compliance with the needs of the army. Article 35 of the 
law states that the “Turkish Court of Accounts shall not undertake propriety audit and 
shall not render decisions that limit or remove the discretionary powers of 
administrations” (Turkish Court of Accounts, 2011). In addition, the auditing of the 
Military Pension Fund (OYAK) and the Turkish Armed Forces Support Foundation 
                                                          
88 Enacted in 1961 and amended in 2013, the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law granted the 
army to guard and protect not only the homeland but also the Republic of Turkey (Hürriyet, 14 July 
2013).  
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(TSKGV) would now require a request by the Parliamentary Petition Committee, 
thereby circumventing the Court of Accounts (TESEV, 2013, p.19).  
A protocol on Security, Public Order and Assistance Units (Emniyet-Asayiş- 
Yardımlaşma, EMASYA), which allowed the military to intervene in domestic security 
incidents without permission from civilian authorities (EC, 2006, pp.7-8; 2007, p.9), 
had been signed between the General Staff and the Ministry of Interior after the 28 
February 1997 military intervention. During domestic security incidents, the EMASYA 
protocol permitted that “provincial police units, and governors are attached to the 
military in matters of intelligence, analysis, and planning. This structure enables the 
military to collect all social and intelligence-related information” (TESEV, 2009, p.22). 
This protocol was abrogated in February 2010.  
In January 2006, The Council of the European Union urged Turkey to “abolish 
any remaining competence of military courts to try civilians” as a short-term priority to 
be completed in one or two years (The Council of the European Union, 2006). This was 
further emphasised in a revised 2008 Turkey Accession Partnership Document that 
advocated limiting the jurisdiction of the military courts to offenses committed by 
military personnel whilst on duty (Council of the European Union, 2008). In return, 
Turkey adopted its third National Programme for the Adoption of the EU Acquis 
(NPAA) in 2008. On civil-military relations, Turkey reassured the EU by preparing a 
Judicial Reform Strategy in which the tasks and competencies of the military courts 
were defined (Nation Programme for the Adoption of the EU Acquis, 2008, p.7). 
Amendments in the Code of the Criminal Procedure in 2009 lifted the power of the 
military courts to try civilians in peacetime (EC, 2009, p.10).  
 The EU welcomed two important developments in 2012: the removal from 
secondary school curricula of a national security course taught by military officers; and 
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the trial of two non-commissioned officers and a PKK member turned gendarmerie 
informant for the 2005 bombing of a bookstore in Şemdinli, in Turkish Kurdistan (EC, 
2012, p.12). The Şemdinli incident brought the Turkish deep state into the spotlight 
when two members of the gendarmerie intelligence service, Ali Kaya and Özcan 
İldeniz, and an informer, Veysel Ateş, were apprehended by local people for the 
bombing of the Umut bookshop in Şemdinli district on November 9, 2005 (Human 
Rights Watch, 2007, p.18). The prosecutor of the Van Third Heavy Criminal Court, 
Ferhat Sarıkaya, prepared an indictment that sentenced these suspects to 39 years in jail 
and specified that the investigation should extend to the senior military officers. In 
March 2006, the General Staff accused Ferhat Sarıkaya of undermining the armed 
forces while the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) debarred Sarıkaya 
from the legal profession for “abuse of his duty and exceeding his authority” (as cited in 
Human Rights Watch, 2007, p.18). The case was forwarded to a military court, which 
released the suspects. After the enactment of the constitutional referendum in September 
2010, which allowed the civilian courts to try military personnel, the retrial process 
started. The Van Third Heavy Criminal Court handed down prison sentences to these 
three officers and charged them of forming a criminal organisation, which was 
overruled by the Supreme Court of Appeals in October 2012. The Supreme Court of 
Appeals however confirmed the prison sentences of these officers (Today’s Zaman, 23 
May 2013; Hürriyet Daily News, 11 October 2012). 
The tactics of the AKP towards the military: the modern capitalist prince 
and a “war of position” 
The crucial question still remains to be answered: How did the AKP find popular 
support to defang the army and to decrease its role in politics? The answer lies in the 
AKP’s creation of a strategic alliance between peripheral capitalists and big capitalists 
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in order to consolidate capitalist democracy. This was achieved through the party’s 
capacity to organise the collective will. The AKP government assumed the historical 
task of carrying democratic transition after the main centre-left and centre-right parties 
were defeated in the 2002 elections in the aftermath of the major economic crisis of 
2000/2001. The accompanying political crisis allowed the AKP to express the popular 
collective will with the objective of reducing military tutelage over the parliament.  
 This historical task that the party undertook was the embodiment of the 
“capitalist Modern Prince” in the Gramscian sense. In The Prison Notebooks, the 
modern prince “can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a 
collective will, which has always been recognised and has to some extent asserted itself 
in action, begins to take concrete form” (Gramsci, 1971, p.129). Two tasks of the 
“Modern Prince” are the “formation of a national-popular collective will” and being 
“the proclaimer and organiser of an intellectual and moral reform” (Gramsci, 1971, 
p.133).  
 With regard to attenuating the pre-eminence of the military in politics, the 
strategy of the AKP was quite different from that of Refah. The Refah Party with a 
small Islamic fundamentalist force initiated a direct frontal attack on “actually existing 
Turkish secularism” and Kemalist nationalism. This resulted in the complete defeat of 
the party. Learning from this especially, the AKP pursued a low profile conflict against 
the “political autonomy of the military”. This strategy consisted of pullbacks, 
entrenchment, sacrifices, and temporisation since this effective strategy—a war of 
position—necessitated “an unprecedented concentration of hegemony” in the form of 
alliances between classes in a historical bloc (Gramsci, 1971, pp.238-239).  
 First, the AKP benefited effectively from the division within the army between a 
“tutelary tendency” and a “controllable change tendency” (Demirel, 2010). The former 
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tendency staunchly supports the “supervisory role of the Turkish Armed Forces of the 
Republic”, believing that since Turkey’s transition to a multi-party system in 1946, 
there have been concessions on Republican values, which peaked during the AKP 
government. The latter believes that these values can be better protected in a democratic 
regime (Demirel, 2010). On the other hand, those who advocate “controllable change” 
nonetheless ask for a continuation of the political and judicial prerogatives of the 
Turkish armed forces (Demirel, 2010, p.19). This faction also supports Turkish 
integration with the EU (Aydinli, 2009; Demirel, 2010). According to this classification, 
while National Security Council Secretary General Tuncer Kılınç, General Chief of 
Staff Doğan Güreş (1990-1994), General Chief of Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu (2000-
2002) and Commander of the Turkish Army Aytaç Yalman (2002-2004) are more Euro-
sceptic and favour conservative tutelary tendencies (Aydinli, 2009; Demirel, 2010), 
Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök (2002-2006) and Chief of the General Staff 
İlker Başbuğ (2008-2010) endorse the EU and demand “controllable change” (Demirel, 
2010).89  
The former faction, known as Eurasianists, developed an alternative political 
discourse to Turkey’s Western orientation in foreign policy. They advocated “a cultural, 
military, political and commercial alliance with Turkey’s eastern neighbours, notably 
Russia, Iran, the Turkic countries of Central Asia, and even Pakistan, India and China” 
(Akçali & Perinçek, 2009, p.551). The “creation of a non-Western “Eurasian space” 
under the leadership of Russia had become the political objective of this faction (Akçali 
& Perinçek, 2009, p.560). This was illustrated at the 2002 War Academy in İstanbul, 
when the National Security Council Secretary General Tuncer Kılınç highlighted the 
need for Turkey to explore new strategic allies “that would include Iran and the Russian 
                                                          
89 According to Aydinli (2009), Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükkanıt (2006-2008) and Commander of 
the Second Army from Edip Başer (2000-2002) adopt a more “progressive” attitude and less 
confrontational relationship with the civilians.  
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Federation” (Hürriyet Daily News, 3 August 2002). In 2009, he also suggested exiting 
NATO (Küçük, 2009). Former General Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş (1990-1994) also 
stated in a 2007 interview his distrust towards the USA and EU since he believed that 
their objective had been to divide Turkey for the benefits of Kurds (Bila, 2007). In the 
retired General Suat İlhan’s book Why “No” to the European Union?, European 
integration, which was deemed to jeopardise national interests and challenge national 
integrity, was perceived to be incongruent with Atatürkist thought (Kösebalaban, 2002, 
p.140). The AKP gradually brought this faction within the army under control. 
 Second, the AKP achieved the “absorption” of Islamic fundamentalism “into 
secular neoliberalism more or less successfully at all levels of the hegemonic formation” 
under its moral and political leadership (Tuğal, 2009, p.51). The AKP, as an organiser 
of political society, was able to constitute hegemony in linking civil society and the 
state through the “integration of antisystem cadres and strategies into the system” 
(Tuğal, 2009, p.148). According to a survey conducted in 2006 by Ali Çarkoğlu and 
Binnaz Toprak as a follow-up to a study conducted in 1999, although there had been an 
increase in religiosity in Turkey during the seven years between 1999 and 2006, the 
support for a Sharia-based state declined from 21% in 1999 to 9% in 2006 (Çarkoğlu & 
Toprak, 2007).90 By integrating those segments of society who reflected these evolving 
views into the political system, the AKP departed from the Welfare Party, effectively 
neutralising, defusing, and demobilising the radical insurgency of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Turkey (Tuğal, 2007 & 2009). The AKP’s party programme 
provides a framework for coexistence of religious freedoms with secularism while 
rejecting the use of religion for political aims. While it suggests that the AKP “considers 
                                                          
90 According to the research in 2006, people perceived themselves more religious as compared to 1999. 
While only a quarter of the respondents identified as “very religious” and only 6% as “extremely 
religious” in 1999, this percentage rose to 46.5% and 12.8%, respectively, in 2006 (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 
2007, p.41).     
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religion as one of the most important institutions of humanity, and secularism as a pre-
requisite of democracy, and an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience”, 
the party “also rejects the interpretation and distortion of secularism as enmity against 
religion” (AK Party, n.d.). For instance, during the revolutionary process in Egypt, 
Erdoğan even called on the adoption of a secular constitution for Egypt and was 
criticised for interfering in Egypt’s local affairs by the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Arabiya 
News, 14 September 2011). By no stretch of the imagination could Erbakan have called 
on the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt to a secular constitution.  
 This transformation of Islamic radicalism into a US type of conservatism (Tuğal, 
2007) has been instrumental in overcoming the Bonapartist regime. This is why the 
AKP could wage a war in the form of a “reciprocal siege”, which necessitated “an 
unprecedented concentration of hegemony” and “a more ‘interventionist’ government” 
(Gramsci, 1971, pp.238-239), against the Kemalist state. In the initial phase of 
confrontation, the pro-status quo forces had a dominant position in balancing the 
political leadership of Erdoğan. He had been sentenced to ten months of incarceration 
and a life-time ban from participation in elections by the State Security Court, which 
charged him with “inciting religious hatred” and asking for the “overthrow of the 
government” (Yavuz, 2009, p.67). This is why even though Erdoğan was the leader of 
the AKP, Abdullah Gül formed the cabinet and became prime minister following the 
general elections of 2002. The AKP government under Gül immediately executed an 
effective strategy to enable Erdoğan to be elected, cooperating with the CHP in the 
Parliament to abolish the clause of the Constitution that hindered his election. Even 
though the incumbent President Ahmet Necdet Sezer sent back the constitutional 
amendments, arguing that laws cannot be issued for personal purposes (Hürriyet Daily 
News, 21 December 2002), he was constitutionally obliged to approve the amendment. 
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This was followed by the AKP’s claim of irregularities in the 2002 general elections in 
Siirt. The Supreme Election Board (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) cancelled the elections there 
and prompted by-elections in March 2003. Consequently, Abdullah Gül swapped his 
post with Erdoğan’s, who formed the new cabinet in March 2003. During the first 
tenure of the AKP between 2002 and 2007, the AKP passed major EU-led reforms on 
civil liberties and civil-military relations, as described above.   
 The last stage of this “reciprocal siege” unfolded when Turkey’s political 
turmoil deepened during 2006-2007. The ultra-nationalist organisations that had close 
connections with former soldiers and right-wing party representatives were encouraged 
by the perceived crisis of the Turkish state in the context of Europeanisation (Jacoby, 
2011). Andrea Santoro, a Catholic priest, was killed in Trabzon in February 2006. A top 
judge in the Council of State, Mustafa Yücel Özbilgin, was assassinated and four judges 
were wounded in May 2006, with protests at the funeral of the slain judge. Chief of 
General Staff General Hilmi Özkök welcomed the protests, adding “it must not remain 
the reaction of just one day, a one-off event....It must gain permanence, as something 
continuous. It must be pursued by everyone” (Hürriyet Daily News, 21 May 2006). 
 The death of Hrank Dink, a socialist Armenian journalist and chief editor of the 
weekly newspaper Agos on 19 January 19 2007 was a blatant assassination; Dink had 
been receiving death threats from Turkish nationalists due to his statements on 
Armenian identity and the Armenian Genocide. He was also under prosecution for 
denigrating Turkishness according to Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. At his 
funeral hundreds of thousands of people marched chanting “We are all Armenian, we 
are all Hrant Dink”. Nevertheless, this political murder was followed by another murder 
of three Protestants in Malatya in April 2007. Meanwhile, in March 2007 Nokta 
magazine published excerpts of the diary of former Commander of the Turkish Naval 
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forces Özden Örnek, which allegedly revealed two coup plans (Sarıkız and Ayışığı). The 
claims were challenged by Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök. Founded in 1983, the 
24-year old magazine was closed down under “pressure” (Radikal, 21 April 2007).  
 The peak of the war, in the form of a “reciprocal siege” between the AKP and 
the civil-military bureaucracy, came when the term of the tenth President of the 
Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2000-2007) was about to expire in May 2007. 
This was the last stage of an institutional battle between the AKP and the presidency. 
After that, the political struggle mutated into a judicial struggle between the AKP and 
the pro-status quo forces. Since the AKP dominated the Parliament in the aftermath of 
the general election in 2002, it obtained a sufficient number of parliamentarians to elect 
any of its candidates for president. Kemalist nationalists, on the other hand, were very 
alarmed by Erdoğan’s possible holding of presidential office, claiming that the secular 
character of the state would be under threat. As a conservative attack, Republic Protests 
(Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) were rallied under the initiative of the Atatürkist Thought 
Association (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) whose head was the former Commander of 
the Gendarmerie General Şener Eruygur. Former Commander of the First Army General 
Hurşit Tolon (2004-2005) also participated in the protests.91 
The AKP held off announcing its candidate until the last minute. Three days 
before the presidential elections, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül was nominated. 
However the nomination of Gül, although not Erdoğan, did not put the 
secular/nationalist elites at ease, since Gül’s spouse was veiled. At that point, former 
Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation Sabih Kanadoğlu (2001-2003) 
                                                          
91 For nurturing the secular sentiments of the masses, Cumhuriyet, the daily hard-line secularist 
newspaper founded in 1924, run successive TV advertisements, which said: “Are you aware of the 
danger? Own up to your Republic”, “On May 2007, the presidential elections are taking place. Are you 
aware of the danger? Own up to your Republic”, “On May 16, the clocks are being set back 100 years. 
Are you aware of the danger?” The last one put an unveiled woman on the background who was then 
shown wearing çarşaf (black attire that conceals whole body) while the voiceover demanded “Own up to 
your Republic”. 
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“formulated” that a two-third majority (367 votes) was required for quorum to elect the 
president. This was, indeed, openly against the constitution. Even though Gül received 
357 votes in the first round, the main opposition party applied to the Constitutional 
Court for the annulment of elections. In due course, on 27 April 2007 Chief of the 
General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt (2006-2008) issued a statement on his website, dubbed 
an “e-memorandum”. It stated that the military was following the debate over 
secularism in the presidential election with “concern” and would “openly display its 
position and attitude when it becomes necessary” (Hürriyet, 29 April 2007). 
Not surprisingly, the Constitutional Court adopted Kanadoğlu’s “367 formula” 
and annulled the first round of the presidential elections. When the Parliament was 
unable to assemble for the election of the President for the second round, the election 
process was paralysed. As a response by Erdoğan, the AKP, which believed it had 
public support behind it, called early elections in July 2007. The AKP also called a 
constitutional referendum, believing the president could be elected by a direct popular 
vote in order to block the military’s intervention in the elections. Rather than 
discharging the generals, the AKP adopted a strategic move by transferring the locus of 
the struggle to the “popular will”. The early elections in 2007 resulted in the AKP’s 
landslide victory with 46.6% of the popular vote, an increase from 34.3% in 2002, and 
the control of the Parliament with a majority of 341 seats out of 550 (TÜİK, 2012, 
p.93). Abdullah Gül was elected as the 11th president of the Republic of Turkey in 
August 2007.  
Alongside this extended political feud ran the ongoing political struggle between 
Kemalist forces and the AKP over the headscarf, dubbed the “hijab wars”. With a 
constitutional amendment in February 2008 supported by the AKP and the MHP, the 
ban on headscarves in universities was lifted. However, the secular establishments were 
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alarmed that the AKP had a hidden agenda to change the secular nature of the Republic. 
They argued that lifting the headscarf ban in universities, which had been a zero-sum 
game between hard-line secularist forces and Islamic forces for a long time, was one 
step towards the Islamisation of society. Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP, described 
it as a “clear challenge to secularism” (Hürriyet Daily News, 6 February 2008). 
Following the appeal by the CHP and DSP to the Constitutional Court, the Court ruled 
to annul the constitutional changes on the grounds that they violated Article 2 of the 
Constitution on the secular character of the state. 
 The continuation of the political struggle between the AKP and the high 
judiciary came to a head in 2008. In March the judiciary struck again, harsher than 
before, with a file by the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya to close the AKP and ban its 71 leading members for five 
years, including President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan. This case signalled possible 
political instability. The party was indicted as becoming the “centre of anti-secular 
activities” by Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya. The demand for the closure of the AKP was 
rejected with six votes to five while a verdict was rendered for partial cutting of public 
funding for the party (Milliyet, 30 July 2008). 
The most important round of democratic struggle with pro-status quo Kemalist 
forces occurred in June 2009 when Parliament, by amending Article 250 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, passed legislation providing for civilian courts—actually “specially 
authorised heavy penal courts"92—to try military personnel in peacetime for crimes 
such as attempted coups d’état, crimes affecting national security and organised crime 
(EC, 2009, p.10). By amending Article 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the power 
                                                          
92 These “specially authorised heavy penal courts” had been included in the Code of Criminal Procedure 
in June 2004 and equipped with special powers after the abolition of “state security courts” and became 
instrumental in trying military personnel in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases. Their abolition was 
decreed in July 2012 but not completed until March 2014. 
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of the military courts to try civilians in peacetime was totally abrogated (EC, 2009, 
p.10). Upon the appeal in January 2010 by the CHP under Deniz Baykal to the 
Constitutional Court to annul legislation making amendments to the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the Constitutional Court overturned it (Today’s Zaman, 22 January 2010).     
This prompted the last round between the AKP and the high judiciary through 
the 12 September 2010 Constitutional Referendum, strategically held on the 30th 
anniversary of the 1980 military coup. The AKP promised to enlarge, strengthen, and 
diversify fundamental rights and freedoms and enhance democratic standards (AK 
Party, 2010, p.14). Therefore, the governing party was able to get the consent of liberals 
and some socialists who gathered under the banner of “Not Enough but Yes” (Yetmez 
ama Evet). It can be said that the AKP successfully implemented a strategy of a war of 
position by turning itself into a source of “moral and political leadership” of the liberal 
intelligentsia against the Kemalist monopolisation of the state. The AKP also made 
clear that one of the objectives of the constitutional referendum was to strengthen the 
rule of law and judicial independence (AK Party, 2010, p.14). By modifying the 
composition of the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Public 
Prosecutors93 the referendum broke the judicial monopoly of the Kemalists. However, it 
filled the vacancies with the followers of the Gülen movement (Çakır & Sakallı, 2014, 
pp.28-32). The alliance between the AKP and the Gülen movement also worked in the 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz) trials (Çakır & Sakallı, 2014, pp.28-32). The 
rapid expansion of the Gülen movement after Turkey’s neoliberal turn in the 1980s has 
                                                          
93 According to these constitutional amendments in 2010, the Constitutional Court is composed of 17 
members. They are sourced from Parliament (3 members), President (4 members), Court of Appeal (3 
members), the Council of State (2 members), the Military Court of Appeal (1 member), High Military 
Administrative Court (1 member), and the Council of Higher Education (3 members) (Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Turkey, 2013). The High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors is composed 
of 22 members, made up of the Minister of Justice (1 member), Undersecretary of Minister of Justice (1 
member), regular judges and public prosecutors of the first degree (7 members), administrative judges 
and public prosecutors of the first degree (3 members), Court of Appeal (3 members), Council of State 
(2), the Justice Academy (1 member) and President (4 members) (High Council of Judges and Public 
Prosecutors, 2010).  
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coincided in some ways with the AKP’s struggle against the state establishment. On that 
point, it is crucial to outline the expansion of the Gülen movement.  
The expansion of the Gülen movement 
Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the movement, was born in Erzurum, a conservative city 
in Eastern Turkey, in 1938. There he received a Sufi education from Sheikh Muhammed 
Lütfi (Yavuz, 2003b, p.20).94 He graduated from a madrasa in Erzurum in 1958 (Ünal, 
& Wiiliams, 2000, p.1) and in 1966 was appointed to the Kestanepazarı Quranic school 
in İzmir, Turkey’s third biggest city located in the West of the country (Yavuz, 2003b, 
p.20). As a sympathiser of the Nurcus, which “has been the major pro-NATO and pro-
American Muslim group in Turkey” (Yavuz, 2003b, p.22), Gülen founded the Erzurum 
branch of the “Turkish Association for Struggle against Communism” in 1963 (Yavuz, 
2003b, p.22; Çetin, 2010, p.31).  
 The 1980 coup was supported by Gülen himself, not only because he was in 
favour of a strong state as a buttress against anarchy but also because the political and 
social project propagated by the military, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, aligned well 
with his objective to cultivate a “golden generation” (Yavuz, 2003b). Inspired by the 
reading circles (dershanes) developed by Said-i Nursi (1873-1960) who authored a 
Quranic exegesis known as Risale-i Nur (the Epistle of Light), Gülen had formed the 
lighthouses (ışık evleri) where “university students stay, study, and develop a sense of 
identity to protect their Muslim personality from other temptations” (Yavuz, 2003b, 
p.33). According to Gülen, the “golden generation” (altın nesil) and “people of service” 
(hizmet insanları) would be “faithful to the cause to which they have devoted 
themselves, that deeply in love with it, they willingly sacrifice their lives and whatever 
they love for its sake” (Gülen as cited in Hendrick, 2013, p.90).  
                                                          
94 According to Fethullah Gülen, Sufism is a path that enables an individual to renounce his/her material 
ambitions and desires through a spiritual self-discipline, a strict religious observance, and an 
understanding of the religious and gnostic sciences (Gülen, 2004). 
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Gülen’s ideas—integration of Islam into the formation of national identity and 
promotion of loyalty to the state—were seen as an antidote to Islamic fundamentalist 
forces after the 1980s (Yavuz, 2003b, pp.37-38). While in 1986 Turgut Özal lifted the 
ban on Gülen on delivering sermons (Yavuz, 2003b, p.37), the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs elevated his official status to an Emeritus Preacher in 1989, meaning that he was 
allowed to deliver sermons in any mosque in Turkey (Çetin, 2010, p.46).  
The Gülen movement capitalised on two important developments in the 1980s 
and 1990s. On the one hand, Gülen’s trust networks benefited a lot from the neoliberal 
transformation of Turkey’s education system; they set up private schools, supplemental 
tutoring centres such as lesson houses (dershaneler in Turkish), and dormitories. These 
institutions have provided a refuge for poor students struggling in a highly competitive 
university entrance examination system (Hendrick, 2013). On the other hand, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, more specifically, the ideological vacuum that the Soviet 
Union left in the Central Asia after 1991, provided another window of opportunity for 
the Gülen movement. Unlike the Milli Görüş movement which provided religious 
services to Turkish migrants abroad, the Gülen movement concentrated on building 
schools and cultural centres (Balci, 2014). By means of building networks with the 
Turkish embassies there, the number of the Gülen-affiliated schools abroad increased 
exponentially during the 1990s. By 2003, 149 Gülen-affiliated schools all over the 
world, but mainly concentrated in Eurasia, served approximately 28,000 students with 
more than 3,000 teachers (Balci, 2003, p.156). The Gülen-affiliated schools and 
especially the “dialogue” centres set up in virtually all countries fulfil a two-fold 
mission. They both establish solidarity networks (hemşehrilik) among Turkish people 
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abroad and provide a platform for academics, researchers, and an “elite strata” (H. 
Gülerce, personal communication, April 21, 2013).95 
By 1997, the Gülen movement had already established a strong presence in the 
media with a newspaper (Zaman); magazines (Sızıntı, Ekoloji, and, Aksiyon); a journal 
(Yeni Ümit); a periodical (The Foundation); a television channel (Samanyolu TV); a 
radio station (Burç FM) combined with a growing power in economy with a financial 
institution (Asya Finans) and a business organisation (The Business Life Cooperation 
Association, İŞHAD) (Yavuz, 2003b, p.36). The expansion of the Gülen movement 
abroad during the 1990s was also instrumental in strengthening Turkey’s soft power and 
it was supported by President Turgut Özal (Balci, 2014).  
Despite Gülen’s close relationship with Turkey’s political establishment and his 
pro-state discourse, he could not avert the direct attack on him by the media and the 
military after the military coup in 1997 (Yavuz, 2003b, p.43). The Ankara state security 
court requested an arrest warrant for Gülen in 2000, which was lifted later (Hürriyet 
Daily News, 29 August 2000). The pressure on the Gülen movement in the aftermath of 
the 28 February process eased off the AKP coming to power in 2002. The movement 
continued to expand in finance, media, and business. In 2005, a Gülen-affiliated 
business association (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists, 
TUSKON) was formed. In 2008, Gülen was acquitted of a charge in 2000 of forming an 
illegal organisation by a unanimous vote of the Supreme Court of Appeals (Today’s 
Zaman, 8 March 2008).  
The Gülen movement had an influence on the police institution and judiciary 
and had been backing the AKP since 2002, providing human resources to overcome the 
common enemy, the military (Çakır & Sakallı, 2014; Söyler, 2015, p.171). According to 
                                                          
95 Hüseyin Gülerce was a former columnist in the Zaman newspaper and an important figure in the Gülen 
Movement. 
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Gülen’s followers, the well-educated “golden generation” would be the only potential 
carrier of democratisation contrary to Turkey’s intolerant and aggressive contemporary 
political figures (H. Gülerce, personal communication, April 21, 2013). Vis-à-vis the 
state establishment, the Gülen community claimed that the “Ergenekon mentality” was 
not limited to the military, but also fused into the judiciary, media, the business circles, 
and the university therefore the trials should be expanded to these zones of influences 
(H. Gülerce, personal communication, April 21, 2013).  
The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz) trials  
The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases emerged as the last phase of a tug of war 
between the AKP and the Bonapartist tendency within the military after the balance of 
power shifted in favour of the AKP which challenged the e-memorandum by the 
military in April 2007. The AKP called for early elections in July 2007 and won a 
comfortable victory with 46.6% of the votes (TÜİK, 2012, p.93). The Ergenekon trial 
between 2008 and 2013 and the Sledgehammer trial between 2010 and 2013 by 
“specially authorised courts” basically worked to paralyse a clique in the army—a 
clique which saw itself as saviour of the Republic and would not hesitate to intervene in 
politics since they deemed the AKP to be the facilitator of the decay of Republican 
ideas, secularism and national unity.  
 Few cases in the history of the Turkish Republic have so deeply polarised the 
public and been as baffling as the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases. From their 
initial phases, these inquiries were highly politicised. The CHP leader Deniz Baykal 
accused Prime Minister Erdoğan of being “the prosecutor of Ergenekon” and named 
himself as “the lawyer of Ergenekon” (Radikal, 5 July 2008). Erdoğan responded that 
he was a prosecutor in the name of the nation (Yeni Şafak, 16 July 2008).  
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On the one hand, the Ergenekon trials were deemed to be political trials aiming 
for suppression of the AKP’s prosecular critics (Eligür, 2010, p.266) by the Gülen 
movement supporters (Cagaptay, 2010). The Ergenekon investigation was alleged to 
rest on a “largely fictionalized construct” (Rubin, 2008) which was “full of 
contradictions, rumors, speculation, misinformation, illogicalities, absurdities and 
untruths” (Jenkins, 2009, p.11). It was also put forward that the Sledgehammer 
indictment was, similarly, based on fabricated evidence and conspiracy (Doğan & 
Rodrik, 2010). The Ergenekon trials were argued to be the product of a power struggle 
between “an inner core of unelected, self-appointed and often state-employed arch-
nationalists” and “an imperfectly democratic, illiberal, but nonetheless electorally 
popular new elite of Anatolian populists” (Park, 2009).  
On the other hand, it was suggested that the Ergenekon affair marked a crucial 
point in the democratisation of Turkey since the government could embrace a reformist-
liberal agenda—for instance on the Kurdish issue—once it got rid of military tutelage 
(Cizre & Walker, 2010). Only then did the government feel strong enough to eliminate 
the autonomy of the military in internal security operations by abolishing the Police-
Public Security Cooperation (EMASYA) protocol in early 2010 (Gürsoy, 2012, pp.748-
749). This was a further step for a “regime with consolidated democratic control of the 
military” (Bardakçi, 2013, p.425). In addition, by revealing internal divisions within the 
army—between absolutists and gradualists—the Ergenekon affair contributed to the 
evolution of society towards a more liberal democratic mindset with respect to civil-
military relations, according to Ersel Aydinli (2011). In response to the legal/procedural 
flaws in trials, such as long pre-trial detentions, lack of secrecy during the investigation, 
the hurrying off of suspects from their homes at early hours, and awkward indictments, 
Necati Polat (2011, p.214) reminded that judicial inadequacies were results of the 
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accumulation of problems with a “long-standing, inefficient system that [was] simply 
oblivious to international standards”. H. Akin Ünver (2009, p.16) rightly warned that 
the polarisation in Turkish society hid a debate on democratisation and transparency of 
the state.  
Named after the mythical birthplace of the Turkish nation in Central Asia, the 
“Ergenekon” investigation was launched upon the discovery in June 2007 in a shanty 
house in Ümraniye, İstanbul of 27 hand grenades, having serial numbers that matched 
those used in an attack against the pro-secular Cumhuriyet newspaper offices (Aydinli, 
2011, p.232). Following the investigation, several retired army officers, officers in 
active duty, mafia leaders, journalists and writers linked with the military, and 
prominent figures were arrested one after the other.96 The charges of the suspects 
included “membership in an armed terrorist group, aiding and abetting an armed 
terrorist organisation, attempting to destroy the government of the Republic of Turkey 
or to block it from performing its duties, inciting people to rebel against the Republic of 
Turkey, being in possession of explosives, using them, and inciting others to commit 
such crimes, acquiring secret documents on national security, recording personal data, 
                                                          
96 In the 2,455-page first Ergenekon indictment, which was presented on 10 July 2008, 86 suspects were 
charged. Some of the prominent defendants in the first Ergenekon indictment were retired brigadier 
general and founder of gendarmerie intelligence and anti-terror unit (JİTEM) Veli Küçük, retired 
lieutenant Muzaffer Tekin, mafia leaders Sedat Peker and Sami Hoştan, the head of National Forces 
Association (Kuvayı Milliye Derneği) Bekir Öztürk, the leader of the Workers’ Party Doğu Perinçek, 
former rector of İstanbul University Kemal Alemdaroğlu, lawyer and the head of The Great Jurists Union 
(Büyük Hukukçular Derneği) Kemal Kerinçsiz, Orthodox Patriarchate spokeswoman Sevgi Erenerol, 
chief editor of Workers’ Party-linked TV channel (Ulusal Kanal) Ferid İlsever, journalist in Cumhuriyet 
İlhan Selçuk, the president of the National Forces (Kuvayı Milliye) Association retired Colonel Fikri 
Karadağ (Hürriyet, 26 July 2008). A 1,909-page second Ergenekon indictment was presented on March 8, 
2009, charging 56 suspects of being members or founders of “an armed terrorist organisation”. The 
defendants included former General Commander of the Gendarmerie and later head of Atatürk Thought 
Association (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) Şener Eruygur, former Commader of the First Army Hurşit 
Tolon, former General Levent Ersöz, columnist in newspaper Cumhuriyet Mustafa Balbay, journalist 
Tuncay Özkan, head of Ankara Chamber of Commerce Sinan Aygün and Commander Arif Doğan 
(Radikal, 25 March 2009). The third Ergenekon indictment of 1,454 pages charged 52 suspects of the 
same offence, which included socialist writer Yalçın Küçük, internationally renowned surgeon Mehmet 
Haberal, academician Erol Manisalı, rectors Fatih Hilmioğlu and Ferit Bernay, former head of Higher 
Education Board (YÖK) Kemal Gürüz, former Secretary-General of the National Security Council 
Tuncer Kılınç, former head of Police Special Operation Department İbrahim Şahin and head of trade 
union Türk Metal since 1975 Mustafa Özbek (Radikal, 5 August 2009).    
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encouraging soldiers to disobey superiors and openly provoking hatred and hostility” 
(Park, 2008, p.56). The Ergenekon process lasted six years from June 2007 to August 
2013 and merged 23 indictments, charging 275 suspects, including former Chief of 
Staff General İlker Başbuğ (2008-2010). 
  On 5 August 2013, İstanbul’s 13th High Criminal Court announced its 
punishments, which included consecutive life sentences, aggravated life imprisonment, 
and lengthy sentences for high-ranking officers and prominent figures (Hürriyet Daily 
News, 5 August 2013). After the Constitutional court decided that İlker Başbuğ had 
been “unlawfully deprived of his freedom”, he was released in March 2014, followed by 
other convicts (EC, 2014, p.12). 
 Unlike the heterogonous make-up of the suspects in the Ergenekon trials, all the 
suspects in the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) trials were military officers. The trial started 
after a liberal newspaper, Taraf, revealed in January 2010 the averted coup plan drafted 
between late 2002 and March 2003 by Çetin Doğan, who was Commander of the First 
Army at that time (Taraf, 20 January 2010). In the Sledgehammer trials, the generals 
were charged with “attempting to hinder the operations of the executive body of the 
Republic of Turkey by force” (Hürriyet Daily News, 21 September 2012).  
 On 21 September 2012, a total of 331 serving and retired members of the 
military out of 365 suspects were convicted to 20 years’ imprisonment, including the 
retired Air Force Commander General İbrahim Fırtına, retired First Army Commander 
General Çetin Doğan and retired Navy Commander Admiral Özden Örnek (Hürriyet 
Daily News, 21 September 2012). By March 2011, one tenth of the generals and 
admirals of the Turkish armed forces were arrested and charged with plotting a coup 
(İnce, 2011). However, in June 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled for the release of all 
convicts in the Balyoz trials and opened the way for retrial, since it concluded that the 
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rights of the convicted suspects were violated concerning digital data used as evidence 
and the failure by the court to hear the testimony of witnesses, including Commander of 
the Turkish Army Aytaç Yalman (2002-2004) and Chief of the General Staff Hilmi 
Özkök (2002-2006) (Zaman, 18 June 2014). On 31 March 2015, all suspects in the 
Balyoz case were acquitted in the retrial and they vowed to pinpoint those behind the 
“plot” (Ergan, 2015).  
 The sudden change for the retrial of suspects in the Balyoz case was due to the 
fact that when the specially authorised courts started to question National Intelligence 
Agency (MİT) chief Hakan Fidan in February 2012 over talks with the PKK in Oslo 
(Hürriyet Daily News, 9 February 2012), the alliance between the AKP and the Gülen 
movement broke down (Söyler, 2015, p.172). After Erdoğan ensured that the military 
tutelage was over, the AKP sided with the military against his old ally, the Gülen 
network, and the government started to be critical of the trials. The AKP, first, partially 
abolished the specially authorised courts in July 2012 (Hürriyet, 5 July 2012). The 
Gülen movement was opposed to the abolition of the specially authorised courts due to 
the persistence of a “pro-coup mentality” in the military, judiciary, media, business 
circles, and universities (H. Gülerce, personal communication, April 21, 2013). 
Erdoğan, then, declared his discontent with the allegation that Başbuğ was a “member 
of a terrorist organisation”, and asked for his trial without incarceration (Today’s 
Zaman, 6 August 2012). In addition, in November 2013, Erdoğan sought to dismantle 
the Gülen network by shutting down all private preparatory schools, which were 
predominantly run by Gülen sympathisers (Kılıç, 2013). The response to this attempt 
revealed in December 2013 one of the biggest corruption and bribery cases of Turkey, 
which extended to Erdoğan’s family members (Today’s Zaman, 4 September 2014). It 
was clear that the tug of war between the AKP and the military that started in 2007 had 
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evolved into a war between Erdoğan and the Gülen movement. Fethullah Gülen recently 
wrote in The New York Times that the AKP leaders “are leading the country towards 
totalitarianism” (Gülen, 2015).  
 The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz) trials created growing public 
discontent not only because of the legal improprieties or modus operandi of the 
prosecutors but also because of the inclusion of some irrelevant figures in the trials, 
persons who had distanced themselves from the Gülen movement. The first serious 
blunder was that Prof. Türkan Saylan, a staunch defender of the modern way of life, and 
chairwoman of the Association for the Support of Contemporary Living (Çağdaş 
Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği, ÇYDD), a secular civil society organisation mainly 
working for girls’ education, who was interrogated and her house and offices raided in 
April 2009 (Hürriyet, 13 April 2009). Whilst Türkan Saylan was among the people who 
organised the Republican Rally in 2007 against the AKP’s nominee for the presidency, 
she had distanced herself from the secularist-nationalist camp by adopting the slogan 
“No to Sharia no to a Coup”. This raised doubts on a retaliation of these trials since her 
initiative to foster education of girls and insistence on secular education disturbed the 
Gülen-affiliated civil society organisation in Turkish Kurdistan where ÇYDD had 
worked (Karaveli, 2009). In addition, the incarcerations in March  2011 of Nedim 
Şener, a well-known journalist critical of the Gülen movement, and Ahmet Şık, a 
leading journalist and the author of a book entitled İmamın Ordusu (The Imam’s Army), 
which investigated the Gülen network in the police force, raised doubts on the real 
motivation behind the Ergenekon investigations.  
Gareth Jenkins goes as far as to argue that the indictments did not give any 
evidence supporting the verdict that the Ergenekon as such does exist and that the trials 
were based on “fabricated evidence”. He believes that “[t]he Ergenekon organisation as 
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portrayed in the investigation is the product of a conspiracy theorist’s imagination” 
(Jenkins, 2009, p.80), referring to the description of the Ergenekon in the indictments as 
an “armed terrorist organisation”. However, the problem lies in the broad and 
ambiguous definition of “terror” in Turkish laws, which allowed for frequent and 
excessive subsuming of acts of political opposition under the label “terrorism” (Law 
3713 on Fight Against Terrorism, 1991).  It is ironic that the law (Law 3713 on the 
Fight Against Terrorism) was in effect used against a political stratum that had 
effectively used it against every progressive and oppositional force in Turkey in the 
1990s. However, the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials failed to mark the clearance 
of the “deep state tradition” in Turkey. They were mainly limited to military officers 
who wished to topple the AKP government.  
Moreover, the AKP refrained from opening the way to try the military for their 
atrocities against the Kurds in the 1990s. It rather preferred to try the military for an 
“incomplete attempt to stage a coup” in the Sledgehammer trials or for being a member 
of an “armed terrorist organisation” in the Ergenekon trials. This shows that the 
government is willing to exculpate the military of their crimes against the Kurds, 
Armenians, socialists, and human rights activists in the history of the Turkish Republic. 
Overall, it can be suggested that while the Ergenekon case paradoxically sealed the end 
of the Bonapartist regime in Turkey and “represented a powerful blow against elements 
of the original Deep State” (Gunter, 2014, p.33), the Balyoz case demonstrated that the 
principle of the rule of law, even if flawed, was circumvented in the process of 
investigation and trials. Both trials, nevertheless, showed that the higher echelons of the 
military were not immune to judicial punishment.97 The abatement of the military’s 
omnipotence is an indication of “the civilianisation of the Turkish landscape” (Axiarlis, 
                                                          
97 For various interpretations and critique of Ergenekon trials by Turkish socialists, see Yanardağ (2009). 
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2014, p.191). It is also certainly true that the acute polarisation of public opinion and 
failure to unite for a common purpose (Jacoby, 2014) eventually resulted in 
perpetuating the problem of “unconsolidated democracy” (Gürsoy, 2012).  
Reverse wave of authoritarianism in domestic policy 
Turkey’s illiberal democratic system, a political outcome of long decades of Bonapartist 
rule, crystallised once the AKP fully consolidated its electoral base in 2010/2011 after 
the constitutional referendum on 12 September 2010 and the 12 June 2011 general 
election. In The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, Fareed 
Zakaria says that illiberal democracy corresponds to hybrid regimes “that mix elections 
and authoritarianism” (2003, p.91). It is a regime that backslides “toward an elected 
autocracy with more and more of its freedoms secure in theory but violated in practice, 
with corruption embedded into the very system of politics and economics” (Zakaria, 
2003, p.92).  
Another categorisation for hybrid regimes is the “competitive authoritarian 
regime”, which combines characteristics of procedural minimum Schumpeterian 
conceptualisation of democracy—primarily competitive elections—with 
authoritarianism such as seriously violating the principle of fair competition by creating 
an uneven playing field (Levitsky & Way, 2010). According to Levitsky and Way, these 
regimes are  
civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as 
the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places 
them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive 
in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but 
they are not democratic because the playing field heavily skewed in favour of 
incumbents. Competition is this real but unfair (2010, p.5).  
 
“Croatia under Franjo Tudjman, Serbia under Slobodan Milošević, Russia under 
Vladimir Putin, Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, Peru under 
Alberto Fujimori, and post-1995 Haiti, as well as Albania, Armenia, Ghana, Kenya, 
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Malaysia, Mexico and Zambia through much of the 1990s” fall into the category of 
competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p.52). Turkey perfectly fits in 
with this characterisation of its actual political system. 
 There is evidence to suggest that following the AKP’s third term in 2011, 
Turkey’s democratic transition did not lead to a consolidated democracy, but to 
competitive authoritarianism. While this hybrid regime includes important 
characteristics of procedural democracy, such as competitive elections, continued and 
serious violations of civil liberties render the regime authoritarian. As a case in point, 
despite political efforts to curb the power of the recalcitrant state establishment, the 
downsizing of the Kemalist military state gave way to a proliferation of police forces. 
Indeed, the increase in the power of police force started before the end of the military 
tutelage in Turkey. Through the legal changes under Law 2559 on Police Powers and 
Duties (Polis Vazife ve Salahiyetleri Kanunu) in 2007 and Law 3713 on the Fight 
Against Terrorism (Terörle Mücadele Kanunu) in 2006, discretionary police power was 
expanded at the expense of civil liberties. According to the changes in the Law on the 
Fight against Terrorism in 2006, police forces were endowed with the right to use 
weapons directly and without hesitation against those who disobey the call for surrender 
or intend to use their weapon (Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], 18 July 2006). 
According to a 2007 change in the Police Powers and Duties Law, the police force was 
authorised to use firearms even if the police officers did not face a threat to their lives 
(TESEV, 2013, p.31).98 The 2015 amendments in the Laws pertaining to the security 
and police powers, known as the “Internal Security Law Package”, included articles that 
                                                          
98 According to an amendment in Police Powers and Duties (Polis Vazife ve Salahiyetleri Kanunu) in 
2007, the police can use firearms  “[a) within the context of using the right of self-defence] b) vis-a-vis 
resistance which cannot be  rendered ineffective by way of using bodily physical and material force, with 
the objective of and proportional to breaking such resistance, c) in order to capture individuals for whom 
there is an arrest warrant, a decision to detain, be captured or apprehended; or in order to capture the 
suspect in cases where he/she is apprehended while the crime is in progress, and the extent proportional 
for that purpose” (TESEV, 2013, p.31). 
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would be a sign of the usurpation of the roles of the prosecutors and judges. The police 
chiefs under the permission of provincial governors and district governors were 
authorised to search people and vehicles without a court order. Under “a serious 
disruption of public order or crime”, the police were also authorised to detain people for 
up to 48 hours without getting a court order. When needed, governors were also allowed 
to dispatch the police to pursue suspects. The “Internal Security Law Package” allowed 
police forces to use firearms against those who attack public buildings with a gasoline 
bomb (Molotov cocktail) or similar inflammable materials (TRT English, 4 April 2015; 
Human Rights Watch, 11 December 2014; Anadolu Ajansı, 4 April 2015).  
 There was a sharp increase in the total number of convicts and detainees after 
the legal changes in the Law on the Fight Against Terrorism were put into effect in 
2006. For instance, while there were 70,277 detainees and convicted people kept in 
penal institutions in 2006, this number more than doubled to 158,837 in 2014 (Figure 
5.11). The Associated Press reported that since 9/11, “Turkey alone accounted for a 
third of all [terrorism] convicts, with 12,897” (in Mendoza, 2011). Interestingly, the 
total number of convicts and detainees in 2014 was more than it was under the military 
dictatorship between 1980 and 1983 (Associated Press in Mendoza, 2011). The Ministry 
of Justice has made plans to construct 207 new prisons between 2013 and 2017 
(Hürriyet Daily News, 24 September 2013).  
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Figure 5.11. Total Number of Convicts and Detainees in Penal Institutions, 1970-2014.  
Source: Republic of Turkey, Minister of Justice, General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses, 
2013. 
Apart from the hypertrophy of the police force and prison population since 2006, 
in 2014 a new law on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence 
Organisation (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) expanded the surveillance and data 
collection power of the latter. According to the EU, this law “extended the scope of the 
service’s duties, increased the already broad immunity of its staff and increased access 
to information from all public institutions and banks, without restrictions and without 
adequate judicial or parliamentary oversight” (EC, 2014, p.11). The law also granted 
Turkish intelligence services immunity from judicial control in their conduct concerning 
wiretapping and surveillance (EC, 2014, p.13). The law also prevents a direct judicial 
investigation of MİT members concerning their conduct. It states that public prosecutors 
should first inform the undersecretary of MİT when they receive any tips or complaints 
concerning the conduct of MİT members. Public prosecutors cannot take any further 
procedural act and protection measures if the conduct is in relation with the duties and 
activities of MİT (Devlet İstihbarat Hizmetleri ve Milli İstihbarat Hizmetleri Kanunu 
[Law on State Intelligence Services and National Intelligence Organisation], n.d., 
Article 26). Human Rights Watch warned that this law can immunise intelligence 
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personnel who commit serious human rights violations such as torture (Human Rights 
Watch, 29 April 2014). It added that “[t]he law also effectively places the intelligence 
agency above the law since the agency decides if its own activity should be prosecuted” 
(Human Rights Watch, 29 April 2014).  
 The hypertrophy of the state’s repressive apparatus corresponded to a period in 
which global records in the protection of civil and political rights, not least the freedom 
of press, have painted a disturbing picture since 2007. For eight consecutive years after 
2006, the number of countries around the world experiencing declines in freedom 
outnumbered those registering gains (Freedom House, 2014, p.1). According to the 
2014 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters without Borders, Turkey ranked 154th 
out of 180 countries, falling behind Russia (148th), Mexico (152nd), and Iraq (153rd) 
(2014, p.31). The Reporters without Borders’ report (2014, p.8) stated that Turkey is 
still “one of the world’s biggest prisons for journalists”. According to Larry Diamond, 
Turkey has been one of the states that “had worse average freedom scores at the end of 
2013 than they did at the end of 2005” (2015, p.150).    
 Similarly, according to the findings of Freedom House titled “Freedom of the 
Press 2013: A Global Survey of Media Independence”, Turkey, which was positioned in 
“Partly Free status”, ranked 120th out of 197 countries. The report stated that 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and expression are not fully put into 
practice due to restrictive provisions in the criminal code and anti-terrorist act. The 
report reiterated what Reporters without Borders’ report continuously stated. According 
to Freedom House, “Turkey remains among the nations with the most journalists behind 
bars in the world” (Freedom House, 2013, p.12). Mainly due to the sharp deterioration 
of press freedom following the Gezi Park protests that erupted in May 2013 and lasted 
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for more than a month, Freedom House demoted Turkey’s press status in 2014 from 
“Partly Free” to “Not Free” (Freedom House, n.d.).  
In addition to the formal limitations on civil liberties, the particular capitalist 
structure of Turkish media severely limits democracy. The capitalists who own holding 
companies, active in the construction, energy, and mining sectors, have interests in 
running a pro-government media outlet in order to access government contracts and 
benefit from privatisation (Corke, et al, 2014, pp.12-13). According to Ayşe Buğra and 
Osman Savaşkan, the public procurement law was changed 29 times between 2003 and 
2013 and over 100 amendments were made to the law in respect of its scope, 
applications, and exceptions (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, p.79). In 2013 alone, the 
government issued approximately NTL 90 billion ($40 billion) worth of public 
procurements (Kamu İhale Kurumu [The Public Procurement Authority], 2014, p.1). 
Through close links with the government and Erdoğan, the capitalists in the pro-
government media sector benefited from public tenders and media handovers (Buğra & 
Savaşkan, 2014, pp.95-101). Some examples include Doğuş Holding’s (NTV, Star TV) 
acquisition of a $702 million tender in 2013 to operate Galataport in İstanbul and İhlas 
Holding’s (Türkiye, İhlas New Agency, TGRT TV) $1.86 billion deal in 2013 to 
gentrify the Gaziosmanpaşa area in Istanbul (Corke et al., 2014). Not surprisingly, after 
the Demirören Holding purchased the Milliyet newspaper in 2011, the company owner 
asked Erdoğan who to appoint as the editor-in-chief of the newspaper (Corke et al., 
2014, p.12).  
Meanwhile, political opponents of the party faced serious tax charges. As a form 
of selective and discretionary use of legal instruments,  the Doğan media group, which 
is still one of the biggest media conglomerates in Turkey and whose chairman was an 
open critic of Erdoğan, was levied a $2.5 billion fine in September 2009 due to tax 
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charges (Arsu & Tavernise, 2009). In the 2009 EU Progress Report of Turkey, this fine 
was declared to “potentially undermine the economic viability of the Group and 
therefore affect freedom of press in practice” (EC, 2009, p.18). In 2013, two Koç 
Holding subsidiaries, TÜPRAŞ and Aygaz, were targeted by finance inspectors to 
conduct a “routine” inspection after Erdoğan charged Divan Hotel, owned by Koç, of 
harbouring Gezi protesters (Hürriyet Daily News, 25 July 2013 & Hürriyet, 26 June 
2013). A detailed review of global competitive reports by the World Economic Forum 
reveals that there has been a steady deterioration of Turkey’s judicial independence 
since 2006; Turkey fell 51 places from 2006 (50th) to 2014 (101st) (World Economic 
Forum, 2006, p.407; 2014, p.411). A minimum level of judicial independence and a 
predictable, rational, and systematic legal system are necessary for the operations of 
capitalists to invest in productive sectors, if not in speculative areas, and to calculate and 
assess risks (Weber, 1978, p.883).   
All these backlashes in civil liberties are in contradiction with the Schumpeterian 
understanding of democracy, in which “a considerable amount of freedom of press” is a 
principle in competing for political leadership (Schumpeter, 2003, p.272). However, 
competition for leadership is geared towards the AKP advantage. According to the 
OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (ODIHR) report on 
Turkey’s presidential election in August 2014, unfair competition among candidates 
marked the election with regard to the “misuse of administrative resources and the lack 
of a clear distinction between key institutional events and campaign activities”, as well 
as significantly biased media coverage, including state television, in favour of Erdoğan 
(OSCE, 2014, pp.1-3).99  
                                                          
99 According to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), state television, “TRT 
1 devoted 51 per cent of coverage to Mr. Erdoğan, with Mr. İhsanoğlu and Mr. Demirtaş received 32 per 
cent and 18 per cent, respectively. In addition, 25 per cent of Mr. İhsanoğlu’s coverage was negative in 
tone, while Mr. Erdoğan’s coverage was almost all positive” (OSCE, 2014, p.18). The report also stated 
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Last but not least, Prime Minister Erdoğan latched on to an abrasive populist 
trope not only to win upcoming elections but also to criticise and muzzle his political 
opponents as “elitists”, resulting in a further polarisation of society along cultural fault 
lines. Populism, here, refers to “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the 
corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p.543). This political ideology 
exalts of a unified homogenous “people” through the mediation of a charismatic leader, 
who claims to embody “the interests of the nation” (Canovan, 1999, p.5). This 
charismatic leader addresses a particular logic of articulation to construct a popular 
subject for a mode of representation (Laclau, 2005). By portraying the CHP as the party 
of “crème de la crème” and “White Turks”, the AKP was to be the party of “Negroes” 
(Yeni Şafak, 17 March 2014). While denouncing the CHP as an elitist party, which 
demanded to monopolise “all privileges and opportunities” into its hands, Erdoğan 
called himself a “Negro Turk” (Küçük, 2013). In a protest against construction of a road 
in METU, a leading university in Ankara, Turkey, protesters were portrayed as 
“leftists”, “atheists” and “terrorists” that the CHP embraced while the AK Party youth 
was said to have only “computers and pens” rather than “Molotov cocktails in their 
hands” (Today’s Zaman, 6 March 2014). It then became possible for the AKP 
leadership to increasingly “interpellate” political subjects through an Islamic mode of 
articulation or identification. Insofar as the AKP has been successful in portraying itself 
as the embodiment of the will of “the people” while depicting the CHP as the party of 
the “elitists”, it has served in reducing the social cleavages to cultural splits, obfuscating 
power struggles within both constructed “people” and the “elite”, and thereby glossing 
                                                                                                                                                                          
that Erdoğan combined his presidential campaigning with the inauguration of big state projects such as 
high-speed train between İstanbul and Ankara and Başakşehir football stadium in İstanbul (OSCE, 2014, 
p.14, f.n.39).   
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over the destructiveness of neoliberalism creating and exacerbating social and economic 
insecurities. Meanwhile, democracy is reduced to the ballot-box and any anti-
government demonstration is depicted as an attempt to impose the will of the minority 
over the majority (Özbudun, 2014, p.157). 
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Chapter 6: Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP 
“Turkey does not see diamonds in Africa, but rather a 
common history of friendship and brotherhood” Erdoğan’s 
speech at the Parliament of Gabon, 2013.    
   
This chapter analyses the sub-imperialist expansion of Turkish capitalism under the 
AKP, mainly into the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It argues that the 
realignment of Turkish foreign policy under the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism is a 
product of decades-long capitalist development in which Turkey's regional economic 
power complemented its political-military power after the transition to the export-led 
economic model in the 1980s. This chapter proposes that neo-Ottomanism is in 
accordance with the political and economic needs of Turkish capitalism as a whole. 
Second, it demonstrates that Turkish companies have turned out to be new agents of 
regional economic power. Throughout the chapter, the concepts of imperialism and sub-
imperialism are used as analytical tools to understand the expansion of Turkish 
capitalism under AKP rule. Lastly, it concludes that Turkey's sectarian leanings in 
recent years are a product of a failure in foreign policy calculations during the Arab 
uprising, in which Turkey allied with Qatar to be the guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and of the domestic policy calculation that would rally the AKP's "Sunni" electoral base 
against the "Alevis" in Turkey, which in turn undermined attempts to project Turkey as 
a "model". 
Imperialism and sub-imperialism 
In his 1902 book Imperialism: A Study, liberal economist John A. Hobson depicted 
imperialism as a symptom of the capitalist crisis (Milios & Sotiropoulos, 2009, pp.10-
12). Hobson suggested that it is a disequilibrium between production and consumption 
that pushes industrialists to search for outlets for their goods and investment, thus 
establishing the main economic root of imperialism (1968, p.85). While not completely 
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disregarding the underconsumptionist views of Hobson, early Marxist critics of 
imperialism focused on 1) capitalism as a global structure; 2) imperialism as a 
monopolistic and decaying stage of capitalism; and 3) capital exports and monopolies’ 
domination, stemming from surplus capital in advanced countries (Milios & 
Sotiropoulos, 2009, pp.20-32). The emphasis on the economic basis of imperialism 
suggests that imperialism is a necessary and intrinsic feature of capitalism. This leads 
one to conclude that imperialism entails a political and economic competitive struggle 
between advanced capitalist countries, which have a propensity to lead to inter-
imperialist wars (Brewer, 1990, p.89). In other words, imperialism manifests itself “as 
the intersection of economic and geopolitical competition” (Callinicos, 2009, p.72).   
On that point, the role of the coercive state apparatus in relation to imperialism 
was remarked upon by Rosa Luxemburg. She drew attention to the fact that militarism 
is a complementary tool for capital accumulation. She concluded that  
Capitalism increasingly employs militarism for implementing a foreign and colonial 
policy to get hold of means of production and labour power of non-capitalist countries 
and societies. This same militarism works in a like manner in the capitalist countries to 
divert purchasing power away from the non-capitalist strata. The representatives of 
simple commodity production and the working class are affected alike in this way. At 
their expense, the accumulation of capital is raised to the highest power, by robbing the 
one of their productive forces and by depressing the other’s standard of living (2003, 
pp.446-447). 
 
Imperialism thus can only be understood in relation to “economic, political, and 
military consequences of monopoly competition raging among countries on a world 
scale” (Barone, 1985, p.55).100 It is also crucial to acknowledge that in a “hierarchical, 
monopolistic and unequal world system that produces and reproduces specific national 
patterns of accumulations” (Marini in Misoczky & Imasato, 2014, p.279), capitalist 
development in a dependent country can relocate it further up in this imperialist chain. 
The transformation in “the form which dependent capitalism assumes upon reaching the 
                                                          
100 For other early Marxist theories of imperialism see Hilferding (1981); Bukharin (1966); Lenin (1968); 
for an evaluation of these theories see Barone (1985); for dependency theory see Gunder Frank (1969); 
for a review of  dependency theory see Ghosh (2001); Palma (1961). 
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stage of monopolies and finance capital” (Marini, 1972, p.15) renders these countries 
sub-imperialists.  
The term “sub-imperialism” was originally introduced by sociologist Ruy Mauro 
Marini to depict Brazilian regional economic and political power after the 1964 military 
coup that overthrew President João Goulart (Marini, 1965; 1972). The process of 
converting a dependent country to sub-imperialism was not, however, confined to 
Brazil. Indeed, the crisis of world capitalist accumulation in the late 1970s created an 
opportunity for a limited number of dependent countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran under the Shah, India, and South Africa, to attempt 
to be intermediary powers in the global order on the back of the development of their 
own productive forces (Gunder Frank, 1979).  
The asymmetric power relations within the global order consist of a trichotomy 
of categories of actors for the maintenance of dependence: "imperialist center, 
subimperialist agents and dominated periphery countries" (Väyrynen & Herrera, 1975, 
p.168). The sub-imperial agents are “intermediaries in the relations between center and 
periphery when they are simultaneously both dominant and dominated units; more 
dominated than dominant, however” (Väyrynen & Herrera, 1975, p.165). The 
dependence of the sub-imperialist agents on the core can take technological, financial, 
and commercial forms, with sub-imperialist powers tied to the core though imperialist 
centre’s know-how and big transnational corporations, foreign debts, and trade 
(Väyrynen & Herrera, 1975, p.171). The USA dominates the dependency structures "as 
a center nation of first rank over the West European industrial states (and similarly over 
Japan) as centers of second rank" owing to its penetration in European markets and 
financial sector, the status of the dollar as the leading international currency, its 
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technological supremacy, and its military protective role over Europe (Gantzel, 1973, 
pp.205-206).  
On the one hand, a sub-imperial agent is located at the centre of the periphery 
and exerts a regional hegemony by playing the role of an imperialist power while 
simultaneously having a peripheral relationship to the core (Shaw, 1979, p.348). The 
sub-imperial agent, therefore, encapsulates a combination of “dependence on one or 
more central nations, the economic and military capacity, as well as the regional 
political military and economic expansion” (Väyrynen, 1979, p.353). The regional 
political, military, and economic expansion provides the sub-imperialist agent with the 
autonomy and manoeuvrability to assert its power in foreign policy without a necessary 
break from the imperialist core (Väyrynen, 1979, p.367; Väyrynen & Herrera, 1975, 
p.171). On the other hand, the core maintains global dependency through the sub-
imperial powers which provide regional channels for raw materials and finished 
products in a three-layered exchange system (Grundy, 1976, p.561). This in turn 
reduces the military and political costs of the core for capitalist accumulation (Gunder 
Frank, 1979, p.283). The importance of a subimperialist state for the core lies in the fact 
that it provides a “bridgehead for the transnational corporations” of the imperialist 
centre (Väyrynen & Herrera, 1975, p.173). As Raimo Väyrynen and Luis Herrera 
suggests, "[s]ubimperialism is...military control by dominant actors through go-between 
armies, economic exploitation thorough go-between corporations and banks as well as 
political domination through go-between political elites” (1975, pp.170-171). 
To illustrate, Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s, according to Marini, shared the core 
characteristics of a sub-imperialist country: a regional domination and simultaneously 
dependence on an imperialist core through various mechanisms (Marini, 1965; 1972). 
During the sub-imperialist stage of Brazilian capitalism that extended until 1985 under 
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military government, Brazilian foreign policy was based on the conscious acceptance of 
US quasi-monopoly rule in the South Atlantic. Brazil enabled this domination though its 
policy of continental interdependence (Marini, 1965, pp.19-20). This does not, however, 
lead to the conclusion that Brazil pursued a policy of submission to US interests. 
Rather, it stood for an active imperialist collaborative interdependence of Brazilian 
capitalist interests with American interests on the continent by “assuming in this 
[imperialist] expansion the position of a key nation” (Marini, 1965, p.22).  
 As an example of this imperialist alignment with the US, Marini points to the 
Castelo Branco regime (1964-1967) in Brazil, which joined the US in its invasion of the 
Dominican Republic in 1965, applauded the US decision to send military aid for Latin 
America through the Organisation of American States (OAS), and insisted on the 
military integration of the continent under the aegis of the US army (Marini, 1965, 
p.21). The “communist threat” that hovered over Brazil and the Dominican Republic 
was the main reason for this collaboration. As one Brazilian colonel claimed: 
The Armed Forces brilliantly stopped communism from taking over Brazil. Another 
brilliant example is their participation in the Dominican Republic in the operation 
initiated by the American marines where they also stopped communism from taking 
over that country (as quoted in Burns, 1967, p.208)  
 
While this imperialist integration provided the Brazilian bourgeoisie with a 
chance to intensify its industrial and technological modernisation through the influx of 
foreign capital, the influx of foreign capital was also advantageous for the US since it 
needed to export its obsolete equipment (Marini, 1965, p.22). As a result, Brazilian 
capital and foreign monopolies cooperated in exploiting the Brazilian workers and in 
their shared claims on Brazil’s export earnings (Marini, 1972, pp.16-17).  
The exploitation of trade revenues was a product of the high GDP growth of 
Brazil under the military regime. As Gunder Frank explains, “[f]rom 1968 to 1974, 
Brazilian GDP grew at sustained annual rates of 10% and industrial production at 11% a 
 278 
year…Exports sextupled between 1964 and 1975, rising from $1,430 million to $8,200 
million…The most spectacular increase, however, was registered by the export of 
manufactures or industrial products that increased their share from 7-10% to 15-20% 
(depending on definition) of total exports that themselves sextupled” (1979, p.293). 
Nevertheless, Brazil under the military regime, while playing the role of an imperialist 
centre, was highly dependent on the technology of the US and Western corporations. 
The German Mercedes, for instance, provided the Brazilian army and marines with 
engines for their combat vehicles, while the French Thomson-CSF supplied the 
Brazilian air defence systems (Väyrynen, 1979, pp.361-362).                                                                                      
 In addition to Brazil, South Africa under the colonial-setter apartheid regime, 
possessed the characteristics of an intermediary state (Grundy, 1976). South Africa’s 
sub-imperialist position was the product of decades-long import-substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) and semi-industrial capitalism. The ISI model succeeded in 
producing, to a large extent, capital goods; exports were dominated by primary products 
and manufactured products were exported to South Africa’s less developed neighbours 
(Ehrensaft, 1976, p.62). The exports, however, heavily relied on the flow of technology 
from the imperialist centres that controlled the durable and capital goods sectors 
through foreign direct investment (Grundy, 1976, p.564; Ehrensaft, 1976, p.65).  
Under Afrikaner state capitalism since 1948, a highly skewed income 
distribution in favour of a minority white population was sustained by the strengthening 
of the repressive capacity of the state apparatus, which in return hastened 
industrialisation (Ehrensaft, 1976, p.65). "By holding the real wage rate of non-
Europeans at a constant rate, or by decreasing the rate, capital could maintain the high 
return on investment prevailing before it was forced to grant a better bargain to whites" 
(Ehrensaft, 1976, p.78). "Polarized accumulation" created a society where 71% of total 
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income in 1976 was concentrated in the hands of the top 20% of the population 
(Ehrensaft, 1976, p.65; 1985, p.86). Besides, the apartheid regime provided 
transnational corporations with a political system that guaranteed exploitation, cheap 
access to raw materials, and maintenance of order (Grundy, 1976, p.571). Through the 
Southern African Customs Union which was established in 1910 and updated in 1969, 
South Africa became "the export springboard of transnational corporations" (Väyrynen, 
1979, p.357). After the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, South Africa continued to 
play a sub-imperial role albeit in a different form under neoliberalism (Bond, 2004a; 
2004b; 2004c; 2005; 2006; 2013).    
In this new form, through the neoliberal New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) initiative launched by South African President Thabo Mbeki 
(1999-2008), South Africa legitimises and facilitates neoliberalism by controlling its 
hinterland for regional capitalist hegemony (Bond, 2013, p.252). Pretoria also stands as 
a regional financial hub for large-scale foreign capital flows for development in weak 
financial sectors of South African states (Kganyago in Bond 2004b, p.14). Policing the 
financial mechanisms of imperialism (Bond, 2004b, p.164), “NEPAD provided merely 
a homegrown version of the Washington Consensus” (Bond, 2004a, p.26). This 
initiative also supports two pillars of the post-Washington Consensus—the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiatives—without 
acknowledging the need to cancel debts (Bond, 2005, p.233). 
Moreover, the neoliberal practices imposed by the World Bank and the IMF are 
new forms of colonial policy (Bond, 2004b, pp.153-154). “Accumulation by 
dispossession” provides “spatial-temporal fixes” for mitigation, if not resolution, of 
capitalist crisis (Harvey, 2003). These hinterlands provide imperialist and sub-
imperialist states with opportunities to seize upon profitable investment, access to cheap 
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assets, and vast outlets for over-accumulated capital to be invested (Harvey, 2003, 
p.185).   
Surplus extraction via “accumulation by dispossession” can take a financial form 
under neoliberal practices. Trade liberalisation in sub-Saharan African countries 
resulted in the cheapening of the latter’s products since the prices of primary 
commodities and raw materials have fallen drastically since the 1980s. In addition, 
capital flight such as illegitimate repatriation of assets, offshore and transfer pricing to 
evade taxation has created a system of financial surplus extraction (Bond, 2004b). To 
give a disturbing example, 37 % of African citizens’ investments in the form of cash 
and assets were channelled offshore by 2004 (World Bank in Bond, 2004b, p.159). This 
reproduction of the deepening of the financial markets is vital for the US’s balance of 
payment and state budget deficits, since it absorbs $2 billion in global savings per day 
(Bond, 2004b, p.162). In all such settings, sub-imperialist partners work to ensure the 
ideological continuity of the “free markets and free politics” dictum. This is necessary 
to guard against the counter-tendency of social struggle against neoliberalism that can 
arise in response to the ravages of surplus extraction via “accumulation by 
dispossession” (Bond, 2004c, p.223). 
Turkey's dependent relationship with the US, economic expansion into its less 
developed neighbours, and attempts to play the role of an imperialist core in the region 
also stands as an example of sub-imperialism. Similarly to the South African case, the 
sub-imperialist expansion of Turkey into the Middle East is the product of a decades-
long process—a process of establishing an economic infrastructure through ISI and of 
strengthening its military power during the Cold War under the auspices of the US. It 
can be argued that the economic expansion of Turkey since the transition to export-led 
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growth of the 1980s complemented its military capacity, thus rendering the country sub-
imperialist.   
The military dimension of Turkey’s sub-imperialist role 
The Turkish state as “local cop on the beat” and the Middle East 
Turkey has been trying to play the regional role of local cop on the beat under the 
auspices of the US. During the Cold War era, one of the driving forces of Turkish 
foreign policy was its tenacious attachment to the Western alliance against the Soviet 
Union (Hale, 2013, p.80). In line with the containment policy regarding the “communist 
threat” in Europe, Turkey was added to the Truman Doctrine in 1947, and one year later 
received Marshall Aid under the European Recovery Programme. Moreover, since 1952 
Turkey has been a member of NATO (Hale, 2013, pp.83-87). US military assistance 
($2,271 million between 1948 and 1964 along with the deliveries of surplus equipment 
equivalent to $328 million) and economic aid (totalling $1,380 million between 1950 
and 1962) were indeed instrumental in Turkey’s economic growth under the successive 
Menderes governments in the 1950s and in fortifying Turkey’s defences (Hale, 2013, 
pp.89-90). “U.S. economic aid to Turkey between 1950 and 1964 was equivalent to 17 
percent of total gross investment and 35 percent of total public investment in Turkey” 
(Tansky in Uslu, 2003, p.99). Between 1964 and 1969, this economic assistance, an 
average of $284 million per year, exceeded half of Turkey’s foreign exchange earnings 
(Hale, 2013, p.109).  
In return, Turkey played its regional surrogacy role—one that echoed US 
imperialism in the Middle East—by becoming one of “the local cops on the beat” in the 
periphery, a phrase later used by Nixon’s Defence Secretary Melvin Laird (Chomsky in 
Chomsky & Achcar, 2007, p.55; Chomsky, 1999, p.535). Turkey’s status as the only 
Muslim country in NATO was “crucial for preserving stability in the Middle East and, 
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in a broader sense, neutralizing the region as an arena in the East-West conflict” 
(Rustow, 1987, p.110). This imperialist collaboration revealed itself, for instance, at the 
Bandung Conference in 1955 where Turkey allied with Western powers to “prevent the 
conference from being a spring-board for the communists or even the neutrals” (Kimche 
as cited in Ahmad, 1977, p.396). However, Turkey’s attachment to the Western alliance 
in the 1950s strained its relations with the Arab World. The conclusion of the Baghdad 
Pact (later to become CENTO) in 1955 with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the UK under the 
sponsorship of the US was protested in the Arab world, especially in Egypt (Hale, 2013, 
p.92). Arab nationalist governments denounced Turkey as “an agent of American policy 
in the Middle East” (International Crisis Group, 2010, p.2). Turkey and Iraq, under US 
guidance, were even accused of plotting to overcome the Syrian regime in August 1957 
(Bishku, 2012, p.40). This did not prevent Nasser from establishing a political union 
with Syria in 1958 known as the United Arab Republic (Bishku, 2012, p.40). In the 
same year, Turkey put the İncirlik Air Base at the disposal of the US for its intervention 
in Lebanon (Hale, 2013, p.95). 
Turkey also backed French imperialism against the Algerian independence 
movements between 1954 and 1962. In addition, it was also one of the first countries to 
recognise Israel in 1949 (International Crisis Group, 2010, p.2). Less than a decade 
later, in 1958, Turkey under Menderes and Israel under Ben-Gurion secretly formed an 
alliance known as “the peripheral alliance” or “Phantom Pact”, also involving Iran and 
Ethiopia. The aim of the alliance was to ward off Nasser’s Pan-Arabism and Soviet 
influence in the region, and guard against the upheavals in Iraq. The bilateral alliance 
between Israel and Turkey “included cooperation on diplomatic, military, and economic 
levels” (Bengio, 2010, p.44). The alliance included cooperation on industrial 
development in Turkey and increase of trade between the two countries. Economic 
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cooperation included development in agriculture, irrigation pipes, and planning of the 
Keban Dam. In military cooperation, the alliance included exchange of intelligence and 
know-how in military industry, training of Turkish armed forces, and permission for the 
Israeli air force to use Turkish territory. In return, Turkey agreed to side with Israel, 
calling NATO and Pentagon for increasing Israel’s military capacity (Bengio, 2010, 
p.44).   
The intensive courtship between Turkey and Israel yielded a trilateral 
cooperation between MOSSAD, SAVAK and MAH (later to be called MİT – National 
Intelligence Organisation) to form an organisation called “Trident”, which functioned to 
share intelligence (Bengio, 2010, p.45). The Turkish army was the guardian of this 
relationship (Bengio, 2010, p.52). This alliance continued until the annulment of the 
intelligence connection in 1966 when the Cyprus issue had already evolved as a key 
determinant of Turkish foreign policy (Bengio, 2010, pp.54-64).  
Turkey, seeking to maintain imperialism in the region was at odds with the 
independence movement in Cyprus, and Turkey sided with the NATO members 
opposing Cypriot self-determination (Fırat, 2010, pp.357-358). Rather, the Turkish state 
advocated a policy of partition of the island after 1955 (Hasgüler, 2002) when EOKA 
(Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston – the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) 
launched its military struggle against British imperialism (Hitchens, 1997, p.47). Even 
though four years of Greek revolt against British colonialism ended with the 
proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus in August 1960 (Hasgüler, 2002, p.237), the 
resolution did not stabilise the island.101 Post-1960 Cyprus was a battleground of 
                                                          
101 The Republic of Cyprus, whose “sovereignty” was guaranteed by Britain, Turkey and Greece, was a 
product of the Zurich and London Conferences of 1959 which concluded the London Treaties and the 
Treaty of Guarantee (Fırat, 2010, pp.364-365). Under the new regime, the settlement was based on a 
communal balance in which the Turkish Cypriots “who constituted 18% of the population, were granted a 
30% ratio in all levels of power as well as the civil service” (Drousiotis, 2008, p.9). The Turkish vice 
president was granted veto power on foreign policy and defence (Drousiotis, 2008, pp.9-10; Fırat, 2010, 
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outside powers trying to subvert its independence while an internal nationalist tug of 
war developed between EOKA under General George Grivas and TMT (Türk 
Mukavemet Teşkilatı – The Turkish Resistance Organisation) in liaison with Turkish 
Colonel Alparslan Türkeş (Hitchens, 1997). The Turkish deep state was also active in 
Cyprus and inflamed intercommunal tension to legitimise partition (Y. Okut, personal 
communication, February 22, 2015).102 During an interview Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu, retired 
Turkish General and Secretary-General of the National Security Council (1988-1990), 
confessed to the carrying out of a false flag operation in Cyprus. He admitted that the 
Turkish deep state “burnt down a mosque” in order to [blame it] on the enemy [Greek 
Cypriots] to increase public resistance” (Today’s Zaman, 24 September 2010). In 
addition, Makarios’ introduction of constitutional amendments in December 1963, 
which sought to overcome the minority veto power of Turkish Cypriots, was first 
denounced not by Turkish Cypriots but by the Turkish government (Hitchens, 1997, 
p.55). This engendered inter-communal warfare (Bahcheli, 1990, p.59), which led the 
United Nations to establish a peacekeeping force in Cyprus in 1964.103  
                                                                                                                                                                          
p.365). Separate municipalities were granted for each community (Hitchens, 1997, p.49). The Treaty of 
Guarantee allowed Turkey, Greece and Britain to “take action” solely or collectively in Cyprus in case of 
violation of the treaties (Fırat, 2010, p.265). Importantly, British imperialism acquired a territory and 
bases in Cyprus, followed by Turkey and Greece stationing forces on the island (Hitchens, 1997, pp.49-
50). The way the Cyprus dispute was resolved in the London-Zurich Conferences was not welcomed by 
Greek Cypriots (Drousiotis, 2008, p.9). Not only was it humiliating for Cypriots, it also institutionalised 
intercommunal tension (Hitchens, 1997, p.50). 
102 Yalçın Okut is a journalist in Turkish Cypriot daily newspaper Afrika.   
103 Although the National Security Council in Turkey decided to conduct a military operation in Cyprus 
(Uslu, 2003, pp.169-170), a full scale Turkish intervention was prevented by US President Lyndon 
Johnson. In a letter of 5 June 1964 to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü, he stated that NATO would not 
defend Turkey if Turkey provoked the direct involvement of the Soviets through its invasion of Cyprus, 
and additionally Turkey could not benefit from US-supplied weapons in that scenario (Hale, 2013, p.107). 
A possible war in the “Southern flank” of NATO was temporarily warded off. This was important for US 
imperial strategy, the aim of which was forthrightly expressed by Jimmy Carter’s National Security 
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski: “to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, 
to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together” (1997, p.40). It 
is these geostrategic imperatives that meant the US remained silent when the Turkish air force bombed 
Greek Cypriot forces around Kokkina on 8 August 1964 following an attack against Turkish positions 
(Uslu, 2003, p.178).  
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When an Athens-junta-sponsored coup, aided by EOKA-B units, was staged 
against Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus on 15 July 1974,104 Turkey invaded the 
Northern part of the island with two military operations on 20 July and 14 August.105 
Before the invasion, the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Kemal Kayacan 
threatened Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit by saying that “...if, as in the past, we draw 
back at the last minute, neither we as commanders, nor you as the Prime Minister, can 
survive...” (as quoted in Birand, 1975, p.15). Furthermore, the partition policy was 
wholeheartedly pushed by the fundamentalist National Salvation Party under Erbakan, 
who was in coalition with Ecevit at that time. Hasan Aksay, a parliamentarian from the 
National Salvation Party, even suggested in the Milli Gazete that the military occupy 
not only a small part of the island, but the whole of it (İslamoğlu, 1974, pp.64-65).   
 Using the coup as an excuse for invasion, the second phase of the Turkish 
military operation resulted in horrifying human cost, as outlined in a report of the 
European Commission of Human Rights on 10 July 1976 (in Hitchens, 1997, p.103).106 
The attitude of the US on the Cyprus crisis, imposing an arms embargo on Turkey, 
                                                          
104 This coup was given the blessing of the Kissinger administration (Couloumbis, 1983, pp.88-89; 
Hitchens, 1997, p.79) since Makarios, who pursued a non-aligned foreign policy and signed trade 
agreements with the Soviet Union, was deemed unreliable (Uslu, 2003, p.183). Moreover, the US had 
underground contacts with General George Grivas (Hitchens, 1997, pp.58-59). In addition, the Greek 
military junta of 1967-1974 was embraced by two consecutive US administrations under Lyndon Johnson 
and Richard Nixon, respectively (Couloumbis, 1983, pp.53-54). While the Greek junta provided 
investment opportunities for US companies, it also opened its territory and air space to the US during the 
June 1967 War, the Jordanian-PLO fighting in 1970, and the October 1973 War (Couloumbis, 1983, 
pp.53-54). 
105 Melek Fırat suggests that Turkey’s intervention in 1974 was grounded in Article 4 of the Treaty of 
Guarantee, which expressly stipulates that “In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present 
Treaty, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to 
representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as the common 
or concerted action may not prove possible, each of three guaranteeing Powers reserves to right to take 
action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty” (Fırat, 2010, 
p.265). This raises a legitimate question about whether 1) “to take action” necessarily involves “to put 
boots on the ground” and whether 2) Turkey had an objective to re-establish order and integrity in 
Cyprus. 
106 Due to the mass rape of Greek Cypriot women after the invasion, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus 
authorised abortion (Aimilianidēs, 2011, p.179; Hitchens, 1997, p.103). 
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caused Greece to withdraw from the military wing of NATO (Couloumbis, 1983, p.97; 
Hitchens, 1997, p.131). Greece only returned six years later, in 1980.107  
Nevertheless, the embargo set the stage for the development of local defence 
industry and thus the establishment of the foundation of Turkish Land Forces in 1974 
(Undersecretariat for Defence Industries, 2010). The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) 
unified the foundations of land, air, and naval forces under the Turkish Armed Forces 
Foundation (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı, TAFF), formed in 1987 and 
expanded capitalist economic activity of the foundation. TAFF has since been 
functioning as a military corporation. Law number 3388 sets out the foundation’s 
objective as being to develop national war industry, to form new war industry branches, 
to purchase war industry equipment and supplies, and importantly, to contribute to 
enhancing the warfare capability of the Turkish Armed Forces (Resmi Gazete [Official 
Gazette], 25 June 1987, p.16). Concomitantly, the foundation enjoys economic benefits 
such as being exempt from inheritance and succession tax, stamp tax, and corporation 
tax even though its separate economic enterprises are subject to corporation tax (Resmi 
Gazete [Official Gazette], 25 June 1987, p.17). TAFF is particularly significant in its 
direct involvement in the warfare industry. It owns the biggest share in Aselsan 
(Military Economic Industries), Havelsan (Military Aerospace Industries), Roketsan 
(Military Rocket Industries) and TAI (Turkish Aerospace Industries), which are the 
biggest military-industrial enterprises in Turkey. For instance, Aselsan, which maintains 
                                                          
107 Turkey’s National Security Council hastily recognised the establishment of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus in November 1983, just before it handed power to the Özal government (Howe, 1983). 
This self-proclaimed state run by Rauf Denktaş until 2005 was only recognised by Turkey. The Turkish 
state embarked on a policy of partition for nearly five decades, which ceased with the recognition of a 
UN plan under Kofi Annan in 2004. Since 1974, Turkey also expanded militarily to the northern part of 
Cyprus and deployed the “Cyprus Turkish Peace Force Command” on the island. According to a research 
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the size of this force deployed in the Northern 
part of Cyprus stood at 36,000 personnel in 2010 (2010, p.167). This number even excludes the Security 
Forces Command of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which has already been harnessed to the 
Turkish army. It is important to bear in mind that the Turkish Republic of Cyprus had a population of 
294,906 people according 2011 census (Milliyet, 9 December 2011). 
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the leading position in the Turkish military economy, ranked as being the 46th biggest 
industrial enterprise in net production-based sales in Turkey in 2012 (İSO, 2012). It also 
ranked as the 85th largest arms producing and military services company in the world in 
2012 (excluding Chinese companies), with $870 million arms sales and $163 million 
total profit. It employed 5,205 people in 2011, according to the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) research (Perlo-Freeman & Wezeman, 2014, p.216).  
Another significant organisation that links TAF with the capitalist economic 
rationale is the Defence Industry Support Fund (DISF) which has been functioning 
under the control of the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries since 1985. DISF forms 
the main extra-budgetary resource for Turkey’s defence expenditure (Akça, 2010b, 
p.16), which has aimed at modernisation of the armed forces and development of the 
national defence industry since its foundation in 1985 in accordance with Law number 
3238. Not surprisingly, DISF is endowed with economic privileges for its income 
generation. Law number 3238 provides for a wide range of resources to be made 
available to DISF, although it has been subject to major amendments since 2002. The 
income of DISF is based on various resources such as the grant in aid submitted to the 
annual budget for this purpose, a share of income and revenues from corporate taxes, 
the funds allocated in the Ministry of Defence Budget, share of private consumption tax, 
of National Lottery revenue, of national racetrack betting revenue, and of national 
numbers games, as well as transfers from the foundations established to support TAF, 
grants, revenue generated for paid military service, donations and aids, and revenue 
generated for the Fund’s assets (Akça, 2010b, p.16). Between 1985 and 2000, $11.6 
billion was collected in the Fund, of which 70.1% was spent on military projects (Akça, 
2009, p.256). According to the 2012 Activity Report of the Directorate of Defence 
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Industry, between 2000 and 2012, the Fund had an income amounting to more than $14 
billion in total (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı, 2012, p.31).  
Continuity in Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s 
 In the new geopolitical order of post-Cold War period, NATO swiftly mutated into a 
“security” organisation—a broader designation than the bounded concept of “defence” 
that characterised the Cold War era—and expanded into the countries  which were in 
the zone of influence of Soviet Russia.108 NATO extended its military jurisdiction under 
the “new strategic concept” of security set out at the Rome Atlantic summit in 
November 1991 and took on a political role while charging itself with managing 
possible risks and preventing political, economic, and social instabilities that would 
arise even beyond its territories (Achcar, 2000, pp.61-62). The importance of the 
Turkish military in the new geopolitical order did not diminish, but rather increased. 
According to the 2014 report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), Turkey became the world’s 14th largest military spender with $19.1 billion in 
2013 (Perlo-Freeman, Solmirano, & Wilandh, 2014, p.182).109 Even though there was a 
decrease in Turkish military expenditure as a percentage of GDP from 2.8% in 2004 to 
2.3% in 2013, military expenditure in constant US$ (2011) prices increased from 16.6 
billion in 2004 to 18.7 billion in 2013 (Perlo-Freeman, Ferguson, Kelly, Solmirano, & 
Wilandh, 2014). The Turkish armed forces, consisting of 629,593 active military 
personnel out of 982,223 personnel as of January 2015 (Milliyet, 1 January 2015), is 
also one of the largest armies in NATO. 
                                                          
108 At the Madrid Summit in 1997 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were accepted to NATO, 
followed by seven countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—in 
the Prague Summit in 2002 (Achcar, 2000). Albania and Croatia were accepted to this establishment in 
2009. Currently, NATO has 28 members and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the 
former Republic of Macedonia aspire for NATO membership (NATO, 2013).  
109 Calculated using market exchange rates in current US$ for 2013. 
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In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the Turkish state continued its 
regional surrogacy role. In the first Gulf War in 1990/1991, Turkey under Turgut Özal 
backed US imperialism in countering Iraq's invasion of oil-rich Kuwait in 1990. During 
the first Gulf War, Turkey opened its İncirlik air bases and other air bases for the use of 
coalition forces (Hale, 2013, p.160). Özal attempted to turn this crisis into an 
opportunity by siding with the US since he firmly believed that Saddam Hussein would 
be removed by the US and Iraqi military power would be neutralised (Robins, 1991, 
p.71).110 However, Saddam Hussein stayed in power for over a decade and crushed, 
with US consent, the popular uprisings taking place in northern and southern Iraq in 
1991 by Kurds and Shiites (Achcar, 2004, pp.234-239). It was only after the crushing of 
these popular uprisings that the UN passed Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991 enforcing a 
no-fly zone in Northern Iraq (Hale, 2013, p.161). This was followed by the deployment 
of an international force, known as “Operation Provide Comfort” and later “Provide 
Comfort” to the İncirlik Air Base in Turkey for a non-NATO operation. Despite 
opposition from the general public, it was routinely renewed by the Turkish parliament 
upon the “recommendations of the National Security Council”. “Operation Northern 
Watch” replaced "Provide Comfort" in 1997 (Hale, 2013, pp.161-163; Jenkins, 2001, 
p.75).  
The Turkish military’s role in foreign policy administration included playing its 
role within US imperialism in the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” even beyond 
Turkey’s neighbourhood. The Turkish military joined “Operation Restore Hope” in 
Somalia between 1992 and 1994 and Turkish Lieutenant General Çevik Bir was 
                                                          
110 Achcar points out that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a “windfall for the first Bush administration” 
(in Chomsky and Achcar, 2007, p.18) for a couple of reasons: Besides the US’s getting over Vietnam 
Syndrome, showing its military power and demonstrating its partners—Western Europe and Japan—that 
they are still in need of US hegemony even after the post-Cold War episode, the US chiefly benefited 
from  acquiring a direct military presence in the Middle East since its evacuation to the US base in the 
Saudi Kingdom in 1962 (ibid, p.20).      
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appointed in 1993 as commander of the coalition forces. The Turkish military did not 
miss the chance to take part in IFOR (Implementation Force) in Bosnia and SFOR 
(Stabilization Force) in Kosovo; it also deployed a peacekeeping force in Palestine in 
the 1990s (Uzgel, 2003, p.196). In the Kosovo War of 1998/1999, Turkey only served 
“the Machiavellian desire of the Clinton-Albright administration to marginalize the role 
of Russia and the institutions of which it is a pillar, like the UN and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)” (Achcar, 1999, p.17). Turkey was also 
involved in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and 
took over its command in 2002 (Uzgel, 2003, p.196) and 2005.  
This military expansion of Turkey even beyond its neighbourhood suggests that 
Turkey consolidated its position as a “military sub-imperialist country” in the 1990s 
(Erkiner, 2000, p.149). Armament, modernisation of the military, and a “Military 
Training and Cooperation Agreement” with Israel signed in 1996 played a key role in 
advancing Turkey’s sub-imperialism (Erkiner, 2000, pp.34-40). A long-term military 
modernisation programme was initiated in 1985 to establish a domestic arms industry 
(Günlük-Şenesen, 2002; 1993). The programme initially allocated $10-12 billion over a 
10-year period, and was extended for 30 years in 1996 with a budget of $150 billion. It 
was revised in 2000 to decrease its budget due to economic problems (Günlük-Şenesen, 
2002, p.107). Between 1994 and 1998 Turkey became the third-largest recipients of 
weapons in the world, mainly from the USA and Germany (Hen-Tov, 2004).  
With respect to the “Military Training and Cooperation Agreement” signed with 
Israel in 1996, the high command of the military took a lead in forming and executing 
the agreement by bypassing the jurisdiction of the foreign ministry (Bengio, 2010, 
p.108). This agreement enabled Turkey to acquire military know-how, participate in 
joint air and naval exercises with Israel, cooperate in advanced weapons systems 
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production, and intelligence sharing, and modernise its fighter planes (Bengio, 2010, 
pp.110-115; Hale, 2013, p.227). The relationship between Israel and Turkey in the 
second half of the 1990s produced “the biggest-ever foreign contract for Israel’s aircraft 
industry”, which was about $700 million (Bengio, 2010, p.114).  
In domestic affairs, the military was the prime actor in relations with Syria. In 
1998, Turkey amassed troops along the border with Syria to force her to expel the PKK 
leader Öcalan (Hale, 2013, pp.232-234). It was the Turkish General Staff that initiated a 
plan to press on Syria to expel Öcalan, which was called “controlled crisis 
management” (Jenkins, 2001, p.73). First Army Commander General Atilla Ateş said 
near the Syrian border on 16 September 1998 that “Our patience is exhausted. If the 
necessary measures are not taken, we as the Turkish nation will be forced to take every 
kind of measure” (as quoted in Jenkins, 2001, p.73).111  
Sub-imperialist expansion of Turkish capitalism in its vicinity 
 Turkish exports and capital in the region 
With the shift of Turkey’s economic structure from an inward-looking capital 
accumulation model based on national-developmentalism to an export-oriented 
industrialisation model based on competition after the 1980s, Turkey’s economic power 
was subsumed into its military power. In the process of transforming into a sub-
imperialist power, Turkish exports increased from nearly $3 billion in 1980 to nearly 
$158 billion in 2014 (Figure 6.1). This export expansion has necessitated that Turkish 
goods must be sold not only inside domestic borders but also beyond its borders. 
                                                          
111 In addition to Turkey’s objection to Syria’s hosting the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in its territory, 
there has been a clash of interests in Turkey’s increasing control over the Euphrates water and a territorial 
conflict over Alexandretta since 1939 (Hale, 2013, pp.232-234).  
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Figure 6.1. Turkish Exports by Years (million $), 1960-2014.  
Source: Foreign Trade by Years by TÜİK, 2015. 
This shift in the economic model under neoliberalism moved Turkey to export 
manufactured goods while the structural adjustment programmes imposed on the Arab 
countries under the infitah (opening) from the 1970s brought forth crony capitalism 
under patrimonial and neopatrimonial states (Achcar, 2013a, Chapters 1 & 2). Figure 
6.2 illustrates that the percentage of the manufactured goods in Turkey’s total exports 
tripled from 26.9% in 1980—the year neoliberalism was inaugurated under military 
dictatorship, a trajectory similar to that of Chile under General Pinochet between 1973 
and 1990—to 81% in 2000. Even though there was a slight decrease in the percentage 
of manufactured goods in total exports in 2009, the ratio has still been above 75%, 
hitting 78.5% in 2014 (Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2. Export of Manufactured Goods (% of Exports), 1960-2014.  
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015. 
In this new economic setting, the increasing need of the Turkish economy to 
export its goods led to the intensification of its relations with the Middle East (Tür, 
2011). The restructuring of Turkish finance capital on the basis of competition after the 
2001 crisis and the increasing influence of peripheral capital since the 1980s 
conditioned the new activism of foreign policy (Kutlay, 2011). This transformation of 
state-society relations resulted in what Kemal Kirişci (2009) has called a “trading state”. 
According to Kirişci, in a trading state, new economic actors participate in decision-
making processes in foreign policy matters and exert greatest power to steer foreign 
policy to be in line with economic priorities (2009, pp.33-34). In foreign policy 
administration, the priorities of new agents feature the geographical division of 
economic interests. As Davutoğlu has stressed, while TUSKON expands to Africa, 
TÜSİAD has an interest lobbying the EU for Turkey’s membership. MÜSİAD, on the 
other hand, is active in Arab Gulf countries (Davutoğlu, 2008, pp.83-84).  
To show this trajectory, under AKP rule Turkish exports to Near and Middle 
Eastern Countries increased more rapidly between 2004 and 2013 than exports to EU 
countries. The former increased from $7.9 billion in 2004 to $35.4 billion in 2014, a 
quadruple rise in a decade, whilst the latter increased from $36.7 billion in 2004 to 
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when the  militay 
took power 
81.2% in 2000 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
 294 
$68.4 billion in 2014 (Figure 6.3). It should be stressed that Near and Middle Eastern 
countries together with North African countries are the only two regions where Turkey 
extracts a trade surplus. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, while Near and 
Middle Eastern countries and North African countries absorbed $35.4 billion and $9.8 
billion worth of Turkish products, respectively, in 2014 they only exported $3.4 billion 
and $20.5 billion worth of products to Turkey, thus yielding a trade surplus of more 
than $21 billion (TÜİK, n.d.). This also explains the subimperialist expansion of Turkey 
into the Middle East. 
 
Figure 6.3. Turkish Exports by Two Country Groups (billion $), 2004-2014.  
Source: Exports by Country Group and Year by TÜİK, n.d.  
In the face of the Eurozone crisis since late 2009, the Middle Eastern market 
subsequently provided a new arena for Turkish peripheral capitalism (Kaya, 2011, 
p.86). During the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, which evolved into the Euro crisis 
in the European Union, the Near and Middle Eastern market became even more 
important than the European market for Turkish goods. Another major reason for the 
increase in trade volume with the Middle East is that the increase of oil prices since 
2002, after hitting bottom in 1998, increased demand for imports to oil-rich Middle 
Eastern countries (Tezcür & Grigorescu, 2014). While in 2002 crude oil prices were as 
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low as $29.92 per barrel, they were slightly over $100 in 2008 and had decreased to 
$89.08 per barrel by November 2014 (McMahon, 2014). 
It is worth recognising that Turkey engages with exporting capital 
notwithstanding its small scale. In 2010, FDI stocks of Turkish companies exceeded 
$20 billion, with developed countries absorbing more than half with $11.6 billion 
(UNCTAD, 2012, pp.16-17). However,  Turkey's FDI stocks amounted to only 2.9% of 
its GDP in 2010, while inward FDI stocks were equivalent to 25% of Turkey's GDP in 
2010 (UNCTAD, 2012, p.4). On the other hand, the increase of Turkish investments in 
North Africa is also noteworthy. Turkish corporations in 2001 only had investment 
values of $1 million in Libya; $5 million in Tunisia; and $5 million in Egypt. By 2010 it 
increased to $168 million, $142 million and $103 million in each of these three 
countries respectively (UNCTAD, 2012, p.16). Figures 6.4 and 6.5 demonstrate the 
increase in Turkey’s enormous inward and outward investments in the 2000s. 
 
Figure 6.4. Inward FDI Flows and FDI Stocks in Turkey (million $), 1980-2010.  
Source: "Investment Country Profiles Turkey" by UNCTAD, 2012, pp.5-6. The vertical axis on the right 
shows the inward FDI stocks; the vertical axis on the left shows the inwards FDI flows.  
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Figure 6.5. Outward FDI Flows and FDI Stocks of Turkey (million $), 1980-2010.  
Source: "Investment Country Profiles Turkey" by UNCTAD, 2012, pp.5-6. The vertical axis on the right 
shows the outward FDI stocks; the vertical axis on the left shows the outward FDI flows. 
Similar to the findings of UNCTAD (2012), in 2011 the Ankara Chamber of 
Commerce showed that close to 3,500 Turkish companies have operated in 103 
countries, mainly doing business in the energy and banking sectors. Whereas the total 
value of direct investment of Turkish companies was only $3.7 billion in 2001, it rose to 
$23.6 billion by October 2010. The value of FDI of Turkish companies in the energy 
sector was recorded at $4 billion. In 2010, Turkish companies abroad invested $4 billion 
in energy; $3 billion on banking; $1.6 billion in financial institutions; $2 billion in 
manufacturing; $1.6 billion in commerce; $1.5 billion in information and 
communication; and $444 million in construction. The need to diversify across 
investment markets reflects the different geographical location of export of capital by 
Turkish capitalism. With respect to the amount of FDI abroad of Turkish companies, the 
Netherlands, Azerbaijan, Malta, Germany, the USA, Luxembourg, Kazakhstan, and the 
UK constitute the main geography of Turkish FDI (ATO, 2011).       
         However, sub-imperialist Turkey is heavily dependent on the technology and 
know-how of foreign capital. Turkish capitalism integrated into dependence chains and 
increased its exports on the basis of providing cheap labour for transnational 
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corporations (TNCs) in return for access to technology. This has resulted in Turkey’s 
positioning as a springboard for TNCs. For instance, while the automotive industry 
accounted for 25% of total exports in 2013 (Automotive Manufacturers Association, 
2014), it is technologically dependent mainly on French (Renault), German (Mercedes-
Benz), Japanese (Toyota), and South Korean (Hyundai) capitalism (UNCTAD, 2012, 
p.22). Turkey's other important export sectors, electrical and electronic equipment and 
household appliances, are subordinated to Dutch (Vestel Electronics),112 German (BSH 
Group and Siemens), French (Areva T&D) and Italian (Indesit) technology (UNCTAD, 
2012, p.22). Having said that, some of the largest home-based TNCs enlist the help of 
foreign capital in a number of sectors, including: retail and whole trade (OMV Petrol 
Ofisi and Opet Petroleum); transport, storage and communications (Turkish Airlines 
and Turkcell); metals and metal products (Ereğli Iron and Steel Factories); electrical and 
electronic equipment (Arçelik); construction (ENKA); and finance (Koç, Sabancı and İş 
Bankası) (ibid, p.20).                  
Turkish companies as agents of regional economic power  
According to a survey conducted in 2013 by Kadir Has University, the Foreign 
Economic Relations Board (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu, DEİK), and the Vale 
Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, the top 29 non-financial 
Turkish multinationals on the basis of their foreign assets had $36.7 billion in 2012, 
with TPAO and Anadolu Group accounting for more than $4 billion each (Table 6.1). 
These 29 non-financial multinational companies had $23.4 billion in foreign sales in 
2012, with 115,539 workers abroad employed in 426 foreign affiliates on five 
continents. The survey shows that 326 out of 426 foreign affiliates of these 
multinational corporations were concentrated in Europe and Central Asia in 2012, while 
                                                          
112 The Vestel Electronics Company was indeed opened in Manisa in 1985 as a FDI of British Polly Peck 
International under Asil Nadir (Milliyet, 4 May 1985) before its shares were transferred to the Dutch 
Collar Holding in 1991. The company has been a part of the Zorlu Holding in Turkey since 1994.                                                              
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53 were concentrated in the Middle East and Africa (DEİK, 2014, p.1). The survey also 
shows the accelerated process of monopolisation; the five largest Turkish multinationals 
controlled 58% of total assets or $21.4 billion (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1. 29 Largest Turkish Multinationals*, (million $), 2012 
 
Name 
 
Industry 
Assets Sales Number of 
Employment 
 
Number 
of 
Foreign 
Affiliates 
Foreign Total Foreign Total Foreign Total 
TPAO Oil and gas 4,872 8,423 1,535 3,453 49 5,000 4 
Anadolu 
Group 
Conglomerate 4,443 11,109 2,597 6,110 13,750 27,500 20 
Enka 
Construction 
Infrastructure and 
Real Estate 
3,779 8,156 1,365 5,720 10,331 21,290 42 
Koç Holding Conglomerate 3,333 60,579 1,857 47,119 8,289 82,158 41 
Doğuş Group Conglomerate 3,104 31.151 149 6,110 6,213 30.250 50 
Yıldırım 
Holding 
Conglomerate 1,867 2,619 300 1.050 4,200 7,100 9 
         Sisecam A.S. Glass 
manufacturing 
1,368 4,845 705 2,967 6,090 17,838 15 
Yıldız 
 Holding 
Food and 
Beverage 
1,277 3,629 444 6,887 7,500 36,000 7 
         Tekfen 
Holding 
Conglomerate 1,250 2,296 1,563 2,264 11,752 17,532 11 
Zorlu Energy 
Group 
Energy 1,120 2,768 234 292 0 864 3 
TAV Holding Conglomerate 1,081 2.937 226 1,425 3,837 22,704 8 
Turkcell Communications 1,057 10,360 595 5,836 1,418 13,901 14 
Borusan 
Holding 
Conglomerate 973 3,394 325 3,949 1,455 5,072 10 
Sabancı 
Holding 
Conglomerate 828 97,421 245 6,546 2,827 57,556 34 
         Çalık 
Holding 
Conglomerate  816 7,613 523 2,745 8,103 19,940 15 
Hayat 
Holding 
Conglomerate 780 3,085 243 1,828 3,463 7,914 7 
Gübretaş Fertiliser 686 1,197 528 1,237 415 1,103 1 
Alarko Group Conglomerate 651 1,200 488 899 1,323 4,879 8 
Orhan 
Holding 
Conglomerate 534 778 300 1,050 2,044 7,300 11 
Doğan 
Holding  
Conglomerate 486 4,815 275 1,753 4,073 13,750 64 
Türk 
Telekom 
Communications 444 9,558 - 7,057 1,200 37,524 2 
Turkish 
Airlines 
Airlines 400 10,431 5,962 8,281 2,228 15,857 0 
Ekol 
Logistics 
Logistics 375 750 125 350 1,200 6,791 7 
Eczacıbaşı 
Holding  
Conglomerate 371 2,686 569 3,307 1,994 11,730 18 
Kürüm 
Holding 
Iron and Steel 281 522 318 849 400 1,031 2 
Teklas Automotive 175 400 28 139 522 1,283 2 
Çelebi 
Holding 
Conglomerate 167 297 119 307 6,491 10,619 6 
Eroğlu 
Holding 
Textiles 148 269 850 1,133 5,214 12,117 13 
Evyap  Consumer 
Products 
98 772 53 630 536 2,205 2 
Total  36,766 294,062 23,415 131,290 115,539 501,740 426 
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Note: *The benchmark for these multinational companies is to invest more than $100 million in foreign 
assets. Information is based on the responses of the MNCs to the survey. There may be other large 
Turkish multinational corporations, which did not respond to the survey.  
Source: "Despite Stronger US Dollar Turkish OFDI Continues to Grow" by DEİK, Report dated 24 
March 2014, p.13. 
With regard to the geographical diversification of Turkish companies, while they 
have reached technology and high-skilled labour in the EU, they have also sought a 
cheap labour force in Africa and Asia. The supply of natural resources in Central Asian 
countries appeals to Turkish capitalism, as well. In particular, Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, TPAO), a state-owned enterprise, is 
active in this “spatio-temporal fix”. TPAO has been operating in Kazakhstan for crude 
oil exploration and production activities through the joint venture company 
KazakhTurkMunai Ltd (KTM), of which TPAO has 49% of shares. In Azerbaijan, 
TPAO is a shareholder in three exploration, development, and production projects. The 
projects are Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli Project; Shah Deniz Project; and Alov Project in 
which TPAO has shares of 6.75%, 9% and 10%, respectively. The company holds 
6.53% shares of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Oil Pipeline Project and 9% of 
shares in the South Caucasus Pipeline Project, which transports Shah Deniz natural gas 
to the border of Georgia and Turkey (TPAO, 2013a).113 In Libya, TPAO has been 
operating exploration activities since 2000 and its drilling activities have been active 
since 2010; in Iraq, it was awarded a contract to develop the Badra Oil Field, Missan 
Oil Field, Siba Gas Field, and Mansuriya Gas Development Projects. Besides this, 
TPAO has business development activities in hydrocarbon rich regions such as the 
                                                          
113 The other three biggest international players in these development projects are BP, Chevron and Inpex 
in Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli Project with shares of 37.40%, 11.30%, and 11%, respectively; BP, STATOIL 
and AzSD Ltd (SOCAR) in Shah Deniz Project with shares of 25.5%, 25.5%, and 10%, respectively; BP, 
SOCAR, Chevron in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Oil Pipeline Project with shares of 30.10%, 25%, 
and 8.90% respectively and BP, STATOILHYDRO, AzSCPLtd (SOCAR) in South Caucasus Pipeline 
Project with a share of 25%, 25% and 10%, respectively (TPAO, 2013b).   
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Russian Federation, Indonesia, Sudan, Yemen, North Africa, and South America 
(TPAO, 2013a).   
 Noteworthy mergers and acquisitions by Turkish companies between 2007 and 
2013114  included the following purchases: Russian SABMiller by Anadolu Efes for 
$1.9 billion in 2011; Belgium Godiva by Yıldız Holding for $850 million in 2007; 
Greek Astir Palace Resort by Doğuş Holding for $598 million in 2013; Razi 
Petrochemical Company, the largest fertiliser facility of Iran, by Gübretaş for $532 
million in 2008; the world’s third largest container carrier, French CMA CGM, by 
Yıldırım Holding for $500 million in 2010; Belarusian Telecommunications Network 
(BeST) by Turkcell for $500 million in 2008; Miran exploration block in Iraqi 
Kurdistan by Genel Energy for $450 million in 2012; Russian coking coal and steel 
producer Mechel Chrome by Yıldırım Holding for $425 million in 2013; TradeMedia 
East, a leading advertising publishing company in Eastern Europe and Russia, by Doğan 
Holding for $336.5 million in 2007; South African’s Defy by a Koç Holding company, 
Arçelik, for $323.7 million in 2011; Malta Freeport Terminals by Yıldırım Holding for 
$285.5 million in 2011; Hungarian data services provider Invitel by Türk Telekom for 
$269.7 million in 2010; Bina Bawi Exploration Block in Iraqi Kurdistan by Genel 
Energy for $240 million in 2012; and U.S. DeMet’s Candy Co. by Yıldız Holding for 
$221 million in 2013 (Deloitte, 2012, pp.7-8; 2013, pp.6-8).  
 Recently, Yıldız Holding acquired the 184-old British United Biscuits in 2014, 
thus becoming the world’s third largest biscuits maker (Hürriyet Daily News, 3 
November 2014). Turkish Holdings also continue to facilitate resource extraction from 
the MENA region. Tosyalı Holding invested in the largest iron and steel plant in 
Algeria, a country that supplied the largest quantities of natural gas to Turkey in 2013 
                                                          
114 For the sake of clarity, this thesis included the biggest ten mergers and acquisitions between 2007 and 
2013 by Turkish companies for those which had a transaction value more than $200 million. 
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after Russia and Iran (Daragahi, 2014).115 In Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkish companies 
accounted for 55% of foreign companies in 2010, mainly concentrating on building 
projects including roads, airports, and a police academy (Fielding-Smith, 2010).     
 Turkish construction firms underwrote 433 foreign projects amounting to $26.1 
billion in 2012, mainly in Turkmenistan, Iraq, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Morocco (Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği 
[Turkish Contractors Association], 2013, p.20). ENKA Holding, one of the largest 
contractor firms in the world, participated in a large number of power plant 
constructions in Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk, and Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, including 
motorways, bridges and tunnels in Balkans; a new “city” in Oman under the Blue City 
Project;  and business centres, public buildings, shopping malls and industrial plants, 
mainly in Russia (ENKA, 2014). In December 2010, a Turkish consortium won a 
construction bid to rebuild Sadr City in Baghdad with residences for more than a half 
million people in 75,000 units, valued at $11.3 billion (Karataş, 2010). According to 
UNCTAD (2013), two Turkish multinational companies, Turkcell (73rd) in 
telecommunications and ENKA (99th) in construction and real estate sectors, belong to 
the top 100 list of non-financial companies from developing and transition economies, 
with foreign assets in 2012 exceeding $6 billion and $3 billion, respectively. 
 The influence of Turkish entrepreneurs, especially in Central Asia, is not limited 
to doing business in profitable areas. They also benefit from crony capitalism under the 
dictatorial regimes of Central Asia. Ahmet Çalık, founder of Çalık Holding, became 
energy advisor and was appointed Minister of Textiles under President Niyazov in 
                                                          
115 The revolutionary process in MENA not only frightened the despotic regimes in the region but also 
foreign companies doing business there. Turkish Eroğlu Holding, which invested $150 million in denim 
garment manufacturing in Ismailia in Egypt, complained about the workers’ demand during the 
revolutionary process, which included the reduction of work week from 48 hours to 42 hours and the 
increase of wages from $110-120 to $200. Ümmet Eroğlu, member of the Board of Directors of Eroğlu 
Holding, did not hesitate to label Egyptian workers as “capricious” and said that there is not an 
unemployment problem in Egypt but a worker problem (Yüzbaşıoğlu, 2011).  
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Turkmenistan for fifteen years (Hendrick, 2013, p.171). Muammer Türkyılmaz, 
founding member of Başkent Education Firms—the Gülen community’s financial and 
administrative umbrella organisation in Turkmenistan—was promoted to Deputy 
Minister of Education by the current President Berhimuhamedov in 2007 (Zaman, 17 
March 2007). Ali Bayram, an influential figure in the educational field of the Gülen 
Movement, had no difficulty in being appointed honorary member of the Committee for 
Education of the Parliament of Kazakhstan after President Turgut Özal (1989-1993) 
supported him by writing a reference letter to Nazarbayev in 1992 (Yüksel, 2005). 
Turkish companies and the state have not only rushed to snap up investment in 
manufacturing and services but also investment in agriculture by grabbing large tracts of 
land especially in Africa. For instance, in 2014 Turkey signed a big land deal setting up 
a joint venture between the Turkish General Directorate of Agricultural Enterprises and 
an institution from Sudan to lease 780,000 hectares of farmland for cultivation. Mehdi 
Eker, Turkey’s Food, Agriculture, and Livestock Minister since 2005, expressed 
Turkey’s plan in Sudan, which is situated within the basin of the River Nile: “Turkey 
will help its technology, mechanization and animal breeding. The company will export 
its production to the world” (World Bulletin, 29 April 2014).116  
Political tools for Turkish sub-imperialism  
As an umbrella organisation of Turkish capitalists, excluding TUSKON, the Foreign 
Economic Relations Board (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu, DEİK) sets the economic 
priorities of Turkish capitalism. DEİK was established as a Turkish government 
initiative by Özal in 1986 under the auspices of the Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB). This business 
                                                          
116 It is darkly ironic that Darfur, a region in Western Sudan, faces a food crisis while Sudan opens its 
borders for agro-business. According to a 2012 United Nations World Food Programme Report, “out of 
total of 9.36 million people in Darfur, 960,000 people are estimated to be food insecure and 2.51 million 
are vulnerable to food insecurity” (World Food Programme, 2012, p.24).  
 303 
association conducts the foreign relations of the Turkish private sector, explores inward 
and outward investment opportunities, helps businesses increase their exports, and 
coordinates business activities (DEİK, 2011). With a new structure tying the 
organisation to the Ministry of Economy by a law enacted in September 2014, DEİK is 
charged with “managing the foreign economic relations of the Turkish private sector” 
(DEİK, 2011). Through 120 Business Councils, DEİK has established counterpart 
organisations and by 2014 had 900 member companies; Turkish capitalists benefit from 
direct contact with state leaders, build corporate cooperation worldwide, and take part in 
foreign policy formulation. DEİK’s Board of Directors, which includes 35 members, 
comprises representatives of Turkey’s small and big capitalists. Former head of 
MÜSİAD Ömer Cihad Vardan (2008-2012) was assigned in 2014 by the Ministry of 
Economy to the new presidency of the organisation (DEİK, 2011).117 
At the heart of this proactive foreign policy, Turkey has strenuously mobilised a 
range of economic and political tools available to it for the purposes of regional 
integration. This has been blessed by the US, since Turkey has constituted a major sub-
imperialist player for US interests in MENA in the context of diminished American 
legitimacy in the region following the Iraqi invasion in 2003. Under the “zero problems 
with neighbours” policy, which was rigorously implemented until the revolutionary 
process erupted in the Arab region in 2011, the AKP sought to comply with the features 
of a “trading state”. By playing the role of an imperialist core, Turkey actively 
facilitated trade and lubricated the neoliberal transformation of its vicinity. A 2010 
                                                          
117 The role of DEİK in foreign economic policy is shaped by a corporatist relationship with the state 
(Atlı, 2011). While DEİK is privileged by taking part in policy-making process with respect to foreign 
policy, bargaining is conditioned upon acquiescent approval of some particular state policies. Atlı 
highlights two specific examples in which DEİK yielded to state policies. One was the cancellation of a 
conference in 2007 by the Turkish-American Business Council after the US House of Representatives’ 
Foreign Relations Committee decided to recognise the Armenian Genocide. The other one was the 
suspension of the Turkish-Greek Business Council’s operations in 1999 after Greece was supportive of 
the PKK (Atlı, 2011, p.123). With the new regulation of DEİK enacted in September 2014, the Minister 
of Economy is endowed with the selection of the chairperson of DEİK.  
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Report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) states that “[p]romoting free trade, 
facilitating transfers of technology and expertise and carrying out infrastructure 
integration projects all evoke a win-win attitude which has become a catchphrase of 
Turkish diplomacy, by contrast with the zero-sum equation that traditionally has 
dominated the region” (International Crisis Group, 2010, p.13). Under AKP rule since 
2002, Turkey signed successive free trade agreements with MENA countries: Morocco, 
Tunisia, Syria,118 and Palestine in 2004; Egypt in 2005; Jordan in 2009; and Lebanon in 
2010.119 In addition, the Balkans have appeared as economic geography to Turkey’s 
conclusion of successive free trade agreements. Turkey currently has free trade 
agreements with Albania signed in 2006; Montenegro in 2008; Serbia 2009; and 
Kosovo120 together with earlier ones signed with Macedonia in 1999 and Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 2002 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, 2012).121 Turkey also 
lifted visa requirements for some Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in 2009 and Libya in 2010 (Aygül, 2014, p.409).122  
Just before the revolutionary process ignited in MENA in December 2010, the 
private sectors of Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon formed a “Levant Quartet” for 
further economic and cultural integration and increased economic stability (Tür, 2009, 
p.597). This project was hailed as an “EU of the Middle East” (Kurtaran, 2010). Turkey 
had also provided mediation in Syria-Israel peace talks in 2008. Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad was even hosted in southern Turkey by “his friend” Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan in August 2008 (Today’s Zaman, 6 August 2008). The love affair 
between Erdoğan and al-Assad peaked when joint cabinet meetings were held on 13 
                                                          
118 This agreement was suspended on 6 December 2011.  
119 By January 2015, Lebanon has not ratified the Association Agreement establishing Free Trade. 
120 By January 2015, the free trade agreement signed with Kosovo was still under ratification process.  
121 Turkey also has free trade agreements with EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and 
Switzerland) signed in 1991; Israel in 1996; Georgia in 2007; Chile in 2009, Mauritius in 2011 and South 
Korea in 2012. Free Trade Agreements with Malaysia and Moldova are under ratification process 
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, 2012).  
122 See Aygül (2014) for Turkey’s visa policies under the AKP in the 2000s. 
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October 2009, before it turned sour in 2011 during the revolutionary process in MENA 
(Demirtaş, 2013, p.111). 
 Another political linchpin of Turkey’s pro-active foreign policy with respect to 
its sub-imperialist expansion is its foreign aid policy, which entails the “good 
governance” component of the Post-Washington Consensus. This policy is motivated by 
Turkey’s strategic calculations and aims of enhancing Turkey's presence in its sphere of 
influence (Altunisik, 2014). Founded in 1992 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve 
Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, TİKA) has been one of the institutional tools of 
Turkish foreign policy ever since. It initially aimed to provide assistance to the “Turkic” 
republics, and its first Programme Coordination Office was inaugurated in 
Turkmenistan. TİKA expanded its sphere of influence and increased the number of its 
Programme Coordination Offices from 12 in 2002 to 33 in 2012 (TİKA, n.d.). Through 
this state organisation, there has been a tremendous increase in Turkish foreign aid. 
While official Turkish development assistance123 amounted to only $85 million in 2002, 
it reached $2.5 billion in 2012 (TİKA, 2012, p.13). Not surprisingly, Middle East 
countries were the largest recipients of Turkish bilateral official development assistance 
in 2012 with approximately $1.1 billion, followed by Africa with $750 million (TİKA, 
2012, p.93).124 
This foreign aid also went hand in hand with the restructuring of coercive 
apparatuses of foreign countries, an illustration of Turkey’s attempt to legitimise the 
                                                          
123 According to OECD, “[o]fficial development assistance is defined as those flows to countries and 
territories on the DAC [Development Assistance Committee] List of ODA [Official Development 
Assistance] Recipients...and to multilateral development institutions which are provided by official 
agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction of 
which is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as its main objective; and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 
per cent...” (OECD, 2008). 
124 Bilateral official development assistance includes direct assistance by the public sector, assistance 
through national or international NGOs, and assistance made by public-private partnership (TİKA, 2012, 
p.12).  
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“good governance” concept through building “effective institutions”. Turkey was 
involved in training Tunisian police and gendarmerie forces in 2013, supported 
Mohamed Morsi for his election in Egypt and gave social infrastructure and services 
assistance to Egypt in 2012. In Libya, Turkey participated in a state building process 
and trained 800 Libyan Police Academy cadets in İstanbul, while the bulk of foreign aid 
to Yemen mainly comprised of health assistance in 2012 (Altunisik, 2014, pp.342-343). 
With the election in 2004 of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu as Secretary-General of the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)—the first Turkish citizen to serve in this 
post since its foundation in 1969—Turkey acquired the opportunity to reform the OIC 
to adopt “good governance” and “expansion of political participation” in its Ten-Year 
Programme of Action in 2005 and its Charter in 2008 (Kirişci, 2013, p.208). 
Strategic depth approach by Ahmet Davutoğlu and Neo-Ottomanism as the 
ideological cement of Turkish sub-imperialist foreign policy  
The sub-imperialist stage of Turkish capitalism is articulated into a political project 
called Neo-Ottomanism. Neo-Ottomanism is the “ideal expression of the dominant 
material relations”. It is the ideological cement of Turkish capitalism in alignment with 
the expansionary needs of the export-oriented Turkish economy after the 1980s. It is 
worth noting that Turkey’s expansionary foreign policy was initially crystallised after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 in the context of new geopolitical order. 
Turkey’s expansionary foreign policy in the 1990s was rested upon reaching a zone of 
influence; “a Turkish World stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”. 
The phase was first used by Henry Kissinger in World Economic Forum in Davos on 1 
February 1992 in a session called “Turkey Having Vast Opportunities for Regional and 
Global Collaboration” and the same vision was promoted by Prime Minister Süleyman 
Demirel in the same year (Erkiner, 2000, p.26). This expansionary policy espoused a 
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nationalist and Islamic discourse in order to reach the “Turkic states” of former Soviet 
Russia countries. However, Turkey’s plan to unite these Central Asian countries by 
integrating them under a Turkish Bank and Turkish Common Market —promoted at the 
1992 Ankara Summit—was a failure since Russia had a more profound sphere of 
control in those countries (Erkiner, 2000, pp.28-29). Additionally, in the 1990s, Turkey 
lacked economic power commensurate with its military power to make large energy 
investments in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Erkiner, 2000, p.144).  
It is in the post-Bonapartist/Kemalist era of the 2000s that Turkey has adopted 
an active stance in foreign policy in terms of embracing an Ottoman past to affect “the 
dynamic flow of history, rather than an ordinary and passive component of it” 
(Davutoğlu, 2013, p.865). Ahmet Davutoğlu who was chief foreign policy advisor to 
Erdoğan and then Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2014) before becoming Prime 
Minister in 2014, said in a speech in Sarajevo in October 2009:  
“As in the 16th century, when the Ottoman Balkans were rising, we will once again 
make the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, together with Turkey, the centre 
of world politics in the future. That is the goal of the Turkish foreign policy, and we will 
achieve it” (Bekdil, 2013).  
 
The need for a proactive diplomacy and foreign policy was detailed in 
Davutoğlu’s book Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic 
Depth: Turkey’s International Position) written in 2001. According to him, Turkey 
needs to fervently seize on its geography and history as “two constant variables” since it 
is positioned at the intersections of multiple regions and centred on the legacy of the 
Ottoman Empire (Davutoğlu, 2014c).  
Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the capability as well as the 
responsibility to  follow an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy. The unique 
combination of our history and geography brings with it a sense of responsibility. To 
contribute actively towards conflict resolution and international peace and security in all 
these areas is a call of duty arising from the depths of a multidimensional history for 
Turkey (Davutoğlu, 2009, p.12).  
 
 308 
This is why, according to Davutoğlu, “historical depth, geographical positioning 
and rich legacy in international affairs” compels the country to pursue a proactive 
foreign policy. According to him, “those who fail to understand the flow of history and 
do not position themselves in the world accordingly will be overtaken by the rapid pace 
of events and will end up paying a heavy price for it" (Davutoğlu, 2012, p.3). Turkey as 
a pivotal-country is located at the intersection of three geopolitical and concentric 
geographical areas, and therefore should take advantage of this “cognizance of 
geography”: 1) “the near land basin” including the Balkans, the Middle East and the 
Caucasus; 2) “the near maritime basin” including the Black Sea, Adriatic, the East 
Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Caspian Sea; and 3) “the near 
continental basin”, including Europe, North Africa, Southern Asia, and Central and 
Eastern Asia (Davutoğlu, 2014c, p.118).  
 Davutoğlu capitalises on different geostrategic theories and concepts by 
Haushofer (Lebensraum), Mackinder (pivot area/Heartland), Spykman (Rimland), 
Mahan (sea power/geostrategy), and Seversky (strategic air power and area of 
decision) (Davutoğlu, 2014c, pp.102-109).125 The expansionist foreign policy espoused 
by Davutoğlu calls for enlarging Turkey’s Hinterland far beyond its natural borders. As 
he states, “the defence of Eastern Thrace and Istanbul now begins in the Adriatic Sea 
                                                          
125 Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) published “The Geographical Pivot of History” in 1904 in which he 
attached a particular geostrategic importance to the control of Eastern Europe. According to him, for 
world domination, the control of Euro-Asia is needed; for the control of Euro-Asia, the control of 
heartland [The heartland, today, refers to the area covering Russia, Central Asia and the Caspian Basin] is 
needed; and for the control of the heartland, the control of Eastern Europe is needed. Karl Haushofer 
(1869-1946), on the other hand, relied on Ratzel’s theory called Lebensraum (habitat or living space) in 
which a perceived anthropomorphised state, like a living organism, needs new spaces and colonies to live. 
This was used to legitimise the Nazi expansion. Another geostrategist is Nicholas Spkyman (1893-1943) 
who gave importance to the control of an area called Rimland, covering an area of Western Europe, 
Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, China, Korea and East Siberia. He is known as the founding 
father of the containment policy of the U.S. after the Second World War. While Alfred Thayer Mahan 
(1840-1914) suggested controlling the peripheral sea in order to contain the expansionary potential of a 
dominant power, Alexander P.de Seversky (1894-1974) prioritised air power in global strategy in a 
bipolar world (Davutoğlu, 2014c, pp.102-109).  
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and Sarajevo, and the defence of Eastern Anatolia and Erzurum begins in the Northern 
Caucasus and Grozny” (Davutoğlu as quoted in Ozkan, 2014a, p.124).  
Harking back to Ottoman history plays an instrumental role in challenging the 
Kemalist narrative of the official ideology, which aimed to break away from the 
Ottoman legacy. According to Davutoğlu, “dehistoricisation” and disconnect with this 
past resulted in alienation of society from its “inner self”. The product of this alienation 
is a “divided self” and consequently a frail embracement of a “false self” (Davutoğlu, 
2014c, p.59). According to him, the “exclusionary and reductionist ideology of history” 
embraced during the nation-state formation process led to perceiving the Ottoman era 
“as an archaic construct that represented the pre-modern era” (Davutoğlu, 2014a, pp.22-
23). The new political elites, referring to Mustafa Kemal and his entourage, radically 
broke away from Ottoman civilisation; they associated with a particular identity, culture 
and institutions in order to join Western civilisation (Davutoğlu, 2014c, pp.81-82). 
Therefore, Turkey's fundamental conflict, it is suggested, lies in the disparity between 
the society that inherited the political and cultural Ottoman legacy and the political 
system imposed by a political elite who aimed at joining another civilisation 
(Davutoğlu, 2014c, p.83). 
Neo-Ottomanism challenges Kemalist foreign policy and “republican strategic 
culture” (Evans, 2014, Parts 3 & 4). Under the Bonapartist regime espoused by Mustafa 
Kemal, foreign policy was based on two objectives: the preservation of the nation-state 
and the borders of National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) and adherence to the Western bloc. In 
the Cold War period, Turkey continued to conduct this foreign policy, which aimed to 
preserve its borders against the Soviet Union by aligning itself with NATO, rather than 
“achieving a distinctive position in the international system” (Davutoğlu, 2014c, pp.69-
71). Therefore it can be argued that “republican strategic culture” was a reaction to the 
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long decay of the Ottoman Empire from the early 19th century. It evolved into an 
obsession with homogeneity and national unity under the Kemalist regime and set aside 
the role of Islam in politics. On the other hand, the “neo-Ottoman strategic culture” 
developing after the 1980s espoused sub-national identities and active, sometimes 
interventionist foreign policy with an ambition to be a regional power (Evans, 2014, 
Parts 3 & 4). In this new setting of a “neo-Ottoman strategic culture”, Turkishness 
denotes being a member of the Ottoman legacy. In a 2014 interview with Richard Falk, 
Davutoğlu stressed: 
Even when we make reference to “the Turkish people,” it has been correctly observed 
that, “It’s a culmination of all the ethnic and religious groups of the Ottoman state: 
Balkan nations, Caucasian nations, Middle Eastern nations, all mixed into Turkey.” This 
past has a continuity with the present. What we need is to restore these values, 
especially the strong political sense of order and cultural belonging that we owe to each 
other (Davutoğlu, 2014b).  
 
This challenge to Kemalist “republican strategic culture” and foreign policy, 
however, departs from Erbakan’s direct assault on Westernisation and his attempt to 
form an alternative path to European integration, through development of economic 
cooperation between major Muslim countries of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey (in the Developing Eight – D8). Under the 
AKP, the overarching relationship with the East supplements Turkey’s alliance with the 
West, rather than being a substitute for it (Taspinar, 2008, p.14). The US Ambassador to 
Turkey James Jeffrey remarked in 2010: “Does all this mean that the country is 
becoming more focused on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign 
policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is “abandoning” or wants to abandon its 
traditional Western orientation and willingness to cooperate with us? Absolutely not” 
(Wikileaks, n.d.).126  
                                                          
126 According to some authors, Turkish foreign policy has pursued a Pan-Islamist line under Davutoğlu 
(Kıvanç, 2015; Ozkan, 2014a, 2014b). For Kıvanç (2015), Davutoğlu’s book titled Stratejik Derinlik 
(Strategic Depth) is based on a Pan-Islamic and unscientific approach. Ozkan, on the other hand, outlines 
in his article the reflections of Pan-Islamism by delving extensively into Davutoğlu’s early writings in the 
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 Needless to say, this proactive foreign policy alongside Turkey’s “multiple 
regional identities” attributes the EU membership to “Turkey’s strategic choice” and 
“one of the most important projects of the Republican era” (Davutoğlu, 2010, p.13). 
However, as a foreign policy strategy, Turkey should refrain from attaching only to EU 
membership (Davutoğlu, 2014c). The strategy should involve “rearrangement of 
relations with power centres in a substitute mode and the establishment of a hinterland 
in which long-term cultural, economic and political links are fortified” (Davutoğlu, 
2014c, p.118). This, indeed, stems from Turkey’s multiple identities. “In terms of its 
area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, 
Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country” (Davutoğlu, 2008, p.78). 
Therefore, Davutoğlu advocates a renewal of self-reliance by mobilising a “strategic 
mindset” which draws its strength from summoning up a legacy of the Ottoman Empire; 
it should rely on its “strategic depth” (Davutoğlu, 2014c). 
Basic structural economic limitations of Turkey’s sub-imperialist 
expansion: the sustainability and capacity problem of the Turkish economy  
The sub-imperialist economic and ideological expansion of Turkey reveals the basic 
contradiction in achieving economic growth: the increasing gap between Turkey's 
exports and imports. In other words, the fundamental deep paradox of sustaining 
economic growth in Turkey is possible only by incurring a trade deficit. According to 
the Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkey’s exports in 2014 amounted to slightly less than 
$158 billion, while its imports were slightly more than $242 billion, thus constituting a 
trade deficit of around $85 billion (Figure 6.6).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
second half of the 1980s and the 1990s when he referred to atrocities and war crimes by Serbian armed 
forces in Bosnian War as “Christian terrorism and fundamentalism”, the wars in Afghanistan and 
Chechnya as “jihad”, Chechnyan warriors as “mujahedeen”, and Israel as “geopolitical tumour” 
(Davutoğlu in Ozkan, 2014a, pp.127-130). He, however, overlooks the mutations of Islamic 
fundamentalists in Turkey in the late 1990s. Rather he sees continuity in their ideology. 
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Figure 6.6. Turkish Exports and Imports (billion $), 1980-2014.  
Source: "Foreign Trade by Years" by TÜİK, 2015. 
A 2010 Turkish Central Bank working paper, which surveyed 145 big 
manufacturing Turkish firms, concluded that the manufacturing sector predominantly 
used foreign intermediate and investment goods as inputs in its production. The paper 
showed that the more Turkey went beyond its traditional labour-intensive 
manufacturing (such as textiles, leather, garments, and agriculture) and the more it 
specialised and transformed its manufacturing into sectors such as motor vehicles and 
electrical machines, the more the economy necessitated raw materials, equipment and 
engines, which are insufficiently produced domestically (Saygılı, Cihan, Yalçın, & 
Hamsici, 2010). For instance, although Turkey has a 50% market share in colour 
television production in the EU, this product has low value-added since the picture tube, 
chip set, and other electronic components must be imported (in Saygılı, Cihan, Yalçın, 
& Hamsici, 2010, p.115). The binary characteristics of the Turkish economy suggest 
that while specialisation in the economy necessitates controlling outlets and markets for 
raw materials and intermediate goods in its production, it also creates a deficit problem 
due to the fact that these inputs cannot be provided from domestic supply.   
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The second striking problem which is linked to Turkey's trade deficit is the 
combination of the low level of high-technology exports and a decline in 
competiveness. With respect to competitiveness, Turkey dropped one place to 45th out 
of 144 countries in 2014 according to The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 by 
the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2014). This report highlighted 
the worst indicator of Turkey with regard to the global competitiveness index: female 
participation in the labour force (World Economic Forum, 2014). According to official 
statistics, the women's labour force participation rate in Turkey was 29.9% as of January 
2015 (TÜİK, 15 April 2015). On the other hand, the ratio of high-technology exports127 
to manufactured exports is still nominal while the rate of manufactured products in 
Turkish exports has been showing a rapid increase since the 1980s—nearly a threefold 
jump from 27% in 1980 to 78% in 2014 (Figure 6.2, above). Apparently, according to 
World Bank, World Development Indicators, there has been a clear stagnation in the 
ratio of high-technology exports to manufactured exports in the last two decades, 
representing a ratio of 2% in 1989 and 2012 (The World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, 2015). Yet, other emerging countries have much higher ratios of high 
technology exports to total exports of manufactured goods. In this respect, South Korea 
and China seem to have rapidly ramped up their high-technology exports, which cover 
more than a quarter of their total exports, amounting to 26% in 201. On the other hand, 
Malaysian high-technology exports constituted nearly a half of their total exports in 
2012 at 44% (Figure 6.7).  
                                                          
127 It is defined by OECD as “products with high R&D intensity such as in aerospace, computers, 
pharmaceuticals,  scientific instruments, and electrical machinery” (The World Bank, World 
Development Indicators Database Archives, 2015) 
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Figure 6.7. High-Technology Exports in Some Selected Emerging Countries and Turkey (% of 
manufactured exports).  
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015. 
In order to tackle these two structural problems, the AKP announced in 2012 a 
“Decree on Government Subsidies for Investments” so as to strengthen the international 
competitiveness of firms by encouraging high-tech, large-scale and strategic investment 
incentive schemes (Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], 19 June 2012). Incentive tools, 
depending on the characteristics of the investment and schemes—general, regional, 
large-scale and strategic investment incentive schemes—include VAT exemption, 
customs duty exemption, tax reduction, social security premium support both for 
employer’s and employee’s shares, income tax deductions, interest support, land 
allocation, and VAT refunds (Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], 19 June 2012, Article 4). 
This new investment system divides Turkey into six regions according to the socio-
economic development index. Private investment for the least developed provinces, 
especially those of the Sixth Region, which mostly cover Turkish Kurdistan, is 
encouraged. The decree also introduced “specific priority investments” in which 
investors are encouraged without the state stipulating which specific region they will 
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invest in. The priority investment sectors include high value added sectors such as 
automotive, pharmaceuticals, space, and defence industries, as well as transportation, 
mining, tourism, and education. In order to reduce the dependency of Turkish industry 
on imports and increase international competitiveness, strategic investment and large-
scale incentive schemes promote high tech and high value added products (Republic of 
Turkey, Ministry of Economy, n.d.).  
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Concluding Observations  
Throughout this thesis, Bonapartism has been used as an analytical tool to conceptualise 
the Kemalist state. As a product of precarious circumstances and a political crisis, 
Bonapartism is an exceptional form of the capitalist state whereby the state secures the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations. Distinctively, in Bonapartist political regimes, 
real power does not rest with the political representatives of the dominant classes, but 
with the executive apparatus of the state. It has been shown that Bonapartism 
recapitulated and institutionalised itself after the passing of a “national hero” in relation 
to circumstances and existing class relations. In this context, it is suggested that the 
Kemalist regime safeguarded the conditions of capital accumulation and created the 
conditions for the growth of Turkish bourgeoisie, which was too weak to consolidate its 
political hegemony. Nevertheless, as this thesis has shown, the Kemalist state’s 
economic pillar started to slowly crumble after the transition to export-led capitalism 
eroded national developmentalism. In this transition, the military dictatorship of 1980-
1983 played an instrumental role. 
This study has suggested that the AKP has represented a departure from its 
predecessors by successfully uniting the general interests of the “devout bourgeoisie” 
with those of the big bourgeoisie for civilianisation of the political power apparatus. 
The political trajectory of Necmettin Erbakan’s successive Islamic fundamentalist 
parties, on the other hand, had been successful only in representing the interests of the 
peripheral capitalists. Therefore, the central argument of this study is that the mutation 
of Islamic politics in Turkey was instrumental in achieving the severance of military 
control from parliamentary power. In other words, the AKP used the mutation of 
Islamic politics as a means to neutralise the military by co-opting the liberals and 
entering into an alliance with the Islamic community of Fethullah Gülen, which had a 
strong presence in the judiciary and the police force. By doing this, the AKP waged a 
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democratic struggle to vest power in the elected parliament and carry the democratic 
transition until 2010/2011. However, once the AKP to a large extent presided over the 
military in 2010/2011, it did not refrain from centralising political power in its hands, 
thereby drifting to authoritarianism and losing its integral hegemony over society.  
With respect to foreign policy, it has been shown that in relation to the 
transformation of the Turkish economy after the 1980s and the demise of the Kemalist 
state, the AKP has found a fertile ground to realign Turkish foreign policy under the 
doctrine of neo-Ottomanism. Neo-Ottomanism has been an ideological anchor of 
Turkish capitalism since the 1980s when Turkey's regional economic power 
complemented its political-military capacity and power. The expansion of Turkish 
capitalism into Middle Eastern countries mobilised a mild form of pan-Islamic ideology 
and a policy of “zero-problem with neighbours” by recognising the Ottoman legacy. 
However, neo-Ottomanist expansionary policy has encountered a sectarian rift in 
Turkish foreign policy owing to two political developments: the mutation of the Syrian 
uprising into a civil war and Turkey’s domestic political instability, which peaked with 
the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013. These political developments will be briefly 
sketched here due to their ongoing conjuncture.  
The revolutionary process in the Arab world in 2011 presented Erdoğan with a 
ripe opportunity to further implement his neo-Ottomanist expansionary foreign policy. 
At the initial stage of the Arab revolutionary process, he was praised in the Arab world 
when on 2 February 2011 he called for Mubarak’s resignation—the first leader to do so 
(Edelman et al., 2013, pp.71-72). This was an important step, along with two events that 
popularised Erdoğan in the Arab world: his condemnation of Israeli President Shimon 
Peres in the Davos Summit for conducting a war in Gaza in 2008-2009; and the raiding 
of the Mavi Marmara flotilla by Israeli naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea in May 
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2010 after it tried to break the Israeli blockage of Gaza, which created a major crisis 
between Turkey and Israel (Samaan, 2013). Erdoğan’s Cairo visit in September 2011 
was also welcomed in the Arab world, during which he promoted the Turkish model of 
secularism to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Edelman et al., 2013, p.72). His pro-
Muslim Brotherhood policy continued after the election of the Brotherhood candidate, 
Mohamed Morsi, as Egyptian president in June 2012. Turkey pledged in September 
2012 to provide Egypt with a $2 billion financial package to assist the Egyptian 
economy (Edelman et al., 2013, p.72). Qatar also pledged $2 billion to finance the 
Egyptian budget deficit and invested an $18 billion in tourism and industrial projects 
(Werr, 2012). In this context, Turkey’s interests converged with those of Qatar, which 
financed the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic fundamentalist forces in the wake of the 
Arab uprising (Ulrichsen, 2014; Steinberg, 2012; Achcar, 2013a),128 based on a neo-
Ottoman, pan-Islamic view that the Muslim Brotherhood would prevail in the post-
revolutionary process.  
Turkey’s pro-Muslim Brotherhood policy was not limited to Egypt. In 2012 
Turkey accommodated and then gave a residence permit to former Iraqi Vice President 
Tariq Al-Hashimi from the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood when the Shiite-dominated Nouri Maliki government issued an arrest 
warrant for him in December 2011 (Yezdani, 2012). In addition, Tawakkul Karman, 
who represents the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al-Islah, the reformist wing of 
the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood) (Jacob, 2011), was granted Turkish citizenship in 
October 2012 (Hürriyet Daily News, 12 October 2012). With respect to Syria, Turkey 
initially pursued a dual role. On the one hand it used diplomacy to push Assad to make 
                                                          
128 Qatar under Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, who came to power with a palace coup in 1995, had 
capitalised on the break-up of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi Kingdom, 
which permitted US troops to station on its soil in the first Gulf War in 1991 (Achcar, 2013a, pp.125-
128). 
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some political reforms at the initial stage of the uprising. On the other hand, it helped 
Syrian opposition organise in Turkey (Ayata, 2015, pp.102-103). When Assad refused 
to make political reforms, Turkey suspended its diplomatic relations with Syria that 
September and staunchly pursued a policy of “regime change” (Ayata, 2015, p.103). 
For this aim, Turkey hosted the establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in 
İstanbul in August 2011 (Al Arabiya News, 23 August 2011), an umbrella organisation 
that brings together various opposition forces but is dominated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2013). When in November 2012 the US 
dismissed the SNC for not adequately representing the Syrian opposition and urged the 
inclusion of more Syrian opposition forces, a new body called the “National Coalition 
of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces” replaced the SNC, crystallising the 
divergent views between Turkey and the US (Edelman et al., 2013, p.42). Turkey 
responded in December 2012 by facilitating a meeting that unified the command 
structure within the Free Syrian Army known as the “Supreme Military Council 
Command of Syria” under General Salim Idriss (MacFarquhar & Saad, 2012b; O’Bagy, 
2013, p.16). 
However, when the Syrian uprising turned into “a full-scale civil war” in 2012 
(Achcar, 2013a, p.224) this impacted on Turkish foreign policy, which became 
increasingly shaped by sectarian calculations (Edelman et al., 2013, p.46).129 When 
Lebanon’s Shiite Hezbollah joined the war in Syria in support of Assad in 2013, Deputy 
                                                          
129 The rebel forces were not equipped with sophisticated and advanced weapons such as anti-aircraft and 
anti-tank missiles, since it was feared that these could be captured by the jihadists (MacFarquhar & Saad, 
2012a; Achcar, 2013, p.226; Gordon, 2013). However, US Secretary of State John Kerry did commit to 
sending non-lethal aid to the council in February 2013 (O’Bagy, 2013, p.9). Consequently, the 
prolongation of civil war in Syria and the ill-equipped nature of the rebel forces vis-à-vis the regime 
forces (backed by Russia and Iran) led to the growth of jihadists and deepening of sectarianism 
(MacFarquhar & Saad, 2012a; Achcar, 2013a, pp.225-227). On the other hand, sectarianism was also 
instrumentalised by the Bahraini and Saudi ruling families to prevent broad-based and cross-sectarian 
opposition movements, to maintain their political survival, to confront Iran, and to mobilise the Sunnis 
against Assad in Syria and against Iran (Matthiesen, 2013). 
 
 320 
Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ ridiculed Hezbollah (meaning the Party of God) by saying 
that it should change its name to the Party of Satan (Today’s Zaman, 26 May 2013; 
Taştekin, 2013). Interestingly enough, when Israel attacked Hezbollah in Syrian Golan 
Heights in January 2015, Turkey remained silent and did not criticise Israel, showing 
that Turkey prioritises an anti-Assad stance over anti-Israel rhetoric (Tremblay, 2015). 
This anti-Assad stance and sectarian rift in Turkish foreign policy was followed by 
allegations that Turkey supported the fundamentalist Ahfad al-Rasoul (Grandsons of the 
Prophet) Brigade against Kurdish militias in northern Syria in November 2012 (al-
Shishani, 2013). In interviews with the representatives of Islamic fundamentalist forces 
in Syria, such as Ahrar ash-Sham (Free Men of the Levant) and Jabbat al-Islamiyya 
(the Islamic Front), these forces all warmly praised the Turkish “humanitarian aid” and 
“hospitality” (Çiçek, 2013 & 2014). It has also been alleged that the Islamic coalition 
under Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest), which includes the al-Nusra Front, was 
supported by Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in the capture from regime forces of the 
northern Syrian city of Idlib in March 2015 (Hassan, 2015; Özkan, 2015). The fall of 
the city to Islamic forces was praised by the pro-AKP media as the “big victory of the 
Syrian opposition” (Sabah, 28 March 2015). Furthermore, in a sign of sectarian 
calculation, Turkey allied with the Sunni bloc, which included most of the Gulf 
countries along with Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, and Jordan, in order to undermine the 
Iranian influence in the Gulf region and in Yemen particularly. President Erdoğan 
reassured Saudi Arabia of Turkey’s political and possible logistical support to the 
Saudi-led airstrikes against the Shiite-oriented Houthi movement in Yemen and 
denounced Iran for pursuing a sectarian role in the region (France 24, 27 March 2015). 
Nevertheless, the sectarian rift in Turkish foreign policy did not lead to a break 
in Turkish-Iranian relations, since Turkey’s attitude towards its neighbour has many 
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layers. On one hand, it is clear that Turkey and Iran have prioritised contradictory 
interests with regards the preservation of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (Ayman, 2014, p.18). 
On the other hand, the establishment of self-rule in Syrian Kurdistan, known as Rojava, 
led to a rapprochement between Turkey and Iran in terms of security cooperation, since 
both countries perceive the possibility of a Kurdish conflict in their territories as a 
national security threat (Lawson, 2014, pp.1354-1358). In addition, both countries have 
an interest in energy cooperation. While Turkish capitalism very much depends on 
secure access to the oil and the natural gas deposits of Iran, Iran needs a transit country 
like Turkey in order to reach the European market (Bahgat, 2014, p.121).    
On that point, it should be added that the sectarian shift and increasing 
deterioration of relations with Syria also has a domestic dimension. When two car 
bombs exploded in the town of Reyhanlı, in Hatay province on the border with Syria in 
May 2013, Erdoğan did not refrain from emphasising the sectarian affiliations of those 
who died. He expressed his condolences for 53 "Sunni" citizens and charged the CHP 
with having links with Assad (Radikal, 14 June 2013). This only exacerbated the 
sectarian tension in Turkey. Three months earlier in February 2013 Erdoğan had 
remarked that cemevleri, places of worship for the Alevis, who make up an estimated 
10% to 20% of the population in Turkey (Çarkoğlu & Bilgili, 2011, p.353), are nothing 
but cultural centres, since Islam dictates that the mosque is the only place of worship 
(Radikal, 22 February 2013). When a complex that would combine side-by-side a 
mosque and a cemevi was inaugurated in an Alevi neighbourhood of Tuzluçayır, in 
Ankara in September 2013 (Bayram & Tercanlı, 2013), some Alevi organisations raised 
concerns that this project was aimed at making the cemevi an auxiliary establishment of 
a mosque (Tremblay, 2013). Worryingly, sectarian tension focused on residency. A 
2012 law (Law No 6360) concerning the establishment of new municipalities split the 
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Antakya municipality in Hatay province in two, along religious and ethnic lines (Letsch, 
2013). The Alawite neighbourhoods brought together under a new local municipality, 
"Defne", and cut off from the more developed municipality "Antakya", a demarcation 
referred to by residents as "the Berlin Wall" (Letsch, 2013).  
Importantly, the sectarian turn in Turkish foreign policy was boosted following 
the Gezi Park protests of summer 2013. When a neoliberal urban renewal project aimed 
to demolish Gezi Park, the only green public space in Taksim, to construct an Ottoman-
style barracks and a shopping mall, nation-wide protests erupted in May 2013. The Gezi 
protesters mostly raised political demands against the authoritarian and conservative 
moves of the AKP and challenged the commercialisation of a public space (Yörük & 
Yüksel, 2014, pp.122-123). However, the government and its supporters attempted to 
link the Gezi protests with the Alevi community (Karakaya-Stump, 2014). It was stated 
that 78% of those who were taken into custody during the protests were Alevis, 
according a police report (Şardan, 2013). On the other hand, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
demonised the CHP with allegations of provocation and attempts to mobilise the Alevis 
for the protests (Hürriyet, 26 June 2013). Pro-government newspapers speculated about 
a possible Alevi revolt in August 2013 (Kütahyalı, 2013). Even the corruption scandal 
on 17 December 2013, which resulted in the arrest of sons of three AKP ministers with 
key figures in the party circle, was depicted by the pro-AKP media as an extension of 
the Gezi protests (Karagül, 2015).  
Yet, the sectarian calculations in foreign policy and the authoritarian drift of 
Erdoğan, if not of the AKP itself, suffered a setback in the 2015 parliamentary elections 
with the success achieved by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi, HDP). The HDP crossed the 10% electoral barrier and acquired more than six 
million votes. As an umbrella party of the Kurdish people, environmentalists, feminists, 
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Alevis, and the LGBT community, the HDP has implemented an electoral strategy 
against the concentration of power in the hands of Erdoğan while it has embraced a 
radical democratic programme that transcends formal democratisation and calls for a 
substantial democratisation. It also challenges the commercialisation of education, 
health, and more broadly daily life (HDP, n.d.). This challenge was crucial in two 
aspects. First, the victory of the HDP initially ended the thirteen-year single-party 
dominance of the AKP, thereby temporarily killing the presidential project of Erdoğan. 
Second, the rise of the HDP, along with the party programme, still carries the potential 
to reinvigorate left-wing politics in Turkey and challenge neoliberalism. However, the 
failure of the coalition talks between the AKP and the CHP, and then, between the AKP 
and the MHP, led Turkey to hold an early general election on 1 November 2015.The 
AKP won a landslide victory, receiving almost 50% of all votes against the backdrop of 
renewed war with the Kurds. Thus, the immediate future of the AKP will be contingent 
upon its handling of the Kurdish issue, which has already been shown to be its Achilles’ 
heel, and simultaneously upon the AKP’s ability to remain united despite the 
contradictions that have been developing within the party. Under these circumstances, 
whether Turkey will be back on the rails of democratisation or continue on the same 
track of authoritarianism remains an open question.  
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